tion of their debts. Such action is clearly forbidden by § 2296 of the Revised Statutes. Seymour v. Sanders, Fed. Cas. No. 12,690; Baldwin v. Boyd, 18 Neb. 444, 25 N. W. 580; Shoemaker v. Stimson, 16 Wash. 1, 47 Pac. 218; Jean v. Dee, 5 Wash. 580, 32 Pac. 460; Brown v. Kennedy, 12 Colo. 235, 20 Pac. 696. There is certainly no such inconsistency between the bankruptcy act and § 2296 of the Revised Statutes as would sustain a repeal of § 2296 by implication. Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, 155 Fed. 945, 961, 84 C. C. A. 93, and cases there cited. In some of the cases there are general remarks to the effect that the state law establishes the rule of exemption under the bankruptcy act, and that only such exemptions in value and kind as those laws permit can be claimed by the bankrupt. Steele v. Buel, 104 Fed. 968, 44 C. C. A. 287; In re Manning (D. C.) 112 Fed. 948; In re Wunder (D. C.) 133 Fed. 821. The question before the court in these cases, however, was whether a specific piece of property came rightfully within the terms of the state law granting exemptions. In none of them was the question raised whether a bankrupt was entitled to the protection of the few federal laws granting to him special rights as against his creditors. The question here presented therefore must be determined, not upon such general observations as are found in these cases, but upon the provisions of the statutes themselves. For example, Rev. St. U. S. § 1628 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1122), declares that military uniforms, arms, and equipments shall be exempt from all judicial process These articles are not exempt under many of the state laws. Could it be reasonably contended that such articles pass to the trustee in bankruptcy because they are not covered by state exemption laws? I think not. The cardinal principle of the bankruptcy act is to grant to creditors only those rights which would have been theirs if bankruptcy had not supervened, and to save to the bankrupt and his family every right and exemption which would have been theirs as against creditors enforcing their claims by ordinary judicial process. Thomas v. Woods, 170 Fed. This prin ciple should not be departed from except in obedience to a command of the statute which is altogether clear. Such feeble inconsistencies as are here brought to the notice of the court would afford no justification for such action. The decision of the referee must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. In re BAKER 182 Fed. 392, 104 C. C. A. 602 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 3, 1910) WARRINGTON, Circuit Judge. This is a proceeding to revise in matter of law a judgment denying to the petitioner a homestead exemption in certain real estate. The petitioner was adjudged a bankrupt under voluntary proceedings begun July 31, 1908. He presented with his petition and schedules his claim to the exemption under § 1702, Ky. St. (Russell's St. § 4661). His real estate consisted of an undivided one-fifth interest in three parcels of land, which descended to him upon the death of his brother in June, 1908. The lands were neither improved nor susceptible of partition; and the trustee in bankruptcy, under order of the referee made in November, 1908, sold the interest of the bankrupt in the lands for $926, and set apart the whole of the proceeds of sale to the bankrupt as exempt in lieu of his claim to a homestead. Prior to the bankruptcy proceedings some of the petitioner's creditors, whose claims antedated the inheritance, commenced suits in attachment and otherwise. to subject the land to the payment of these debts. These creditors objected to any allowance of a homestead, and the order of the referee was set aside by the court below. In view of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3424), the validity of the action of the trustee in setting apart the bankrupt's exemption and the rights of the bankrupt in that behalf are to be tested by the law of Kentucky. The federal courts are accustomed in such cases to follow the decisions of the court of last resort of the state whose laws are so drawn in question. In speaking of the Constitution and statutes of Texas respecting homestead exemptions in a proceeding like the present one in Duncan v. Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co., 150 Fed. 269, 271, 80 C. C. A. 157, 159, Circuit Judge Shelby said: "It has been the policy of the state of Texas in its Constitution and legislation, as construed by the decisions of its Supreme Court, to favor by liberal interpretations the exemptions in favor of debtors. These decisions, construing the state Constitution and statutes, are as binding on this court as the Constitution and statutes themselves." See, also, McCarty v. Coffin, 150 Fed. 307, 310, 80 C. C. A. 195; In re Wood (D. C.) 147 Fed. 877, 878; Huenergardt v. Brittain Dry Goods Co., 116 Fed. 31, 33, 53 C. C. A. 505; In re Irvin, 120 Fed. 733, 734, 57 C. C. A. 147; In re Meriwether (D. C.) 107 Fed. 102; In re Pope (D. C.) 98 Fed. 722; Loveland on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) § 177, p. 514. Since the federal courts cannot administer or distribute exempted property as an asset of the bankrupt's estate, or do more than to set it apart to the bankrupt (Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294, 23 Sup. Ct. 751, 47 L. ed. 1061), this practice of the courts would seem to be in accord with the course pursued by Mr. Justice Gray respecting a dower right under the bankruptcy act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat. 517) in Porter v. Lazear, 109 U. S. 84, 3 Sup. Ct. 58, 27 L. ed. 865. See, also, In re Petition of Carrie E. Hays (decided by this court March 8, 1910) 181 Fed. 674. The court below in terms recognized the binding effect in such matters of decisions of courts of last resort of the states in which the questions arise; but, as we understand his opinion the learned judge did not think any rule of decision on the present issue was settled in Kentucky. He said: "At the outset I would emphasize that the homestead exemption is purely statutory. It is created by statute, and it exists only as it is so created. The courts cannot adjudge that to be such an exemption which is not such by the terms of the statute according to their intent and meaning. They are concerned solely with determining what that true intent and meaning is. This court, however, is not entirely free to do this. It is limited by any construction of the statute put forth by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, at least if it clearly appears that such is its construction, and there is no reason to think that in any future case it will not adhere thereto. I recognize fully this restriction upon me, and have no disposition to go beyond it. But the proper standpoint from which to view any particular construction of the statute by that court, and to determine accurately just what it is, is one's own construction. I will therefore at the first undertake for myself to ascertain the statute's true intent and meaning." We of course agree that where the decisions of the State Court are in conflict, and point to no definite rule touching the construction of a statute of the state, the federal courts are quite as much at liberty to place their own construction upon the statute as they would be if the State Court had not con strued it at all. But if there be a rule of decision which is reasonably clear with respect to a given statute, we think the federal courts are bound in a case like this to follow the rule, rather than to undertake to determine upon their own interpretation whether the State Court may not change the rule in the future. The statute in question provides that: be there shall, on all debts or liabilities exempt from sale under execution, attachment or judgment, except to foreclose a mortgage given by the owner of a homestead, or for purchase money due therefor, so much land including the dwelling house and the appurtenances owned by debtors, who are actual bona fide housekeepers with a family, resident in this commonwealth, as shall not exceed in value one thousand dollars; but this exemption shall not apply to sales under execution, attachment or judgment, if the debt or liability existed prior to the purchase of the land, or of the erection of the improvements thereon." It is further provided in substance by § 1705 that where real estate "in the opinion of the appraisers, is of greater value than one thousand dollars, and not divisible without great diminution of its value, then the same shall be sold, and one thousand dollars of the money shall be paid to the defendant to enable him to purchase another homestead." We do not feel called upon to comment on all the distinctions urged by learned counsel to exist between a number of the deci sions cited in this opinion, and between some of them and others cited in their brief. Enough has been adduced to show what we conceive to be the plain trend of decision of the Court of Appeals, and also why we regard those decisions as controlling in the present case. The judgment of the court below is reversed, with direction that the order of the referee be affirmed, with costs. CHAPTER IV COMPOSITIONS ZAVELO v. REEVES 227 U. S. 625, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365 In re HOXIE et al. 180 Fed. 508 (District Court, D. Maine. July 2, 1910) HALE, District Judge. The bankrupts were duly adjudicated on the 15th day of March, 1910, upon an involuntary petition filed February 26, 1910. At the first meeting of creditors, claims of 44 creditors, amounting to $9,146.59, were filed. Claims of certain other creditors, duly scheduled, have not yet been presented for allowance. Appraisers have been appointed, and have filed their report, showing the value of the assets of the bankrupts to be: Real estate, $5,300, which is under mortgage for more than that amount; personal property, $4,481.95. The appraisers report that the basis of their valuation is partly at cost price and partly at possible selling value. After the bankrupts filed their schedule and were examined they offered a composition at the rate of 15 per cent. A majority in number of all the creditors whose claims have been allowed, namely, 29 creditors, representing $5,362.06, have accepted in writing the offer of composition. The referee reports the above facts. He recommends that the composition will be for the best interests of the creditors; that it is made in good faith, and not procured by any means, promises, or acts prohibited by the bankrupt law; and that the bankrupts have not been guilty of any act, or of any failure in duty, which would be a bar to their discharge. He also assigns certain reasons which have influenced him in coming to his conclusion. It is provided by § 12d of the bankruptcy act of 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427]) that the judge shall confirm a composition if satisfied (1) that |