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Messrs. Hayes, Christie, and Bellenden Ker*. Mr. Ker has expounded the views of himself and his colleagues in a letter to the Lord Chancellor, which has been given to the world, and which, if its authority is to be received, effectually disproves the boast of conveyancers, that their practice is regulated by the rules of an exact science. The letter has not been settled with a view to conciseness; and we can, therefore, afferd space only for a few extracts.

After premising that the commissioners (as we may call them) have reviewed the Act to facilitate the Transfer of Property, with the intention, first, of confining it to points which may safely admit of being separately treated, and, secondly, of legislating upon those points with greater accuracy and perspicuity, Mr. Ker proposes altogether to omit the 9th and 10th

sections of the Transfer Act.

tial application of the principle,-to amend the law by engrafting upon it an anomalous provision,-the 9th section of the Transfer Act may be so modified as to attain more perfectly the very limited objects of its framers."

The commissioners recommend that the act should be repealed, and the clauses of which the policy is unexceptionable be re-enacted in a different form. They then go into detail; and, as to the 9th section, after shewing that its policy is unexceptionable, nay, essential to a wise and just amendment of the law, they conclude with "making no attempt." They think the object very desirable and very attainable, but they cannot make the effort necessary to attain it: it would fatigue them; put their faculties into a very unprofessional fluster, and take too much time. As any substituted provision would require to be "well considered," they decline the attempt. The summa ratio of a lawyer, directed to the task of amendment, becomes summa imbecillitas!

With regard to the 10th section, authorising trustees and surviving mortgagees to give discharges for money, the commissioners observe, that it could never have been intended that it should have the extensive operation which its words import, and they point out the limited and, as they admit, beneficial effect which was intended; but, as the clause to be restrained to such limited and beneficial operation would "require considerable alteration," they propose to omit it altogether! We hope that the treatment which the public experience at the hands of these gentlemen, after obthe privilege of having its business done by them, is not a sample of what their private clients have to expect. What would an intending testator say, if his instructions were returned with the following marginal observation:-"This would be a very beneficial arrangement, but, as any attempt to carry it out would require to be well considered, we advise that it should be abandoned"?

"First, as regards the 9th section, which provides for the conveyance of a mortgaged estate by the executor or administrator of the mortgagee, the design is good; but it is so imperfectly carried out by the very limited terms of the enactment, that, practically, the power is attended with very little real advantage. It is necessary, for the purposes of title, to ascertain that possession has not been taken, that no action or suit is pending, and that the legal estate is vested in the real representative of the mortgagee. But it is obvious that the necessity of proving these facts, and, particularly, the fact of the legal estate being vested in the real representative, (the very difficulty being that the heir is unknown), destroys in a great measure the utility of the enactment. The clause, besides, authorises a convey-taining, through the intercession of a Lord Chancellor, ance only on actual payment to the executor or administrator of the whole debt, not extending to a conveyance on part payment, or a conveyance under any arrangement for exonerating the whole or part of the lands without payment; nor to cases where the money has been paid in the mortgagee's lifetime, or the executor has received the money at a former period, or has assented to a bequest of, or has assigned, the debt. And, moreover, as the power-a bare statutory authorityis not conferred on the proving executor alone, it might be considered (though not, we think, on a just view of the provision) necessary to its due execution that an executor who has not proved, or had even renounced the probate, should join; a possible construction, which would not only narrow still further the range of the power, but probably implicate many titles depending on the contrary assumption."

After pointing out other deficiencies in the language of the clause, he thus proceeds: "Then, as regards the principle involved in this section of the act, if it be fit that a mortgagee's executor or administrator (who, after being paid in full, has no further interest in the matter, and who, as he might, be it observed, have recovered the debt, although unable to make or procure a reconveyance of the estate, may refuse to exercise the statutory power vested in him, as a mere instrument, for the convenience of others) should be enabled by his act to denude the heir or devisee of the legal estate, and vest it in the mortgagor or his nominee, it must, à fortiori, be fit that the unpaid executor or administrator should be enabled to command the legal estate for the purposes of the security, and the better administration of that portion of the assets of his testator or intestate."

After pointing out other directions in which the principle is capable of beneficial extension, the learned commissioner says: "Having arrived at the conclusion, that a free yet well-considered application of the principle already admitted by the Legislature is of the very essence of a wise and just amendment of the law of real property, no attempt has been made to fit the existing elause to the particular case at which it aimed. If, however, it should be deemed expedient to make a parSee Davidson's Concise Precedents, p. 10.

What remains of Mr. Ker's letter is criticism on the construction of the clauses which are considered by the commissioners to be objectionable only in point of expression. As this is peculiarly the province of a lawyer, it is in this part of the letter that we must expect to find the "perfection of reason" promised by Lord Coke. We pass over the solemn discussion of the childish question as to progressive duty, which, it seems, some one raised on the 2nd section of the Transfer Act, and come to these observations on the same section:

"When it is said that any person may convey by any deed, without livery of seisin or inrolment, or a prior lease,' it seems to be assumed that there is, in law, some standard instrument by which, with the addition of any of the above concomitants, the immediate freehold in lands may be conveyed; but there is, in fact, no such instrument in law. There are (besides a covenant to stand seised) three several assurances adapted to convey it, viz. feoffment, bargain and sale inrolled, and lease and release-all founded on different principles, differing in their modus operandi, and having an important difference in their effects. If the deed of conveyance established by the Transfer Act be a new statutory assurance, which is neither a feoffment nor a bargain and sale, nor a lease and release, it is merely nugatory to provide that such assurance shall be effectual without livery of seisin, inrolment, or prior lease,' for the forms and solemnities in question have not the slightest significance with reference to such a conveyance. While if, on the other hand, it be consi

words "without progressive duty" has been to oblige the *Surely not. If the consequence of omitting the nonsensical Lord Chancellor to crave the assistance of three learned conveyancers to insert them, the insertion of the equally useless words" without livery," &c., may be justified.

dered that the framers did not intend to introduce any new assurance, but only to exempt the existing assurances from useless and troublesome forms, the inattention to principle in the structure of the section is equally apparent; for it is not clear that it would not be necessary to attribute to the assurance the character either of a feoffment without livery, or a bargain and sale without inrolment, or a release without a lease for a year; and there seem to be no means of ascertaining to which of the three kinds of assurance the conveyance under the act would belong.'

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There is more in the same style, with which we will not trouble our readers. Here, again, we hope that the learned commissioner makes a distinction between the public and individuals as clients; for we can imagine the perplexity of an executor selling real estate, under a testamentary power "to sell and convey to the purchaser, without the necessity of the concurrence of the testator's heir or the legatee of the produce," if he were asked by Mr. Ker, whether his conveyance was to operate as 66 a standard instrument," or as a conveyance by the heir, or as a conveyance by the legatee?

With respect to feoffments, the commissioners think that the omission in the former act to require the solemnity of a deed was not well advised. They think, moreover, that, though wax or wafers are essential in the case of an adult, an infant conveying under a custom should not be trusted with such matters. We can understand why wax is interdicted; but, as an infant cannot burn his fingers with wafers, we contend that a distinction should have been made.

The reasoning by which it is attempted to be shewn that the repealed enactment, as to indenting deeds, was objectionable, is curious, but too long for extraction. We cannot let it pass, however, without protesting against the position, that a deed-poll cannot operate by way of estoppel.

Correspondence.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE BARON DE BODE'S
CASE, WITH REFERENCE TO SOME DOC-
TRINES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE JURIST.

The case of the Baron de Bode, in which judgment was lately given by the Court of Queen's Bench against the claimant, has attracted not less attention on the Continent than in England. Besides the practical application of the law of nations, as it resulted from the treaty of Westphalia, and the subsequent treaties between the European powers based upon it, it brings before us the municipal laws of three great countriesEngland, Germany, and France; and the peculiar conflict of laws it displays, renders it one of the most interesting international cases that has ever been decided by a court of justice: indeed, it is rather an European than an English case. For these reasons, and, as having been concerned in the case as one of the foreign advocates who at the trial at bar last year, gave evidence to the foreign law, I am sure you will pardon my offering for insertion in your valuable publication a few observations on some points of international law which the case presents to view.

I, of course, assume that Lord Denman (for whom every one feels the highest respect) has, in his judgment, strictly applied the English law; and, as far as can be collected from the reports of it at present accessible, the principal grounds, in an international point of view, on which the court refused to give judgment for the claimant are these: that, by the treaties of 1786, 1814, and 1815, a British subject, whose property had been confiscated during the French Revolution, or detained in France, could only claim indemnification in case such From the observations on the provisions as to the confiscation or detention was contrary to the laws of conveyance of executory estates we must make one ex- France; that, from the facts as alleged by the Baron, tract:-"As the 22nd section of the stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, and found by the jury at the trial at bar, the court c. 92, for the abolition of fines and recoveries, has pro- could not collect that the property had been unduly or vided, in terms somewhat different, for the conveyance illegally confiscated; that, by the Baron's own shewing, of contingent interests, we have deemed it advisable to it, on the contrary, appeared that the confiscation had confine the 6th section of the proposed bill to England. taken place by the adjudgment of some French tribunal The terms of the enactment for Ireland have not been on the ground of the claimant emigrating to, or rather pursued, because it appears to be so framed as to enable taking refuge in, the Austrian army, whilst the latter the original taker of a contingent interest to assign it, was invading the soil of France: that the Baron's birth but not to confer on his assignee a similar power." In could not make him so much a British subject as not to other words, "As there is an opportunity of having two be amenable to French law, which would be inconsisdifferent provisions for effecting the same object in dif- tent with the principles of local allegiance; that there ferent parts of the empire, we have thought it advisable was no complaint made of this being unlawfully ento embrace it." Perhaps, before the next session, the forced by the tribunal, though, even if there had been, Lord Chancellor may instruct the learned commission- the Court of Queen's Bench could not sit as a court of ers to prepare a bill "for assimilating the Laws of Eng-error on points of French law, or as a court of appeal land and Ireland, with respect to the Conveyance of for the revision of sentences of a French tribunal. contingent Interests."

We have not left ourselves room in this Number to do justice to the observations on the protection of contingent remainders, the consideration of which, and also of some questionable positions on the assignment of attendant terms contained in Mr. Joshua Williams's able "Remarks on the Acts of the Session 8 & 9 Vietoriæ relating to Real Property," and on Lord Brougham's Conveyancing Acts, contained in the last Number of the Law Review, we reserve for another paper. We have animadverted freely on the manner in which the Lord Chancellor's deputies have discharged their trust; for we are quite sure that the business of no private client of any of these gentlemen was ever slurred over with such indolent carelessness, and we do not see why the public, when in its capacity of client it receives more scurvy treatment than any of its individual members would submit to, is to acquiesce in deferential silence.

(To be continued).

It appears to me that the above argumentation is based on a misconception of the meaning of some important expressions in the treaty of 1814. The words of the 4th additional article of the treaty of 30th May, 1814, between Great Britain and France, which principally concern Baron de Bode's right to indemnifica tion, are, "induement confisqués"-unduly confiscated. The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench interprets this term as if it had the same meaning as "illegally confiscated," and bases on this the proposition, that the Baron de Bode had neither shewn that he had done no illegal act to justify the confiscation, nor how the Court of Queen's Bench could sit as a court of error or appeal over a French tribunal.

A foreign lawyer may well be permitted to ask, is English forensic language so vague and illogical as to confound the meanings of the words illegal and undue? It is true, that, in the English translation of the 4th additional article of the treaty of 1814, (which translation is, as far as I understand, an official one), accom

panying the papers when laid before Parliament, the treaty of Westphalia to the French Revolution. Cerwords induement confisqués" were rendered "ille-tainly no other English-born subject, who possessed progally confiscated." But the Court of Queen's Bench perty in France, stood in so favourable and exceptional appears to have been well acquainted with the words in a position with respect to French law, as the Baron de the original sense: and in the judgment both the words Bode; and if the confiscation of his proporty was not "unduly" and "illegally" are used without distinction, "undue," then I do not know what other confiscation as having one and the same meaning. I apprehend of English property could have been so. that the word "illegally" (illegallement) was inten- The Court of Queen's Bench maintains that it has no tionally not used in the 4th article of the above con- right to sit as a court of error or appeal over a French vention, but the word "induement," which is very far tribunal. The correctness of this principle cannot be from meaning the same thing. Could the governments denied, and ought to constitute a part of the munithat were parties to the treaties of 1814 and 1815, by cipal law of all nations. It certainly is most objecwhich the war against the French Revolution was ter- tionable to find the courts of justice of some of the minated, intend that any one of the confiscations in- continental states, especially of France, arrogating to flicted by the public authorities of revolutionary France themselves the authority of sitting as in some sort courts should be legal in the true sense of the word, incurring of appeal over foreign sentences. From that principle, thereby the necessary inference, that the acts of the Re- as laid down in the judgment of the Court of Queen's volution were regarded as legal by the very govern- Bench, it does not, however, in the least follow, that a ments who had fought so many battles against revolu- court is bound to acknowledge and uphold all foreign sentionary France, and were then on the point of restoring tences, without distinction, which may be alleged by to her the old order of things? Supposing that the parties in actions at law. This would, indeed, be a words" unduly confiscated" were not a mere diplo- novel principle in the law of nations. On the conmatic phrase, but that they were given to convey trary, it must be regarded as a general rule of the law some practical meaning; this meaning, and the sense of nations, that no state will execute or impart any to be ascribed to them, can amount to nothing more validity within its territory to a sentence by which one than to afford some guarantie to France, that, on the of its own subjects has been grossly injured. By part of England, no wanton claims of indemnification acknowledging this principle, and declaring that the should be raised,-no claims which were not justified Baron de Bode had, by the confiscation of his property, by circumstances. been grossly injured in his rights by a French tribunal, the Court of Queen's Bench would not have in the least assumed the authority of a court of error or appeal over a French sentence.

The French confiscations for emigrating in order to evade the working of the Revolution and its dangers, had more the nature of political measures against those who were opposed to the principles of the Revolution, than of judicial proceedings for offences against the law of France. In the eyes of the parties to the restoration, by whom the conventions of 1814 and 1815 were concluded, the confiscations can never have appeared in the character of legal acts. This cannot have even been the case with respect to Frenchmen, who owed natural allegiance to their sovereign, how much less, then, with respect to foreigners, who, as mere subditi_temporarii, owed only temporary obedience to French laws during the time of their actual residence in that country,-who were under no obligation of positive law whatever to fight for the revolutionary government, but who might leave the country and go wherever and whenever they pleased? The Baron de Bode is no Frenchman, and could offend against no French law by leaving France and seeking refuge in the Austrian army. His alle giance to the French sovereign power was no other than that of any other foreigner. His being the owner of a landed estate within the territory of France made no change in that respect, for the possessing landed property does not in itself, according to the law of the continental states, constitute allegiance. By the law of almost all continental states, foreigners may own landed property; but their position with respect to the government is not affected by such ownership; it remains the same as that of other foreigners. A foreigner possessing landed property is bound to plead to all real actions, and answer all claims concerning his estate; but in all other respects he only owes obedience to the laws of the country for the time of his residence there. But the Baron de Bode stood, as a member of the German immediate nobility, in a peculiar position, which made him even less than the generality of foreigners, dependent on French law. His lord paramount was the Archbishop of Cologne, and he possessed the privilege of his estate, though lying within the territory of France, not being subject to French law. He had that privilege by the treaty of Westphalia, that is to say, by the positive law of nations; the independence of the immediate German nobility possessing estates in Alsace from the sovereign power of France having been guaranteed by all treaties between the European powers, from the

C. G., Advocate.

We have great pleasure in inserting the foregoing observations on the Baron de Bode's case, communicated to us by a foreign advocate. Our readers will not, however, take it for granted that we coincide in the view of our learned correspondent. The distinction that he makes between "induement" and "illegally" is, we apprehend, not one of which a court of law in this country, nor, as we apprehend, in any country, can take notice, even if it exists at all, which we doubt. "Induement' means that which ought not to be; ce qui ne doit pas se faire; ou, qui ne doit pas être. Now, in the legal language of England, and again we apprehend of all civilised countries, that which ought not to be, is illegal; for a court of law can take no cognisance of what ought or ought not, politically speaking, to be done. Nor are we at all aware that the government of this country, although repudiating the political validity of the government of republican France, necessarily denied jurisdiction to courts of justice acting under the authority of that government.

Again, our correspondent argues, that, although it may be admitted that a court of justice in one country, cannot sit as a court of appeal from the decision of a foreign court, yet it ought not, as a matter of course, to uphold the decision of every foreign court. But how is a court to inquire into the propriety of the finding of a foreign court, unless it does arrogate to itself the jurisdiction to sit as a court of appeal over it? There can be no right of inquiry, unless there is a right of redress; and to claim a right of redress, is to claim a right of reversing the judgment of the foreign tribunal. There can, we apprehend, be no medium between claiming the right to review, and to reverse, if thought necessary, the proceedings of a foreign tribunal, and refusing to disturb in any manner its decision.-Ed.

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Court Papers.

EQUITY CAUSE LISTS, HILARY TERM, 9 VICT., 1846.

Court of Chancery.

The following abbreviations have been adopted to abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occupied:-4. Abated-Adj. Adjourned—A. T. After Term-Ap. Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-C. Costs-D. Demurrer-E. Exceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro Confesso-Pl. Plea-Ptn. Petition-R. Re-hearing-S. O. Stand Over-Sh. Short.

Before the LORD CHANCELLOR.
APPEALS,

Strickland v. Strick- (Ap) | Att.-General v. Masters and

land

Day to be

fixed.

Ditto v. Boynton
Ditto v. Strickland
Millar v. Craig (Ap) A pt. hd.
Forbes v. Peacock (Ap) pt. hd.
Tylee v. Hinton (Ap)
Miln v. Walton (Ap)
Vandeleur v. Blagrave (Ap)
Crosley v. Derby Gas Co.
(Ap) 4

Parker v. Bult (Ap)
Ladbrooke v. Smith (Ap)
Hitch v. Leworthy (Ap) SO
Coore v. Lowndes (Ap)
Minor v. Minor (3 Ap)
Drake v. Drake (Ap)
Dalton v. Hayter (Ap)

Baggett v. Meux (Ap)

Payne v. Banner (Ap)
Dobson v. Lyall (Ap)
Moorat v. Richardson (Ap)
Millbank v. Collier (Ap for
want of parties)
Deeks v. Stanhope (3 Ap)
Wiltshire. Rabbitt (Ap)
Archer v. Hudson (Ap)
Turner v. Newport (Ap)

Trulock v. Robey (Ap)

Wardens, &c. of the City of
Bristol (Ap)
Younghusband v. Gisborne
(Ap)
Courtney v. Williams (Ap)
Whitworth v. Gangan (Ap)
Bush v. Shipman (Ap)
Black v. Chaytor (Ap)
Mitford v. Reynolds (E) By
Johnson v. Ditto (FD) Jord.
Thwaites v. Foreman (Ap)
Watts v. Lord Eglinton (Ap)
Curson v. Belworthy (Ap)
Watson v. Parker (Ap)
Dietrichson v. Cabburn (Ap)
Bellamy v. Sabine (Ap)
Att.-Gen. v. Malkin (Cause by
order)

Johnson v. Child (Ap)
Kidd v. North (Ap)
Dord v. Wightwick (Ap)

Lovett v. Marquis of Bath
Smale v. Beckford
Peacock v. Kernot
Morrison v. Watkins
Patten v. Peploe

Scaife v. Stewart (F D, C)
Wright v. Barnewell (E, FD)|
Greenway v. Buchanan
Walton v. Morritt

Ring v. Roberts (F D, C)
Parker v. Hawkes (E)
Davison v. Bagley
Brunton v. Neale
Penny v. Turner
Attorney-Gen. v. Malkin
Giffard v. Withington
Daniel v. Hill
Insole v. Featherstonhaugh
Lane v. Durant (E, F D)
Pocock v. Johnson
Coope v. Lewis
Evans v. Hunter

Attorney-Gen. v. Trevanion
Stert v. Cooke

Blundell v. Gladstone (4 caus.
FD)

Dew v. Bernard
Fish v. Palmerston
Hodgkinson v. Barrow (F D,
C)

Colbourn v. Coling Sh
Fenn v. Edmonds

Langton v. Langton (2 causes)

Parkin v. Knight (F D, C) Sh
Higgins v. Francis

Gowar v. Bennett (F D)
Wallis v. Wallis

Palmer v. Palmer

Pawson v. Smith (2 causes)
Gabriel v. Sturgis

Doubtfire v. Elworthy (FD)
Mackreth v. Williams (FD)
Hickson v. Smith (at deft.
request)

Pennant v. Pennant (Cause, Askew v. Peddle (F D, C)

Ptn)

Palmer v. Pattison (F D, C)

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Carmichael v. Carmichael (Ap) Duke v. Barnett
Hawkes v. Howell (Ap)
Heming v. Swinnerton (Ap)
Trail v. Bull (Ap)
Youde v. Jones (Ap)
Wrightson v. Macauley (Ap)
Carpinael v. Powis (Ap)

Garside v. Edwards
Hadfield v. Ditto
Dobson v. Austen Jan. 14
Pierce v. Franks

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Jones v. Jones (4 causes)
Harris v. Davison
Parker v. Goude

Beckwith v. Hawkins (FD, C)
Johnson v. Forrester (F D, C)
Ross v. Blink
Henderson v. Eason (E)
Searle v. Law (F D, C)
Ferrabee v. Lewis (F D, C)
Harcourt v. M'Cabe
Booth v. Creswick (E)
Allibone v. Jones
Howell v. Reeves

Champion v. Champion To fix Smith v. Sherwood

a day

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Legh v. Legh (F D, C)
Newport v. Lomas (5 causes,
E, F D, C)

Parnell v. Hand (F D, C)
Smith v. Plummer
Attorney-Gen. v. Wright
Terry v. Wacher
Borrodaile v. Swann
Scott v. Ditto

Rogers v. Rogers (F D, C)
Horner v. Billam
Simpson v. Holt (F D, C)
Thompson v. Michele
Garrod v. Moor

Larkin v. Sandle (F D, C)

Early v. Benbow

Goodwin v. Goswell
Lloyd v. Waring
Pattison v. Pattison
Watts v. Hyde

Butler v. Powis (F D, C, Ptn)
Davies v. Price $ O

Cockshott v. Cockshott
Le Blanc v. Le Blanc

Billing v. Webb (E, part hd.)

Jan. 12

Ditto v. Ditto (F D)

Farquharson v. Cave

Shields v. Boucher Relfe v. Pocock Wilkinson v. Earle Watts v. Spottiswoode Taylor v. Butler Nixson v. Few (F D, C) Edwards v. Edwards Ditto v. Williams Ditto v. Serle

Burkett v. Ransom (E)

Attfield v. Williams

Freer v. Lafargue

Law v. Jackson

Before the Vice-Chancellor WIGRAM.

(F D,

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C)

Hooper v. Hill Jan. 17
Moore v. Newham (FD, C)

Ditto v. Stafford
Barnes v. Johnson
Morse v. Tucker'
Ditto v. George
Ditto v. Tucker

}

Jan. 12

(F D, C)

Mackinney v. Jones (F D, C), Wilkin v. Townshend Lambeth v. Willetts

Wilson v. Wilson

Prendergast v. Lushington (F
D, C)

Cathrow v. Ede
Ditto v. Cathrow
Chandler v. Brittan
Ditto v. Shepherd
Newton v. Sadler

Hudson v. Dungworth

Ditto v.
Leek v. Porter
Brookes . Cotes

COMMON-LAW CAUSE LISTS, HILARY TERM, Liverp.-Rayner v. Grote

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Middlesex

Shropshire..

Cornwall

Yorkshire

Devonshire

Same...

Middlesex
Wiltshire

Middlesex
Kent

Yorkshire

Ely
Yorkshire
Devonshire
Surrey .....
Leicestershire..
Lincolnshire
Huntingdonsh.

Devonshire

Essex......

Buckinghamsh.

Worcestershire

Middlesex ....

Reg. v. Churchwardens of Birmingham.
Inhabitants of Scammonden.
Christopher Neville, Clerk.
James Smyth.

David Smith.

H. J. Conyers & ors.

I William Jones.

Newton v. Grand
Junction Rail. Co.
Taylor v. Lawrence
Toulmin v. Hedley
Exeter-Pyle v. Tartridge
Bridgwater-Draper v. Crofts
Bristol-Kynaston v. Davis

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Surveyors of the Highways of Westoe. Croydon-Lillywhite v. De

Inhabitants of Heyop.

Mayor of Sandwich.

George Buchanan.

Inhabitants of Mile End, Old Town.

Inhabitants of Gourton.

Inhabitants of St. Gennys.

Joseph Foster.

Inhabitants of Bickington.
Inhabitants of Ashburton.
William Bond.

Inhabitants of Bradford.
Thomas Paynter.
Mayor of Dover.

Inhabitants of Keighley.
Inhabitants of Chatham.
Inhabitants of Northowsam.
Inhabitants of Newton Terrars.

Churchwardens of St. Mary, Lambeth.
Inhabitants of Radcliffe Culey.
Trustees of the river Welland.
Inhabitants of Molesworth.

Inhabitants of Holne.

Inhabitants of Saffron Walden.

Churchwardens of Aylesbury with
Walton.

Inhabitants of St. Peter, Droitwich.

vereux

Croydon-Croucher v. Ether

ington Cardiff-Doe d. Bippert v.

Mayor of Swansea Chester-Harrison v. Ruscoe Lond.-Brown v. Wilkinson

Moved Easter Term, 1844. Liverp. Rodgers v. Maw Moved after the 4th day of Mich. Term, 1845.

Midd.-Hills v. Haswell

Reeve v. Mitcalfe

Goding v. Hanne

SPECIAL PAPER FOR HILARY TERM, 1846.

FOR JUDGMENT.

Duncan v. Benson-D.

(Heard 2nd June). Slater v. Dangerfield-Sp. C. (Heard 28th June). Bevins v. Hulme-D.

(Heard 10th Nov.). Sanders v. Coward-D.

(Heard 1st Dec.). Brooke v. Spong-D.

(Heard 4th Dec.)

FOR ARGUMENT.
Davis v. Nutt-D.

(To stand over till similar case

disposed of in Com. Pleas).
Offor v. Windsor-D.
Ashley v. Pratt-Sp. C.

Richards v. Easto-Sp. C.
Griffiths v. Pike-D.

NEW CASES.

Entered Hilary Term, 1846.
Hill v. Jennings--Sp. C.
Doe d. Haw v. Earles-Sp. C.
Bancroft v. Barnes-D.
Collins v. Hopwood-D.
Doe d. Lloydv. Ingleby-S.C.
Brown v. Jones-D.

Dean and Chapter of Ely v.
Cash-Sp. C.

Ollive v. Booker-D.
Davies v. Bute (Marq. of)-D.
Redish v. Grote-D.
Young v. Smith-D.

Doe d. Bute (Marq. of) v. Spry v. Gallop-Sp. C.

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Inhabitants of St. Giles in the Fields. colonial legal appointments:-John Shiell, Esq., to be
Her Majesty has been pleased to make the following

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Chief Justice for the islands of Antigua and Montserrat; and Sir Robert Horsford, Knt., to be her Majesty's Attorney-General for the island of Antigua. Thomas Brown Wylly, Esq., to be Puisne Judge for the island of Trinidad; and George Knox, Esq., to be her Majesty's Solicitor-General for that island. R. R. Craig, Esq., to be her Majesty's Solicitor-General for the colony of British Guiana.

The Right Hon. Sir Nicolas Conyngham Tindal, London 1st Sitting Knt., Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, has appointed the under-mentioned gentlemen to be Perpetual Commissioners for taking the acknowledgments of deeds to be executed by married women in and for the respective counties and districts attached to their names:-Joseph Arrowsmith, of Thirsk, Yorkshire, in and for the North Riding of the county of York; Alfred Cox, of Chipping Sodbury, Gloucestershire, in and for the county of Gloucester; Hugh Bruce Campbell, of Nottingham, in and for the town and county of the town of Nottingham, also in and for the county of Nottingham; James Eldridge, of Carisbrooke, in the Isle of Wight, in and for the county of Hants; William Marshall of Plymouth, Devonshire, in and for NEW TRIAL PAPER FOR HILARY TERM, 1846. the county of Devon; John Richard Bloxham, of BirFOR ARGUMENT. Anglesea-Hughes v. Buck-mingham, Warwickshire, in and for the county of Warwick, also in and for the counties of Stafford and Worcester; Charles Amphlett, of Birmingham, Warwickshire, in and for the county of Warwick, also in and for the counties of Stafford and Worcester; John Edmonds, of Plymouth, Devonshire, in and for the county of Devon; Joseph Hall, of Keswick, CumberNorthum.-Knight v. Water-land, in and for the county of Cumberland; Alfred ford (Marq. of) Catchmayd Hooper, of the city of Worcester, in and Carlisle-Mounsey. Mounsey for the city of Worcester, also in and for the county of Liverp.-Marrow v. Chapman Worcester.

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