Love, George H., president, Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. Lukens, W. H., vice president and general sales manager, R. M. Hollingshead Co., Camden, N. J.

Lundborg, Louis B., vice president, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. Macdonald, R. W., export manager, Burroughs Adding Machine Co., Detroit, Mich.

MacNaughton, E. B., president, Reed College, Portland, Oreg.

Malott, Deane W., chancellor, the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans. Marcus Stanley, Neiman-Marcus, Dallas, Tex.

Marshall, M. Lee, chairman, Continental Baking Corp., Inc., New York, N. Y. May, Rene A., president, Getz Bros & Co., San Francisco Calif.

McCormick Charles P., chairman, McCormick & Co., Inc., Baltimore, Md.

McFadden, John H., Jr., George H. McFadden & Bro., Memphis, Tenn.

McGowin, Earl M., vice president, W. T. Smith Lumber Co., Chapman, Ala.

Mead George H., Mead Corp., Dayton, Ohio.

Montague, Gilbert H., counsellor at law, New York, N. Y.

Noble, Edward J., chairman of the board, American Broadcasting Co., Inc., New York, N. Y.

Northrup, Dr. Mildred B., professor of economics, Bryn Mawr College.

Patterson, Hon. Robert P., Patterson Belknap & Webb, New York, N. Y.

Patterson, W. A., president, United Air Lines, Chicago, Ill.

Patton, James G., president, National Farmers Union, Denver, Colo.

Pepper G. Willing, vice president, Scott Paper Co., Chester, Pa.

Perker, Walter G., export manager, Marchant Calculating Machine Co. Oakland, Calif.

Petersen, Howard C., executive vice president, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., Philadelphia, Pa.

Pfeiffer, Curt G., senior councilor, National Council of American Importers, New York, N. Y.

Pickett, Clarence E., executive secretary, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia, Pa.

Potts, Frederic A., president, the Philadelphia National Bank, Philadelphia, Pa. Reed, Philip D., chairman of the board, General Electric Co., New York, N. Y. Rosenfield, Joseph F., chairman of the board, Younker's, Des Moines, Iowa. Rosenthal, Morris S., president, Stein, Hall & Company, Inc., New York, N. Y. Ruml, Beardsley, 783 Fifth Avenue, New York. N. Y.

Schacter, Harry W., president, Kaufman Straus Co., Louisville, Ky.

Scherman, Harry, president, Book-of-the-Month Club, New York, N. Y.
Schramm, James S., vice president, J. S. Schramm Co., Burlington, Iowa.

Shotwell, Dr. James T., acting president, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, New York, N. Y.

Sibley, John A., chairman, Trust Company of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga.

Simons, Gustave, counselor at law, New York, N. Y.

Sitterley, Eugene, publisher, World's Business and Guia, New York, N. Y.

Skouras, Spyros P., president, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., New York, N. Y.

Smith, Eugene B., Eugene B. Smith & Co., Dallas, Tex.

Smith, Marvin W., executive vice president, the Baldwin Locomotive Works, Philadelphia, Pa.

Smith, Paul C., editor and general manager, San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco, Calif.

Sonne, H. Christian, president, Amsinck, Sonne & Co., New York, N. Y.
Speer, Talbot, president, the Baltimore Sales Book Co., Baltimore, Md.
Staley, Eugene, economist, Palo Alto, Calif.

Swope, Gerard, honorary president, General Electric Co., New York, N. Y.
Symington, C. J., chairman, The Symington-Guild Corp., New York, N. Y.
Taft, Charles P., Headley, Taft and Headley, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Teel, Forrest, president, Foreign Sales Organizations, Eli Lilly and Co., Indianapolis, Ind.

Trippe, Juan, president, Pan American World Airways System, New York, N. Y. Virden, John C., chairman, J. C. Virden Co., Cleveland, Ohio.

Watzek, John W., Jr., Crossett, Watzek, Gates, Chicago, Ill.

Weil, Adolph S., Weil Bros., Montgomery, Ala.

Wetherill, Samuel P., president, Wetherill Engineering Co., Bryn Mawr, Pa. Wheeler, W. H., Jr., president, Pitney-Bowes, Inc., Stamford, Conn.

White, D. E., vice president, Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., Cleveland, Ohio. Wilbur, Brayton, president, Wilbur-Ellis Co., San Francisco, Calif.

Williams, Alfred H., president, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa.

Williams, Roger, chairman, executive committee, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., New York, N. Y.

Willkie, H. F., vice president, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., Louisville, Ky.
Winton, David J., chairman, Winton Lumber Co., Minneapolis, Minn.
Wynne, C. M., president, Overseas Industries, Inc., Chicago, Ill.
Yarnall, D. Robert, president, Yarnall-Waring Co., Philadelphia, Pa.

Mr. BATT. It is obvious our members do not agree 100 percent with all the articles in this charter. They understand very well its shortcomings, but they also conclude that the growing extent of governmental trade barriers and controls are so impeding and distorting the flow of trade and so encouraging the growth of economic nationalism that the private trader is increasingly at a disadvantage in international trade. They think unless something is done about it-and soon-that our way of doing business, and the cooperative effort of democratic countries generally, will be even more seriously threatened. The men on this committee do not have an exaggerated idea of what the ITO can do in the immediate future to solve these trade problems. They do not say it is an answer to every ill that has crept into this picture over a long period of time. On the other hand, they do not propose, as do so many people who oppose the charter, that the whole thing should be thrown out because there are one or two features objectionable to one group and one or two objectionable to another group, in the charter. They think it would be an extremely unfortunate thing for the United States, with this critical position of leadership so obviously forced on it, to reject the Habana Charter. They feel that such an action by this Congress would lead to the conclusion on the part of the rest of the world that the United States was reversing the position of authoritative leadership which it has been gradually accepting over the last 20 years.

They believe that on balance, the Charter represents the only positive and constructive approach they have seen and they feel strongly that if it is rejected there is no alternative solution in the picture. They feel, further, that the rejection of this Charter by Congress would tend to drive a coffin nail into the principle of multilateral trade to which this country has been so strongly committed.

In my brief, Mr. Chairman, there are several subheads which I shall only briefly refer to:

RELATION OF ITO TO RECOVERY

Under this heading I discuss the present economic situation, beginning with the British crisis and on through ECA. We recognize that the European recovery program, as significant as it has been, has been limited to only a part of the world-western Europe; that ECA has a normal ending time, and that first the rest of the world, and second the period following the ending of ECA, has to be covered by something.

I had the opportunity of listening to some of the questions put by members of this committee at the hearings last week. I noted that some of the members were raising the question, "What's the use of bothering about this now, because ECA still has 2 years left to go?" My answer to that is, first, that with respect to much of the world there is now no existing single piece of machinery which promises to do

what the charter does and therefore it is needed from that point of view; secondly, that there are a great many factors in international trade with which ECA can only partially deal, and with which this charter can concern itself.

However, more to the point, if all the world were in ECA, knowing that ECA should end in the summer of 1952, it is my conviction as an organizer and a businessman that it is not too early to start at this very moment, this very day, setting up the machinery which would deal with that situation when that particular piece of existing legislation shall have ended; because no more than you can build a factory and begin to turn out a product overnight, can you get a great piece of international machinery like this into effective operation. This is an entirely new operation. It is all new ground that has to be developed. Staffs have to be built up. People have to learn to work together.

It seems to us that with 1952 in front of us and not far away, some organization to deal with the problems which ECA deals with only in part ought to be put under way immediately, so that it may be ready to function effectively, and no gap take place in the effort to deal with basic economic problems.

It seems evident that there is need for some agency, more international in scope than the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and thus with more authority to deal with trade problems.

The Organization of European Economic Cooperation has made some headway in removing quantitative trade restrictions in studying other private and governmental barriers and in restoring limited convertibility of currencies. It has not been able, however, to come to grips with the problem in terms of the long-term adjustments needed to do the job. This is true for several obvious reasons:

The OEEC has only a short-term lease. Participants in OEEC are reluctant to commit their governments to policies that will extend beyond June 1952. The major part of the job of restoring sound trade patterns will come after that date.

The OEEC has only 19 participating members in western Europe and the trade adjustments needed to restore some measure of multilateralism are world-wide in scope and cannot be solved without the active effort of all trading nations.

World trade problems cannot be solved without the active participation of the United States and the United States is not a member of OEEC, merely an amicus curiae or interested observer.

It has become increasingly clear that an agency is needed in which all major trading nations can participate; one in which the interests. of the United States, as well as Canada and our Latin-American neighbors are adequately represented; an agency specifically charged with the job of exploring and attacking trade problems and with sufficient authority to do that job; an agency that can begin operations at once as a permanent part of the United Nations Organization.

The major operation of starting to explore these problems on a world basis is nobody's job, today. The Habana charter does in my judg ment provide an outline for that agency. That is why it seems to us that we ought to approve it at once so that it shall be reasonably effective when ECA is ended, and of course it is a part of my conclusion that we need it in many areas, now.

POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE CHARTER

Having listened to all the objections to the charter over the country, I think I have some understanding of the basis upon which it is being attacked:

The most common tendency is to pick it to pieces, line by line, and taking this or that part out of context, to say, "This is bad. Therefore, I don't like the charter."

The charter cannot properly be appraised thread by thread, as some of the opposition is prone to do. It must be considered in terms of the whole document and the unsettled international picture in which the ITO must serve.

The principal question is, can this charter as a whole, with the defects in it, and the strength in it, do the job which I think everybody agrees ought to be done?

Will these two basic elements in our foreign policy, the development of political and military security on the one hand, the restoration of production in Europe and the correction of trade evils all over the world on the other-will these come about more quickly with the charter or without?

Had you better have a charter which isn't perfect, revise it when and as it needs to be revised, through mechanisms in the charter itself, or have no charter at all?

What is the sound alternative to the Habana charter?

I raise that question of alternative, because, so far, I know of no answer. There are plenty of objections, but no sound alternative.

You have been told by the representatives of the State Department that the charter in its present form is the development of an American policy which started before the war was over. This country had recognized the faults in international trading that had grown up in the twenties and the thirties and there were a great many well-informed people who believed that World War II was the direct result, in large part, of the faults that had grown up in our system of international trading in the twenties, and more particularly the thirties. So this Government, as far back as the first discussions with respect to lend-lease machinery, proceeded on the idea that when the war was over, these people who were beginning then to be our debtors, should be willing to sit down with us and attempt to negotiate something which would regularize international trade. These efforts culminated at Habana.

Therefore, the International Trade Organization is our baby, good, bad, or indifferent, and the rest of the world looks at it that way. Now, I expect a good part of the rest of the world would be happy if we did not ratify this charter because it carries many, many more obligations for other countries to live up to than it does for the United States, since the United States is already living up or trying to live up to the greater part of these principles which it would now like to see the world accept.

Debating this subject over the country, I sense a lack of confidence in the ability of our State Department negotiators to protect American interests. The expression has been made that we are always "outsmarted" in our economic relationships when we are dealing with other countries.

I do not believe that. I think the American negotiators in the fields with which I am familiar do a good job. I think any charge which questions their ability to hold their own in the American interest is demonstrably false.

I would like specifically to point out these things which I think the charter does commit all members to. I want to emphasize that acceptance is easier for the United States, than for virtually any other country in the world because the United States is today adhering to these principles. Therefore, to the extent you accept my view you will have in your minds the fact that the concessions which the United States would have to make if this Congress approved the charter are few in number-for every one that the United States makes other countries will have to make many.

BASIC AMERICAN PRINCIPLE IN THE CHARTER

What are those practices which we want to see agreed to? All signators of the Habana charter will agree

To accord each other equal treatment. That is a reflection, of course, of the historic pattern of the United States with respect to equality of treatment amongst nations. Many countries do not like the requirement of according each other equal treatment.

To undertake negotiations to reduce the general level of tariffs and eliminate preferences, but importantly, not stopping at that point, to do so on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.

To reduce and, as soon as conditions permit, to eliminate barriers other than tariffs and to give adequate justification for such restrictions as must be continued for an emergency period.

To work toward standardization of methods for determining value for customs purposes and the simplification of customs procedures.

I was interested in hearing Mr. Foley, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, say on Friday that this administration has a customs-simplification bill which it is about ready to put before this Congress to plug that terribly weak gap. Obviously, if we do it, we are doing it without any commitment from other nations, as things now stand, that they will do the same thing. It is too bad for us to clean up our customs behavior, as desirable as that is, and get nothing for it from other nations when they have the same kind of a problem.

To operate state trading on a competitive basis.

To take appropriate measures to prevent private and government practices which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or fix artificial prices for products which move in international trade. That is generally the cartel principle.

A good deal has been said about commodity agreements and cartels and I think there is too frequently the loose conclusion that commodity agreements are nothing but public cartels. That is a conclusion which is completely unjustified.

The private cartel, of which Europe has always thought well, and still, by and large, does think well, operates solely in the private interest. That may not always be in opposition to the public, but a private cartel is set up for the purpose of looking after the interests of a certain group of people who control the cartel.

A commodity agreement is set up and approved by governments and operates in the public interest.