testamentary expenses, and legacies, to invest the resi- such refreshment-rooms are situate, either up or down, due thereof in their names in the public funds, or upon shall, save in case of emergency or unusual delay arising government or real securities, with power to vary such from accident, stop there for the refreshment of pasfunds or securities, and to apply the interest and divi-sengers for a certain period; and the company thereby dends for the benefit of her children, as therein men- undertake not to do any act contrary to the above intioned; and the trustees of the will are the same persons tention; this is a legal binding covenant, the specific who are trustees of the settlement creating the power; performance of which the Court of Chancery has jurisand the funds which are the subject of the power are diction to enforce by injunction; as, at law, the covealready invested in stock in their names; and they nantees could only recover such speculative damages as have the same power by the settlement to vary the a jury might give them in repeated actions against the funds or securities as that which is given by the will; company; and, for the purpose of a motion for an inthe will is not an execution of the power: for the funds junction, the company must be regarded as private which are the subject of the power are not subject to individuals, and cannot be heard to excuse a breach of the payment of debts or funeral or testamentary ex- the covenant upon the ground of the convenience of penses; and what the testatrix gives, in the case above the passengers. And if any trains regularly run by dimentioned, she gives as residue; and if she intended rection of the company, without stopping at the staher will to be an appointment of the funds comprised tion for the purpose of affording the passengers an opin the settlement, the powers of investment given by portunity of taking refreshment, and such trains do the will would be unnecessary as to those funds. Clog- not differ from the ordinary trains, except in the rate stoun v. Walcott, 13 Sim. 523. of travelling, they are not trains "sent express or for special purposes," within the exceptions in the covenant, although they are called " express trains" in the POWER OF SALE-See "Conversion," Case 8, "Mort-time table. Rigby v. The Great Western Railway Comgage," Case 2. PRESCRIPTION to work mines under houses.]-A prescription or custom in a manor to work mines under houses, without making compensation for any damage occasioned to such houses, is bad, as being unreasonable. Hilton v. Granville, 1 Dav. & M. 614. PRESUMPTION pany, 10 Jur. 488-V. C. W. But where the right to an injunction would depend on a disputed legal question, which the court will not decide, the court will not grant an injunction while such question continues to be in dispute, if the company undertake to pay such sum of money as may be assessed for damages for the violation of the covenant, to be ascertained by the court, so as to avoid the possibility of inflicting a wrongful and irreparable loss upon the company by means of an injunction, and yet avoid the difficulty of bringing numerous actions at law. Id. 561-L. C. as to a Grant of land between a high road and other land which was granted.]-As between the grantees of Agreement of a Solicitor to exempt the Provisional different lands at different times from the same lord of Committee from a personal liability for Costs.]-An a manor, no presumption arises that a strip of land be- agreement between a solicitor of a company and the tween a high road and the land which was unquestion-provisional committee, that they shall not be personally ably comprised within the grant to one of them, was responsible to him for costs, but that the costs shall be granted to that one. White v. Hill, 6 Adol. & Ell. paid out of the deposits, is not illegal, on the ground that it may diminish the security of the company, as cestuis que trust in regard to the conduct of the provisional committee. For, primâ facie, trustees have a right to be indemnified by their cestuis que trust before they incur any liability. Parsons v. Spooner, 15 Law J. 155-V. C. W. 487. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. Promissory Note given to Bankers for a floating balance, placed by them to the credit of the principal.] Where a person joins as surety in a promissory note, as a security for the floating balance which at any may time be due from the principal to his bankers, the surety is properly answerable for no more at any time than the floating balance may amount to; and the bankers have no right to give the principal credit in their books for the amount of the note, when he has overdrawn his account less than that amount; for the consequence of this would be, that the surety, even though the principal may not have drawn for the amount, might all at once be made answerable for it, since the principal has the immediate benefit of it, having a right to draw for it at once. Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551. RAILWAYS. Injunction to restrain a Breach of a Covenant to stop at a Refreshment Station.-" Trains sent Express." Where, in a lease by a railway company, it is declared to be the intention of the parties, that, in consideration of the outlay to be incurred by the lessee in the erection of refreshment-rooms, the company shall give every facility to the lessee for enabling him to obtain an adequate return, by means of the profits of the refreshmentrooms, and that all trains carrying passengers, not being goods trains, or trains to be sent express or for special purposes, and except trains not under the control of the company, which shall pass the station where REMOTENESS. Alternative Limitation in case of dying "without leaving lawful Issue as aforesaid."]-Where a testator devises real and personal estate, in trust for a person for life, and, after her decease, in trust for all and every such one or more of her child or children, lawfully begotten, as she shall appoint; and, in default of appointment, in trust for all and every her child and children, and to their respective heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for ever; but in case she should die without leaving lawful issue as aforesaid, then to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for ever; the words "as aforesaid" shew, that by "issue" the testator means "children;" and the limitations in default of appointment are alternative limitations to the child Limitation over of personal estate, in default of issue.]— Where a testator gives shares in an insurance office to his son, his executors, administrators, and assigns, his son paying the profits of certain of them to his daughters RENT See "Construction," Case 4. during their lives, and after their decease their shares to a creditor, upon trust to sell for payment of his to return to his son and his issue; and, in default of debt, and then of the debt of a prior creditor; and such issue of his son, he gives all the shares to his the prior creditor and the debtor jointly and sedaughters and their issue, share and share alike; the li-verally covenant to pay the debt of the subsequent mitation over to the daughters is void for remoteness; creditor; and the debtor, as a security to the prior for in this clause there is nothing to shew, that the tes- creditor, executes a deed appointing the prior creditor tator by the word "issue" means "children;" and, his attorney to receive certain debts due to him and therefore, the word cannot be so construed, although, in certain expectant legacies for the prior creditor's own a preceding limitation over, it does mean children. benefit; and the subsequent creditor sells the proHedges v. Harper, 10 Jur, 578-M. R. perty not so long as twenty years before the filing of a bill by the prior creditor, and for a less sum than the amount of his debt; and more than twenty years elapse from the execution of the subsequent security to the prior creditor, without any acknowledgment by the debtor of the prior debt; that deed operates as a valid assignment in equity of the debts and legacies due to the debtor, notwithstanding the Statute of LiImitations. For, as the trust existed up to the time of the sale, and within twenty years, the debt due to the prior creditor is not barred by the statute; and as the debt exists, and the subsequent deed executed as a security to the prior creditor is only a collateral security for the debt as primarily secured by the trust, such subsequent deed continues to be operative. Bennett v. Cooper, 10 Jur. 507-M. R. RESIDUE-See "Construction," Case 2. RESULTING TRUST-See "Heir." SATISFACTION-See "Jointure.” SETTLEMENT. Voluntary limitation of the wife's property in favor of her brothers and sisters.]-Where, by a pre-nuptial settlement, an estate, the property of the intended wife, is limited, in case she should die without children, to trustees, in trust to sell and divide the proceeds amongst her brothers and sisters; and afterwards the husband agrees to sell the estate, and he and his wife join in conveying it to a purchaser, by deed and fine, and the wife dies without issue, the limitation in favor of her brothers and sisters is voluntary, and void as against the purchaser, under the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4. Cotterell v. Homer, 13 Sim. 506. SOCIETY-See" Trust." SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE entitled has received rent for twenty years, under a Receipt of rent under a lease.]-Where a person not valid lease, made prior to the act, the party rightfully entitled to the land in reversion would be barred by the 9th section of the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, if his right were not saved by the 15th section; but it is saved by the 15th section, if asserted by for "the possession and receipt of the profits of the an action within five years from the passing of the act; land" is not adverse to the party rightfully entitled, since the possession and receipt were under a valid lease; and the words "receipt of rent," in this section, do not refer to rent reserved on a lease. Doe d. Angell v. Angell, 15 Law J. 193-Q. B. Right of a person entitled subject to a tenancy at will.]—The Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 7, as to the accruer of a right of a person entitled subject to a tenancy at will, does not apply where the tenancy at will was determined before the passing of the act. Doe d. Evans v. Page, 1 Dav, & M. 601. See "Mortgage," "«Waste." Case 6. STATUTE 27 Eliz. c. 4-See" Settlement,” of an Agreement to bar an Entail and re-settle an Estate.Right of Redemption.]-Where a father, tenant for life, and a son, tenant in tail, join in mortgaging an estate for a debt of the son, under an agreement between them to bar the entail and re-settle the estate, as to the remainder after the death of the father and mother, in case the father shall be obliged to pay any part of the STATUTE 32 Hen. 8, c. 9-See" Vendor and Purchaser,” interest upon the mortgage, or the son shall not pay off the mortgage by a certain day, and the father shall then pay it off and release the son therefrom, to the use of the father in fee, he covenanting to give the son or his issue a certain proportion of the estate, or of the value of such proportion thereof; and the father neither pays off the debt, nor releases the son from it; in such case, the court will not, after the father's death, enforce the specific performance of the agreement, although the father has paid the interest until his death, and his devisees have paid off the mortgage; for as, in the case supposed, the father does not release the son from the debt, a state of things existed for which the agreement did not provide, and as to which it was inoperative. And as the court will not decree a specific performance, the STATUTE 1 Will. 4, c. 47, s. 12. The stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 47, s. 12, does not apply to a case of a mere equitable estate for life, where, in conse quence of the disclaimer of a person named as trustee for the life of the cestui que trust, the legal estate has devolved on the heir, not by devise, but by descent. Heming v. Archer, 7 Beav. 515. original rights of the parties, irrespective of the agree- STATUTE 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13-See "Debtor and ment, remain, and, therefore, the son is entitled to redeem the estate upon repayment of the mortgage debt and the interest. Playford v. Playford, 4 Hare, 546. SET-OFF-See "Vendor and Purchaser," Case 10. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. Bar of a collateral security for a debt.-Assignment of debts and legacies.]-Where property is conveyed Creditor." SURVIVORSHIP. Word "Survivor" referring to the time of the death of a prior taker.-"Issue" meaning “Children."]— Where a testator directs his trustees to sell real estate when they shall think proper and convenient, and he devises and bequeaths such real estate, and the proceeds thereof, and his personal estate, in trust for a person for life, and, after his decease, to convey and pay the E C same to the children of that person, or the survivors of them, their several heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for ever, when and as they shall attain twenty-one; but, in case such person shall die without leaving any children him surviving, or, there being such, they shall all die under twenty-one and without issue, then upon trust to convey and pay the same property to the children of two other persons and the survivors of them, share and share alike; but, in case any of such children shall be then dead, leaving issue, such issue shall have the original share of the father or mother of such issue so dying, and the share or shares to which such father or mother may be entitled by survivorship or otherwise: in such case the word "issue" means "children," being so explained by the word "children," and by the expressions "father or mother of such issue;" and the survivorship is to be referred to the period of division, namely, the death of the tenant for life; and the property is given to the children of the two persons before mentioned living at the date of the will, and those born after that date and before the period of division; with a proviso for survivorship between them in case any should die before the period of division, without leaving children; and with a proviso substituting for the original legatees the children of such of them as should die before the period of division, leaving children, and giving to such children absolute interests, so that, if they die before the period of division, their representatives will take. Buckle v. Fawcett, 4 Hare, 536. Word "Survivor" referring to the time of the decease of a prior Taker.]-Where a testator bequeaths money upon trust for his wife for life, remainder for his daughter for life, and, upon her demise, the interest to be appropriated for the use of any of her children, until they reach the age of twenty-one years, and then the principal sum to be paid to the survivor or survivors of the children of his daughter, share and share alike, the survivorship refers to the time of the death of the daughter; so that a child who attains twenty-one, but dies before the daughter, takes nothing. Turing v. Turing, 10 Jur. 366-V. C. E. See Contingent Interest," "Vested Interest." TRUST. Where a Debt due from a Trustee is a Specialty Debt.] -Although a mere breach of trust creates only a simple contract debt, yet, where it is declared by a deed under seal, that a person, his executors, administrators, and assigns, shall stand possessed of certain funds upon trust for another; a sum due to the cestui que trust from the estate of the trustee, in respect of such funds made use of by him, is a specialty debt. Wood v. Hardisty, 10 Jur. 486-V. C. B. to invest another sum in the same manner, and he deals with the two sums as his own property, and the dividends thereon are carried to his account; on his decease in the lifetime of his wife, the stock forms part of his assets, and does not belong to his wife as survivor, nor to his son as a cestui que trust. Smith v. Warde, 15 Law J. 105—V. C. E. Society incorporated for public purposes.]-Where property is vested in a society incorporated by royal charter, for the accomplishment of purposes of a general and public or political nature, (as for the formation of a colony or settlement), and, according to the constitution of the society, certain other bodies, although interested in any surplus that may remain from time to time, after those purposes are accomplished, are not entitled to control the exercise of the powers which are given to the society for such purposes; the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction, upon the application of those bodies, to determine upon the propriety of the expenditure which has been made by the society, even though the society may have erroneously admitted itself to be a mere trustee for those bodies. The Skinners' Company v. The Irish Society, 7 Beav. 593. Injunction against using a Scotch Kirk as a Free Church.]-Where, according to the intention of the founders of a place of worship, it was to correspond in all respects with a church situated in Scotland, subject to the jurisdiction of a Scotch presbytery, and in strict communion with the Established Church of Scotland, the Court of Chancery will prevent it from being used as a place of worship in connexion with the Free Church of Scotland. Attorney-General v. Welsh, 4 Hare, 572. 66 Words of Recommendation.]-Where a testator, after bequeathing certain specific chattels to the use of his wife, adds, that they may be finally appropriated as she pleases, with a sum" of money, which, "however,” he "recommends her to divide" among certain persons, no trust is created in their favor; because she would not have the power to appropriate this sum as she pleases, if she were bound to comply with the recommendation in the will. The different parts of the will can only be reconciled by holding, that the testator, while he recommends the money to be appropriated in a particular way, leaves it to his wife's discretion to adopt his recommendation, or not. And the court will not carry the doctrine of the cases, in which words of recommendation have been held to create a trust, any further than it has been already carried. White v. Briggs, 15 Law J. 182-L. C. See "Construction," Case 2. TRUSTEES. Opinion taken by a person named a Trustee without his sanction.]—A person who has been named as a trustee of a term, in a deed of assignment thereof, without his sanction, and, on his refusal to assign the term to other trustees, is called upon to execute a deed of disclaimer, is justified in taking the opinion of counsel on his obligation to execute such deed, and will be allowed the costs of taking the opinion. In re Tryon, 7 Beav. 496. Mortgage of Shares by a Trustee.-Notice of a Trust.]—Where a person buys shares in a company in the name of another person, and does not give notice to the company that the latter is a trustee of those shares for him; and the trustee mortgages them, and the mortgagee gives notice of the mortgage to the company, the mortgagee is entitled to a priority over the cestui que trust; the trustee's knowledge of the trust not amountDevise and bequest of Trust Property by surviving Trusing to notice to the company, although he, as a share-tee.]-Where a testator devises and bequeaths real and holder, is a partner in the company. Martin v. Sedg-personal estate, on certain trusts, to be performed by wick, 10 Jur. 463—M. R. Direction to invest in joint names of husband and wife, in trust for their son.]—If a person directs his bankers to invest a sum of money in stock in the joint names of himself and his wife, in trust for his son; and the bankers return an answer, that, as the Bank of England object to have any trusts in their books, the bankers had simply invested the money in the names of himself and his wife; and he afterwards directs them the trustees named, and the survivors and survivor, and by the heirs and assigns, or the executors or administrators of the survivor, and the will contains no power to appoint new trustees, and the surviving trustee devises and bequeaths the trust estates and monies to certam persons, upon the trusts of the first will; this is a valid devise and bequest to them upon those trusts. For, although it would be a breach of trust in a trustee, even a sole surviving trustee, in the absence of a power for that purpose, to vest the trust property in any other person by a disposition inter vivos, because he cannot transfer that personal confidence which the testator placed in him; yet this is not the case with a disposition by will, because, at the death of the last surviving trustee, there must be a devolution or transmission of the property to some one or more persons not immediately or directly trusted by the author of the trust; the property must pass either to the hæres natus, or heir-at-law, or to the hæres factus, or devisee or legatee, of the surviving trustee; and there is more probability of inconvenience arising from its passing to the heir-atlaw, if there is one, since the heir-at-law may be a married woman, an infant, a lunatic, a bankrupt, or out of the jurisdiction. And when the word "assigns" occurs, as in the above case, the validity of such a devise and bequest is the more clear, inasmuch as some rational and legal effect must, if practicable, be ascribed to that word; and as it cannot, consistently with the rules of the Court, be considered to mean "assignees by deed," it may be fairly deemed to mean persons who may be made such by devise and bequest.' Titley v. Wolstenholme, 7 Beav. 436. plied in taking out foreign patents, and the latter sum is not paid by that day, nor previously to the time for inrolling the specification; the patentee is entitled to rescind the contract, notwithstanding his acceptance of other sums at other times than those which were fixed by the agreement; for, time was of the essence of the contract in regard to the payment of the latter sum, because it is most important that the patentee should have the means of obtaining foreign patents before the specification is published to the world. Payne v. Bonner, 15 Law J. 227—V. C. E. and L. C. Abandonment of the Contract by the Purchaser.]Where a purchase of an estate is to be completed by a certain day, and the contract provides, that, in case the vendor shall be unable to obtain the concurrence of all the requisite parties in the conveyance, each party may rescind the contract on notice in writing; and it appears, from the correspondence between the vendor and purchaser, that it was well understood that certain persons should be parties, and yet their concurrence is not procured by the vendor by the time appointed for the completion of the purchase, and a month after that time the purchaser gives notice of his abandonment of the contract, and the concurrence of the parties above mentioned is not procured till some months afterwards, the Court will not enforce a specific performance of the contract at the suit of the vendor. Benson v. Lamb, 15 Responsibility for neglect of bankers in not investing money.]-Where a trustee deposits trust monies with his bankers, with a direction to invest the same in Consols, but he makes no inquiry respecting it until some months afterwards, when the bankers become bank-Law J. 218—M. R. rupts; he is answerable for the loss occasioned by the Presumption of the existence of a probate or letters of omission of the bankers to invest it. Challen v. Ship-administration.]-Probate or letters of administration pam, 4 Hare, 555. Not investing as directed.]—Where trustees are directed to invest personal estate in government or real securities, but some of the cestuis que trust and one of the trustees permit the trust funds to remain in the hands of the other trustees at interest, and he fails; the trustees are chargeable with the amount of the trust funds possessed by them, with interest, and not with what they might have received had they invested in the funds; because, inasmuch as they had an option to invest in either, it is impossible to ascertain the amount which they ought to have received, and they could not be charged with the specific loss resulting from an act (namely, an investment in the funds) not having been done, which they were not imperatively bound to do. Shepherd v. Mouls, 4 Hare, 500. See" Executors,' ""Railway," Case 2, UNDERLEASE-See" Vendor and Purchaser," Case 10. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Part payment of Purchase-money.-Re-sale of goods by the Vendor.-Assignment by the Purchaser for the benefit of creditors.]-Where a purchaser pays part of the purchase-money of goods, and allows them to remain in the vendor's possession, and the vendor assents to a deed of assignment executed by the purchaser for the benefit of his creditors who shall execute the deed, and afterwards re-sells the goods for a sum less than the balance due to him from the first purchaser, he cannot claim a dividend with the other creditors of the first purchaser upon the balance of the purchase-money; for, by assenting to the deed, the vendor ceased to have any property in the goods, which passed, under the deed, to the assignees, and he took instead a dividend under the trusts of the deed. Bush v. Shipman, 10 Jur. 507-L. C. Sale of a share of a Patent.-When Time is of the essence of a Contract, as regards payment of the consider ation.]-Where a patentee agrees to give another person a share of the patent, in consideration as well of other sums to be previously paid at various times, as of a certain sum to be paid by a particular day, to be ap will not be presumed, in support of the title to a term, from a possession of sixty years, where it is not necessary to admit the existence of a probate or letters of administration, in order to account for that possession. Doe d. Woodhouse v. Powell, 15 Law J. 189—Q. B. Sale by a hospital to a corporation.]—Where the of ficers of a hospital are chosen from the members of a corporation, the two bodies are not sufficiently independent to be capable of contracting with each other for the sale of real estate by the former to the latter. Attorney-General v. The Mayor of Plymouth, 15 Law J. 109-M. R. Sale of a term by an administrator out of possession.] intestate died possessed, but which, since his death, has -A sale, by an administrator, of a term of which the been in the adverse possession of other persons for several years, and of which the administrator never had possession, is void, as well at common law as by the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 9. Doe d. Williams v. Evans, 1 M., Gr., & Scott, 717. Specific performance of agreement for sale of a property, part of which is liable to be destroyed.]-Where a person contracts to sell a wharf, with a jetty, which is essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the wharf, but is liable to be removed at any time by the local authorities, and that circumstance is not mentioned by the vendor prior to the contract, a specific performance of the agreement will not be decreed. Peers v. Lambert, 7 Beav. 546. Specific performance of an agreement for sale of a lease, where there will be a liability in respect of the neglect of the lessees-Covenant-Indemnity-Compensation.]— Where a lessee covenants to build some additional houses within a certain time, and well and sufficiently to repair the houses already built, and thereafter to be built, and all the premises thereby demised, so well and sufficiently repaired, to deliver up at the end of the term, but he does not build the additional houses; in such case, although the lessor, by accepting rent after the expiration of the time limited for building the houses, waives that part of the covenant by which the lessee agreed to build, yet the covenant to deliver up the houses extends to the additional houses, as well as to the houses built at the date of the deed; and, al though the purchaser might relieve himself from the proved in pecuniary value; and the remainderman may consequences of a breach of the covenant by assigning either file his bill in respect thereof at or soon after the the term to a pauper for the last day of the term, yet time of the commission of such waste, or he may defer the lease is bad, for he ought not to be compelled to doing so until the death of the tenant for life; and the adopt any such expedient; and the purchaser is not time fixed by the Statute of Limitations will not begin bound to accept the title with an indemnity; and the to run until the death of the tenant for life. And in amount of the liability cannot be ascertained, so as to case he files the bill then, the estate of the tenant for render it a fit subject for a compensation. Nouaille v. life is liable to account to the remainderman for all the Flight, 7 Beav. 521. profit received by means of such acts of waste, with inAgent setting off a Debt due from himself to the Pur-terest at 41. per cent. from the time of the decease of the chaser against part of Purchase-money.]-If a vendor tenant for life; although the remainderman may have employs an agent to receive the purchase-money, and made no specific claim in respect of the waste during the the agent sets off a debt due from himself to the pur-lifetime of the tenant for life, but stated, in the course chaser against a part of the purchase-money, and then of certain negotiations with the tenant for life, that he represents to the vendor, that he, the agent, had rewas not desirous of founding any specific claim, but he ceived the full amount of the purchase-money, and the could not but think due consideration ought to be had to the circumstance of the commission of waste. Duke vendor signs a receipt for the same, and executes a conveyance, the purchaser will still be liable for the amount of Leeds v. Earl Amherst, 10 Jur. 509-V. C. E. not actually paid to the agent, but retained in respect of the agent's debt. Young v. White, 7 Beav. 506. WILL. Instrument partially testamentary.]-An instrument may operate as a will, though it be only partially testamentary. So that, where a person, in the same inhim, and in his name, and to his use, to demand and restrument, appoints his mother to be his attorney for cover the possession or rent of a house, and to retain all proceeds for her own use, until his return to England; or, in the event of his death, he thereby assigns and delivers to her the sole claim to the property, to be held by her during her life, and disposed of by her at her death; the latter part of this is a valid will. Doe Cross v. Cross, 15 Law J. 217—Q. B. Sale of a term, with the advantage of an improved rent reserved on an underlease made by the termor after a mortgage of the whole term.]-If a termor for years, after mortgaging the whole term, and making default in payment of the mortgage debt at the time appointed, makes an underlease, and then agrees to sell the whole term, with the advantage of the improved rent reserved on the underlease, he can make a good title, if the mortgagee reconvey to him all his interest; for, the underlease, though originally by estoppel only, (the termor having parted with all his interest to the mortgagee), becomes a lease in interest by the reconveyanced. by the mortgagee. Webb v. Austin, 7 M. & Gr. 701, VESTED INTEREST. Publication.]-Where an attestation is made in this form, "We, the undersigned, attest to have seen the above testator sign the above will," it is sufficient eviLimitation to the testator's right heirs of his own dence that the will was published; for it is an attestaname.]-Wrightson v. Macaulay, 4 Hare, 487. This tion that the witnesses saw the testator sign what they case was sent for the opinion of the Court of Exche-knew to be his will; and hence it must be presumed, that quer: a statement of the point decided will be found in 10 Jur. 214. Necessity of surviving a prior taker.]-Where a testator gives the proceeds of his residuary property upon trust for such of the children of a person as may be living at the time of the decease of the tenant for life, and the issue of such of them as may be then dead, in equal shares, such issue respectively, however, only taking the share or shares which his, her, or their parent or parents would have taken, if living; and some of the children die leaving issue; and such issue also die in the lifetime of the tenant for life, such issue take a vested interest, transmissible to their representatives. Legon v. Coward, 10 Jur. 486-V. C. E. See "Contingent Interest," "Heir." WAIVER.-See "Waste," Case 2. WASTE. Cutting down pollard willow-trees.]-If a lessee for years cuts down pollard willow-trees, leaving the stools or butts, from which they will shoot afresh, it is not waste, where they are not timber by the custom of the country, and do not shelter or ornament the house, or protect the bank of a river, or are not intended as a permanent shade to beasts while depasturing. Phillips v. Smith, 14 Mee. & W. 589. by some words or acts he made known to them that it was his will; and by what words or acts is immaterial. Bartholomew v. Harris, 15 Law J. 166—V. C. E. TABLE OF CASES IN THIS PART OF THE Angell v. Angell, 15 Law J. 193, Q. B. [p. 439]. M. R. [p. 456]. v. Welsh, 4 Hare, 572. [p. 455]. Bartholomew v. Harris, 15 Law J. 166, V. C. E. [p. 457]. Beales v. Crisford, 13 Sim. 592. [p. 430]. Beaumont v. Reeve, 15 Law J. 141, Q. B. [p. 428]. Beck v. Barn, 7 Beav. 492. [p. 430]. Bennett v. Cooper, 10 Jur. 407, M. R. [p. 455]. Benson v. Lamb, 15 Law J. 218, M. R. [p. 456]. Beresford v. Archbishop of Armagh, 13 Sim. 643. [p. 451]. Bohn v. Bogue, 10 Jur. 420, V. C. E. [p. 431]. Bolton v. Ward, 4 Hare, 530. [p. 452]. Bradburne v. Botfield, 14 Mee. & W. 559. [p. 432]. Brooks v. Lord Lake, 10 Jur. 485, V. C. E. [p. 440]. Brown v. Bamford, 10 Jur. 447, L. C. [p. 451]. Equitable Waste by Tenant for Life.-Time fixed by Bush v. Shipman, 10 Jur. 507. [p. 456]. Buckle v. Fawcett, 4 Hare, 536. [p. 455]. the Statute of Limitations, not running till his death.Waiver of compensation for Waste.]-Where a tenant Campbell v. Campbell, 7 Beav. 482. [p. 429]. for life, without impeachment of waste, pulls down a Challen v. Shippam, 4 Hare, 555. [p. 456]. mansion, and cuts down the ornamental timber around Chambers v. Chambers, 10 Jur. 326. [p. 431]. it, and sells the materials and the timber, this is equit- Clogstown v. Wallcott, 13 Sim. 523. [p. 453]. able waste, although the inheritance may have been im-Coham v. Coham, 12 Sim. 639. [p. 440]. |