is admissible upon the question of damages as showing that the location of the road upon the church property rendered it less valuable for church purposes. Evidence as to Disturbance of Worship. In such case, evidence is also admissible to show that the operation of the road distracted the attention of the worshippers and drove them to other churches and in that manner impaired the usefulness of the property for church purposes and rendered it less valuable. Evidence as to Value Before Location of Road.—In condemnation proceedings it is competent to show what the land was reasonably worth before location of the railroad upon it, preparatory to showing what it was worth after the road was constructed and used. Opinion Evidence-Presumption as to Competency of Witness.-The presumption is that a witness expressing an opinion as to the value of land is qualified in the absence of objection on that account. Excessive Damages-Commissioner's Report-Verdict of Jury.—In proceedings by a railway company to condemn certain land after the commissioners had made their report as to damages sustained, the company excepted on the ground that the assessment was excessive. The landowner did not except at all. Held, that the inquiry in the court to which the case was taken related solely to the question whether the damages were excessive, and a judgment for a greater amount than the assessment, although not excepted to, will, on appeal to the supreme court, be reduced to the extent of the excess over the commissioner's report. APPEAL: from Granville County Superior Court. Case stated. MERRIMON, J.-The plaintiff brought its summary proceeding to condemn land of the defendants for the purpose of right of way for its railroad. Commissioners were appointed to view the land and assess damages. They afterwards did so, and made their report, to which the plaintiff excepted and objected, upon the ground that the damage assessed was excessive. In the superior court a proper issue was submitted to a jury. On the trial the parties examined divers witnesses. Certain of those examined by the defendants respectively testified as follows, plaintiff excepting to parts of their testimony as indicated in the course of their examination: The defendant introduced M. L. Winston, who testified: "I have been accustomed to attend Bullock Church all my life. Have examined the boundaries. There is a ditch around three sides of the church land. The lot is a parallelogram, with the longest side on the railroad; the other three sides bounded by private prop erty. The public highway has been taken and occupied by the railroad, and the highway put upon church land,—that is, on land condemned for right of way. (Defendant proposed to show that the land was used for the purpose of hitching horses, etc. Plaintiff objected. Objection overruled. Exception.) Some horses are hitched on the east line, some on the north and south ends, on the church land. There is nearly three-fourths of an acre left. Before railroad was laid out, have seen two or more horses hitched to the same tree, besides many buggies and other vehicles being on the ground. The owner of the adjacent land cut a ditch about eighteen inches deep on the church line, on all three sides, except next to the railroad. The church is about 35x54 feet, and about 100 feet from the railroad. I have been at the church when the train passed. There is a very large membership. (Defendant then proposed to show the value of the property before the railroad was built. Plaintiff objected. Objection overruled. Plaintiff excepted.) Witness stated that before road was built he valued the property at about $1,000; now thought it was worth $600. Taking off the land condemned makes the lot more oblong, being smaller in the rear. Church stands on slight hill; a depression behind the church. Church yard is well wooded. The church is not cut off from the highway. I was one of the commissioners appointed to assess the damages. I am not a member of the Methodist Church; I am a minister of the Christian Church. Before the land was condemned, they had barely enough for church. purposes; taking off one-fourth of the land would depreciate the value of the building." H. R. Gooch, witness for defendant, stated that the lot was in the shape of a parallelogram, with the railroad on the long side of it. "Sometimes [before the railroad was built] there was not room enough in the lot for church purposes, and there is not enough now. Horses could see train from any part of lot, unless they were put behind the church. Have been there during services. (The defendant proposed to show the effect of running trains by the church during services. Plaintiff objected. Objec tion overruled. Exception.) The attention of the congregation was diverted from the minister to the passing train. The only way of approach to the church is by the way alongIside of the railroad; a ditch having been cut around the other three sides of it. The property was worth $1,250 for church purposes, and was so valued in report to conference. I consider the railroad has damaged it fully one half." cross-examination, witness said: “I am a member of that church. Attention is sometimes diverted by persons coming in. Church has not been valued since the report to conferteams at home and walk, and some have gone to other churches. It is now worth but little for church purposes." There was The congregation is falling off. Some leave their a verdict and judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appealed ence. to this court. On We need not trouble ourselves to settle here the particular frightening horses. rules to be observed in assessing damages under the statutory provisions of this state against railroad companies, Evidence as to occasioned by the location of the right of way for their railroads across the land of individuals, because the plaintiff requested the court, among other things, to instruct the jury "that the defendant is only entitled to recover such actual damages as result from the taking of the land, and such damages as directly flow therefrom," and it gave this instruction. Indeed it gave all the instructions asked for by the plaintiff, with slight modification, to which there was no objection. The plaintiff cannot then complain of the instructions given. For the present purpose, treating them as correct, we are of opinion that the exceptions to evidence cannot be sustained. The evidence in respect to hitching horses, objected to, was not offered for the purpose of showing damages, special or otherwise, as suggested on the argument, but for the pertinent purpose of showing that the value of the small parcel of land of the defendants was impaired by reason of the fact that passing trains on the railroad would tend to frighten and render unruly and unsafe horses fastened to trees and other things near to and about the church during, just before, and after church service. It is of common knowledge that it is convenient and essential at country churches to leave sufficient room near to them to fasten horses, where they will stand quietly and safely while the worshipers are assembled at worship. The land in question was dedicated to and used as a place for public worship. It was useful and valuable for that purpose, and the defendants were entitled to damage if trains passing over the road rendered it less valuable for the necessary incidental purpose of hitching horses. The impairment of the value of the land in such respect constituted an element of damage that directly flowed from the location of the road on it. That horses might be fastened to trees and other convenient things on the small parcel of land, in view of the purpose to which it was devoted, rendered it in some measure valuable. The location of the road on it rendered it less valuable for that essential purpose; created the necessity for erecting stalls, screens, and the like for horses, at an outlay of money that otherwise would have been unnecessary. In this view, the evidence was certainly competent. Raleigh & A. A. L. R. Co. v. Wicker, 74 N. Car. 220. value of land UnEvidence as to questionably it was competent to show what the land was reasonably worth before the location of the railroad on it preparatory to showing what it was worth after the road was constructed and used. This is a common, reasonable, and necessary way of proving -Opinion- the quantum of damages, when it appears that the construction and use of the road produced the difference in value. 2 Wood, Ry. Law, 899 et seq; 3 Suth. Dam. 441. The value of land, as of all kinds of property, is much a matter of opinion, and a witness should have knowledge of such value, gained from experience, information, and observation, to fit him to testify in that respect; otherwise, his opinion would be at random, worthless and misleading. But the objection here was not to the qualification of the witness to testify. It does not so appear, and it would be unfair to merely infer that such was the ground of objection. It may be that he was qualified; that he had bought and sold land in that neighborhood; that he had knowledge of sales made by others from time to time, and particularly of church property. So far as we can see, in the absence of objection on that account, the witness was qualified. The presumption is he was, else objection would have been made for the reason he was not. 2 Wood. Ry. Law, 941 et seq. Disturbance of worship. Nor has the third exception substantial force. If the result of the location of the road on the land close to the church was to disturb and distract the attention of the worshipers accustomed to assemble at the church, when assembled for the purpose of worship, so as to impair or destroy the usefulness of the property for church purposes, to which it was and has been devoted, the property was on that account less valuable, unless it was more valuable for some other purpose, and that it was is not suggested. Indeed the evidence tended to show that it was of trifling value for any other purpose. The purpose of the evidence was not, as contended on the argument, to show how much or how little the worshipers, severally or collectively, were or would or might be shorn of religious impressions and advantages, but to show that the property was less valuable, in that worshipers would not go there, but would find some other safer, more quiet and agreeable place to worship, until little or no value for church purposes,-until the church buildthe church, as a place of worship, would be deserted, and of ing would be useful only to be torn down, and the lumber devoted to other purposes, and the land would be worth for other pose of church organizations is to extend religious advant purposes only a nominal price. While the chief pur ages, and afford opportunity to worship Almighty God, through their officers and agents, they own much and valuable property, both real and personal, to be affected favorably or adversely as to its pecuniary value, like similar property Owned by individuals; and the law takes notice of and protects it just as it does the like property of individuals in material respects. Injury to such property, in a respect that impairs its usefulness for the purpose to which it is devoted, constitutes an element of damage, recoverable when such injury is the direct cause of the act complained of, or when it flows directly from the act as a consequence. If the effect of the location and use of the plaintiff's road had been to ruin the church building in question, would not the defendants have had their remedy? Most assuredly they would. If such effect has seriously injured its usefulness, not in a spiritual point of view, as to worshipers there, but as a church property, shall they not have redress? If the road is so near to the church as that passing trains of cars, or some or many of them, distract and divert the attention, for one cause or another, so that they cannot or will not properly worship there, shall the defendants not have redress for the injury so in the nature of the matter done the property as a place of worship? Is the property on that account not less valuable? Would any church organization give as much money for the property with such disadvantage, so wrought, for church purposes, as it would otherwise do? Obviously it would not. Did such injurious effect, great or small, flow as a consequence directly from the location and use of the plaintiff's road? If it did, such effect constituted an element of damage cognizable in this proceeding. The purpose of the evidence excepted to was to prove that it did, and it had that tendency. It was therefore competent. 2 Wood, Ry. Law, 925 et seq. commission ers-Exces The commissioners who viewed the land assessed the damage at $300. The plaintiff objected, and excepted to this assessment as excessive. Thereupon, the parties Assessment of waiving irregularities in the course of the proceeding, the question of the quantum of damages was sive damages. submitted to a jury in term time, and they.assessed the damage at $450. The defendants did not except to the assessment made by the commissioners. Hence, in this court, the plaintiff contended that the court below could not give judgment for a greater sum than $300. The report of the commissioners to assess the damage when made and filed gave character and point to the proceedings as to damages. "Any person interested in the said land may file exceptions to said report, and, upon the determination of the same by the court, either party to the proceedings may appeal to the court at term, and thence, after judgment, to the supreme court. The court or judge on the hearing may direct a new appraisal, modify or confirm the report, or make such order in the premises as to him shall seem right and proper," etc. Code, § 1946. Acting upon this provision, the plaintiff excepted to the report solely on the ground that |