inferred from evidence, it is hardly possible | C. R., which directly negatives the doctrine,

and a case from 4 Hall's Law Journal, 462, which must have been quoted to sustain the opposite doctrine. It is the case of The United States v. Williams, in which the Chief Justice of the United States presided, and in which the right of election is expressly negatived, and the individual who pleaded expatriation is convicted and punished.

This cause came on to be heard on the tran

for a stronger case to be made out than that which is presented by the facts in that case. With regard to State decisions upon this question, I would remark that it is one so exclusively of State cognizance, that the courts of the respective States must be held to be best acquainted with their own law upon it. Though every other State in the Union, therefore, should have decided differently from the State of South Carolina, their decisions could only determine their own respective law upon seript of the record from the Supreme Court of 266*] this subject, and *could not weaken Appeals in Law and Equity in and for the that of South Carolina with regard to her own State of South Carolina, and was argued by law of allegiance and descents. It does appear counsel; on consideration whereof, it is consingular, that we are here called upon to over-sidered and declared by this court that Ann rule a decision of the courts of South Carolina Shanks, the mother of the original defendants, on a point on which they ought to be best in- was at the time of her death a British subject, formed, and to decide an individual to be a within the true intent and meaning of the ninth British subject, to whose allegiance the British article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and courts have solemnly decided the king has no Navigation made between his Britannic majesty claim. On this point the case of Ludlow, in and the United States of America on the 19th Thomas v. Acklam, is the case of Mrs. Shanks; of November, 1794, and that the said original it is impossible to distinguish them. The State defendants, as her heirs and British subjects, of South Carolina acknowledges her right to are capable to take, and did take by descent all the benefits of allegiance; the King of Great from her the moiety of the land in the proceedBritain disavows all claim to her allegiance; ings mentioned, and are entitled to the pro and yet we are called upon to declare her a ceeds of the sale thereof, now in the registry of British subject. the Circuit Court of Equity, as in the said proceedings mentioned. It is therefore considered and adjudged by this court, that there is error in the decree of the said Court of Appeals in Equity of the State of South Carolina, in affirming the decree of the Circuit Court, in said proceedings mentioned, whereby it was ordered and decreed, that the money arising from the sale of the land in question, thereto

I have not had opportunity for examining the decisions of all the States upon this subject, but I doubt not they will generally be found to concur in principle with the court of South Carolina, except so far as they depend upon local law. This is certainly the case in Massachusetts. The decision in the case Palmer v. Dorner, does, it is true, admit the right of the election; but besides that that case is very im-fore reserved *subject to the order of [*268 perfectly, and, I may add, unauthentically reported, it is most certainly overruled in the subsequent case of Martin v. Woods.

Before I quit the cause it may be proper to notice a passage in a book recently published in this country, and which has been purchased and distributed under an Act of Congress; I mean Gordon's Digest. There is no knowing what degree of authority it may be supposed to acquire by this act of patronage; but if there is any weight in the argument in favor of expatriation drawn from the Acts of Congress on that subject, I presume the argument will at some future time be applied to the doctrines contained in this book. If so, it was rather an unhappy measure to patronize it; since we find in it a multitude of nisi prius decisions, obiter dieta, and certainly some striking misapprehensions, ranged on the same shelf with Acts of Congress. On the particular subject now under consideration, art. 1649, we find the following sentence: Citizens of the United States have a right to expatriate themselves in time of war 267*] as well as in *time of peace, until restrained by Congress;" and for this doctrine the author quotes Talbot v. Jansen (3 Dall.), and the case of the Santissima Trinidad (7 Wheat., 348); in both which cases the author has obvi ously mistaken the argument of counsel for the opinion of the court; for the court in both cases expressly waive expressing an opinion, as not called for by the case, since, if conceded,

fense.

the court, be paid over to the petitioners, as the only heirs who are capable of taking the same. And it is further ordered and adjudged by this court, that for this cause the decree of the Circuit Court aforesaid, and of the Court of Appeals aforesaid be, and each of them is hereby reversed. And it is further ordered and adjudged by this court, that the cause be remanded to the said Court of Appeals, with directions that a decree be entered therein, that the said moiety of the said proceeds of the said sale be paid over to the original defendants (the present plaintiffs in error) as their right, and that such further proceedings be had therein as to justice and equity may in the premises appertain.

Cited-3 Pet., 99; 14 Pet., 628; 19 How., 577; 20 How., 20; 16 Wall., 434; 10 Otto, 487, 490,

The author also quotes a case from 1 Peters' Island.

When the case was opened by the counsel of Congress, passed the 18th of May. 1796, for the plaintiff, it was found on inspecting the entitled An Act providing for the [*271 record, that the particular point on which the sale of the lands of the United States, in the judges of the Circuit Court had differed, was territory north-west of the River Ohio, and not certified. The whole record had been sent above the mouth of the Kentucky River." The up, and it contained a certificate that the declaration charges that the register, on the 2d judges of the court had differed in opinion, of August, 1810, refused to enter the applicawithout a specific statement of what the differ- tion, although the lands had never been legally applied for or sold, and were then liable to be applied for and sold.

The statute does not extend to trusts, to charities or to *legacies. (3 Bac. Ab., 510; [*272 In giving a construction to the statute of limita-2 Lord Ray., 852, 935, 1204; Salk., 361, pl. 11: tions of Ohio, the action being barred by its denomination, the court cannot look into the cause of action. They may do this in those cases where actions are barred for causes specified in the statute; for the statute only operates against such actions, when prosecuted on the grounds stated. 1278]

has been sustained, the statutes of the State | ture had not before them the protection of the have been pleaded to suits in the federal courts.registers of the United States land-oflice, from (2 Cranch., 272, 1 Condensed Rep., 411; Hop- suits for a violation of duties by which the citi kirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454, 1 Condensed Rep., zens of Ohio might be injured. 595; Mandeville et al. v. Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15; 7 Cranch, 156; 8 Cranch, 84; 3 Wheat., 541; 5 Wheat., 124; 6 Wheat., 481, 497.)

To apply the regulations of the several States to such cases would produce the absurdity and injustice of different laws, and different limitations existing in different States. If the power of State Legislatures to limit actions against officers of the United States is admitted, the power over those officers might be exercised in other and in oppressive legislative provisions. The statute of Ohio cannot be enlarged by construction, so as to apply it to things not properly within State control, nor within the intention contemplated by those who enacted it. Mr. Berrien, Attorney General, for the defendant in error, contended, that the application and authority of State statutes of limitations to suits in the circuit courts of the United States, had been frequently decided in this

The nature of the case prevents there being a State decision in affirmance of the principles claimed for the plaintiff in error. The question is no more or less than this: where a duty is created by an Act of Congress, to be performed by a ministerial officer of the general government for the benefit of a citizen of another State whose rights grow out of the same law, and the injured party, as a citizen of another State, sues the officer in a federal court for malfeasance or for nonfeasance, can that officer plead in bar a statute of the State made for the protection of its own ministerial officers? 273* *The Circuit Court in the trial of civil actions arising under the law of a State, or cog-court. nizable by its courts, where a citizen of another State or a foreigner is plaintiff, act precisely as a State court, and is bound to interpret and enforce its laws as they are made to operate in the State courts.

What may have been the intention of the Legislature of the States in enacting limitation laws is not inquired into, and is not material; the only question is, whether the law applies to the case. (Faw v. Roberdeau, 3 Cranch, 174; 1 Condensed Rep., 483; Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 If the law of Ohio can be pleaded at all, it is Cranch, 454; 1 Condensed Rep., 595; Marsteller the Act of the 24th of January, 1810, which v. M'Lean, 7 Cranch, 156, 158; King v. Riddle, went into operation the 1st of June, 1810; the 7 Cranch, 168; Bond v. Jay, 7 Cranch, 350; act which is the cause of action in this suit Ciemenston v. Williams, 8 Cranch, 72, &c.) having been done in August, 1810. That law It is admitted that this action was not com(4 Ohio Laws, page 62, sec. 1) provides "that menced within six years, and that it is in its natall actions of trespass for assault, menace, bat-ure an action which would be within the optery, or wounding, actions of slander for words spoken or libel, or false imprisonment, shall be brought within one year next after the cause of such actions or suits; and all actions upon book accounts, and for forcible entry and detainer shall be brought within four years next after the cause of such actions and suits; and all actions of trespass upon real property, trespass, detinue, trover and conversion, and replevin, all actions on the case, or of debt for rent, shall be sued or brought within six years next after the cause of such action arose.'

This act is not a copy of the statute of James I., ch. 16; and all the objections that would urge the exemption of suits, er maleficio, from that statute, may be presented under the law of Ohio; other exceptions may also be claimed. "Actions on the case" are associated with actions arising ex contractu; and thus actions arising out of contract are only intended to be provided for-nothing is said in the law of actions er maleficio.

If actions of this kind are embraced by the Act of 1810, they are only so by a forced construction of the words "actions on the case," associated and classed in the same statute with various actions arising ex contractu; while in a subsequent law of Ohio passed in 1824, they are described in express terms, and naturally associated in the same sentence with various other actions, arising ex delicto.

But if these actions are embraced in the Act of 1810, they must be such only as may be prosecuted against officers of the State. Actions against officers of the United States were not in the view or contemplation of the Legislature of 274*] *Ohio when the law was enacted, nor did they intend to afford protection to any of ficer but one of the State. Certainly, the Legisla

eration of the law of Ohio, unless a construction shall be given to that law different from the general and usual import of its terms.

The argument that the association of the action on the case with debt for rent, proves that pecuniary actions were only to be barred, will not be found correct, as forcible entry and book accounts" are in the same association.

*The plain and obvious construction [*275 of the law is that which has been given by the Circuit Court. The different kinds of action, and causes of action upon which the limitations of the law were intended to operate, were in the view and purpose of the Legislature of Ohio; the association or classification was not because the cases were analogous, or had an affinity one to the other, but because of the intention that the action of the statute should be the same as to time on each of the members of the class.

The words of the statute of Ohio being general, unless the officers under the government of the United States are especially exempted, they may avail themselves of its provision. (Cited, 2 Stark. on Ev., 901; 1 Saund., 37; 3 Bacon, 509; Ballantine on Limitations, 88.)

Mr. Justice M'LEAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, as register of the United States land-office at Zanesville, in the District of Ohio. The declaration charges, that on the 2d of August, in the year 1810, the plaintiff produced to the defendant, in his office of register, the receipts of the receiver of public moneys at that office, as follows, viz.: one number three thousand two hundred and fifty-five, and another number three thousand two hundred and fifty-six, amounting together to the sum of

Under this statute, the Acts of Limitations of the several States, where no special provision has been made by Congress, form a rule of decision in the courts of the United States, and the same effect is given to them as is given in the State courts. The act in question provides, "that all actions hereinafter mentioned, shall be sued or brought within the time here

sault, menace, battery and wounding, actions of slander for words spoken or libel, and for false imprisonment, within one year next after the cause of such actions or suits; and all actions of book accounts, or for forcible entry and detainer, or forcible detainer, within four years after the cause of such action or suits; and all actions of trespass upon real property, trespass, detinue, trover and conversion and replevin, all actions upon the case, and of debt for rent, shall be sued or brought within six years next after the cause of such actions or suits."

one hundred and ninety dollars eighty-nine | law, in the courts of the United States, in cases cents of moneys paid by the plaintiff to the where they apply." receiver, for the purchase of public lands in the said district, being the one-twentieth part of the purchase money for section number six, in township number twelve, and range number thirteen, and fraction number five, in the same township and range adjoining the said section; and for section number twelve, and fraction number one, adjoining in township number thirteen, and range number fourteen of pub-inafter limited; all actions of trespass for aslic lands within that district; and that the plaintiff then and there applied to the defendant for the purchase of the said lands, that is, each of the said sections with the fractions at tached according to law, and requested that his 276*] application *should be entered on the books of the defendant's office; upon which application, the defendant informed the plaintiff that the said lands had been sold at Marietta, before the establishment of the land-office at Zanesville; and if not so sold there, that they had not been offered at public sale at Zanesville; whereupon the plaintiff insisted on his applications, and requested to have them entered, according to the provisions of the tenth section of the Act of Congress, approved the 18th of May, 1796, entitled "An Act providing for the sale of the lands of the United States, in the territory north-west of the River Ohio, and above the mouth of Kentucky River." The declaration then charges, that the register refused to enter the application, although the lands had never been legally applied for nor sold, and were then liable to be applied for and sold. The dam ages are laid at fifty thousand dollars.

To this declaration the defendant pleaded not guilty, whereupon issue is joined; and not guilty within six years before the commencement of the suit. To the latter plea there is a general demurrer, and joinder in demurrer. The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio overruled this demurrer, and sustained the plea of the statute of limitations; and this writ of error is brought to reverse that decision.

For the plaintiff in error it is contended:

1. That the statute of limitations does not apply to an action upon the case, brought for an act of nonfeasance or malfeasance in office.

2. That no statute of limitations of the State of Ohio, then in force, is pleadable to an action upon the case brought by a citizen of one State against a citizen of another, in the Circuit Court of the United States, for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office, in a ministerial officer of the general government, and especially where the plaintiff's rights accrued to him under a law of Congress.

It is contended, that this statute cannot be so construed as to interpose a bar to any remedy sought against an officer of the United States, for a failure in the performance of his duty; that such a case could not have been contemplated by the Legislature; that the language of the statute does not necessarily embrace it; and, consequently, the statute can only apply in cases of nonfeasance or malfeasance in office, to persons who act under the authority of the State, and are amenable to it.

It is not probable that the Legislature of Ohio, in the passage of this statute, had any reference to the misconduct of an officer of the United States. Nor does it seem to have been their intention to restrict the provision of the statute to any particular causes for [*278 which the action on the case will lie. In the actions of trespass, debt, and covenant specified, the particular causes of action barred by the statute are stated; but this is not done in the action on the case, nor is it done in the action of detinue, trover and conversion, and replevin.

Where the statute is not restricted to particu lar causes of action, but provides that the action, by its technical denomination, shall be barred if not brought within a limited time, every cause for which the action may be prosecuted is within the statute.

If the statute required the action of debt for rent to be brought within six years from the time the cause of action arose, the bar could extend to no other action of debt. But, if the statute provided that all actions of debt should be prosecuted within six years, then it would operate against the action, for whatever cause it was brought.

The decision in this cause depends upon the construction of the statute of Ohio, which pre- The action on the case must be brought scribes the time within which certain actions within six years from the time the cause of acmust be brought. It is a well-settled principletion arose, and it is immaterial what that cause 277*] *that a statute of limitations is the law of the forum, and operates upon all who submit themselves to its jurisdiction.

In the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is provided, that the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common

may be; the statute bars the remedy, by this form of action, if it be not prosecuted within the time.

In giving a construction to this statute, where the action is barred by its denomination, the court cannot look into the cause of action. They may do this in those cases were actions are barred when brought for causes specified in the statute, for the statute only operates against

It is within the undoubted powers of State eider grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if This cause came on to be heard on the tran- the prior deed is not recorded within a limited script of the record from the Circuit Court of time; and the power is the same, whether the the United States for the District of Ohio, and Though the effect of such a deed is to render the deed is dated before or after the recording act. was argued by counsel; on consideration where- prior deed fraudulent and void against a subseof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court,quent purchaser, it is not a law violating the oblithat the judgment of the said Circuit Court ination of contracts. So, too, is the power to pass this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.

|

It is the peculiar province and privilege of the The Supreme Court has no authority on a writ of State courts to construe their own statutes; and it error from a State court to declare a State law void is no part of the functions of the Supreme Court to on account of its collision with a State constitu- review their decisions, except when specially aution. Withers v. Buckley, 20 How., 84: Medberry v. thorized by statute. Commercial Bank v. BuckOhio, 24 How., 413; Porter v. Foley, 24 How., 14;ingham, 5 How., 317; Adams v. Preston, 22 How., Jackson v. Lamphire, supra: Satterlee v. Matthew- 473; Congdon Mining Co. v. Goodman, 2 Black, 574; son, 2 Pet., 380; Solomon y. Graham, 15 Wall., 208; Scott v. Jones, 5 How., 243; Smith v. Adsit, 16 W. Tennessee Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 13 Wail., 432, Wall., 185; Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall., 257; Mur14 Wall., 9; Palmer v. Marston, 13 Wall., 10; Seirer ray v. Gibson, 15 How., 421; Nichols v. Levy, 5 v. Haskall, 13 Wall., 12. Wall., 433.