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No. 517-VOL. X.

DECEMBER 5, 1846.

PRICE 18.

*The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity:

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transfer would be made-and he thinks it ought to have been made by taking a given number of causes from the top downwards. If that process had been adopted, he would have got into another list, where he believes his cause would have been earlier disposed of. But, alas! the Lord Chancellor has followed some mystic rule of selection, taking a cause here and a cause there, so that some at the bottom of the list are transferred from the Vice-Chancellor of England's paper to another ViceChancellor's, and some at the top and in the middle, remain where they were.

Now, this aggrieved suitor has totally misunderstood the principle on which causes are transferred: they are not transferred for the direct purpose of expediting the hearing of any particular set of causes, but for the general expediting of business, by keeping all the branches of the court employed. Only, therefore, indirectly is the practice calculated or intended to bring forward the hearing of particular causes.

We do not set ourselves up for reformers of every alleged abuse in the law or the procedure of courts; neither do we affect to consider ourselves as called upon to take up the defence of the law, whenever it is attacked, justly or unjustly. But when we find the public totally misapprehending the ground and nature of some particular mode of proceeding in the despatch of legal business, we desire, so far as we can through the pages of this Journal reach the public mind, to disabuse it of its error. We have lately seen some remarks in a public journal, purporting to emanate from one of that class of persons called "Chancery suitors," a class with whom the public is, in general, disposed to have a most violent sympathy. The complaint of the individual suitor, to whose lament we refer, is directed against the new practice of transferring causes from the list of one of the Vice-Chancellors which may happen to be overloaded, to that of another which happens to be underloaded; and the particular ground of the complaint is, singularly enough, the very opposite of that which has been generally made against it. The general, and, as we think, well-founded complaint against the practice of transferring causes, is, that it forces a suitor out of the court which he has been permitted to choose, and has chosen, and out of the hands of the counsel that he rightly or wrongly has exercised his undoubted right to confide in, and has chosen, into another court, where he may, at the maturity of a suit, find himself in the hands of a judge and of counsel, to whom its birth is a mystery, and its adolescence an un-so, if its mere numerical position in the list had been known thing. But the complaint of our injured suitor is, that he is not transferred: he has got into the cause list of the Vice-Chancellor of England, whose list very heavy; and recently he had hugged himself with the notion, that, as there was to be a transfer, the VOL. X. UU

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But, adopting that as the general principle, the authorities on whom the arrangement of these matters depends, have not thought it right to break in upon private convenience, more than was necessary for effectuating the general purpose of not wasting the judicial strength of the court. Therefore, it has been made, as we believe, a rule, that, in selecting the causes to be transferred, regard has been had to certain circumstances, with a view to avoid, as far as possible, the mischiefs of a compulsory transfer. For instance, if briefs have been actually delivered in a cause, that cause is not transferred, although it might have been

considered. So, if both parties desire a cause to remain in the court in which it was originally set down, atten tion is paid, if possible, to that desire; and a selection is made upon these principles, not with a view to accelerate directly the relative period for the hearing of any

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cause, but with a view to distribute the causes among the several branches of the court, with as little damage to the conduct of causes as may be.

incidence of taxes, in order, if possible, to prevent the trying of so absurd an experiment as that of seeking to compensate in the reign of Victoria an injustice which, if it ever existed, was consummated in the 53rd of George III.

The operation of taxes in respect of their incidence may be stated in a few propositions, which are so simple and obvious that we should not be justified in bringing them forward and dwelling on them, if they had not But we may fairly assume that the subject, simple as been strangely overlooked in some recent discussions.

If causes were transferred simply with reference to their places on the list, as, for instance, the first dozen or so, it is manifest that no regard could be paid to any considerations of convenience. The result might, perhaps, be convenient to a very few suitors, viz. those whose causes are at the end of the transferred list, who might thus have their causes brought to a hear-it is, cannot be universally understood, when we find a ing earlier than would otherwise have happened. But to all those who stood at the upper end of the transferred list, as they would have stood already well for a speedy hearing without being transferred, they could gain little or nothing by the transfer in point of time, and would, or at any rate might, lose much in point of convenience and safety, and even incur great additional expense by having to instruct fresh counsel, probably without giving them sufficient time to master the cases thus suddenly brought before them.

That the whole system of transfer is clumsy, we do not deny; we have already before in these pages commented upon it, and suggested, as we now again suggest, that either the several branches of the court should be left to take their chance of business, according to the popularity that they can command, as is the case with the courts of common law; or else that causes should be set down in a regular order by the registrars, without any reference to the wishes of the parties, so as to divide the business compulsorily be tween the several branches of the court; but no transfer should ever take place, except by the consent of both parties. While, however, the present system does last, it is preposterous for any one, when he has selected his court, and come in at the end of a long list, of the length of which he is apprised, to complain of being wronged, not because the hearing of his cause is deferred, but because he is left in the list of his own selection.

committee of the House of Lords, selected (it is to be
supposed with regard to their qualification for the
task) to inquire and report on the very question before
us, returning, as the result and quintessence of their
investigations, such incoherencies as these:-
"It is evident that every compulsory charge levied
upon the land, and which becomes payable out of its
proceeds before any portion of them is available or ap-
plicable to the profits of the capital vested in it, must be
held to affect that capital*"

"Affect the profits of the capital," we suppose is the meaning. But this will not happen while the land yields rent; for the rent, being the surplus produce of the land after all expenses and the ordinary profits of capital are deducted, must bear every peculiar charge upon the land or its produce; a fact of which the authors of the report appear to be dimly conscious,-for to reduce the value of the net produce of the land below they go on to say: "If such charges are of a magnitude the average profits of capital, such capital would, in accordance with general principles, be withdrawn from the cultivation of the soil to be diverted into some other channel." Are we to infer, then, that the landowner ever allows the capitalist to reap more than the ordinary profits of capital? By no means; he is well aware, as the committee informs us, that "the cultiva tion of land will attract capital at a lower rate of interest than most other occupations;" and yet we are told, in the next paragraph, that "all charges levied upon the land, whether paid by owner or occupier, reduce the net profits of their joint capital invested in the cultiva

tion of it!"

"The land-tax," in the opinion of the committee, "is a burthen upon land, inasmuch as it must be deducted from the gross proceeds of the land before its

THE INCIDENCE OF TAXES.-BURTHENS ON net product can become available as profits of capital."

LAND.

In treating of the burthens on land, we do not mean to break our vow of political neutrality; on the con

trary, our object is to deprive the discussion of its political zest, by shewing that no established tax can possibly constitute a burthen on the owners of land, or of any other species of property. It has often been urged, that moveable and immoveable property do not contribute to the public revenue in just rateable proportion. That there is an inequality is generally admitted; but whether land or personalty is favoured is warmly debated. Going into detail, one party complains of the heavy duties on the administration of personal property, and calls for the repeal of this, or the imposition of a similar tax on real property passing by devise or descent. The landowner, justly alarmed, retorts, that this inequality is more than compensated by the great excess of the duties on conveyances of land over those on the transfer of personalty; and both parties concur in demanding a revision of the stamp laws. It is because we think, though on very different grounds, that there is a pressing necessity for an amendment of the stamp laws, and some probability of its being attempted, that we beg the attention of our readers to the theory of the

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The beginning and end of this apparently contradictory sentence may, perhaps, be reconciled by reading profits of capital" in the sense of "rent," a "nice derangement of epitaphs," by no means without a parallel in this extraordinary report.

burthen might be thought to be equally applicable to The same process which proves land-tax to be a the tithe rent; but the committee feel a lordly contempt for such economy of logic, and having inferred the landtax to be a burthen because it must be deducted from the gross proceeds of the land before they are netted, concluded that the tithe-rent must be a burthen, because (as they strangely assert) it is to be paid whether there is any produce or not. "The committee are of opinion that the tithe commutation rent-charge operates as a burthen on the land which is subject to it, inas much as a certain amount, measured in produce, must be paid, whatever may be the nature of the cultivation, or the return made by it."

Having treated the other burthens with the like felicity and cogency of logic, the committee proposes seven "remedies," the seventh being a repetition of certain experiments on the value of malted barley for fattening cattle.

Real Property. (Dom. Proc., 18th May, 1846).
* Report of the Select Committee on the Burdens affecting

Among the infinite variety of shapes which taxation may assume, it will be sufficient for our purpose to consider a few of extensive application-taxes on rent, on land, on profits, on capital, on wages, on commodities. To exclude ambiguity in the use of terms,-by "wages" we mean that share which the labourer obtains of the produce of his labour, remaining after the capital (including rent) expended in obtaining the product has been replaced. The residue is the profits of capital. It is unnecessary here to shew how this definition may be extended to include wages of what is called "unproductive labour." The ratio in which the net product of labour and capital is divided between the labourer and the capitalist, or the ratio of wages to profits, varies inversely as the ratio between the quantity of labour in the market and the quantity of labour which the existing capital is capable of fully employing. But the actual ratio in the standard (but indeterminate) case of an exact adaptation of the quantity of labour to the quantity of capital, is obviously incapable of à priori or exact determination. It is the result of a variety of physical and moral inducements, acting in various ways. By "rent" we mean that part of the produce of land which remains, after replacing the capital expended in cultivation, and paying the wages of the labour and the profits of the capital employed.

A tax upon rent will be borne by the landowner. It will not affect the profits of capital, because the landowner has no control over such profits. A tax upon land may be either a tax upon rent, a tax proportionate to the value of the land, (which is the same thing), or a tax varying with the acreage. In the latter case, as well as in the former, the landowner will pay the tax, for it will operate by diminishing rent, which is the surplus left after payment of all expenses, (including taxes), wages, and profits of stock. An acreage tax will also throw out of cultivation all land which, if untaxed, would yield less rent than the amount of the tax; but the details of the operation of such a tax must depend on the mode in which it is levied, and other circumstances. By throwing out of cultivation the most inferior lands, it will diminish the production, and tend to increase the price of agricultural produce; but as the price of other kinds of produce will also rise, it is obvious that (independently of foreign competition) the landowner will lose on the whole. A tax upon the produce of land will also stop the cultivation of the poorest land.

Taxes upon capital and upon profits are the same thing. They fall on the fund to be divided between the capitalist and the labourer, and must affect both profits and wages.

A tax upon wages is obviously the same thing as a tax upon profits: neither tax will affect the consumer as such, because the means of production, and the application of capital and industry, will not be interfered with, and the relative values of commodities will remain the same.

A tax upon all commodities or products of industry, is the same as a tax upon profits or wages: it diminishes the fund to be divided between the capitalist and the labourer, and falls upon those parties.

Rent is not affected by any tax upen capital, profits, wages, or produce, because it is the excess of the produce of land over the gross result obtainable from the same capital and labour otherwise employed.

The taxes we have been considering do not (except in case of an acreage tax on land, or a tax upon the produce of land) interfere with the application of industry, as taxes of a more restricted incidence may do. Most partial taxes, independently of their operation in restraining particular applications of industry, or modes of expenditure, may be referred to one or other of the general classes we have been considering.

A tax upon the sale of land falls chiefly on the seller. He cannot sell in the investment market, except at the real value of the land, and must pay the tax out of that value. But this circumstance makes it the interest of the landowner not to sell; and a buyer in want of the land will not generally induce him to sell, except by offering to pay all or part of the tax, in addition to the value of the land. The tax, therefore, operates as a restraint on sales.

Taxes on voluntary gifts, and on successions, fall on the donee or successor; but, inasmuch as they impair the ability of the owner to give or leave his property, the owner may be said also to feel their pressure.

Whenever a tax falls on the consumer, it operates in the same manner as a tax on his wages or his capital; for it is only out of his wages or his capital that he could have purchased the commodity.

It appears, then, that, as land, capital, and labour constitute the entire wealth of a country, its revenue can only be raised from one or more of these sources. The question remains, how is the pressure of the tax felt after it has once been imposed and settled?

Consider, first, taxes upon land. Suppose an estate of fifty acres, producing 1007. clear income, to be worth 2000l. A perpetual tax of 27. per annum is imposed on it, reducing its clear rental to 987., and its value to 1960. This is at once a confiscation of 401. for the service of the state. Thenceforth, the owner's income is so much smaller,—his estate is worth so much less. Its value to sell, to give, to leave, is permanently reduced. He sells, and the purchaser pays for a property worth only 19607.:-he dies, and transmits an inheritance of that value. The purchaser or heir, to whom it was never worth more, does not feel the tax. The evil was consummated and exhausted at the moment when the tax was imposed, just as if, instead of taking a perpetual rent-charge of 21., the government had set apart and appropriated to its own use one out of the fifty acres of the land itself,-which is very nearly what has been done where the land- tax has been redeemed.

A., the owner of the property, now sells it to B., & fundowner, who has never felt the pressure of the tax at all. B. sells out, and A. purchases, stock worth 1960. After this, further supplies are needed, and the Legislature, considering that the landowners are overtaxed, determines to give the fundowner a turn, and now levies 27. per cent. upon stock. How does this equitable adjustment of burthens operate in the individual case we have put? Simply to take from A., in his new character of fundowner, about 397., making, with the 40%. which he formerly contributed as landowner, a total confiscation of 791. B., the fundowner turned squire, escapes free on both occasions.

Past confiscations, like past blows, are felt by no one; and thus taxes upon land and upon existing capital do not constitute a permanent burthen. But taxes which include within their scope capital yet uncreated and wages yet unearned, carry a more enduring sting. The pressure of these taxes is felt from time to time, as the capital or wages on which they are imposed comes into existence, in the same way as if a new tax had been imposed, save only in the absence of the element of unexpectedness.

The moral to be drawn from the above investigation is sufficiently obvious. As all existing taxes on land and on existing capital are, no matter how unjustly imposed in the origin, not burthens on individuals or classes, but portions of the land and capital set apart for the public service, a remission of any of these taxes would be a wanton misapplication of public property for the benefit of particular classes. The land-tax, tithes, highway rates, income-tax on land and on existing stock in the funds, and in joint-stock companies, and other taxes of the like nature, can never, therefore, be remitted consistently with justice to the community. Commutation

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or modification, for the purpose of remedying any incon-practical a view as possible of a subject which is likely veniences incident to the collection of them in their pre- to become of so much interest and importance, and yet sent form, may be allowed, but not remission. On the one which, from its very nature, is at present, and for other hand, no new tax of partial incidence should be some years likely to remain, in an unsettled and unimposed, whether as a remedy for past injustice, or on 'certain state, it is proposed, in the following treatise, any other pretence. ' under such titles as may be deemed the best guides to the subject-matter they contain, first, to set out in full all the statutory enactments; then to give such comments thereon as may be deemed advisable; and, lastly, to set out all the common law collateral to, or bearing upon, the matters treated of under those titles, hoping, by these means, to anticipate and solve, as far as possible, the doubts and difficulties which are sure 6 to arise in a scheme so extensive as the present."

In another paper we shall endeavour to ascertain how far the vexatious restrictions of the stamp laws may be relaxed, without detriment to the interests of the public, or of particular classes. G. S.

Review.

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[Stevens & Norton. London, 1845.]

This is the first part of a work which, if continued in the same style, will probably become a standard book with those whose practice shall lead them within the atmosphere of the new county courts. Mr. Moseley has not hastened to snatch at the new statute, and to bring out, almost with the publication of the act itself, one of those things called editions of an act, with notes critical | and practical, but which are in general little more than a reprint of the act, with a few unlearned notes, merely twisting its phrases into some other phrases, not more intelligible than themselves, under pretence of explaining them. But he has set himself, in the spirit of an earnest writer, to expound the new statute, not only by a careful analysis of its enactments, but by collecting a great mass of common-law learning, bearing upon the jurisdiction of inferior courts in general, and upon the powers, duties, and liabilities of persons filling such judicial and official stations as are created by the new statute.

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According to Mr. Moseley, the new courts will be of a very nondescript character, and he suggests in limine speaking of the power of the Crown to create courts, a fertile cause of doubt as to their jurisdiction. After and of how that power is limited, and shewing, that, where courts are created accordant with the common law, all necessary authority will impliedly accrue to them, he proceeds thus:-"And no authority will arise but such as is absolutely necessary. For, as we have seen, though power of appointing officers for the execution of process is created by implication, no such power accrues to appoint an officer to execute a writ of inquiry to assess damages, for that might have been done by the court itself. (Metcalfe v. Worseley, 1 Roll. Abr. 526). And it is doubtful whether any process will be implied by law, other than process of common law, or whether the common law would imply anything in aid and assistance of a court whose proceedings were not according to the course of common law. As, if a court of conscience, or equity, or of civil law were created by act of Parliament, and power of issuing process or other necessary powers were omitted, it seems doubtful whether such power 'would be raised by common law. And, at least, it seems improbable that the common law would raise other powers than those existing at common law. And as the proceedings in the new county courts, as before observed, are partly not in accordance with the common law, there may be doubt as to whether any powers necessary for the carrying on the business of the court, and not contained in the statute, would arise to them by implication of law. But, as these courts are declared to be courts of record, and their powers and jurisdiction are to be the same as those of

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A work of this structure is a work of labour and thought, and deserves a very different measure of examination and consideration at the hands of the critic, from those meteoric productions of which we have before spoken. We shall therefore devote somewhat more of our space and criticism to Mr. Moseley's pages than we have done, or ever will do, to the ordinary class of editions, cum notis, of new statutes. Mr. Moseley's plan will be best understood by the explanation given of it in his Introduction, which we therefore transcribe:-the old county courts, except as altered, there would "By the 3rd section of the statute of the 8 & 9 Vict.be less room for any difficulty on this point with re

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c. 95, which, it is scarcely necessary to remark, is the 'statute on which the new county courts will chiefly 'depend, and which will therefore be referred to in the following work as 'the statute,' it is declared, that every court holden under this act shall have all the 'jurisdiction and powers of the county court for the recovery of debts and demands as altered by the act.' The effect of this enactment would appear to be not only to give all the powers and jurisdiction of the old county court to the new county court, subject to the express or implied alteration by statute, but also all the law and practice attached to the use of such juris'diction and practice, subject to the alteration by the statute. For the latter will pass as inseparable from the former, and it would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature intended to give the powers without the duties that are incumbent on the use of them. It will therefore follow, that the jurisdiction and the 'power, and the law and practice by which such juris<diction and power were regulated, of the new county courts, is partly that which is contained in the statute and partly that which exists at common law, because the common law was peculiarly that of the old county

'court.

"In order, then, to obtain as scientific as well as

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spect to these courts than courts of conscience." So that, if Mr. Moseley's doubt is well founded, and we think it is, the judges of the new courts will probably not proceed far, before finding that the act does not tell them what they are to do; and they cannot infer it from the common law.

We would wish particularly, also, to call to the fol lowing passage the attention of those gentlemen who may be ambitious of sitting in the new judicial seats, indulging themselves in the dream that they will have nothing to do but to study the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, and to deal out pure moral justice, unencumbered by form, and untrammelled by rules of practice. If Mr. Moseley is right, they will carry with them to the judgment seat the whole of the law and practice of the old county courts, in which case we can only say they will fairly earn their salaries of 12007. per annum. But let us hear Mr. Moseley on this point.

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"It were difficult to give any legal definition of the new county courts, such as they appear to be from the ' above enactments. They are not, indeed, entitled to the name of county courts in its strict sense, for the fact of their being courts of record, and of some of 'their proceedings being so utterly at variance with the common law, as the trial by five jurymen, and, in

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some cases, by none at all, would disqualify them from 'such appellation. And yet, by the 3rd section, they are declared to be county courts, except as altered by "the act. On the whole, however, the new county courts may be said to be inferior courts of record, the 'law and practice of which is regulated partly by common law and partly by statute. For, as it is declared that they are to have the powers and jurisdiction of the county court for the recovery of debts and de'mands as altered by this act,' it is presumed that they 'will be the same in those respects as the old county 'court, except as so altered. And, as they are to have 'all the power and jurisdiction of the old county courts, 'it would appear that they will also have all the law 'and practice by which such powers were regulated in 'the old county courts as incidental thereto, except so 'far as altered expressly or impliedly by the act; for it could never have been intended by the Legislature 'to give them the power and jurisdiction of the old county courts without the corresponding duties and obligations incumbent on the use of it. But as, by the 6th section, all former acts of Parliament, so far as the same affect the jurisdiction and practice of the courts established by the act, are repealed, there is some doubt whether all the law of the old 'county courts, so far as the same arose by statute and 'concerned the practice and jurisdiction of the same, 'is not repealed so far as the new county courts are 'concerned. But the statute concerning the oaths necessary to be taken by officers, and the statute concerning the sale of offices, all of which are so important in all courts, are, probably in neither case, statutes 'within the description of statutes affecting the juris'diction or practice of the court, and will be as binding on the officers of the new county courts as upon the 'former ones. "The importance of the 3rd section, which assimilates 'the new county courts to the old ones, is extreme, as 'it has the effect of letting in the whole common law, 'which was peculiarly that of the old county court, as applicable to the new county courts, subject to the express alterations of the act, and thereby has the 'effect of elucidating and filling up, as it were, those imperfections and oversights which must ever exist in 'so extensive a scheme as that contained in the present 'measure for local jurisdiction. And although the practice and framework of the new county courts 'bears but little resemblance to that of the old county courts at common law, yet, as all the general principles ' of common law are not merely applicable to commonlaw practice, but to most legal proceedings, they will be found more extensive in the application to the new courts than it would at first appear. And these express 'provisions of the statute are the more necessary, as 'common law could be applied in aiding and assisting there is some doubt whether the general principles of in the carrying out of jurisdictions, which, in some points of view, were diametrically opposed to it, like courts of conscience and courts of equity, to the former of which these new courts, in some points, and, indeed, 'entirely in matters below 40s., resemble."

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Mr. Moseley proceeds to treat of the courts, shewing, in conjunction with the enactments of the statute, the common law, as to when and where courts may be held, &c. He then proceeds to treat largely of the officers of the court-of their appointment, of their oaths of office, of their interest in their office, of their duties, their fees, and their offences: and on all these subjects he pursues steadily his plan, of stating the effect of the new enactments, so far as they can be expounded before any cases have arisen upon them; and of collecting a great deal of common-law learning bearing upon the different subjects of disquisition. The first part stops here; and we must look forward to the publication of the remainder, for the discussion of that which will be

more important to the practitioner, viz. the procedure of the new courts. On this part of the subject, we presume Mr. Moseley will not enter, until the judges shall, pursuant to the 78th section, have framed the general rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of the county courts. In the meantime, we recommend those who intend to practise, or in any way to connect themselves with the new courts, to procure the part of Mr. Moseley's work that we have here noticed, assuring them that they will find in it solid and practical information, such as they will find it useful to recollect in their county court practice.

Court Papers.

EQUITY CAUSE LISTS, AFTER MICHAELMAS TERM, 1846.

The following abbreviations have been adopted to abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occupied:-4. Abated-Adj. Adjourned-A. T. After Term-Ap. Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-C. Costs-D. Demurrer-E. Exceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro Confesso-Pl. Plea-Ptn. Petition-R. Re-hearing-S. 0.

Stand Over-Sh. Short.

Court of Chancery.

Before the LORD CHANCELLOR. APPEALS.

Strickland v. Strickland

(Ap)

Ditto v. Boynton
Ditto v. Strickland
Dalton v. Hayter (Ap) To fix
a day

Att.-General v. Masters and
Wardens, &c. of the City of
Bristol (Ap)

Black v. Chaytor (Ap) S O

Johnson v. Reynolds (F D by order) S O

Lord v. Wightwick (Ap, M) Trail v. Bull (Ap)

Stocken v. Dawson (4 ca., Ap)
SO

Watts v. Hyde (Ap) S.O
Walford v. Adie

Adie v. Walford (Ap)

Morison v. Morison (Ap)
Davis v. Chanter (Ap)

Macmahon & Burchell }(
}(Ap)

Ditto v. Ditto
Att.-Gen. v. Mayor, &c. of
Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Ap)
Joynson v. Moseley (Ap)
Bainbridge v. Baddeley (Ap)

De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir
(Ap)
Finden v. Stephens (Ap)

Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND. PLEAS, DEMURRERS, CAUSES, and Further DIRECTIONS. Heath v. Chadwick (D) Chambers v. Waters (E) Thelluson v. Lord Rendlesham Smith v. Robinson (D) Foster v. Vernon (F D, C) Vale v. Sherwood (7 causes, F D, C) Haffenden v. Wood (E) Branscomb v. Branscombe (F D, C) Stammers v. Halliby (3 ca., F D)

Tibbs v. Rushbrook (PI) Terry v. Wacher (part heard) Simpson v. Holt (F D, C)

Garrod v. Moor

Morrison v. Watkins
Smale v. Bickford (2 causes)
Wright v. Barnewell (E, FD)
Walton v. Morritt
Greenway v. Buchanan

Peacock v. Kernot

Dobson v. Lyle (F D, C)
Parker v. Hawkes (E)
Giffard v. Withington
Daniel v. Hill
Insole v. Featherstonhaugh
Lane v. Durant (E, F D)
Pocock v. Johnson
Cope v. Lewis
Attorney-Gen. v. Trevelyan
Stert v. Cooke

Hodgkinson v. Barrow (FD,C)
Colbourn v. Coling
Hickson v. Smith (at deft.
request)

Palmer v. Pattison (F D, C)
Minter v. Wraith (FD, cause)
Hemming v. Spiers (E)

Ditto v.

Battye (by order) Dorville v. Wolff (F D, C) Richards v. Patterson (F D, C) Woodman v. Madgen (F D, C) Attorney-Gen. v. Pearson (E, FD)

Dawson v. Chappell (F D, C)
Wait v. Horton (F D, C)
Montague v. Cator (F D, cau.)
Groom v. Stinton (4 causes)
Corbett v. Limbrick (F D, C)
Baxter v. Abbott (F D, C)
De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir
(F D, C)
Beale v. Warder (Re-hearing)
Turner v. Simcock (F D, C)
Booth v. Lightfoot (F D, C)
Ludlow v. Guilleband (F D,
C)
Howell v. Saer

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