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such ground, but were entirely of a contrary description. For, in Browne v. Houghton, the fund was not given indefinitely to the first possessor of the estate who should time laid out in purchases of real estate, to be settled to attain twenty-one, but was directed to be from time to the like uses as the estates devised. Was there any invalid suspense in the vesting of the fund here? Obviously not; for otherwise the very limitations of the estate themselves must have been too remote and void. The limitations being valid, the trusts of the accumulaIt follows, consequently, that the only ground for imtions, which are referential thereto, must be valid also. peaching the validity of the accumulation clause was the indefiniteness of the events contemplated by it. Clearly, this would have been a sufficient objection, unless met by some other circumstance arising upon the will. Such a safeguard, I assert, was, in fact, supplied did not override the estates tail) was destructible ab by the circumstance, that the clause (inasmuch as it initio. And hence arises the clear distinction between

doubts the validity of a lease granted under a power given immediately to the guardians of the infant possessor for the time being under an entail? or whether a title is rejected which depends upon a power of sale exerciseable by trustees, without consent or other restriction, and collateral to a strict settlement? The answer is, certainly not. But the addition to the answer is,-none of such powers attempt to affect the vesting of the estate. The one merely purports to carve out of it a limited interest consistent with the title of the owner; and the other to change the quality of the estate. But neither power, as we have observed, attempts to prevent its vesting, or the enjoyment of its fruits. If, indeed, a power of sale during minorities were given, with a direction that the produce of the sale should be held in trust, and accumulated, and to vest only in the first person, who would have been tenant in tail of the land, and have attained twenty-the two cases; there being no power of destroying the one; that, indeed, would, we apprehend, be a power constructed on the same principle as the trusts in Browne v. Houghton, and bad. But it appears to us that it is quite an inaccurate reasoning, which confounds powers or trusts annexed to a series of limitations in tail, and consistent with the vesting and enjoyment of the estate, with powers or trusts that cannot take effect without absorbing, and withholding from the owner in whom the estate has vested, the enjoyment of the rents

of that estate.

trust for accumulation in Southampton v. Hertford, because the term which secured the trust preceded the estates tail, and was, therefore, placed beyond all possibility of annihilation, so far as regarded the powers conferred by the settlement.

I have assumed, for argument's sake, the correctness of your correspondent's premises, deeming it sufficient to prove, that, even upon his own shewing, the conclusion is untenable. But I beg to observe, that, to my not graver objection, as wholly at variance with settled mind, every part of his argument is open to equal, if principles of law. But, Sir, there is neither time nor space for the discussion of abstract points.

Let me only further observe, that the decision in

It is to be observed, moreover, that it is not, in reality, correct to say that the trusts in Browne v. Houghton follow the estate tail, and are, therefore, de-Browne v. Houghton, if correct, completely upsets ninestructible ab initio. That may be true of the second, third, and others of the series of trusts; but it is not true of the first trust, which, in fact, does of necessity precede and overrule the first estate of inheritance, if it has any existence at all; since it is limited not to cease till the period when the first tenant in tail shall have power to bar the entail. How can the power of the tenant in tail to bar all remainders and limitations in defeasance of his estate be called in aid to shew that an accumulation is good, which would only be good, if he could stop it, before, by the very terms of the trust and the very nature of his own estate, he has any power to stop it? Clearly, such a trust is precedent in fact, wherever the proviso that creates it may be placed in the instrument.

Correspondence.

THE CASE OF BROWNE v. HOUGHTON. (10 Jur., Part 1, p. 747).

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE JURIST." Sir,-Were it not disrespectful towards your correspondent C. S. D., I should simply observe, in reference to his argument contained in your Number for Saturday last, that it furnishes its own answer.

C. S. D. states, that Southampton v. Hertford and Browne v. Houghton are "in perfect harmony with each other," on the ground that the true principle of both decisions was, that the vesting of the accumulated fund was intended to be suspended for an indefinite period. I admit this most readily, as regards Southampton v. Hertford, but as respects Browne v. Houghton, it is strange your correspondent has not observed, that the circumstances of that case not only failed to supply any

been prepared in Lincoln's Inn within twenty years tenths of the settlements and wills of realty which have past. Not only is the clause of accumulation in question the usual one in these cases, but various other provisions forming part of the machinery of strict settlements are, with that clause, either valid or invalid, as standing upon the same footing. Thus, the usual estates upon the accession of others,-nay, even the or name-and-arms clause, and that for shifting particular dinary powers of leasing, sale, and exchange, must stand or fall with the clause of accumulation in Browne v. Houghton. Every one of these provisions, in their ordinary terms, extends and applies to all the successors to the estates, without limit or restriction. I am aware, that sometimes the powers have been confined to tenants in tail entitled by purchase, but the restriction is an antiquated remnant of timid and obscure notions. Let this be the test,-does any one ever see, at the present day, shifting clauses engrafted upon strict settlements expressly limited to the period of lives in being, and twentyone years? Does any one doubt the validity of a lease granted under a power given indefinitely to the guar dians of the infant possessor for the time being, under an entail? Is a title rejected which depends upon power of sale exercisable by trustees, without consent or other restriction, and collateral to a strict settlement? And wherein consists the distinction, in point of principle and substance, between a proviso for accumulation of rents during minorities (with a view to the purchase of other estates) and a proviso entirely shifting the property from the parties entitled under the settlement, at any time, upon the happening of a given event? Clearly, all these portions of settlements and wills are good or bad together; and that they are valid there can be no doubt, upon the simple and sufficient ground of their being (as an incident of their very existence) capable of destruction.

It is lamentable, Sir, to witness this warfare against methods and schemes of settlement, long sanctioned by

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experienced minds eminently conversant with the subject, and upon which almost all the family arrangements in the country may be said to rest for validity and efficiency. We have already had one impeachment of conveyancing law, (Brown v. Bamford), which completely unsettled settlements until the late prudent Chancellor came to the rescue, and affirmed the separate use clauses. And now we are told that the other common forms in our settlements will not hold water. Alas! Sir, after all the legislative and judicial innovations of these times, what intelligible remnant will there be of the law of I am Sir, real property?

Your obedient servant,

Lincoln's Inn, Oct. 26, 1846.

X.

A REPOSITORY OF POINTS IN EQUITY AND
CONVEYANCING,

Designed to combine the Advantages of an Abridgment of,
and an Index to, the recent Cases, and of an original
Statement of the Points established thereby.

(Continued from p. 432).

DEBT-See" Trust.”

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

scended from the lineal male ancestor entirely through males, though they be not heirs general. Doe d. Angell v. Angell, 15 Law J. 193—Q. B.

Executory Devise and Bequest.]-Where a testator devises real and personal estate to his daughter, who is his heiress-at-law and next of kin, and her heirs and assigns for ever, "provided she at a proper time intermarries and shall have no children, then and in that case" over; "but nevertheless, providing she shall not have a child or children lawfully begotten in wedlock," he "still" gives all his real and personal property to her, and for her own use during her life, and at her death to be equally divided between her children then living, their heirs and assigns, for ever, with benefit of survivorship, and a limitation over in case the survivor shall die without issue; and the daughter does not marry, she becomes entitled to the fee simple in the real estate, and to the absolute interest in the personalty; but whether under the will, or as heiressat-law and next of kin, it was not decided. Aspinall v. Audus, 7 Man. & G. 912.

Effect of a Charge in passing the Fee.]-14 Mee. & W. 698. A statement of the point decided will be found ante, p. 187.

DOWER.

Election between Dower and Freebench and an An

Right against the separate estate of a deceased Part-nuity.]—Where a testator directs his trustees, out of his ner.-Notwithstanding an order of the Court of Review for the consolidation of the estates of two firms, and the receipt by a creditor, under that order, of a dividend out of the aggregate fund, he may, by a suit in Chancery, establish his claim against the separate estate of a deceased partner, to the extent of the balance remaining due to him. Harris v. Farwell, 15 Law J. 185-M. R.

Judgment Debt a Charge on an Annuity.]-A judgment debt operates as a charge upon an annuity secured by an assignment of leaseholds, under the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13. Harris v. Davison, 15 Law J.

255-V. C. E.

See" Vendor and Purchaser," Case 4.

DEED-See" Compromise," "Construction."

DEVISE.

To the male Heirs of a Person, and their male Heirs.] -Although it may be a rule, that, in order to take under the description of heir male, a person must be heir general and a male descended wholly through males, yet there may be such plain indications of a contrary intention in the testator as to take the case out of such a rule; so that, if a testator devises to the male heirs, if such there be, of a lineal ancestor of his, and their male heirs for ever, and if there be no male heirs or descendants of him, then to a person who is heir general to him through a female, and to his male heirs for ever; and he directs that the males shall take place first, so long as there are any through any descent; and it appears from the will, that the testator knew the pedigree of the family up to the lineal ancestor above mentioned; a person descended from that ancestor entirely through males will be entitled in preference to his heir general descended from him through a female. For the testator, knowing the pedigree, must be taken to have been aware that there was no person answering the description of heir male, in the strict sense; and he could not mean "the heir general, if a male," because there is an express devise to such heir general in default of the male heirs or descendants of the lineal ancestor; and the words "male heirs or descendants" shew that he did not mean "heirs" in the strict sense, and, together with the express preference of males, shew that he means those males who are de

real and personal estate, to pay from time to time, but not by way of anticipation, a yearly sum to his wife during widowhood, and, subject thereto, to apply the whole or any part of the income for the benefit of another person; and, in case of the death of that person under age, without issue, in his wife's lifetime, then to pay the said annuity to his wife for her life, for her separate use; and the testator empowers his trustees to carry on his farming concerns, and to let or sell all or any part of the property; and the property is insufficient to raise the annuity in addition to her dower and free bench; the widow must be put to her election between her dower and freebench and the annuity. Lowes v. Lowes, 10 Jur. 453-V. C. W.

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ELECTION-See "Dower."

ESTATE OR INTEREST (QUANTITY OF).

For Life only, and not in Tail.-Limitation over on not leaving Issue.]-Where a testator devises an estate to a person for life, and, from and after her decease, to her first child, and to his or her heirs and assigns, for ever; but, if such child shall depart this life under the age of twenty-one years, without leaving issue, then in like manner to the second, third, and every other child of the prior taker, regard being had to the seniority of age and priority of birth of such child and children, and to their several and respective deaths underage, and without issue; it being his will, that, in case of issue, such issue shall inherit the estate, and he thereby gives the same to him or her, and to his or her heirs accordingly; but in case the prior taker shall die without leaving issue of her body, or, having issue, such issue shall die under the age of twenty-one years without leaving issue as aforesaid, then he devises the estate over; the prior taker has only a life estate, the word "issue" in the limitation over meaning "children." Goymour v. Pigge, 7 Beav. 475.

Where Issue are to take by way of Substitution, and not of Succession or Limitation over; their Parents taking Absolute Interests.]—Where a testator gives certain shares in an insurance office to his son for life, and, after his decease, to his children; and, in default of such issue, to his daughters and their issue, share and share alike, such issue not to be entitled to take more than their deceased parents' share; and the son

dies in the lifetime of the daughters, without ever having had any issue; the daughters take absolute interests, their children being intended to take by way of substitution, and not of succession or limitation over. Hedges v. Harper, 10 Jur. 578-M. R.

approve of a guardian for an infant, notwithstanding the infant, being fifteen years of age, has by deed appointed a guardian for himself; and although it does not appear, and it is not suggested, that the guardian so appointed is an unfit person. Coham v. Coham, 12 Sim.

HEIR-HEIRS.

"Heir or Heirs," a Designatio Persona.]-14 Mee. & W. 698. A statement of the point decided will be found, ante, p. 187.

Parents and Children taking Life Interests in Succes-639. sion, notwithstanding a Limitation over, in Default of issue of the Parents.]-Where a testator gives each of his daughters an annuity during their lives, and after their respective decease, he gives the same to their children respectively, share and share alike; and, in case any of his daughters shall die without issue, then he directs such annuity to cease and fall into the residue of his estate; the daughters and their children only take life

interests in succession. Id. 580.

Parent taking the Absolute Interest, and not a Life Interest, with Remainder to his Children. - Bequest to Heirs of the Body.-Limitation over of Personalty on Failure of Heirs.]—Where a testator, after bequeathing legacies to several sisters and a brother, wills, that, in the event of either of the sisters dying without heirs, the sum so falling is to be equally divided between the survivors, and, should it so happen that the whole should die without heirs, the sum is ultimately to revert to the estate of the family; but should all or any of them die with heirs of the body, the sum of which they severally die possessed is to be continued to their heirs for ever, and not to revert to the estate; adding, that the sum left to his brother" is his for ever;" the sisters take absolute interests, and not life interests, with remainder to their children. Brooks v. Lord Lake, 10 Jur. 485-V. C. E.

ESTOPPEL-See "Admission."

EXECUTORS.

Improperly permitting Property to be enjoyed in Specie.] -Where trustees and executors, who are directed to convert and invest the testator's property, allow it to be enjoyed in specie by the tenant for life, with his concurrence, and, sometime after the death of the tenant for life, they account for the value, and pay the amount into court, they must pay interest thereon, at 41. per cent., from the death of the tenant for life to the day of such payment. Mackenzie v. Taylor, 7 Beav.

467.

FRAUD.

Person in loco Parentis inducing a Child to do an act for his benefit.]-The court will interfere to prevent an act of bounty by a child to the parent or person standing in loco parentis, when, under the circumstances in which they are placed prior to what may be called a complete emancipation of the child, the child is not in such a position as will enable him to form an entirely free and unfettered judgment. And if an act of bounty is done by a child to the parent or person standing in loco parentis just after the child attains the age of twenty-one years, and prior to such complete emancipation, without any benefit moving to the child, the presumption is, that an undue influence has been exercised over the child; and it is incumbent upon the party who endeavours to maintain such a transaction, to shew that that presumption is adequately rebutted. And hence, where a female orphan who has all along resided with her uncle, joins with him in a promissory note for his debt, two months after attaining her majority, while she is still resident at his house, and without having any friend to consult, the court will set aside the transaction. Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551.

GUARDIAN

appointed by the Court, although the Ward had appointed one.-The court will refer it to the Master to

Limitation over to the Testator's own Heir, Executor, or Administrator, after a Devise and Bequest to his sole Issue and Heir-at-law.]-Where a testator devises and bequeaths his real and personal estate upon trust for a person who, at the date of the will and at the time of the testator's decease, is his sole issue and heir-atlaw, and also next of kin; and, in case of his death under a certain age without issue, then upon trust for his (the testator's) own heirs, executors, or administrators, such issue is entitled to the property, under the limitation over, as heir-at-law and next of kin at the death of the testator, and not the person or persons who would be heir-at-law and next of kin at the death of the son; for the son might die in the testator's lifetime leaving children, or the testator might have other children living at his death. And the expression, "my own heirs," might be used with the view of excluding the heir on the maternal side. At all events, there is not sufficient indication of an intention to benefit other persons than the heir and next of kin, at the time of the testator's decease, to justify the court in departing from the general rule. Wilkinson v. Garrett, 10 Jur. 560-V. C. B.

66

Whether there is a resulting Trust in his Favor.]Where a testator devises all his freehold estates to his nephew (designating him in strong terms of commendation) and his heirs and assigns, upon the trusts and for the uses following," and then only limits an use of one of his estates, and directs certain sums to be paid out of those estates, and then declares that he leaves his son unprovided for on account of his misconduct, but by a codicil directs that his nephew, his heirs, executors, or administrators, shall allow his son a certain amount for his maintenance; adding a declaration of his determination that his son shall never enjoy any part of his estate, and limiting over his estate from his nephew, in case he shall give up any part of his estate to his son; in such case the nephew takes beneficially; the words "upon the trusts and for the uses following" meaning nothing more than "subject to the trusts and uses following;" and there is no resulting trust in favor of the son and heir as to any part of the estates. Hughes v. Evans, 13 Sim. 496. See "Construction," Case 9, "Estate."

HEIRS MALE-See " Devise."

HEIRS OF THE BODY-See "Estate."

INJUNCTION

to restrain Proceedings at Law to set aside an Annuity which had been treated as valid in a Chancery Suit.]-Where the grantor of an annuity admitted, in his answer to a bill in Chancery, that the annuity was a subsisting charge on his estates, and the number of years have treated the annuity as valid, decree and proceedings in the suit during a great and a large sum of money has been paid on the faith of the admission of the grantor, the grantor's de visee will be restrained from proceeding at law to set aside the annuity as invalid, on the ground that no memorial of it was inrolled, pursuant to the stat. 17 Geo. 3, c. 26, and that the estates were not of greater

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Apportionment of a Jointure on an Estate devised to the Widow, and on a descended Estate.]-Where the owner of two estates covenants in his marriage settlement to convey so much of them as shall be of a certain annual value for his wife's jointure, and, by his will, after confirming the settlement, devises both estates to his wife for life, and then executes a deed, which has the effect of revoking his will as to one estate, which consequently descends to his heir-at-law, and he dies without having made any conveyance by way of jointure pursuant to the covenant; in such case, the jointure being originally a charge upon both estates, and the testator not intending that the will should be a satisfaction of the jointure, the jointure remains, as it originally was, a charge on both estates, and therefore mus be apportioned rateably on the estate, which passes t the widow under the will, and upon the descende i estate. Eyre v. Green, 10 Jur. 384 V. C. B.

JUSTICE.

Court Papers.

EQUITY CAUSE LISTS, MICHAELMAS TERM, 1846.

The following abbreviations have been adopted to abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occupied:-A. Abated-Adj. Adjourned-A. T. After Term-Ap. Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-C. Costs-D. Demurrer-E. Exceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro Confesso-Pl. Plea-Ptn. Petition-R. Re-hearing-S. O. Stand Over-Sh. Short. Court of Chancery.

land

Before the LORD CHANCELLOR. APPEALS.

Day to be

fixed.

Strickland v. Strick- (Ap)
Ditto v. Boynton
Ditto v. Strickland
Vandeleur v.
Blagrave (Ap)
Coore v. Lowndes (Ap) To fix
a day
Minor v. Minor (2 Ap)
Ditto v. Ditto (Suppl.
suit)
Dalton v. Hayter (Ap) To fix
a day
Att.-General v. Masters and
Wardens, &c. of the City of
Bristol (Ap) To fix a day
Black v. Chaytor (Ap) SO

To

fix a

day

Principles connected with the Administration of Jus- Johnson v. Reynolds (F D by

tice. See "Award." "Compromise."

order) SO

Lord v. Wightwick (Ap)

LEASE-See" Construction," Case 4; " Vendor and Pur- Carmichael v. Carmichael (Ap)

chaser," Case 10.

LEASEHOLDS.

Apportionment of Fines for Renewal.]-Where freeholds and leaseholds for lives or years are devised to a person for life, with a direction to pay the fines and other expenses of renewing the leaseholds out of the rents and profits, or by mortgage of the leaseholds, or by such other ways and means as shall be advisable, there, if the trustees do not take upon themselves to exercise the discretion given them by the will, but the Court is called upon to decide how the burthen of renewal is to be borne, the Court will impose it upon the parties in the proportion of their actual enjoyment of the estate. And, in order to accomplish this, where the tenant for life has not taken upon himself to renew, but the trustees have paid the expenses of renewal out of rents accumulated during the minority of the tenant for life, the court will direct the tenant for life to keep down the interest, and to give security for the payment of a part of the principal proportionate to the estimated value of his interest, without prejudice to the question, whether he may or may not be liable, according to the eventual duration of his life, to less or more than the sum for which security is given, and to the consequent question, whether he is to have a lien on the estate for what he may have overpaid, or must give further security. Jones v. Jones, 10 Jur. 516-V. C. W.

(To be continued).

MASTERS IN CHANCERY.-The Lord Chancellor has appointed the following gentlemen Masters Extraordinary in the high Court of Chancery:-John Penrice Bell, of Cheltenham, Gloucestershire; Walter Henry Moore, of Woodbridge, Suffolk.

The Queen has been pleased to grant unto Thomas Coxhead Marsh, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law, her royal license and authority to take and use the surname of Chisenhale, in addition to and before that of Marsh.

Wrightson v. Macauley (Ap)
Gompertz v. Gompertz (3
causes, Ap)
Morris v. Howes

}(Ap)

Horsman v. Abbey}

Thomas v. Blackman (Ap)
Bonds v. Slyman (Ap)
Cooper v. Pitcher (Ap)
Salkeld v. Johnson (on eq. re.)
Booth v. Creswicke (Ap)
Forbes v. Leeming (Ap)
Andrews v. Lockwood (Ap)
Stocken v. Dawson (4 ca., Ap)
Watts v. Hyde (Ap)
Walford v. Adie (Ap)
Morison v. Morison (Ap)
Eyre v. Green (Ap)
Davis v. Chanter (Ap)
Ansley v. Cotton (Ap)
Colombine v. Chichester (Ap)
Macmahon v. Burchell (Ap)

Duke of Leeds v. Earl Amherst (Ap)

Att.-Gen. v. Mayor, &c. of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Ap)

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Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND. PLEAS, DEMURRERS, Causes, and Further DIRECTIONS. Moore v. Mitchell (2 D) SO Hodgkinson v. Barrow (FD,C) Button v. Simpson (D, part Colbourn v. Coling heard) Hickson v. Smith (at deft. Kingham v. Lee (D) request) Baldwin v. Damer (D) Finden v. Stephens (D) The Co. of Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal v. Dimes

Bower v. Scott (Re-hearing)
Walker v. Watkin (by order)
Ditto v. Goude
Parker v. Day
Johnson v. Forrester (F D)
Terry v. Wacher
Simpson v. Holt (F D, C)
Garrod v. Moor

Smale v. Bickford (2 causes)
Peacock v. Kernot
Morrison v. Watkins
Wright v. Barnewell (E, FD)
Greenway v. Buchanan
Walton v. Morritt
Dobson v. Lyle (F D, C)
Parker v. Hawkes (E)
Davison v. Bagley
Giffard v. Withington
Dani

Daniel v. Hill

Insole v. Featherstonhaugh
Lane v. Durant (E, F D)
Pocock v. Johnson
Cope v. Lewis
Evans v. Hunter
Attorney-Gen. v. Trevelyan

Stert v. Cooke

Palmer v. Pattison (F D, C)
Lee v. Ryle (F D, C)
Minter v. Wraith (FD, cause)
Hemming v. Spiers (E)
Chambers v. Waters (E)
Smith v. Robinson

Foster v. Vernon (F D, C)
Vale v. Sherwood (7 causes, F
D, C)
Haffenden v. Wood (E)
Branscomb v. Branscombe (F
D, C)

Stammers v. Halliby (3 ca.,

FD)
Ditto v. Battye (by order)
Gray v. Gray (3 causes, F D)
Dorville v. Wolff (F D, C)
Richards v. Patterson (F D, C)
Adlam v. Barham (2 causes)
Beatson v. Beatson
Woodman v. Madgen (F D, C)
Attorney-Gen. v. Pearson (E,
FD)

Dawson v. Chappell (F D, C)
Wait v. Horton (F D, C)
Montague v. Cator (F D, cau.)
Groom v. Stinton (4 causes)
Corbett v. Limbrick (F D, C)
Baxter v. Abbott (F D, C)
De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir
(F D, C)

Beale v. Warder (Re-hearing) | White v. Briggs (E, 3 sets, F

Turner v. Simcock (F D, C)
Booth v. Lightfoot (F D, C)
Ludlow v. Guilleband (F D,
C)

Howell v. Saer
Attorney-Gen. v. East India
Co., after Term
Roberts v. Cardell (E)
Warwick v. Richardson (E, F
D)
Morgan v. Kingdon (F D, C)
Lewis v. Hinton (F D, C)

Wilson v. Williams
Robotham v. Amphlett (E)
Poole v. Troughton
Ellison v. Clark

Bailiff, &c. of Bridgnorth v.
Collins (F D, C)
Gaches v. Warner (2 causes)
Frant v. Deffell (Cause, Ptn)
Birch v. Joy (F D, C)
Tarte v. Phillips
Bilton v. Frewheela
Atkinson v. Glover

Mayor, &c. of Rochester v. Lee
Day v. Slade
Pennyfather v. Pennyfather (2
causes)

Radcliffe v. Readett
Lufkins v. Lufkins (F D, C)
Hollis v. Bryant (2 causes)
Nightingale v. Goulbourn (F
D, C)

Williams v. Jones (F D, C)
Howard v. Kirk
Reddish v. Howard (2 causes)
Glasscott v. Long
Green v. Bailey
Atkins v. Hatton (FD)
Straker v. Wilson

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D)

Bradley v. Teale

Smith v. Smith (2 causes)
Parkin v. Taylor
Warde v. Hill
Damer v. Portarlington (2 ca.)
Greenham v. Greenham (F D,
C)

Bellringer v. Blagrave
Burrow v. Hardey (F D, C)
Finch v. Secker

Crommetin v. Earl of Belfast
Cholmondeley v. Cholmonde-
ley (F D, C)
Cotgreave v. Cotgreave
Middleton v. Elliot (F D, C)
Hemming v. Dingwall
Booker v. Clarke (F D, C)
Bannister v. Ellis
Hyde v. Neate (E)
Hall v. Hugonin (F D, C)
Milne v. Loe (F D, C)
Bownass v. Abbott (E)
Martindale v. Hayton
Langston v. Cozens (F D, C)
Mapp v. Ellcock (F D, C)
Webb v. Enticknop (F D, C)
Kortright v. Maqueen (F D,
C, cause)

Hanmer v. Hanmer (F D, C,
cause)

Levesey v. Leicester (F D)
Rentell v. Scales

Myers v. Macdonald (2 causes)
Wilson v. Wilson, (E, 2 sets)
Garratt v. Lancefield (F D)
Gregory v. Wade
Hodgson v. Hodgson

Before the Vice-Chancellor WIGRAM.
CAUSES, FURTHER DIRECTIONS, AND EXCEPTIONS.
Hunter v. Macklew (Objection | Dobson v. Land
Winter v. Winter (F D, C)
Coates v. Hammond (2 causes)
Shuttleworth v. Bengough (2

as to parties)
Lowes v. Lowes (F D, C) To
fix a day
Sayers v. Lacon (FD, pt. hd.)
Plowden v. Thorpe
East India Co. v. Coopers' Co.,
after Term
Campbell v. London and
Brighton Railway Co. (part
heard)
Blair v. Bromley
Duncombe v. Levy
Fraser v. Jones
Leigh v. Earl Balcarras
Dale v. Hamilton
Bostock v. Shaw
Emerson v. Emerson
Hammon v. Sedgwick
Warner v. Hodgson (2 causes)
Kirby v. Mash

Pennington v. Buckley
Tapperell v. Taylor
Parks v. Odill (2 causes)
Carlisle v. Elliott
Handford v. Hanford
Maxwell v. Kibblethwaite (2
causes)

Porter v. Porter
Scott v. Bealey
Starkey v. Blake
Tolson v. Dykes (3 causes)
Ogle v. Hansard
Knight v. Knight (E, 2 sets)
Lewis v.
Thomas
Bell v. Alexander

Ingonville v. Blackstock (FD) Bull v. Pritchard
Amey v. Walker (2 causes)

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causes)
Champion v. Banks
Worley v. Frampton (E, FD)
Dawes v. Betts
Wood v. Rowcliffe
Attorney-Gen. v. Lucas (E)
Stinton . Taylor
Beach . Beach (F D, C)
Henson v. Blackwell (F D, C)
Moss v. Leigh

Ditto v. Whitley } (E)

Lake v. Stewart
Blundell v. Mills
Methold v. Turner
Dean v. Hickenbotham
Whitlow v. Dilworth (2 cans.)
Routledge v. Gibson
Bachelor (pauper) v. Middleton
Payne v. Coles

Letts v. The London and
Blackwall Railway Co.
The London and Blackwall
Railway Co. v. Letts
Chase v. Morris (F D, C)
Crockett v. Crockett (F D, C,
Ptn)
Stephenson v. Everatt (FD, C)
Tyler v. Lea (F D, C)
Pringle v. Smith
Justice v. Langster
Marsh v. Kingdom
Raby v. Ridehalgh
De Sola v. Mesnard

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Beard v. Mottam

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Milne v. Bamford (F D, C)

England.

Middlesex

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Gawen v. Gawen (FD, C) SO Mostyn v. Mostyn (F D, C)

Gibbs v. Waters SO

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Grayson v. Deakin

Hodgson v. Shaw (F D, C)
Weston v. Radford

Dunston v. Paterson (F D, C)
Quarrill v. Binmore (F D, C)
Topping v. Howard
Shelswell v. Preedy
Roakes v. Manser (2 causes)
Wright v. Taylor (F D, C)
Sanford v. Sanford (F D, C)
Kershaw v. Clegg (F D, C)
Geare v. Norton

Parker v. Morrell (F D, C)
Eversfield v. Troup
Wroughton v. Colquhoun (F
D, C)

Newenham v. Pemberton
Boultbee v. Collier
Holmes v. Trappes
Walworth v. Cartwright

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Iron Steamboat Co.

Inhabitants of Watford, Herts.

Inhabitants of Little Marlow.
Inhabitants of Crondall, Hants.
Inhabitants of Mylor.

Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes.
Inhabits. of St. Paul, Covent Garden.
Wright v. Reg. (in error).

Reg. v. Churchwardens of Anderson.

Churchwards. of Holme St. Cuthbert.
Westbrook & ors.

Churchwardens, &c. of Bangor.
Inhabitants of St. Anne, Westminster.
Same.

Inhabitants of St. Peter, Droitwich.
Bateman.

Inhabitants of East Stonehouse.

Inhabs. of Widecomb-in-the-Moor.

South-eastern Railway Company.
Inhabitants of Mendham.
Inhabitants of Blackburn.
Churchwardens of Bangor (orders).
Everist.

Council of the borough of Birmingham.
Inhabitants of Marton-cum-Grafton.
Inhabitants of Landkey.

Great Western Railway Company.
Same.

Inhabitants of Clixby.

Shipperbottom.

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