ders, as the state of society brings them forth,' could be repressed." According to the writer we have quoted, the principle is not laid down as law, or even announced for consideration in any legal work prior to that of Baron Hume; and the first time that it was mentioned in any printed book was in the reports of the Sedition Trials in 1793 and 1794. Baron Hume's work was under composition while these trials were proceeding, and was published about three years afterwards. Being engrafted into the Commentaries, it does not appear to dent or statutory authority, merely by the native vigour' of our common law. But Mr. Bell* explains, with perfect accuracy, that this doctrine is plainly not meant to be applied solely to the case of offences which, although not yet distinguished by any short and unbending nomina juris, do yet fall under some defined category of crime (and) are comprehended under some clearly marked principle or rule, which has in former times been enforced! (Sup., p. 174). If this had been all, it would only have amounted to the humble doctrine, that a culprit cannot escape by committing an old crime in an original way. But Mr. Bell says, just-have been acted upon again till the year 1808, when it ly, that the principle laid down by Hume applies, 'not reappeared on certain trials for combination. The acmerely to such cases as these, where a new form of trans- count of these is too long to be inserted here; it is sufgression against an old, established, and clearly marked ficient to say that three of the judges thought combinarule of law has been invented, but where an entirely new, tion, however alarming, not indictable, and other three and by the law unheard-of, description of wickedness has thought the reverse; and the result was, that, in 1808, sprung up, and been displayed in acts which it is impossible combination, even when connected with violence, was to regard as partaking of the same individual species of cri- not a crime. "But, in 1811, by which time one of the minality with any offence that has been punished before.' judges who had been against the relevancy (against (P. 174)." And the power of applying adequate punish-treating combination as a crime) had died, a similar ment is involved in that of declaring new crimes. Hume charge was preferred against some shoemakers. The lays it down expressly, that the court, on rearing up a objection was renewed, and again argued, and it was new offence, can always "chastise it with a suitable and announced that the court now thought that combinaseasonable censure," but only "with the exception of tion was a crime. However, no trial took place, belife or limb." This limitation, however, has been dis- cause there were some technical obstacles." "A further sented from; and the court is reported to have been, in experiment was made by indicting some cotton weavers 1808, in a case for child-stealing, unanimous in holding in 1813, who were found guilty of mere combination, that they had powers, from the inherent nature of their and punished with various terms of imprisonment for jurisdiction, to pronounce a capital sentence on a crime what, five years before, had been judicially declared meriting that severity." The fact, indeed, is clearly not to be a crime." In 1818, a mere threat to strike established, however strange it may seem to us, that in was found a relevant charge against two colliers. Scotland a power of judicially introducing new crimes," Thus," says the writer, "in the course of about nine and of applying adequate punishments, does exist; or, years and a half, did the law vibrate between combinawhich is the same thing in as far as the people are con- tion effected by striking work and violence being no cerned, has been decided to exist; and that this au- crime at all, and its being a crime, when effected by thority adheres to the court by the mere force of the simple union, without even striking." common law." In six or seven years after, Parliament, reasoning on the very same principles as the court had done, decided that combination was not only not dangerous, but that, in itself, and apart from violence, it was beneficial. We have said enough now to make our readers acquainted with what seemed to us, and must seem to them, an extraordinary state of criminal law in Scotland. Its existence seems hitherto not to have been generally known to the public, and probably it has but to be known to be terminated. With us in England it is more a matter of curiosity and surprise than apprehension, though attachment to our own institutions must teach us to wish, that, even amongst our neighbours, such a judicial power should not be permitted to exist. Well may the writer in the Edinburgh Review exclaim, that the policy of such a law is a question in which every one of the lieges-man, woman, and child -has the deepest personal interest. The only defences that can be made for it are utterly frivolous. Nor does it even appear to have the authority of antiquity. On the contrary, there are many reasons for doubting whether it was anciently understood that any such principle had got itself embedded in the law. "One of these reasons," says the reviewer, "is, that the whole Scotch statute-book teems with new-made crimes. We have been told that there are greatly above 300 of of them. And the actions thus condemned by Parliament are precisely the same with those which are described, and, indeed, expressly specified, by Baron Hume, as within the creative jurisdiction of the court, The abuse of the Bar seems a never-failing resource -practices deemed commercially or politically danger- for the amusement of those whose speculations lead ous, breaches of good order, and injuries inflicted by them most to require its assistance. Every mischief gross violations of moral duty. There was no need of which results from the folly of litigants, or their inorone-tenth, if of any, of these parliamentary interfer-dinate desire of gain, every cause of defeat to which ences, if there had been understood to be a judicial board always sitting, by which 'all wrongs and disor they expose themselves while grasping at the means of overcoming an opponent, is laid to the charge of the Bar. The last grievance is that of the shareholders in railroad companies, who invoke the aid of Parliament to prevent counsel practising in committees from accepting retainers for more than one committee per day; man. he rules. You make a man a king, and then wonder that because, it is said, counsel accepting retainers for several committees, cannot attend to all, and, therefore, As to Parliament interfering in the matter, the very they pocket by a flagrant "robbery"—yes, robbery is the mild and urbane term-the fees given by those As the retainers of counsel and fees to counsel are notion is absurd. Parliament will not so stultify itself. whose committees they cannot attend. How often and merely gratuitous, it would be impossible for Parliahow long, O obtuse litigants and shareholders! must it ment to attempt to regulate the relation of agent and be repeated to you, that, if this be a grievance, it is one counsel. It is inconceivable how any standing orders of your own creation, and one which yourselves, and could touch the right of a suitor to make a present to yourselves only, can destroy? If you will persist in counsel, (and that is what, in truth, the retaining fee is), trusting to his honour to attend a committee in repersecuting Mr. A. or Mr. B. with briefs, when you turn, if not elsewhere engaged. The only way in which know that they have already more than human strength the evil can be cured (assuming it to be one) is, by the and human time can get through,—if you will believe suitors adopting the plan of procuring the certain serthat only Mr. A. or Mr. B. can adequately represent vices of a man of second or third-rate popularity, from your interests, why do you repine because these gentle-whom it is practicable to obtain a promise of attention men yield to your importunities, and give you that which, when you retained them, you knew was all they could give, the chance of their services? If men will buy contingent interests, have they any right to complain, because the contingencies on which they are to become entitled, do not happen? You invoke the aid of Parliament, to do-what? To say to counsel "You shall not accept retainers;" and to say to shareholders and their agents, "You shall not buy the chance of particular counsel's advocacy!" Would it not be as well, at once, to ask of Parliament to compel counsel to attend and practise at its bar for a daily fee to be fixed by Parliament; and would it not be as well, at the same time, to ask Parliament to make every counsel equally popular? Surely, of all the absurdities that of late have disgraced the attacks made upon the Bar, the greatest is that which lays to their charge the consequence of the star worship of suitors, and the weakness with which their folly is petted and pampered by their agents. to the case entrusted to him to the exclusion of any others till the first is concluded, rather than to the chance of the advocacy of the one or two universal favourites, who cannot be expected to give, and would be idiots if they did give, any pledge. It is plain, that, if there are ten committees sitting at once upon the bills mined to have one man as counsel, some of the ten of ten companies, and the ten companies are all determust be disappointed. And it is equally clear that the fault is not in the one man whom they all insist upon taking the chance of having, but of those of the companies who insist upon hoping against hope, and retaining him after he is already retained to the very last fraction of his time. One word before we conclude these observations, upon the alleged exorbitancy of the fees given to parliamentary counsel. It is quite true that the learning necessary for advocacy before railway committees is not so difficult and tedious of acquisition, as the learning requisite for the equity or common lawyer. And it may, at first sight, therefore, seem strange that parliamentary fees Far be it from us to attempt to deny the hard-earned should be, as they are, at least three times as large as reputation and popularity of a Follett, a Kelly, an the fees given upon equity or common-law business. Austin, a reputation and popularity which are too But it is not to be forgotten, that, in the first place, the often earned with the life-blood of their gifted and business of the parliamentary counsel is over in less doomed possessors. We ought not, perhaps, to wonder than half a year, and during the remainder of the year that clients should strive against each other for the ad- he may go, if he likes, to Persia, or anywhere else; in vantage of having their interests advocated by men, the second place, while it does last, it is harassing and whose skill and talent seem ever ready to take advan- fatiguing to the most intense degree; and, in the third tage of every success, and to beat down every obstacle; place, and this, though last, is not least to the brighter but we may and do wonder that they who are crowd-spirits, it must be remembered, that the only reward of ing into the chambers of the popular advocate; they who are clamorous in his antechamber for the chance of his assistance; they who pour out their treasures into his coffers and their choice offerings at his feet, knowing that, to use their own words, he cannot be ubiquitous; we do wonder, we say, when we see these very persons malign the Bar with the coarsest vituperatives, not for the fault of the general Bar, not for the fault of the few idolised leaders, but for the fault of their own utter folly, which will buy a mere chance, and yet complain that it is but a chance! Listen, O litigants and shareholders! If you are dissatisfied with the eminent leaders of the parliamentary Bar for accepting many retainers; go to them, or rather to their clerks, and ask of any of them, if he will take a brief for one committee, and undertake to attend exclusively that committee, and you will receive a most emphatic negative. Go, then, a step lower in the scale of popularity, and tender your brief on the same conditions to a popular junior, and there you will receive the emphatic negative. Go down now still somewhat, till you reach the perhaps talented, and certainly industrious and ambitious, but still unknown, junior, and tender to him your brief upon the terms of his being at his post in your committee while it sits, and probably then your brief will be accepted. But this does not suit your purpose. You do not want to have the services of the accessible, but of the inaccessible the successful parliamentary counsel is the acquisition of fortune; that for him the highest honours of the Profession have, in general, no existence; that for him the hope of posthumous fame is scarcely to be entertained; that for him political life is closed so long as he is compelled to labour in his Profession; that, in fine, he has no reward to look forward to but money. His efforts are never associated with any great constitutional question; he cannot identify himself with the improvement of the laws of his country; his struggles are concerning the conflict of gradients and traffic tables; his noblest object is to impress on Parliament the merits of an iron road; and, were it not for the occasional gleam of sunshine thrown across the desert of his labours by the light of science, there would be little in the occupation of the parliamentary counsel to make business anything beyond the tamest and most wearying drudgery. Nothing, therefore, but high fees will tempt men of any energy of character or intellectual ability, to abandon the ordinary practice of the law, for that of the parliamentary committees; and, keeping in view all these circumstances, we say most unhesitatingly, that the fees given to parliamentary counsel, however high they may sound, and however much they may enrich a few very successful advocates, are not in the least degree higher than is necessary to secure ability for the parliamentary Bar. Correspondence. THE TRANSFER OF RAILWAY SCRIP. TO THE EDITOR OF THE JURIST. SIR,-The case of Young v. Smith, in the Exchequer, (10 Jur. 52), has decided that the transfer of railway scrip, after provisional registration merely, and before complete registration of the company, is legal; and that sect. 26 of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, does not apply to railway companies. If I remember aright, your pages were the first to question the opinion of the Attorney General, which had been given to the effect, that such transfer was illegal; and arguments pro and con have since appeared in your columns. The decision in Young v. Smith, under the circumstances attending it, is not considered, among professional men, quite satisfactory, and it is to be hoped that the judgment of the Exchequer will be reviewed by a court of error. The judgment was delivered in the absence of two learned judges of the court, Barons Parke and Rolfe; it was given off-hand, and without the usual signification, in important cases, of "Curia advisari vult." Moreover, the 7th section of the Jointstock Companies Act does not appear to have been sufficiently brought before the court. By that section, companies, expressly including railway companies, are prohibited "from acting otherwise than provisionally in accordance with the act," until completely registered. Then comes the question, "What is acting otherwise than provisionally in accordance with the act?" Sect. 26 appears to point out one mode of such acting, as it declares that no subscriber of any joint-stock company shall dispose of his share before such company is completely registered. It has been ingeniously argued in your pages, that sect. 7 applies to the acts of companies as companies, while sect. 26 applies merely to the acts of individual subscribers. However this may be, it would have been more satisfactory had this point been brought specifically to the notice of the court. As to the intention of the statute, a search into Hansard will shew that one of the chief objects of its enactment was the prevention of excessive gambling in railway scrip, and it was so declared at the time by Mr. Gladstone. But, if the decision in Young v. Smith holds good, it by no means follows that we should admit the extensive corollary which is sought to be derived from it. It is said by some, that, if the sale of scrip be legal, then the case of Kempson v. Saunders (4 Bing. 5) applies, and invests such sale with certain incidents, that, if the undertaking be abandoned, the purchaser may recover the money he paid to the scrip-vendor, the vendor from the preceding vendor, and so on until they arrive at the projectors, "which," said Best, C. J., in "will be doing a great service." that case, In Kempson v. Saunders the defendant had sold to the plaintiff, at 31. 5s. premium, twenty shares in a projected railway company, on each of which shares a deposit of 27. had been paid by the original holder, of whom they had been purchased by the defendant. The committee, who had framed the project and issued the scrip, agreed that nothing should be done till the sanction of the Legislature was procured; they afterwards abandoned the project, and no act of Parliament was ever obtained. The scheme having failed, the plaintiff brought his action for money had and received, on the ground of failure of consideration, and had a verdict. It was said by Best, C. J., "There was nothing illegal in the transaction in which the plaintiff was concerned, because, at the meeting convened for the purpose of framing the project, it was agreed that nothing should be done till the sanction of the Legislature had been obtained. While things were in this state, the defend ant, who was not an original subscriber, but had purchased these shares, (which, in fact, were not saleable till the company was formed), sold them to the plaintiff; but he sold a nothing, an alleged title of no value." In the first place, it is to be observed, the company, in company until it received an act of Parliament; it was, Kempson v. Saunders, could hardly be said to exist as a at the utmost, a mere scheme, in which nothing was to be done until the act was obtained. registered. They have certain powers; they are quasi But it is not so in railway companies provisionally companies, and in some respects may act as such; they may assume the name of the intended company, open subscription lists, allot shares, and receive deposits. It cannot be said, in such case, nothing is to be done until the act of Parliament is obtained. Neither can it be said the scrip are not saleable until then, for we know in practice they are (or rather were before the panic) sold every day; such sale was held to be not contrary to 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, in Young v. Smith, and the modern doctrine seems to favour the transferability of scrip. It also appears to me, Sir, with the utmost deference for the learned Chief Justice Best, that reasonable doubts may be entertained whether the doctrine laid down in Kempson v. Saunders would now be held good law. The judgment therein proceeded on the ground of failure of consideration, the scrip being, it was said, of no value. Now, the principle on which consideration fails seems to be this: there is an implied promise of something existing which does not exist, or of something being performed in future which is not performed, and, in consideration of which implied promise, money has been paid. A familiar instance is, where a purchaser of an estate has paid a deposit, and vendor fails in making out a title. It is thus imported into the original contract, and is in the nature of a condition precedent to the recipient's right absolutely to retain the money. It is well known there must be a total failure of consideration, and the parties must be capable of being ranty or promise on the part of the seller of scrip, that placed in statu quo; but is there any implied warthe undertaking shall not be abandoned by the company? Is he to take upon himself the burden of answering for payment of deposits, punctuality and ve way committees, and like uncertainties over which he racity of engineers and surveyors, the decision of railhas no control whatever? It seems rather to be a sale of title to shares, which may be worth much or little, something or nothing, and the maxim, "caveat emptor," should apply. Scrip are supposed to be of a certain value when they are sold, that is, they represent the sum which may be obtained for them in the share market. But their present value is fluctuating, their future value wholly unascertained and inappreciable, and the purchaser takes them knowing these facts. He has all he bargains for,-the scrip, a mere title to shares, with all its defects and advantages. There is no fraud on the part of the vendor; no consideration, it seems to me, is kept back, to which failure can be said to attach. Take the case of a transfer of a lottery ticket, when lotteries were legal; in the event of its turning out a blank, it would not be contended that the transferee could recover the amount he had paid for it. Again, it is well known that many of the paintings of Sir Joshua Reynolds have unfortunately lost their colours within the last few years. Had one of these, in the full bloom of healthy colour, been sold to a connoisseur, and had he, to his dismay, perceived it one morning undergoing the dissolving process, and fading into a dead white, it would scarcely be just that he should make the vendor pay for the faulty use or mixture of colours by the artist. And yet one would think there is no more warranty Same v. Same (assumpsit)—Rule absolute for nonsuit. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Birmingham-Order of sessions set aside, except as to the illegitimate son. Campbell v. Reg.-Venire de novo awarded. Foster. The Bank of England-Rule absolute for inspection Cinque Ports-His Grace the Duke of Wellington. Undersh., Thomas Paine, Esq., Dovor. Deps., Wright & Kingsford, 23, Essex-st., Strand. Cornwall-C. H. T. Hawkins, Esq., Trewithen. Undersh., John Gilbert Chilcott, Esq., Truro. Dep., Joseph Raw, 5, Furnival's Inn. Coventry (City of)-Act 5 & 6 Vict. c. 110, s. 10, abolished the Office of Sheriff for this City, and Warrants are now granted by the Sheriff' of Warwickshire. Cumberland-Joseph Pocklington Senhouse, Esq., Barrow House and Nether Hall. Undersh., Silas Saul, Esq., Carlisle. Deps., Capes & Stuart, Field-court, Gray's Inn. Derbyshire-Sir Robert Edward Wilmot, Bart., Osmaston Hall, near Derby. Francis Jessopp, Esq., Derby. Undershs., {Jessopp, Son, & Burnaby, Derby. A.U. Deps., Smedley & Rogers, 40, Jermyn-street, St. Devonshire-Sir Walter Palk Carew, Bart., Haccombe, near Newton Abbot. Undersh., W. Jones, Esq., Cathedral Yard, Exeter. Dep., George Carew, 9, Lincoln's-inn-fields. of the entry of the supposed transfer, in the book of de- | Dorsetshire-Charles Porcher, Esq., Cliffe House. fendants. Lord Denman, C. J., said, “We think it is desirable to reform the practice as to motions in arrest of judgment. Where the question is merely on the form of declaration, and the rule obtained is, therefore, simply in arrest of judgment, we shall direct the case to be put down in the Special Paper, instead of the New Trial Paper." Undersh., Thomas Coombs, jun., Esq., Dorchester. Deps., Rickards & Walker, 29, Lincoln's-inn-fields. Durham-R. S. Pemberton, Esq., Usworth House, Gateshead. Undersh., William Emerson Wooler, Esq., North Bailey, Durham. Essex-John Clarmont Whiteman, Esq., Grove, Thoydon Dep., H. M. Vane, Carlton Chambers, 12, Regent-st, Garnon, Epping. LIST OF SHERIFFS AND UNDER-SHERIFFS Exeter Bedfordshire-William Stuart, Esq., Watford. Undersh., William Day, Esq., St. Neot's, Huntingdonshire. Deps., Hale, Boys, & Austen, 6, Ely-place. Berkshire—William Stephens, Esq., Prospect Hill, Reading. Undersh., John Jackson Blandy, Esq., Reading. Deps., Gregory, Faulkner, Gregory, & Skirrow, 1, Bedford-row. Ava Berwick-upon-Tweed-Captain William Smith, R. N., Undersh., W. O. Hare, Esq., 3, Small-st., Bristol. Deps., Bridges & Mason, 23, Red Lion-square. Buckinghamshire-Sir William Robert Clayton, Bart., Harley ford House. Undersh., James James, Esq., Aylesbury. Dep., William Meyrick, 2, Furnival's Inn. Camb. & Hunt.-Sir Charles Wager, Bart., West Wratting. Undersh., Christopher Pemberton, Esq., Cambridge. Deps., Cole & Son, Adelphi-terrace, Strand. Canterbury (City of)-Frederick Freeman Cobb, Esq., Newroad, Canterbury. Undersh., R. G. Chipperfield, Esq., Canterbury. Undersh., John F. Maddock, Esq., Town-clerk of Dep., John_Philpot, jun., 3, Southampton-street, * Butt, (Crowder, contra, concurring), applied that the court would hear the argument on the rule for a nonsuit. Lord DENMAN, C. J., said, we will consider your application. Undersh., Joseph Jessop, Esq., Waltham Abbey. Deps., Nelson & Wynn, Gresham-place, Lombard-st. (City of)—Joseph Shephard, Esq., Exeter. Undersh., Henry Willcocks Hooper, Esq., Exeter. Deps., Clipperton & Impey, 17, Bedford-row. Gloucestershire-George Bengough, Esq., Newland. Undersh., John Burrup, Esq., Berkeley-street, Glou Undersh., Thomas Smith, Esq., Gloucester. Deps., Jones, Tudway, & Eyre, 1, John-street, Bedford-row. Hampshire-John Beardmore, Esq., Uplands, Fareham. Undersh., F. Lewis Bodenham, Esq., High-street, Deps., Overton & Hughes, 25, Old Jewry. Undersh., Philip Longmore, Esq., Castle, Hertford. Hunts. & Camb.-Sir Charles Wager, Bart., West Wratting. Undersh., Henry Kingsford, Esq., Canterbury. Deps., Palmer, France, & Palmer, 24, Bedford-row. Kingston-upon-Hull-C. Leake Ringrose, Esq., Fanby, York shire. Undershs., Holden & Son, Hull. Deps., Hicks & Marris, 5, Gray's-inn-square. Lancashire-W. Standish Standish, Esq., Duxbury-park. Undershs., Gorsts & Birchall, Preston. Deps., Wiglesworth, Ridsdale, & Craddock, 1, Gray'sinn-square. Leicestershire-William Ann Pochin, Esq., Barkby. Undersh., C. Smith, Esq., (firm of Miles & Smith), Leicester. Deps., R. M. and C. Baxter, 48, Lincoln's-inn-fields. Lincolnshire-J. Banks Stanhope, Esq., Revesby Abbey. Richard Clitherow, Esq., Horncastle. Undershs., Henry Williams, Esq., Lincoln. A.U. Deps., Taylor & Collisson, 28, Great James-street, Bedford-row. Lincoln (City of)-Henry Moss, Esq., Lincoln. Undersh., Rich. Mason, Esq., Guildhall, Lincoln. Litchfield (City of)-John Allport, Esq., Litchfield. London (City of)- Undershs., (W. J. Chaplin, Esq., 1, Adelphi-terrace, John Laurie, Esq., Hyde-park-place, F. T. Bircham, Esq., 15, Bedford-row, D. W. Wire, Esq., St. Swithin's-lane, J. and W. Burchell, 24, Red Lion-square. Deps., {Secondaries' Office, Basinghall-street. Monmouthshire-Thos. Prothero, Esq., Malpas Court. C. B. Fox, Esq., Newport. Undershs., Prothero, Twogood, & Fox, Newport. Dep., George Hall, 11, New Boswell-court. Tyne. Staffordshire-John Levett, Esq., Wichnor, near Lichfield. Undersh., Robert William Hand, Esq., Stafford. P. Bartholomew Long, Esq., Ipswich. Sussex-Wm Townley Mitford, Esq., Pitshill. Undersh., John Luttman, Esq., Petworth. Undersh., Robert Leadbitter, Esq., Newcastle-upon- | Worcestershire-Wm. Hemming, Esq., Fox Lydiate House. Temple. Norwich (City of)-Jeremiah Colman, Esq., Norwich. Dep., John Mills, 3, Brunswick-place, City-road. Deps., Grimaldi, Stables, & Burn, Copthall-court. Undershs., Nottinghamshire-F. Hall, Esq., Park Hall, Nottinghamshire. Oxfordshire-Mortimer Ricardo, Esq., Kiddington. Undersh., S. Cooper, Esq., Henley-upon-Thames. Undersh., Henry Mooring Aldridge, Esq., Poole. Dep., Henry Hammond, 16, Furnival's Inn. Undershs., { William Robeson, Esq., Bromsgrove. Gillam & Sons, Worcester. A.U. Deps., Cardales & Iliffe, 2, Bedford-row. Worcester (City of)—Frederick Thos. Elgie, Esq., Foregate street, Worcester. Dep., Hen. Bedford, 4, Gray's-inn-square. York (City of)-George Jennings, Esq., Bootham. NORTH WALES. Anglesey-John Lewis Hampton Lewis, Esq., Henllys. Undershs., Poole & Powell, Carnarvon. Undersh., James Vaughan Horne, Esq., Denbigh. Undersh., Arthur Troughton Roberts, Esq., Mold. Deps., Milne, Parry, Milne, & Morris, 2, Harcourt. buildings, Temple. Merionethshire-Sir Robert Williames Vaughan, Bart., Nan- Undersh., Owen & Griffiths, Dolgelly. Undersh., Joseph Jones, Esq., Welchpool. SOUTH WALES. Carmarthen (Borough of)—David Evans Lewis, Esq., Wa- Deps., Rickards & Walker, 29, Lincoln's-inn-fields. Undersh., Philip Griffith Jones, Esq., Carmarthen. Undersh., William Lewis, Esq., Bridgend. |