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No. 519–Vol. X. DECEMBER 19, 1846.
PRICE 18. *** The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and
decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity :
SA. Gordon, Esq. of the Inner Vice-Chancellor Wigram's SF. FISHER, Esq. of Lincoln's House of Lords ...... "newl Temple, Barrister at Law. . Court ..............1 Inn, Barrister at Law.
SG.J. P.Smith, Esq. of the Inner Privy Council ........
ACL Temple, Barrister at Law. 1 Inner Temple, Barrister at Law.
SA. V. KIRWAN, Esq. of Gray's The Lord Chancellor's S A. GORDON, Esq. of the. Inner
Queen's Bench Bail Court
au cours Inn, Barrister at Law. Court ..............1 Temple, Barrister at Law. Court of Common Pleas, D. POWER, Esq. of Lincoln's
Appeals under Registra- | W. PATERSON, Esq. of Gray's
tion of Voters Act.... J Inn, Barristers at Law. Tenison EDWARDS, Esq. of the
Sw.M. Best, Esq. of Gray's Inn, Vice-Chancellor of Eng- Inner Temple, and
Court of Exchequer .... Barrister at Law. .. land's Court ........) CHARLES MARETT, Esq. of the Ecclesiastical and Admi. SJ. P. DEANE, D.C.L. of Doctorsy Inner Temple, Barristers at Law.
ralty Courts ........l Commons. Vice Chancellor Knights W.W. COOPER, Esq. of the Inner || Court of Review ......
s W.W.COOPER, Esq. of the Inner Bruce's Court........l Temple, Barrister at Law.
Temple, Barrister at Law.
LONDON, DECEMBER 19, 1846. | tions and entries by deceased persons; having pre
viously (p. 205, note 1) intimated that the case of THERE are several cases in our reports relative to the Doe v. Pettett appeared to belong to that class. “On admissibility in evidence of the declarations of persons several cases,” he says, “the declarations have been in possession of land explanatory of the character of made by tenants, where they have stated that they paid their possession, the principle of which is sometimes, as rent to particular persons. In these cases, the declaraWe have had occasion to observe, misapprehended, and tions have been considered as made against interest, in, their application supposed to be less extensive than it asmuch as possession is prima facie evidence of a seisin really is. Of these, the first in point of time is Peace- in fee, and therefore the declaration of the possessor that able v. Watson, (4 Taunt. 16, 17), where it was laid he is tenant to another makes against his interest." down by Mansfield, C. J., that, as possession is primâ Now, declarations of deceased persons are admissible facie evidence of seisin in fee-simple, the declaration of where the persons are to be presumed conusant of the the possessor that he is tenant to another makes most subject-matter of the declarations, and where the destrongly against his own interest, and, consequently. I clarations apparently operate against their own interest. is admissible. Next, in Doe v. Pettett, (6 B. & Ald. It is presumed that such declarations are entitled to 223), it was held, that the declarations of a widow in credit, because the regard which men pay to their own possession of premises, that she held them for her life, interests may safely be considered as a sufficient guaand that after her death they would go to the heirs of her rantee against their prejudicing themselves by any husband, were admissible evidence to negative the fact erroneous statement; and the assumed tendency of the of her having had twenty years'adverse possession. The declarations precludes the possibility of any fraudulent widow was dead; but that fact is not alluded to in the one. (Phillips & Amos, 8th ed., p. 308; Greenleaf on judgment, the evidence being treated as admissible to ex- Evid., sect. 148; Sussex Peerage case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85). plain the nature of her possession. Further, in Carne v. And being admitted simply on the ground of their Nicholl, (1 Bing. N. C. 430), it was held, that a witness being against the interest of the party making them, might be asked as to expressions which had fallen from and not being receivable until after his death, it is ima deceased occupier of the premises in question, touch-material whether or not they were made in the performing the party under whom he held them. And in ance of a duty, in the course of business, or accompanyChambers v. Bernasconi, (1 C. & J. 457), Lord Lynd- ing an act done. These circumstances are frequently, hurst says, “Possession is prima facie evidence of own- indeed, found in combination with the fact of the deership, and a tenant's declaration is evidence as cutting claration or entry (which is but a written declaration) down-the fee.” Now, in the first three of the above- being against interest, but they are none of them essenquoted cases, the person whose declarations were offered tial to its admissibility on the latter ground; and inin evidence was dead, which circumstance appears to stances exist of declarations of deceased persons being have caused the misapprehension as to the ground of admitted simply on the ground of their beinr aprint admitting them. Mr. Phillips, in his Book on Evi- the interest of the parties making them. *** dence, (vol. 1, p. 316), classes them amongst the ex- | in Higham v. Ridgway, (10 East, 109), th.
.. ceptions to hearsay, evidence afforded by declara- 'on the subject, and in many others since uci VOL. X.
its authority, but which we need not here particularly on this ground, we apprehend, and not as being made refer to. But there are deelarations the admission of l against interest, that declarations by persons in poswhich does not properly constitute any exception to session of land ought to be admitted. Indeed, it is the rule which rejects hearsay evidence,-declarations so put in Doe v. Peitetë, above referrea i. And if which are admitted, not as hearsay evidence of the facts we are right in this, it follows that the declarations declared, but as being themselves original and independ- may be proved without calling the person who made ent facts*.
them, though he be alive and capable of being proNow, a declaration, made by a person whilst in pos- duced. In the case of declarations against interest, session of land, explanatory of the nature of that pos- the party making them must be dead. They are adsession, is to be admitted as being part of the fact of mitted principally upon the presumption of his knowpossession. If made after the possession has ceased, it ledge of the fact declared, and as the best proof that may be admissible, if against the interest of the party can be had after his death. If alive and capable of making it at the time of doing so; as a declaration by a being produced, he must be examined as to his knowperson who has quitted possession of land, that he owes ledge of the facts declared. But the admissibility of deanother person rent for it, which would be evidence after clarations accompanying an act depends upon no such his death of the fact of his having been a tenant. But, presumption. As the act which they accompany may when made during the possession, it is in itself an ori- be proved by those who witnessed it, without calling ginal and independent fact, forming part of the com- the person whose act it is, so the declarations may be pound fact of possession; and wherever the simple fact proved by those who hear them. It does, indeed, of possession may be proved, the declarations accom- generally happen, that the occupier, whose declarations panying it, and which, with it, make up the entire pos- are offered in evidence, is dead; otherwise it would not session, may be proved, not as hearsay, but as in- be necessary to resort to such evidence: but Doe v. dependent facts; and it may be thus illustrated:- Rickarby (5 Esp. 4) affords an instance of such eviSuppose a person entering upon land, declares at the dence being admitted, though the person was alive, and time that he does so as tenant, it will not be denied might have been called as a witness. that such a declaration is admissible, not as being We might enlarge upon this subject, were it conagainst his interest, but as forming part of the act of sistent with the scope and design of a leading article; entry, and giving to it its true character. A person but we have, we trust, said enough to point the attenmay enter upon land for a variety of objects, and under tion of our readers to it. & variety of titles, and we must therefore look to what he says at the time, to ascertain for what object, or
Rebiews. under what title, he does so; but the remaining in possession of land is of the same nature. Why does he
On the Principles of Criminal Law. remain in possession, and under what claim of right?
William Pickering. 1846.] What he says upon this subject must be regarded! Thi
egaruea This, which is one of a series of brief treatises on vanot as being said against interest, but because the rious subjects, is a meritorious attempt towards the remaining in possession cannot have its true char- solution of a problem, the difficulty of which is conacter ascribed to it without doing so t. And it is stantly becoming more acknowledged. The true objects
of punishment for offenees against the laws of society, * The distinction is pointed out in the following passage
are now generally recognised; but what modes of pufrom the chapter on hearsay evidence in Professor Greenleaf's nishment ought to be adopted are still matters of conexcellent treatise, (sect. 100): “Before we proceed any further troversy. The author, after pointing out what is the in the discussion of this branch of evidence, it will be proper practical working of the present system, proceeds to to distinguish more clearly between hearsay evidence and that state in what respects he considers it might be amended which is deemed original; for it does not follow, because the to secure the two great objects of punishment—the prewriting or words in question are those of a third person, not vention of crime, and, at the same time, the reformation under oath, that therefore they are to be considered as hear- ( of the criminal." say. On the contrary, it happens in many cases that the With respect to juvenile offenders especially, the very fact in controversy is, whether such things were written
punishment of whom, he truly says, is one of the or spoken, and not whether they were true; and in other cases,
most difficult problems of criminal legislation, he such language or statements, whether written or spoken, may be the natural or inseparable concomitants of the principal fact
proposes, including in the class all offenders under sixin controversy. In such cases it is obvious that the writings
teen years of age, “as a second degree of punishor words are not within the meaning of hearsay, but are original l'ment, deportation from England to a colony, say and independent facts, admissible in proof of the issue."
• Canada, where, in asylums properly constituted for * " Where a declaration accompanies an act, it is frequently that purpose, they might receive education, be taught admissible as part of the act itself. Such declarations, it wiú /' trades, and, after a time of probation had elapsed, and be seen, are more frequently used as collateral or indirect evi. 'by their labour they had contributed towards defraydence, from which some other fact is to be inferred, than as ' ing the expense of their maintenance and teaching, direct evidence of a fact, and as such will be afterwards consi- ' might be allowed in that same colony to live free men, dered. Suffice it to observe, for the present, that declarations supported by their own exertions." are usually admissible where the fact which they accompany is We abstain from quoting the passages in which the material and admissible, and where the nature and quality of the act are also material; for, in such instances, a de referrible to this principle in all cases where the nature and claration accompanying the act may either be regarded as quality of an act of ownership or dominion, or of the pospart of the act itself, or as the most proximate and satis- session, is questioned, and requires explanation; and w factory evidence for explaining and illustrating the fact." the nature and quality of the possession are questioned, and (Starkie on Evidence, vol. I, p. 34). “To this head also contemporary declaration of the party doing the act, or of toc the admissibility of declarations by tenants has sometimes party in possession, serves to elucidate and explain the nati been referred, and it seems that such declarations are clearly and quality of such an act or possession." (Id. 352).
suthor points out the advantages which this would have in which one was agent for the other, for the purposes over a similar asylum in England, as we think the of all preliminary proceedings necessary to enable them whole work deserves to be read, and its length is not to obtain an act: or that the fact of their being co-prosuch as to deter any one from doing so. Suffice it to 'moters of the scheme, coupled with the fact that no say, that, in conjunction with a better system of classi- ' money was supplied for the expenses of it, was evidence fication of untried offenders, so as to prevent the juve- 'to go to the jury, that each authorised the other to nile from being corrupted by association with the contract for those purposes, on his behalf and that of adult, it offers many advantages over the present sys- the other promoters-it was insisted that where there tem, (Parkhurst included), and seems to tend more was no other evidence than the mere fact of the detowards the attainment of the true objects of punish- ' fendant having already agreed to be a provisional comment. The following concluding passage of the workm ittee-man, there was a sufficient case, or at least a may be deservedly quoted, explaining, as it does, the case for the consideration of the jury to prove an ausentiments and design of its author:
thority given by the defendant to every other commit“I have now reviewed all the offences of which our tee-man to give the order, out of which the contract law takes cognisance. In many of the punishments 'arose, by himself, or by the solicitor or secretary or alterations have been suggested, which are put for-'an authority to such solicitor or secretary to give it on *ward in the belief that they will bear the two great behalf of the committee. tests which ought to be applied to all provisions of this “We think that no such consequence follows as matnature, i.e. that while they would lead to the preven-' ter of law from the mere fact of the defendant agreeing tion of crime, they would at the same time reform the 'to be a provisional committee-man-such an agreecriminal.
'ment amounts to no more than a promise that he would “Hitherto, with very rare exceptions, no one has act with other persons appointed or to be appointed for paid any attention to the general condition of offend-' the purpose of carrying some particular scheme into *ers against the laws. Some great crime, perhaps, con- effect: the term “committee" means an individual,
contrates for a time a morbid interest upon the indi-' or a body to which others have committed or delegated 'vidual who has committed it; but this is the result of a particular duty, or who have taken on themselves 'mere curiosity for the most part, which is soon ex- to perform it in the expectation of their acts being conhausted, and no beneficial result ensues: the subject formed by the body they profess to represent or act for is, in itself, a distasteful one; no man likes to contem-1-an agreement to be a committee-man is an agreement plate the degradation of his species, and the malefactor to become one of that body. The schemes may be va' is, by general consent, put out of remembrance. It'rious--to establish an hospital, or place of emigration, ' is only thus that the system of wholesale transporta-' to which persons are to subscribe merely for charitable
tion, with all its moral evils, could have gone on so'motives; or partly from these motives, partly from long without an attempt at any amendment: year 'others; or a proprietary school, or literary institution, after year thousands of wretches were removed from or assembly-room in which they are to be beneficially England to perpetrate the same or worse crimes else l'interested as shareholdersor to obtain an act for a 'where, and the public was satisfied. The Archbishop • bridge, drainage, railroad or canal: but whatever the
of Dublin at last laid open its horrors before the objects may be it seems to us to make little or no dif* Lords, many of whom acknowledged that they were ference in the position of the person agreeing to act as unaware till then of what had been the state of things, ' a committee-man, if the object of some most or all, is and to his efforts must be attributed the present im | gain to themselves individually—the legal consequence provement in the system. To a certain degree, there is the same, as if the object of the parties were the most 'fore, he has been successful, but more-much morem charitable and benevolent; though the result may be remains to be done.”
practically very different, in exciting an improper pre‘judice in the minds of a jury; when the evidence is laid
before them for their consideration. Such an intended A Consideration of the Judgment of the Court of Ex
chequer, in Reynell v. Lewis and Wyld v. Hopkins, or loss which is the characteristic of a partnership: it 8. By A BARRISTER of the Middle Temple.
| 'would be absurd to suppose that such a relation could
Sweet, 1846.] be meant to be created by any of those who consented to Towards the settlement of the law affecting the lia-'act-could it be imagined that a person would agree to bility of persons promoting schemes for companies, one be a partner not only with those who were then named rule is laid down in the cases above referred to, viz. | 'committee-men but any that should afterwards be that the mere relation of co-provisional committee-men named by themselves, or by the projector of the comdoes not constitute a partnership or quasi partnership 'pany, and could those who subsequently agreed to bebetween such persons; and that therefore, to make one come members, suppose that those previously named of such persons liable for the contracts entered into by could ever have so intended ? The truth is the agreeanother with third persons, there must be something 'ment to become a provisional committee-man means more-acts or circumstances which shew agency, ex-l' neither more nor less, than what the words express : clusive of the relation of co-provisional committee- viz. an agreement to act on the provisional committee, men.
‘in carrying into effect the preliminary arrangements It is observed upon this doctrine by the writer of the for petitioning Parliament for a bill and so to propamphlet now before us, that the omission, in the judg- mote the scheme. If afterwards the provisional comment in Reynell v. Lewis and Wyld v. Hopkins, of all mittee-man does act, he is responsible for his acts." reference to the Act for the Registration of Joint-stock Whether this doctrine will be acquiesced in, whether Companies, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, is, to say the least, re- it is not inconsistent, if not with the natural relation markable; and undoubtedly it is remarkable, that, in between co-provisional committee-men, at any rate a judgment upon cases involving proceedings necessa- with that parliamentary relation which the language rily affected by that act, no notice of its provisions of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, establishes between them, we should have occurred.
venture humbly to express a doubt; and that we are “It is contended," (says the court, in Wyld v. Hop- not singular in our doubt, appears by the publication kins, see 10 Jur. p. 973), “ (and that formed the chief of the pamphlet above referred to, in which the author
part of Mr. Martin's argument and a part of that of suggests some reasons why the doctrine of Wyld v. others) that the relation of co-provisional committee-Hopkins should not be thought conclusive. It can 'men constituted an association or a quasi co-partnership, scarcely be disputed, that provisional committee-men
are promoters of an undertaking within the meaning of say, that persons forming members of a body who the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110. The words of the act are: “ The put their names in a return which they know is to be expression promoter or promoters of a company' to open for inspection, can do so with any other view, or apply to every person acting, by whatever name, in the can at any rate pretend that they do not view as a forming and establishing of a company at any period probable consequence, that their names will be looked prior to the company obtaining a certificate of com to and relied upon by those who deal with the body of plete registration.” The court, in Wyld v. Hopkins, which they constitute individual parts. Documents distinguishes between a person merely agreeing to become inrolled, and which any person has a right to inspect a provisional committee-man, and acting as a commit-on payment of a fee, are, we believe, considered as tee-man. But, whatever may be the abstract correct- published in point of law; as, for instance, an invenness of that distinction, it is submitted that it does not tion described in a specification duly inrolled, is pubaffect the question, whether a person agreeing to become lished, so as to avoid a patent afterwards taken for it; a committee-man, is or is not a promoter within the not because it is the subject of the patent to which meaning of the act. For though the act uses the word the particular specification refers, (for it may happen “ acting," the expression is not acting in committee or that it is not included in the patent), but because any in any other particular way, but acting in the forming and person may inspect the specification; and therefore the establishing a company. Now, as agreeing to become a public has notice of its contents. We apprehend, then, member of a provisional committee is an act of some that, by force of the provisional registration, the prosort, and as it seems to us impossible to say that the moters of a company do hold out to the public, as much formation of a committee is not a step in the forma- as if they circulated a specific prospectus, the facts tion of the company, it follows, that he who agrees to contained in the return, that is, at least, that they are be a member of a provisional committee, does act in promoters. Next comes the question, whether, as proforming and establishing a company, and is therefore moters, they are intended by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 to & promoter of the company.
be partners, or at least to be quasi partners, for the purNext, let us see what is the effect of provisional regis-pose of being jointly liable; for we fully subscribe to tration with reference to what is thereby held out to the what is said by the court in Wyld v. Hopkins, that, "if -public. It seems to be assumed by the court, in Wyld v. the prospectus state merely the names of the provisional
Hopkins, that the effect of a person merely constituting committee, and nothing more, and no right can be derived himself a provisional committee-man, is different from from the context, that circumstance does not alter the that of his holding himself out as such in terms to the liability of the defendant. If not responsible as being public. “But," says the court, in the passageimmediately one of that committee in fact, he cannot become so by following the one already quoted, “There are other cases, the representation of the fact." But the question, not, ' in which the question does not assume so simple a form, as it would seem, adverted to by the court in this importand where there is evidence that the defendant has not ant judgment, is, whether, by the fact of being a proonly consented to be a provisional committee-man, but visional committee-man, viz. & promoter, & person is has authorised his name to be inserted in a prospectus, not, by force of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, (whatever he not generally, but a particular prospectus, in which, in might be dehors that act), a partner with his co-prosome cases, certain persons are described as the acting / visional committee-men? And we shall refer to a . committee; in others, solicitors are named, or en clause of the statute, the language of which seems to
gineers, or a secretary. If such a prospectus has been us to be scarcely intelligible, unless the Legislature in680 publicly circulated, with the defendant's consent, tended to treat the promoters of a company as partners, • that the jury would presume the plaintiff knew of it, or, at least, as jointly liable. We do not lay much • or if the plaintiff has had it shewn to him, at or before stress on the circumstance, that the promoters are ge
the time of making the contract, and has in either case nerally spoken of in the plural- not every promoter acted upon it, the question is, what inference ought a severally, but the promoters jointly; though, perhaps, reasonable man to draw from the contents of that even that circumstance is not without its weight. But
when we come to the 23rd clause of the act, which deThe court, therefore, it would seem, considered, that | fines the powers and privileges of companies on proon proof of the specific circulation of a specific pros- visional registration, we find it enacted, that it shall be pectus, it might be left to the jury to presume, and that lawful for the promoters, among other things, to open a jury might presume, that the plaintiff had notice of subscription lists, to allot shares, to receive deposits, the facts appearing by such prospectus. Now, let us to perform such other acts only as are necessary for consider what is the effect, for the purpose of publica- constituting the company, or for obtaining letters-pation, of provisional registration, and its consequences. tent, or a charter, or an act of Parliament; and, with
The return to be made under the 4th clause of the regard to railway undertakings, and the like, to enter act, before publication, by any prospectus or otherwise, into contracts for services in making surveys, and per. of the intention to form a company, is of the names of forming all other acts necessary for obtaining an act of the promoters, with their occupations, places of busi- incorporation, &c. ness, and residences; and after or before such publica Now, is it intended by this section that each protion of “ the names of the members of the committee moter shall be at liberty to do the several things men
or other body acting in the formation of the company, tioned on his own sole responsibility; or is it intended together with a written consent on the part of every that the promoters, as a body, may do them? The such member or promoter to become such; and also a former can hardly be the intention; for, to enable each written agreement, on the part of such member or pro- promoter respectively to render himself liable, it would moter, entered into with some one or more persons as not have been necessary for the statute to have spoken trustees for the said company, to take one or more shares at all. He might have done so in the absence of any
in the proposed undertaking, which must be signed by enactment; and so might all the promoters together, • the member or promoter whose agreement it purports if, on every occasion of doing any act, they all concurred • to be.” And, by the 18th clause, all these returns in the act. The enactment of the 23rd section is thereare open to public inspection. The effect of this is, fore surplusage, unless it meant to give to the promoters we apprehend, both in point of law and in point of as a body some other characters and some other powers common sense, that all persons dealing with a provi- than those of a set of individuals capable each separately sional committee have notice of the constitution of that of binding himself; and, unless it meant to give to them committee. No other object scarcely of the right of the character of persons jointly liable, and capable seinspection can be conceived; and it seems strange to I verally of binding the body, it was entirely unneces
sary, and can be held to have meant nothing. We HENRY TATTERSALL, Globe Brewery, New Wharf. conclude, that, by the 23rd section of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. road, Battlebridge, Middlesex, common brewer, dealer and 110, it was intended that the promoters of a company chapman, (lately carrying on business as a coachmaker at should be capable of doing the acts specified as a body,
Cardington-st., Hampstead-road, Middlesex), Dec. 26 at after the manner of partners, and that therefore they
11, and Jan. 30 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. are quasi partners, for the purpose at least of binding
Ass. Green; Sol. Wilson, Aldermanbury.-Fiat dated
Dec. 12. the body by the acts of any member of it, done con
THOMAS TAYLOR, Headbourne Worthy, Southampton, sistently with the enactment. In aid of this construc
blacksmith and coal merchant, dealer and chapman, Dec. tion may be pressed the first declaration of the section,
23 and Jan. 21 at half-past 12, Court of Bankruptcy, Lon. that the promoters may assume the name of the in
don: Off. Ass. Johnson ; Sol. Buchanan, Basinghall-street. tended company. It would be singular to enable se - Fiat dated Dec. 11. veral persons to call themselves a company,-that is, a WILLIAM TOMS and JOHN MATTHEWS, Hungerpartnership,--and yet, at the same time, to say, that gerford, Berkshire, brewers, dealers and chapmen, Dec. 24 they are not to have the qualities and liabilities of a at 2, and Jan. 28 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London : partnership
Off. Ass. Bell; Sol. Bishop, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. The writer whose pamphlet has suggested these in-.
- Fiat dated Dec. 5. quiries, taking the same general views that we have
JOHN NEWBY, Leicester, haberdasher, dealer and chap. here offered, urges further, in support of them, the
man, Jan. 1 and 29 at half-past 11, District Court of Bank. intention of the statute, as it is to be collected from the
ruptcy, Nottingham : Off. Ass. Bittleston; Sols. Smithe, expressed intentions of its framers, in reference to the
Birmingham ; Hoskins, Loughborough; Holme & Co.,
New.inn, London.-Fiat dated Dec. 8. report of the committee on joint-stock companies. In | HENRY PEERS, Birkenhead, Cheshire, stonemason and this argument we cannot agree with him. The inten builder, Jan. 1 and 19 at 12, District Court of Bankrupt. tion of the statute must be collected from its own lan
cy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Bird; Sols. Atkinson, Liverpool; guage; what the report of the committee on which it Vincent, Temple, London.-Fiat dated Dec. 10. is founded may have said, or thought, or done, is quite WILLIAM JONES, Liverpool, boiler maker, iron boat inadmissible as evidence to expound the statute. This builder, blacksmith, dealer and chapman, Jan. 1 and 19 at pamphlet contains, however, other arguments of some 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool : Off. Ass. force, in favour of considering provisional committee
Turner; Sols. Almond, Liverpool; Bridger & Blake, Lon. men as quasi partners, independently of the statute; don-wall, London.-Fiat dated Dec. 9. and, referring our readers to a perusal of it for these
mercat it for the FREDERICK WILLIAM FARLEY, Liverpool, hatter, and other arguments in opposition to the doctrine lately
dealer and chapman, Dec. 31 and Jan. 15 at li, District laid down by the Court of Exchequer, we shall, for
Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool : Off. Ass. Cazenove ; Sols.
Hetherington & Co., Liverpool ; Keightley & Co., Chan. the present, conclude our observations on the liabilities
cery-lane, London.-Fiat dated Dec. 9. of provisional committee-men.
JAMÉS SUTCLIFFE, Habergham Eaves, near Burnley, C. S. D. Whalley, Lancashire, cotton spinner, dealer and chapman,
Jan. 4 and 20 at 12, District Court of Bankrupety, Man. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
chester : Off. Ass. Pott; Sols. Hisson & Robinson, Man.
chester; Shaw & Artindale, Burnley ; Scott & Tabourdin, . Dec. 17. -Lord Denman, C. J., delivered the judg- I RICHARD WHITE, Thorney-close, and Sunderland, Dur
Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.-Fiat dated Dec. 8. ment of the court in the following cases:
ham, merchant, Dec. 30 at 12, and Feb. 8 at 1, District Reg. o. The Inbabitants of St. Paul, Covent-garden-Order Court of Bankruptcy, Newcastle-upon-Tyne : Off. Ass. of sessions confirmed.
Baker ; Sols. Young & Harrison, Sunderland ; Maples & Reg. o. The Commissioners of Sewers-Rule discharged, with Co., 6, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, London.-Fiat dated costs.
Dec. 3. Reg. o. Gompertz-Rule for arresting judgment discharged ;
MEETINGS. rule for new trial absolute.
Robert Francis Barber, Bishopsgate-street Without, Lon. Doe d. Pennington v. Barrett-Rule discharged.
don, licensed victualler, Jan. 8 at half-past 11, Court of Bank. Bluck o. The Bishop of Norwich-Rule discharged, with ruptcy, London, aud. ac. - Nathaniel Levy, Butcher-row, costs.
Aldgate, London, carcase butcher, Jan. 8 at half-past 12, Ford v. Beech-Rule absolute to enter verdict for plaintiff on Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.—Joseph Wood, Lu. the plea of set-off.
ton, Bedfordshire, plumber, Jan. 8 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, Bolam v. Shaw-Rule for setting aside verdict on second count London, aud. ac.—Wm. Joy, Tonbridge, Kent, plumber, discharged.
Jan. 8 at half past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud, ac. Murieta o. Oldfield-Rule discharged.
- Isaac Bird, Harrow-on-the-Hill, Middlesex, grocer, Jan. Patteson, J., delivered judgment in
8 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-John Kirkup,
Providence Coal-wharf, Rotherhithe, Surrey, coal merchant, Bushell v. Boord-Rule discharged, with costs.
Jan. 8 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.- Rich.
Marsden, Brynmawr, Brecknockshire, linendraper, Jan. 12 London Gazettes.
at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, aud. ac. ; Jan. 14 at 1l, div.-Daniel Wade Acraman, William Edward
Acraman, Alfred John Acraman, William Morgan, Thomas TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15.
Holroyd, and Jas. Norroway Franklyn, Bristol, ship builders, BANKRUPTS.
Jan. 15 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, aud. ac. ; JOHN CROSS HUMBY, Blackfriars-road, Surrey, and Jan. 19 at 12, div.-Charles Caldwell and Thomas Smyth,
Northampton, boot and shoe manufacturer, Dec. 23 at half. Liverpool, and John Forbes and Daniel Gregory, London, past 1, and Jan. 29 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London : bankers, Jan. 5 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, LiverOff. Ass. Cannan; Sol. Archer, 15, Wine-office-court, pool, aud. ac.-J. S. Daintry and John Ryle, Manchester, Fleet-street.--Fiat dated Nov. 7.
bankers, Jan. 7 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, ManchesWILLIAM THOMAS GOODING, Old Brentford, Mid. ter, aud. ac. ; Jan. 8 at 12, div. sep. est. J. Ryle.-J. Taylor,
dlesex, glass cutter, dealer and chapman, Dec. 22 at half. | Higher Walton, Cheshire, farmer, Jan. 7 at 12, District Court past 2, and Jan. 26 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London : of Bankruptcy, Manchester, aud. ac. ; Jan. 8 at 12, div.-J. Off. Ass. Belcher; Sols. Watson & Sons, 12, Bouverie-st., | Cornish, Bridport, Dorsetshire, painter, Jan. 19 at 11, DisFleet-street.-Fiat dated Dec. 5.
trict Court of Bankruptcy, Exeter, aud. ac.; Jan, 20 at 11, WILLIAM HUNTER, Gray's-inn-lane, Middlesex, coach div.-Robert Ludgate Harness, Dulverton, Somersetshire, manufacturer, Dec. 22 at half-past 12, and Jan. 21 at 11, | spirit dealer, Jan. 19 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Pennell; Sol. Exeter, aud. ac. ; Jan. 20 at 11, div.-John Commins, WeyPhilipps, 4, Sise-lane, City.-Fiat dated Dec. 10. Imouth, Dorsetshire, bookseller, Jan. 19 at 11, District Court