being, places at the disposal of creditors.

One of the effects

of a bankrupt law is that of a general execution issued in favor of all the creditors of the bankrupt, reaching all his property subject to levy, and applying it to the payment of all his debts according to their respective priorities. It is quite proper, therefore, to confine its operation to such property as other legal process could reach. A rule which operates to this effect throughout the United States is uniform within the meaning of that term, as used in the Constitution.'

We concur in this view, and hold that the system is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States, when the trustee takes in each state whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bankrupt law had not been passed. The general operation of the law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in different states.

Nor can we perceive in the recognition of the local law in the matter of exemptions, dower, priority of payments, and the like, any attempt by Congress to unlawfully delegate its legislative power. Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560, sub nom. Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 35 L. ed. 572, 576, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865.

But it is contended that as to voluntary proceedings the act is in violation of the 5th Amendment in that it deprives creditors of their property without due process of law in failing to provide for notice.

The act provides that "any person who owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as a voluntary bankrupt” (§ 4a), and that "upon the filing of a voluntary petition the judge shall hear the petition and make the adjudication or dismiss the petition." § 18g. With the petition he must file schedules of his property, and "of his creditors, showing their residences, if known, if unknown, that fact to be stated." § 7, subd. 8. The schedules must be verified, and the petition must state that "petitioner owes debts which he is unable to pay in full," and "that he is willing to surrender all his property for the benefit of his creditors, except such as is exempt by law." This establishes those facts so far as a decree of bankruptcy is concerned, and he has committed an act of bankruptcy in filing the petition. These are not issuable facts, and notice is unnecessary, unless dismissal is sought, when notice is required. § 59g.

As Judge Lowell said: "He may be, in fact, fraudulent, and able and unwilling to pay his debts; but the law takes

him at his word, and makes effectual provision, not only by civil, but even by criminal, process to effectuate his alleged intent of giving up all his property." Re Fowler, 1 Low. Dec. 161, Fed. Cas. No. 4,998.

Adjudication follows as matter of course, and brings the bankrupt's property into the custody of the court for distribution among all his creditors. After adjudication the creditors are given at least ten days' notice by publication and by mail of the first meeting of creditors, and of each of the various subsequent steps in administration. § 58. Application for a discharge cannot be made until after the expiration of one month from adjudication. § 14.

Form No. 57 gives the form of petition for discharge and the order for hearing to be entered thereon, requiring notice to be published in a designated newspaper printed in the district, and "that the clerk shall send by mail to all known creditors copies of said petition and this order, addressed to them at their places of residence as stated."

Section 14b provides for the granting of discharge unless the applicant has" (1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as herein provided; or (2) with fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial condition, and, in contemplation of bankruptcy, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account or records from which his true condition might be ascertained.'

The offenses referred to are enumerated in § 29, and embrace misappropriation of property; concealing property belonging to the estate; making false oaths or accounts; presenting false claims; receiving property from a bankrupt with intent to defeat the act; extorting money for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceedings.

It is also provided by § 15 that a discharge may be revoked, on application within a year, if procured by fraud and not warranted by the facts.

Notwithstanding these provisions, it is insisted that the want of notice of filing the petition is fatal because the adjudication per se entitles the bankrupt to a discharge, and that the proceedings in respect of discharge are in personam, and require personal service of notice. The adjudication does not in itself have that effect, and the first of these objections really rests on the ground that the notice provided for is unreasonably short, and the right to oppose discharge unreasonably restricted. Con

sidering the plenary power of Congress, the subject-matter of the suit, and the common rights and interests of the creditors, we regard the contention as untenable.

Congress may prescribe any regulations concerning discharge in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental law, and we cannot find anything in this act on that subject which would justify us in overthrowing its action.

Nor is it possible to concede that personal service of notice of the application for a discharge is required.

Proceedings in bankruptcy are, generally speaking, in the nature of proceedings in rem, as Mr. Justice Grier remarked in Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 643, 12 L. ed. 854. And in New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S. 662, 23 L. ed. 339, it was ruled that a decree adjudging a corporation bankrupt is in the nature of a decree in rem as respects the status of the corporation. Creditors are bound by the proceedings in distribution on notice by publication and mail, and when jurisdiction has attached and been exercised to that extent, the court has jurisdiction to decree discharge, if sufficient opportunity to show cause to the contrary is afforded, on notice given in the same way. The determination of the status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his liberation from encumbrance on future exertion is matter of public concern, and Congress has power to accomplish it throughout the United States by proceedings at the debtor's domicil. If such notice to those who may be interested in opposing discharge, as the nature of the proceeding admits, is provided to be given, that is sufficient. Service of process or personal notice is not essential to the binding force of the decree. Judgment affirmed.

B. STATE LEGISLATION

1. EFFECT OF NATIONAL ACT

NOTE.-In the absence of a national bankruptcy statute it is within the power of the several states to enact such legislation. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. State bankruptcy laws, however, in so far as they purport to affect contracts made before the adoption of the statutes are void as impairing the obligation of contracts. Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra. As to contracts made after the enactment of the state

bankruptcy statute there is no constitutional objection to the state law providing for a full and complete discharge. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213. During the times when there was no national bankruptcy law, when the several states had covered the ground more or less fully, many interesting and difficult problems confronted the courts as to the proper law applicable to given cases. The problem usually presented was the effect of a discharge by a state court under the state statute upon contracts made in other states or held by creditors who were non-residents or citizens of other states. For a discussion of this very interesting though now comparatively unimportant problem see 6 Harv. L. Rev. 349.

Upon the national act taking effect, state statutes covering the same or part of the same ground (see infra, 12-41) are ipso facto suspended; and upon the repeal of the national act they are ipso facto revived. Lothrop v. Highland Foundry Co., 128 Mass. 120; Oil Co. v. Morse & Co., 97 Ark. 513. In Maine an insolvency act was passed before the repeal of the national act of 1867, and it was held that upon the repeal of the federal statute the state law became operative and covered things done during the time that the state and federal laws overlapped. Palmer v. Hixon, 74 Me. 447. See also Lothrop v. Highland. Foundry Co., supra.

2. WHAT STATE LAWS ARE SUSPENDED

MAYER v. HELLMAN

91 U. S. 496, 23 L. ed. 377

(United States Supreme Court. January 31, 1876)

Hellman, as assignee in bankruptcy of Bogen and others, sued Mayer and Evans, assignees of the same parties under the assignment laws of the State of Ohio, to obtain property which passed to defendants under the assignment to them. The defendants answered, setting up their title under the assignment; and the plaintiffs demurred to the answer. The Court below sustained the demurrer, and the defendants sue out their writ of error.

The facts as disclosed by the record, so far as they are material for the disposition of the case, are briefly these: On the 3rd of December, 1873, at Cincinnati, Ohio, George Bogen and Jacob Bogen, composing the firm of G. & J. Bogen, and the same

parties with Henry Muller, composing the firm of Bogen & Son, by deed executed of that date, individually and as partners, assigned certain property held by them, including that in controversy, to three trustees, in trust for the equal and common benefit of all their creditors. The deed was delivered upon its execution, and the property taken possession of by the assignees.

By the law of Ohio, in force at the time, when an assignment of property is made to trustees for the benefit of creditors, it is the duty of the trustees, within ten days after the delivery of the assignment to them, and before disposing of any of the property, to appear before the probate judge of the county in which the assignors reside, produce the original assignment, or a copy thereof, and file the same in the Probate Court, and enter into an undertaking payable to the State, in such sum and with such sureties as may be approved by the judge, conditioned for the faithful performance of their duties.

In conformity with this law, the trustees, on the 13th of December, 1873, within the prescribed ten days, appeared before the probate judge of the proper county in Ohio, produced the original assignment, and filed the same in the Probate Court. One of the trustees having declined to act, another one was named in his place by the creditors, and appointed by the Court. Subsequently the three gave an undertaking with sureties approved by the judge, in the sum of $500,000, for the performance of their duties, and then proceeded with the administration of the trust under the direction of the Court.

On the 22nd of June of the following year, more than six months after the execution of the assignment, the petition in bankruptcy against the insolvents was filed in the District Court of the United States, initiating the proceedings in which the plaintiff was appointed their assignee in bankruptcy. As such officer, he claims a right to the possession of the property in the hands of the defendants under the assignment to them. Judgment having been rendered against them, they sued out this writ of error.

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.

The validity of the claim of the assignee in bankruptcy depends, as a matter of course, upon the legality of the assignment made under the laws of Ohio. Independently of the Bankrupt Act, there could be no serious question raised as to its