« AnteriorContinuar »
doubts the validity of a lease granted under a power such ground, but were entirely of a contrary description. given immediately to the guardians of the infant pos- / For, in Browne v. Houghton, the fund was not given sessor for the time being under an entail? or whether a
the time being under an entail 2 or whether indefinitely to the first possessor of the estate who should title is rejected which depends upon a power of sale
attain twenty-one, but was directed to be from time to
time laid out in purchases of real estate, to be settled to exerciseable by trustees, without consent or other re- the like uses as the estates devised. Was there any striction, and collateral to a strict settlement? The invalid suspense in the vesting of the fund here? 0banswer is, certainly not. But the addition to the an- viously not; for otherwise the very limitations of the swer is,-none of such powers attempt to affect the estate themselves must have been too remote and void. vesting of the estate. The one merely purports to
The limitations being valid, the trusts of the accumula
tions, which are referential thereto, must be valid also. carve out of it a limited interest consistent with the
It follows, consequently, that the only ground for imtitle of the owner; and the other to change the quality peaching the validity of the accumulation clause was of the estate. But neither power, as we have observed, the indefiniteness of the events contemplated by it. attempts to prevent its vesting, or the enjoyment of its Clearly, this would have been a sufficient objection, fruits. If, indeed, a power of sale during minorities unless met by some other circumstance arising upon the
will. Such a safeguard, I assert, was, in fact, supplied were given, with a direction that the produce of the
by the circumstance, that the clause (inasmuch as it sale should be held in trust, and accumulated, and to
did not override the estates tail) was destructible ab vest only in the first person, who would have been initio. And hence arises the clear distinction between tenant in tail of the land, and have attained twenty- the two cases; there being no power of destroying the one; that, indeed, would, we apprehend, be a power trust for accumulation in Southampton v. Hertford, be constructed on the same principle as the trust in cause the term which secured the trust preceded the Browne v. Houghton, and bad. But it appears to us
estates tail, and was, therefore, placed beyond all posthat it is quite an inaccurate reasoning, which confounds conferred by the settlement.
sibility of annihilation, so far as regarded the powers powers or trusts annexed to a series of limitations in I have assumed, for argument's sake, the correctness tail, and consistent with the vesting and enjoyment of of your correspondent's premises, deeming it sufficient the estate, with powers or trusts that cannot take effect | to prove, that, even upon his own shewing, the concluwithout absorbing, and withholding from the owner in
the owner in sion is untenable. But I beg to observe, that, to my
mind, every part of his argument is open to equal, if whom the estate has vested, the enjoyment of the rents
not graver objection, as wholly at variance with settled of that estate.
principles of law. But, Sir, there is neither time nor It is to be observed, moreover, that it is not, in space for the discussion of abstract points. reality, correct to say that the trusts in Browne v. Let me only further observe, that the decision in Houghton follow the estate tail, and are, therefore, de
Browne v. Houghton, if correct, completely upsets ninestructible ab initio.
tenths of the settlements and wills of realty which have That may be true of the second,
| been prepared in Lincoln's Inn within twenty years third, and others of the series of trusts; but it is not past. Not only is the clause of accumulation in questrue of the first trust, which, in fact, does of necessity tion the usual one in these cases, but various other proprecede and overrule the first estate of inheritance, if it visions forming part of the machinery of strict settlehas any existence at all; since it is limited not to ments are, with that clause, either valid or invalid, as
Thus, the usual cease till the period when the first tenant in tail | standing upon the same footing.
name-and-arms clause, and that for shifting particular shall have power to bar the entail. How can the
estates upon the accession of others,-nay, even the or power of the tenant in tail to bar all remainders and dinary powers of leasing, sale, and exchange,-must limitations in defeasance of his estate be called in stand or fall with the clause of accumulation in Brown aid to shew that an accumulation is good, which would v. Houghton. Every one of these provisions, in their only be good, if he could stop it, before, by the very
ordinary terms, extends and applies to all the succes terms of the trust and the very nature of his own es
sors to the estates, without limit or restriction. I am
aware, that sometimes the powers have been confined to tate, he has any power to stop it ? Clearly, such a trust
tenants in tail entitled by purchase, but the restriction is precedent in fact, wherever the proviso that creates is an antiquated remnant of timid and obscure notions. it may be placed in the instrument.
Let this be the test, does any one ever see, at the present day, shifting clauses engrafted upon strict settlementsex
pressly limited to the period of lives in being, and twentyCorrespondence.
one years? Does any one doubt the validity of a lease
granted under a power given indefinitely to the guarTHE CASE OF BROWNE v. HOUGHTON. dians of the infant possessor for the time being, under (10 Jur., Part 1, p. 747).
an entail ? Is a title rejected which depends upon &
power of sale exercisable by trustees, without consent TO THE EDITOR OF "THE JURIST."
or other restriction, and collateral to a strict settleSir,Were it not disrespectful towards your corre- ment ? And wherein consists the distinction, in point spondent C.S.D., I should simply observe, in reference of principle and substance, between a proviso for accuto his argument contained in your Number for Satur-mulation of rents during minorities (with a view to the day last, that it furnishes its own answer.
purchase of other estates) and a proviso entirely shiftC. S. D. states, that Southampton v. Hertford and ing the property from the parties entitled u Browne v. Houghton are “in perfect harmony with each tlement, at any time, upon the happening of a given other," on the ground that the true principle of both event? Clearly, all these portions of settlements and decisions was, that the desting of the accumulated fund wills are good or bad together; and that they are valid was intended to be suspended for an indefinite period. there can be no doubt, upon the simple and sufficient I admit this most readily, as regards Southampton v. ground of their being (as an incident of their very ex. Hertford, but as respects Browne v. Houghton, it is istence) capable of destruction. strange your correspondent has not observed, that the It is lamentable, Sir, to witness this warfare against circumstances of that case not only failed to supply any methods and schemes of settlement, long sanctioned by
experienced minds eminently conversant with the sub- scended from the lineal male ancestor entirely through ject, and upon which almost all the family arrangements males, though they be not heirs general. Doe d. Angelb in the country may be said to rest for validity and effi- v. Angell, 15 Law J. 193—Q. B. ciency. We have already had one impeachment of con- Executory Devise and Bequest. Where a testator veyancing law, (Brown v. Bamford), which completely devises real and personal estate to his daughter, who is unsettled settlements until the late prudent Chancellor his heiress-at-law and next of kin, and her heirs and came to the rescue, and affirmed the separate use clauses. assigns for ever, “ provided she at a proper time inAnd now we are told that the other common forms in termarries and shall have no children, then and in our settlements will not hold water. Alas! Sir, after all that case" over; “ but nevertheless, providing she shall the legislative and judicial innovations of these times, not have a child or children lawfully begotten in wedwhat intelligible remnant will there be of the law of lock,” he still” gives all his real and personal proreal property?
I am Sir,
perty to her, and for her own use during her life, and Your obedient servant, at her death to be equally divided between her children Lincoln's Inn, Oct. 26, 1846.
then living, their heirs and assigns, for ever, with benefit of survivorship, and a limitation over in case the
survivor shall die without issue; and the daughter A REPOSITORY OF POINTS IN EQUITY AND
does not marry, she becomes entitled to the fee simple CONVEYANCING,
in the real estate, and to the absolute interest in the Designed to combine the Advantages of an Abridgment of, personalty; but whether under the will, or as heiressand an Index to, the recent Cases, and of an original at-law and next of kin, it was not decided. Aspinall Statement of the Points established thereby.
V. Audus, 7 Man. & G.912. (Continued from p. 432).
Effect of a Charge in passing the Fee. 1-14 Mee. & W. 698. A statement of the point decided will be found
ante, p. 187.
Election between Dower and Freebench and an AnRight against the separate estate of a deceased Part- nuity. ]-Where a testator directs his trustees, out of his ner. Notwithstanding an order of the Court of Re- real and personal estate, to pay from time to time, but view for the consolidation of the estates of two firms, not by way of anticipation, a yearly sum to his wife and the receipt by a creditor, under that order, of a during widowhood, and, subject thereto, to apply the dividend out of the aggregate fund, he may, by a suit whole or any part of the income for the benefit of anin Chancery, establish his claim against the separate other person; and, in case of the death of that person estate of a deceased partner, to the extent of the balance under age, without issue, in his wife's lifetime, then to remaining due to him. Harris v. Farwell, 15 Law J. pay the said annuity to his wife for her life, for her 185-M. R.
separate use; and the testator empowers his trustees to Judgment Debt a Charge on an Annuity. ]-A judg
carry on his farming concerns, and to let or sell all or ment debt operates as a charge upon an annuity se
any part of the property; and the property is insufficured by an assignment of leaseholds, under the stat.
cient to raise the annuity in addition to her dower and 1 & 2 Vict. e. 110, s. 13. Harris v. Davison, 15 Law J.
13 Borrie v Davison 15 Law freebench; the widow must be put to her election be255V. C. E.
tween her dower and freebench and the annuity. See " Vendor and Purchaser," Case 4.
Lowes v. Lowes, 10 Jur. 453— V.C. W. DEED—See * Compromise,” « Construction.”
ELECTION-See “ Dower.”
ESTATE OR INTEREST (QUANTITY OF). To the male Heirs of a Person, and their male Heirs. 71 For Life only, and not in Tail.- Limitation over on not -Although it may be a rule, that, in order to take leaving Issue.]-Where a testator devises an estate to a under the description of heir male, a person must be person for life, and, from and after her decease, to her heir general and a male descended wholly through first child, and to his or her heirs and assigns, for ever; males, yet there may be such plain indications of a but, if such child shall depart this life under the age of contrary intention in the testator as to take the case twenty-one years, without leaving issue, then in like out of such a rule; so that, if a testator devises to the manner to the second, third, and every other child of male heirs, if such there be, of a lineal ancestor of his, the prior taker, regard being had to the seniority of age and their male heirs for ever, and if there be no male and priority of birth of such child and children, and to heirs or descendants of him, then to a person who is their severaland respective deaths underage, and without heir general to him through a female, and to his male issue; it being his will, that, in case of issue, such issue heirs for ever; and he directs that the males shall shall inherit the estate, and he thereby gives the same take place first, so long as there are any through any to him or her, and to his or her heirs accordingly; but descent; and it appears from the will, that the testator in case the prior taker shall die without leaving issue of knew the pedigree of the family up to the lineal an- her body, or, having issue, such issue shall die ander cestor above mentioned; a person descended from that the age of twenty-one years without leaving issue as ancestor entirely through males will be entitled in pre. aforesaid, then he devises the estate over; the prior ference to his heir general descended from him through taker has only a life estate, the word “issue” in the a female. For the testator, knowing the pedigree, must limitation over meaning “ children.” Goymour v. Pigge, be taken to have been aware that there was no person 7 Beav. 475. answering the description of heir male, in the strict Where Issue are to take by way of Substitution, and sense; and he could not mean “ the heir general, if a not of Succession or Limitation over; their Parents male,” becanse there is an express devise to such heir taking Absolute Intercsts. 7–Where a testator gives cergeneral in default of the male heirs or descendants of tain shares in an insurance office to his son for life, the lineal ancestor; and the words “ male heirs or de- and, after his decease, to his children; and, in default scendants” shew that he did not mean “ heirs” in the of such issue, to his daughters and their issue, share strict sense, and, together with the express preference and share alike, such issue not to be entitled to take of males, shew that he means those males who are de- more than their deceased parents' share; and the son dies in the lifetime of the daughters, without ever approve of a guardian for an infant, not withstanding having had any issue; the daughters take absolute in the infant, being fifteen years of age, has by deed apterests, their children being intended to take by way pointed a guardian for himself; and although it does of substitution, and not of succession or limitation over. not appear, and it is not suggested, that the guardian so Hedges v. Harper, 10 Jur. 578–M. R.
appointed is an unfit person. Coham v. Coham, 12 Sim. Parents and Children taking Life Interests in Succes- 639. sion, notwithstanding a Limitation over, in Default of issue of the Parents. ]-Where a testator gives each of his
HEIR-HEIRS. daughters an annuity during their lives, and after their “ Heir or Heirs," a Designatio Persona.] 14 Mee. & respective decease, he gives the same to their children W. 698. A statement of the point decided will be respectively, share and share alike; and, in case any of found, ante, p. 187 his daughters shall die without issue, then he directs
Limitation over to the Testator's own Heir, E.cecutor, or
Limitation mer to the Testatorie oom Hair Er such annuity to cease and fall into the residue of his | Administrator, after a Devise and Bequest to his sole estate; the daughters and their children only take life Issue and Hcir-at-law. 1_Where a testator devises and interests in succession. Id. 580.
bequeaths his real and personal estate upon trust for Parent taking the Absolute Interest, and not a Life In- a person who, at the date of the will and at the time terest, with Remainder to his Children. — Bequest to of the testator's decease, is his sole issue and heir-atHeirs of the Body-Limitation over of Personalty on law, and also next of kin; and, in case of his death Failure of Heirs. 1-Where a testator, after bequeathing under a certain age without issue, then upon trust for legacies to several sisters and a brother, wills, that, in his (the testator's) own heirs, executors, or administrathe event of either of the sisters dying without heirs, tors, such issue is entitled to the property, under the the sum so falling is to be equally divided between the limitation over, as beir-at-law and next of kin at the survivors, and, should it so happen that the whole death of the testator, and not the person or persons should die without heirs, the sum is ultimately to re- who would be heir-at-law and next of kin at the death vert to the estate of the family; but should all or any of the son; for the son might die in the testator's lifeof them die with heirs of the body, the sum of which time leaving children, or the testator might have other they severally die possessed is to be continued to their children living at his death. And the expression, “my heirs for ever, and not to revert to the estate; adding, own heirs,' might be used with the view of excluding that the sum left to his brother “ is his for ever;" the the heir on the maternal side. At all events, there is sisters take absolute interests, and not life interests, with not sufficient indication of an intention to benefit other remainder to their children. Brooks v. Lord Lake, 10 persons than the heir and next of kin, at the time of Jur. 485_V.C. E.
the testator's decease, to justify the court in departing
from the general rule. Wilkinson v. Garrett, 10 Jur. ESTOPPEL-See “ Admission.”
Whether there is a resulting Trust in his Favor.]EXECUTORS.
Where a testator devises all his freehold estates to his Improperly permitting Property to be enjoyed in Specie.] nephew (designating him in strong terms of commenda-Where trustees and executors, who are directed to tion) and his heirs and assigns, « upon the trusts and convert and invest the testator's property, allow it to be for the uses following," and then only limits an use of enjoyed in specie by the tenant for life, with his con- one of his estates, and directs certain sums to be paid currence, and, sometime after the death of the tenant out of those estates, and then declares that he leaves for life, they account for the value, and pay the his son unprovided for on account of his misconduct, amount into court, they must pay interest thereon, but by a codicil directs that his nephew, his heirs, exeat 4l. per cent., from the death of the tenant for life to cutors, or administrators, shall allow his son a certain the day of such payment. Mackenzie v. Taylor, 7 Beav. amount for his maintenance; adding a declaration of 467.
his determination that his son shall never enjoy any
part of his estate, and limiting over his estate from his FRAUD.
nephew, in case he shall give up any part of his estate Person in loco Parentis inducing a Child to do an act to his son; in such case the nephew takes beneficially; for his benefit.]-The court will interfere to prevent an the words “ upon the trusts and for the uses followact of bounty by a child to the parent or person standing ing” meaning nothing more than “ subject to the trusts in loco parentis, when, under the circumstances in and uses following;" and there is no resulting trust in which they are placed prior to what may be called a favor of the son and heir as to any part of the estates. complete emancipation of the child, the child is not in | Hughes v. Evans, 13 Sim. 496. such a position as will enable him to form an entirely Šee“ Construction,” Case 9, “ Estate." free and unfettered judgment. And if an act of bounty is done by a child to the parent or person standing in
HEIRS MALE—Sce“ Devise.” loco parentis just after the child attains the age of twenty-one years, and prior to such complete emanci
HEIRS OF THE BODY-See" Estate.” pation, without any benefit moving to the child, the presumption is, that an undue influence has been exer
INJUNCTION cised over the child; and it is incumbent upon the
to restrain Proceedings at Law to set aside an An. party who endeavours to maintain such a transaction,
con, nuity which had been treated as valid in a Chancery to slew that that presumption is adequately rebutted. So is adequately rebutted. Suit.
where the crantoro
Where the grantor of an annuity admitted, And hence, where a female orphan who has all along l in his answer to a Will in Chancery, that the anresided with her uncle, joins with him in a promissory note for his debt, two months after attaining her ma
| nuity was a subsisting charge on his estates, and the
decree and proceedings in the suit during a great jority, while she is still resident at his house, and with
number of years have treated the annuity as valid, out having any friend to consult, the court will set
and a large sum of money has been paid on the faith aside the transaction, Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551.
of the admission of the grantor, the grantor's de
visee will be restrained from proceeding at law to set GUARDIAN
aside the annuity as invalid, on the ground that no appointed by the Court, although the Ward had ap- memorial of it was inrolled, pursuant to the stat. 17 pointed one. The court will refer it to the Master to l Geo. 3, c. 26, and that the estates were not of greater
annual value than the annuity. Roberts v. Madocks,
Court Papers. 13 Sim. 549. See “ Railway," " Trusts."
EQUITY CAUSE LISTS, MICHAELMAS TERM,
1846. Issue-See “ Estate,” « Survivorship.”
*** The following abbreviations have been adopted to
abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occuINSOLVENCY—See“ Alienation."
pied: A. Abated—Adj. Adjourned--A. T. After Term-Ap.
Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-C. Costs—D. Demurrer-E. Ex. JOINTURE.
ceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro Apportionment of a Jointure on an Estate devised to the Confesso-Pl. Plea-Ptn. Petition-R. Re-hearing—S. O. Widou, and on a descended Estate. - Where the owner | Stand Over-Sh. Short. of two estates covenants in his marriage settlement to
Court of Chancery. convey so much of them as shall be of a certain annual
Before the LORD CHANCELLOR. value for his wife's jointure, and, by his will, after con
APPEALS. firming the settlement, devises both estates to his wife
| Wrightson o. Macauley (Ap)
Strickland v. Strick-7 (Ap) | Gompertz v. Gompertz (3 for life, and then executes a deed, which has the effect
Day causes, Ap) of revoking his will as to one estate, which conse
Ditto v. Boynton | to be Morris v. Howes Land quently descends to his heir-at-law, and he dies with- Ditto v. Strickland J fixed. I Horsman v. Abbey (AP) out having made any conveyance by way of jointure Vandeleur v. Blagrave (Ap)*** Thomas v. Blackman (Ap) pursuant to the covenant; in such case, the jointure Coore v. Lowndes (Ap) To fix Bonds o. Slyman (Ap) being originally a charge upon both estates, and the a day
Cooper v. Pitcher (Ap) testator not intending that the will should be a satisfac- Minor 7. Minor (2 Ap) 7 To Salkeld v. Johnson (on eq. re.) tion of the jointure, the jointure remains, as it origin- Ditto v. Ditto (Suppl. fix a Booth v. Creswicke (Ap) ally was, a charge on both estates, and therefore mus suit)
J day Forbes v. Leeming (Ap) be apportioned rateably on the estate, which passes to
Dalton o. Hayter (Ap) To fix Andrews v. Lockwood (Ap) the widow under the will, and upon the descende
Stocken v. Dawson (4 ca., Ap)
Att.-General 0. Masters and | Watts v. Hyde (Ap) estate. Eyre v. Green, 10 Jur. 384—V.C. B.
Wardens, &c. of the City of Walford v. Adie (Ap)
Bristol (Ap) To fix a day Morison o. Morison (Ap) JUSTICE.
Black v. Chaytor (Ap) s Ő Eyre v. Green (Ap) Principles connected with the Administration of Jus Johnson v. Reynolds (F D by Davis v. Chanter (Ap) tice. See “ Award.” “ Compromise.”
Ansley v. Cotton (Ap)
Carmichael 7. Carmichael (Ap) Macmahon v. Burchell (Ap) LEASE-See“ Construction,” Case 4; “ Vendor and Pur
Hawkes v. Howell (Ap) Duke of Leeds v. Earl Am. chaser,” Case 10.
Heming v. Swinnerton (Ap) herst (Ap)
Att.-Gen. 0. Mayor, &c. of
Youde v. Jones (Ap) A
Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Ap) Apportionment of Fines for Renewal.]—Where free Lawrence v. Bowle (Cause by Prendergast 0. Lushington holds and leaseholds for lives or years are devised to a order)
(Ap) person for life, with a direction to pay the fines and other expenses of renewing the leaseholds out of the Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND. rents and profits, or by mortgage of the leaseholds, or PlEAS, DEMURRERS, CAUSES, AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS. by such other ways and means as shall be advisable,
Moore v. Mitchell (2 D) SO | Hodgkinson v. Barrow (FD,C) there, if the trustees do not take upon themselves to
Button v. Simpson (D, part Colbourn v. Coling exercise the discretion given them by the will, but the heard)
Hickson v. Smith (at deft. Court is called upon to decide how the burthen of re
request) newal is to be borne, the Court will impose it upon the Baldwin v. Damer (D)
Palmer v. Pattison (F D, C) parties in the proportion of their actual enjoyment of Finden v. Stephens (D) Lee v. Ryle (F D, C) . the estate. And, in order to accomplish this, where the The Co. of Proprietors of the Minter v. Wraith (FD, cause) tenant for life has not taken upon himself to renew, Grand Junction Canal 0. Hemming v. Spiers (E) but the trustees have paid the expenses of renewal out
Chambers o. Waters (É) of rents accumulated during the minority of the tenant
Bower v. Scott (Re-hearing) Smith v. Robinson
Walker v. Watkin (by order) Foster v. Vernon (F D, C) for life, the court will direct the tenant for life to keep
Parker 0. Day
Vale v. Sherwood (7 causes, F down the interest, and to give security for the payment
Ditto v. Goude
D, C) of a part of the principal proportionate to the estimated
Johnson o. Forrester (F D) Haffenden v. Wood (E) value of his interest, without prejudice to the question,
Terry u. Wacher
Branscomb v. Branscombe (F whether he may or may not be liable, according to the Simpson o. Holt (F D, C) D, C) eventual duration of his life, to less or more than the Garrod v. Moor
Stammers o. Halliby (3 ca., ) sum for which security is given, and to the consequent Smale v. Bickford (2 causes) FD) question, whether he is to have a lien on the estate for Peacock v. Kernot
Ditto v. Battye (by order) what he may have overpaid, or must give further se Morrison v. Watkins
Gray v. Gray (3 causes, F D) curity. Jones v. Jones, 10 Jur. 516_V.C. W. Wright v. Barnewell (E,FD) | Dorville v. Wolf (F D, C) (To be continued).
Greenway v. Buchanan Richards o. Patterson (F D, C)
Adlam v. Barham (2 causes)
Dobson v. Lyle (F D, C) Beatson o. Beatson . MASTERS IN CHANCERY.The Lord Chancellor has | Parker v. Hawkes (E) Woodman v. Madgen (FD, C) appointed the following gentlemen Masters Extraordi
Davison v. Bagley
Attorney-Gen. o. Pearson (E, nary in the high Court of Chancery :-John Penrice
Giffard v. Withington
FD) Bell, of Cheltenham, Gloucestershire; Walter Henry
Daniel v. Hill
Dawson v. Chappell (F D, C)
Insole v. Featherstonhaugh Wait v. Horton (F D, C) Moore, of Woodbridge, Suffolk.
Lane o. Durant (E, F D) Montague v. Cator (F D, cau.) The Queen has been pleased to grant unto Thomas;
Pocock v. Johnson
Groom o. Stinton (4 causes) Coxhead Marsh, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister
Cope v. Lewis
Corbett v. Limbrick (F D, C) at Law, her royal license and authority to take and use Evans v. Hunter
Baxter v. Abbott (F D, C) the surname of Chisenhale, in addition to and before Attorney-Gen. v. Trevelyan | De Beauvoir o. De Beauvoir that of Marsh.
Stert u. Cooke
(F D, C)
Beale v. Warder (Re-hearing) | White v. Briggs (E, 3 sets, F |
Before the Vice-Chancellor WIGRAM. Turner v. Simcock (F D, C) 1 D)
CAUSES, FURTHER DIRECTIONS, AND EXCEPTIONS.
Hunter v. Macklew (Objection | Dobson v. Land
as to parties)
Winter v. Winter (F D, C) Howell v. Saer Warde v. Hill
Lowes 0. Lowes (F D, C) TO Coates u. Hammond (2 causes) Attorney-Gen. v. East India Damer v. Portarlington (2 ca.) fix a day
Shuttleworth o. Bengough (2 Co., after Term
Greenbam v. Greenham (F D, Sayers o. Lacon (FD, pt. hd.) causes)
Champion v. Banks
East India Co.o. Coopers' Co., Worley v. Frampton (E,FD) D) Burrow v. Hardey (F D, C) after Term
Dawes o. Betts Morgan v. Kingdon (F D, C) Finch v. Secker
| Campbell 0. London and Wood o. Rowcliffe Lewis v. Hinton (F D, C) Crommetin v. Earl of Belfast Brighton Railway Co. (part Attorney-Gen, v. Lucas (E) Wilson v. Williams Cholmondeley v. Cholmonde
Stinton o. Taylor Robotham v. Amphlett (E) ley (F D, C)
Blair v. Bromley
Beach o. Beach (F D, C) Poole v. Troughton
Henson v. Blackwell (F D,C) Duncombe v. Levy Cotgreave v. Cotgreave Ellison o. Clark Middleton o. Elliot (F D, C) Fraser v. Jones
Moss v. Leigha les Bailiff, &c. of Bridgnorth o. | Hemming v. Dingwall
Leigh o. Earl Balcarras Ditto v. Whitley)
Lake . Stewart
Bostock o. Shaw
Blundell o. Mills Frant o. Deffell (Cause, Ptn) Hyde v. Neate (E)
Emerson o. Emerson
Methold v. Turner Birch v. Joy (F D, C). Hall v. Hugonin (F D, C)
Hammon v. Sedgwick
Dean v. Hickenbotham Tarte v. Phillips Milne o. Loe (F D, C)
Warner v. Hodgson (2 causes) Whitlow o. Dilworth (2 cans.)
Routledge o. Gibson
Pennington o. Buckley Bachelor (pauper) v. Middleton Mayor, &c. of Rochester v. Lee Langston v. Cozens (F D, C)
Tapperell v. Taylor
Payne o. Coles
Parks v. Odill (2 causes) Letts •. The London and Pennyfather v. Pennyfather (2 Webb v. Enticknop (F D, C)
Carlisle u. Elliott
Blackwall Railway Co. causes) Kortright v. Maqueen (F D, Handford v. Hanford
The London and Blackwall Radcliffe v. Readett
Maxwell v. Kibblethwaite (2 Railway Co. v. Letts Lufkins o. Lufkins (F D, C) Hanmer v. Hanmer (F D, C,
Chase v. Morris (F D, C) Hollis v. Bryant (2 causes) cause)
Porter o. Porter
Crockett v. Crockett (F D, C, Nightingale o. Goulbourn (F| Levesey v. Leicester (F D)
Scott o. Bealey
Stephenson o. Everatt(FD,C) Williams v. Jones (F D, C) Myers v. Macdonald (2 causes)
Tolson v. Dykes (3 causes) Tyler v. Lea (F D, C) Howard v. Kirk Wilson v. Wilson, (È, 2 sets) Ogle o. Hansard
Pringle v. Smith
Knight v. Knight (E, 2 sets) Justice v. Langster
Marsh o. Kingdom
Raby v. Ridehalgh
De Sola v. Mesnard
COMMON-LAW CAUSE LISTS, MICHAELMAS
Court of Queen's Bench.
CROWN PAPER, MICHAELMAS TERM, 1846. Cooper v. Scott (D) Ballard v. Bateman
For Saturday, Nov. 7.
England...... Ryalls o. Reg. (in error).
Middlesex .... Reg. v. London, Westminster, and Vauxhall
Iron Steamboat Co. Dodsworth v. Lord Kinnaird Tompsett v. Wickens
Inhabitants of Watford, Herts. (at deft. request)
Stewart o. Bushby (F D, C) Buckinghamsh. - Inhabitants of Little Marlow. Ditto v. Ditto Bright v. Clark
- Inhabitants of Crondall, Hants. Taylor o. Taylor Beard v. Mottam
Cornwall..... - Inhabitants of Mylor. Malins v. Price
Milne v. Bamford (F D, C) England...... - Commissioners of Stamps and Tares.
London ...... Wright o. Reg. (in error).
Dorsetshire. Reg. o. Church wardens of Anderson.
Churchwards. of Holme St. Cuthbert. Massey 1). Johnson Grayson v. Deakin
Westbrook & ors. Hulbert v. Hulbert
Hodgson v. Shaw (F D, C) Carnarvonshire Churchwardens, &c. of Bangor. Sowerby v. Pontop Rail-7 Weston v. Radford
Inhabitants of St. Anne, Westminster, way Co. Dunston v. Paterson (F D, C) Same
Same. Ditto v. Ditto
J Quarrill v. Binmore (F D, C) Worcestershire Inhabitants of St. Peter, Droitwich.
Inhabitants of East Stonehouse. Taylor o. Cooper Roakes v. Manser (2 causes) Same........
Inhabs. of Widecomb-in-the-Moor. Wilson v. Parker Wright v. Taylor (È D, C)'
South-eastern Railway Company. Twemlow v. Bullock (E) Sanford o. Sanford (FD, C) Ely ....... ..
Inhabitants of Mendham. Pascoe v. Sanders (2 causes) Kershaw v. Clegg (F D, C) Lancashire....
Inhabitants of Blackburn. Woodward v. Miller (FDC) | Geare v. Norton
Carnarvonshire Churchwardens of Bangor (orders).
Warwickshire - Council of the borough of Birmingham. Beach v. Rowley
Wroughton o. Colquhoun (F Yorkshire .... Inhabitants of Marton-cum-Grafton. Francis v. Francis (2 causes) D, C)
Inhabitants of Landkey. Edwards v. Browne (F D, C) Newenham v. Pemberton Buckinghamsh. Great Western Railway Company. Westwood v. Slater (FDC) Boultbee v. Collier
- Same. Cuming v. Slater (cause by } | Holmes v. Trappes
Lincolnshire .. - - Inhabitants of Clixby. order) Walworth v. Cartwright
| Bolton ......