Buck & Hedrick applied to the defendant | John. Cas., 77; Etting v. Scott, 2 John. Rep., for payment on said policies, and all the papers 157, 163; Goix v. Knox, 1 John. Cas., 337; 1 to prove the distinct interests of Medina and Mar. on. Ins., 306, 310; Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Fitch were shown; but the office declined to Caines' Rep., 203; Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 pay either, on the ground that said policy cov- Maule and Selw.,485; Sleinback v. Rhinelander, ered no one but Fitch, and that the letter of 3 John. Cas., 269; Vanderheuvel v. Uni. In. 27th April was a representation that the whole Com., 2 New York *Cas. in Error, 217, [*155 cargo was Captain Fitch's, and therefore affect- 269, and 2 John. Cas., 127, 451; Cranch, 100, ed both policies. 109; Seamans v. Loring, 1 Mason, 128, 125, 136.) The plaintiff, on the trial, prayed the court to charge the jury, 1st. That as the policies of insurance in this case purport to insure the plaintiff for whom it might concern," they are not bound to prove, that at the time of effecting said insurance, or any other time, they disclosed to the defend154*] ants that Spanish *property was intended to be covered by said insurance; and that in policies of such description, there can be no undue concealment as to the parties interested in the property to be insured. 2d. That if the jury believed the policy of 6th May, 1822, was founded on the order of the same date, the said policy being "for whom it may concern," does cover belligerent as well as neutral property. 3d. That if the jury believed that the policy dated 24th May, 1822. was founded on the letter of 27th April, 1822, and the order written therein, the policy being “for whom it may concern," does cover belligerent as well as neutral property. 4th. That if the said Daniel Fitch, at the date of said policies, was legal and equitable owner of a part of the cargo insured, and the legal, though not equitable owner of the residue, the policies, for whom it may concern," do cover the entire cargo; and said Daniel Fitch is competent in law to recover the whole in his own name, though the belligerent character of a part of the said cargo was not disclosed at the time of effecting said policies of insurance. 5th. That the court instruct the jury that the letter of 27th April, 1822, with the order written thereon, do not in law amount to representation that the property to be insured was the sole property of Daniel Fitch, or that the whole, or any part thereof, was not bellig erent. Upon these several prayers, numbered in the record 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, the judges of the Circuit Court differed in opinion, and certified the same to this court. The cause was argued by Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Mayer for the plaintiffs, and by Mr. Wirt, Attorney-General, and Mr. Meredith, for the defendants. The plaintiffs' counsel contended, (1st) a policy for whom it may concern covers all possible persons and all possible interests, belligerent as well as neutral. (Hodgson v. Marine Insurance Company, 5 Cran., 100.) Was there a concealment of belligerent interest? Concealment can only have reference to the contract between the parties; non-disclosure is not concealment, and the party charging it must show fraudulent intention. As to the words, "lawful goods and merchandise," the parties refer to municipal sanctions only, and not to foreign circumstances. (1 Johnson's Cases, 77, 120, 487.) Upon the doctrine of concealment, non-disclosure, or misrepresentation, the following positions were assumed, and claimed to be sustained by the authorities cited: 1. That no disclosure of anything within the essential nature of the policy could be necessary, and consequently that no undue concealment can be predicated, either as to the persons interested or their country. 2. That there has been neither a representation nor a misrepresentation, in regard to the cargo insured. 3. That the first policy stands upon nothing but the order of 6th May, in which order no one feature of a representation of neutrality is to be found, but the very reverse. 4. That the letter, and on which the second policy, viz., for $2,000, was effected, contains no such representation in regard to the cargo then to be insured, and if it did, it was strictly true, as Daniel Fitch's absolute interest amounted to $2,275:25. 5. That this letter, if a representation at all as to the neutrality of the cargo covered by this second policy, can in no way affect, by a retroactive energy, the antecedently executed policy. 6. That the office, having neglected to make those inquiries which, under the circumstances of the case, the law imposed on it, cannot now transfer to the insured the effect of an obligation to disclose voluntarily what would have been willingly communicated had the office, at that time, deemed it of consequence to inquire after. 7. That Daniel Fitch, being the consignee and trustee of the whole of Medina's interest, with full authority to insure, and having the custody of the entire cargo laden on board of his vessel, had an insurable interest in the whole, and might, had he seen fit so to do, have truly represented the whole as his own, for the purpose of effecting insurance. (Phill. on Ins. and Authorities, 64, 94; Phill. on Ins., 86, 89; John. Dig., page 284, ss. 143, The doctrine has been so settled in France, 144, 146, 147-153; Wharton's Dig., 319, ss. England, New York, Massachusetts, &c. (Phil. 23, 30, 32; Phill. on Ins., 87; 7 Cranch, 506; on Ins., 57–63, 107; 2 Mag., 211; 2 Emeri., 1 Caines, 75, 492; 2 John. Cas., 487; 1 John. 460; Ordi. Hans T., Tit. 1, s. 4; 1 Emeri., ch. Cas., 1; 2 John. Cas., 77, 120; 1 New York 2, s. 4, ch. 11, s. 4; 2 Dane's Abr., 127; 1 Mar. Cases in Error, XXV.; 2 John. Rep., 130; on Ins., 306, 215, in notes; Norris's Peake, *Anthon's N. P. Cases, 83; Phil., 69, [*156 346-7-8; John. Dig., 274, ss. 41, 43, 280, 108.) 90; 4 East, 590; Dennis v. Ludlow, 1 Caines, (Barnwell v. Church, 1 Caines' Rep., 217, 111, 217; Long v. Bolton, 2 Bos. & Pull., 209; 229, 237, 238, 243; Murray v. Uni. In. Com., Boyd v. Dubois, 3 Camp., 133, 312; 13 Rep., 2 John. Cas., 168; Skidmore v. Desdoity, 261, 267; 9 East, 283, 292; 1 Camp., 116. 117, 118; 1 Maule and Selw., 35; Long v. Duff, 2 | Phill. on Ins., 80, 81, 84, 85; Marsden v. Reid, Bos. & Pull., 209; Phill., 101; Marshall, 475, 3 East, 572; Dawson v. Atty., 7 East, 367; Bell note; Brown v. Shaw, 1 Caines, 489; Depeyster v. Carstairs, 2 Camp., 543: Forrester v. Pigou, v. Gardiner, 1 Caines, 492: Fort v. Lee, 31 Maul and Sel., 13; Brine v. Featherstone, 4 Taunt., 381.) Taunt., 871; Etting v. Scott, 2 John. Rep., 157, 162.) 2. It was the duty of the insurers to inquire into the state of things at the time of the contract, and there was no representation of a sole neutral interest. The insured asks to be insured against "all risks;" and it was therefore the duty of the of fice to inquire what risks were intended to be covered. Authorities cited as to the general nature of representatation: Mar. on Ins., 450, 451; Phill. on Ins., 80; 6 Cranch, 274-281; 7 Cran., 507, 535, 536, 541; Phill, on Ins., 84; 14 Mass, Rep., 152; 1 Mar. on Ins., 459; Phill. on Ins., 109, 110; Pawson v. Watson, Cowp., 785, or Mar. on Ins., 459; Bize v. Fletcher, Doug., 271, or Mar on Ins., 459; Phill. on Ins., 106; Alsop v. Coit, 12 Mass. Rep., 40, or Phill. on Ins., 110; Ross v. Bradshaw, 1 Black. Rep., 312, or Phill. on Ins., 110; Wharton's Digest, p. 380, ss. 28, 30, 31, 32; Hubbard v. Glover, 3 Camp., 312; Clapham v. Colozare, 3 Camp., 382; Dawson v. Atty., 7 East, 357; Hodgson v. Marine Insurance Co., 5 Cran., 100; Livingston and Gilchrist v. Marine Insurance Co., 6 Cranch, 274; 7 Cran., 507; Vandanheuvel v. Uni. In surance Co., 2 Caines' Cases in Error, 257, 267282; Doug., 305. Authorities cited as to the duty of underwriters to make inquiries: 1 Mar. on Ins., 397, 474, 475; Phill. on Ins., 84, 108, 109; 2 Dall., 274: 2 Yates, 178; Fort v. Lee, 3 Taunt., 381; Phill. on Ins., 105; 14 East, 479; Wharton's Dig., 319, s. 23; 1 Camp., 383; Phill. on Ins., 63, or Davis v. Boardman, 12 Mass. Rep., 80; Boyd v. Dubois, 3 Camp., 133; Duplanty v. Com. Ins. Co., Anthon's Rep., 83; Livingston and Gilchrist v. Mary. Ins. Co., 7 Cran., 508, 536, 538, 547. 3d. That even if the letter of 27th April had asserted that Daniel Fitch owned the cargo, it was (as far as the doctrine of representation is concerned) substantially true; he being the legal owner as trustee and consignee of Medina's part, and, as such, competent to sustain any action for that part of the cargo, and also to represent, though perhaps not to warrant, it as his. (Phill. on Ins., 41, 42, 60; Rind v. Wilkinson, 2 Taunt., 237; Joseph v. Knox, 3 Camp., 320; 3 Wheat., Selw.. 774, 775, and note; M'Andrew v. Bell, 1 Cas. N. P. C., 373; Lucena v. Crow, 2 New. Rep., 323; 3 Bos. & Pull., 75; Phill. on Ins., 58; Mar. on Ins., 104-118; Routh v. Thompson, 11 East, 157*] 428; Ludlow *v. Browne, 1 John. Rep., 15; Caruthers v. Sheddon, 6 Taunt., 14, or 1 Serg. and Lowb., 293.) 4th. That even admitting the letter of 27th April to be a gross misrepresentation, it can in no way affect either policy. Not the first policy, because that policy was founded solely on the order of 6th May, and was executed several weeks before the let ter of 27th April was in the country. Not the second policy, because, as respects that portion of the cargo, covered by the $2,000 policy, the letter was strictly true, Fitch's interest exceeding that amount. (1 Mar. on Ins., 455, 456; 2 Wheat. Selw., 750, note (41); On the part of the plaintiff, it was also urged, that the policy of the 6th of May is not to be connected with that of the 24th May; no representation was made whatever, when the first policy was entered into. The insurance on the property on board the Columbia was properly made under the authority and order of Daniel Fitch, who, as master of the brig, and in the relations which existed between him and Mr. Medina, had a right to order the same. Even gratuitious insurances are not void, but voidable. The tests of such insurances are, was the premium secure, and had the party a right to abandon? The cases cited by the defendants' counsel do not impugn these principles, but sustain them. Mr. Meredith, and Mr. Wirt, Attorney-General, for the defendants. The letter of the 27th April was a representation of neutral property; and it is insisted, that the terms for whom it may concern' may be limited by a representation, and the case before the court; the representation was not true. It is admitted that the stipulations in a policy may be enlarged by a representation, and if enlarged, why not restricted? (Earquart v. Bernard, 1 Taunt., 450.) As to a representation and its effect, the following cases were cited: 1 Seam v. Lowry, 1 Mason's Rep., 136; 2 Johns. Rep., 157, 163; 2 Caines, 203; 2 Johns. Cas., 451, 173. The representation having been made by a resident owner, was in effect a warranty of neutrality. (Phill. on Ins., 82; 6 Mass., 220; 2 Johns. Cas., 451, 173.) A representation must correspond with the facts represented, and must be as favorable to the insurers as if it had been literally true. (Phill. on Ins., 102; 2 Johns. Cas., 168; 6 Mass. Rep., 212). No case has been cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs, where the cover of property by fraud was protected. Here the cover was false, and intended_to [*158 protect the property of Medina, a belligerent. Captain Fitch had not an insurable interest in the property of Medina, and as an agent, he was guilty of a misrepresentation. (Lucena v. Crawford, 2 New. Rep., 323; 11 East., 434.) The first policy exhausted the whole of Captain Fitch's interest in the property, and left nothing for the second policy; and the second could not operate, there being a claim against prior insurances in the policy. False lights were held out to the underwriters by the letter, and while they supposed they undertook a peace risk, they had assumed a war risk. The insured are bound to show that the property insured was intended to be insured by the policy; and there is no evidence of any authority given by Medina to Fitch, to cause the insurance to be made, or that the same was made for him. (Phill. on Ins., 57, 58, 61; 3 Johns. Cas., 269.) As to an adoption of a policy, it must be done by the person for whom the insurance | low divided, was prayed for by the plaintiffs, was intended." (2 Maul and Selw., 485; 1 Ma- in these words: son's Rep., 136.) Mr. Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court: This cause comes up from the Circuit Court for the Maryland District, on a difference of opinion. "That as the policies of insurance in this case purport to insure the plaintiffs "for whom it might concern," they are not bound to prove, that at the time of effecting the insurance, or any other time, they disclosed to the defendants that Spanish property was intended to be covered by the insurance; and that in policies of such description, there can be no undue concealment as to the parties interested in the property to be insured. Dangerous as it always is, in a court of justice, to generalize in the propositions which it decides, it is peculiarly so in questions arising on policies of insurance. The present proposition is obviously couch The suit below was instituted on two policies of insurance, the one for $6,000, the other for $2,000, upon the brig Columbia, Daniel Fitch, master, at and from the Spanish island of Porto Rico to Baltimore, for whom it may concern. Buck & Hedrick were the agents of Fitch, and the policies were made in their name. The first policy was executed on the 6th of May, 1822, and stands unimpeached by any circum-ed in terms too general to admit of an answer stances occurring at the time of its execution. But, when application was made for the second policy, which was on the 24th of May, the agents laid before the underwriters a letter, dated Ponce, April 27th, 1822, to this effect: Messrs. BUCK & HEDRICK: "I wrote you a few days ago by the brig Ospray, Captain Perkins, direct for Baltimore, requesting you to have insurance done for me on the brig Columbia, and her cargo, owned and commanded by me, to sail from this for Baltimore, about 5th to 10th of May, with a cargo of sugar. When I wrote you by the Ospray. I could not say what amount of car go to have insured for me. I now think I shall have on board about 130,000 pounds, valued at $8,000, which amount I wish you to have insured for me," &c. The rest has no material bearing upon the cause. On the back of this letter was written the following inquiry: 159*] *What will $2,000 be insured at, agreeable to within letter, on cargo, of which you have $6,000 insured some time since? in the affirmative, without restriction or modification. And as courts of justice are not bound to modify or fashion the instructions moved for by counsel, so as to bring them within the rules of law, if- this cause had come up on a writ of error to the judgment of the prayed, it would be difficult to say, that in the court below, for refusing the instruction as terms in which it is presented, the court was bound to give this instruction. tion, there can be no undue concealment as to To affirm, "That in policies of such descripthe parties interested in the *property [*160 since the underwriter has an unquestionable to be insured," is obviously going much too far; right to be informed, if he makes inquiry; the assured may be silent, it is true, if he will, and let the premium be charged accordingly; but if the inquiry then made should be responded to, with information contrary to the verity of the case, this obviously gives a conventional signification to the terms of the policy; which may differ materially from the known and received signification in ordinary He, for instance, who should insure "for whom it may concern," under an express assurance, that there is no belligerent interest in the cargo, could not, upon any principle, be held to have made assurance upon belligerent interest. cases BUCK & HEDRICK." The vessel and cargo were totally lost, by the perils of the sea; and the interest proved at the trial, consisted of above $2,000, the property of Fitch, and above $6,000, the property of G. Medina, a Spanish subject, of Porto Rico, at that time affected with the character of a belligerent. The whole cargo was consigned to Daniel Fitch, and documented as his; Medina himself being on board, on the voyage. This is no more than the application of the general principle, that insurance is a contract of good faith, and is void whenever imposition is practiced. Nor is it contested, that previous representation will be sunk or absorbed, or put out of the contract, where the policy is executed in obvious inconsistency with those representations. But the ground here insisted on for defendants, is, that the letter of April 27th, was a representation that the whole cargo was Captain Fitch's, and that it thereby operated as an imposition upon the underwriters, and as such, avoids both policies; or that it affixes a conventional meaning to the phrase, in these policies, which limits its ordinary import. That a policy "for whom it may concern," will, in ordinary cases, cover belligerent propThe order for insurance, on which the poli-erty, has been fully conceded in argument. cy of 6th May was effected, was in the following words: Insurance is wanted against all risks, for account of whom it may concern, $3,000 on the brig Columbia, Daniel Fitch master, and on cargo, $6,000, as interest may appear, at and from Ponce, Porto Rico, to Baltimore; a letter from Captain Fitch, dated 19th April, says, he expects to sail about 5th to 10th of May; that the brig is in good order, perfectly tight and seaworthy. What premium? Both policies, it appears, were done at a premium of 14. and on neither occasion was the letter of the 19th April called for by the office, nor was any warranty or representation of any kind made or asked for, respecting the cargo; beyond what was voluntarily made, and has been stated. The first instruction on which the court be Is there anything in the case sufficient to except these policies from the ordinary import and effect of the phrase "for whom it may concern?" We are of opinion there is not. Whatever turn of expression may be given to the question, or in whatever aspect it may be presented, it is obviously, at last, no more than the simple question, have these underwriters been entrapped, or imposed upon, or seduced into a contract, of the force, extent, or incidents of which, a competent understanding cannot be imputed to them? We in its ordinary effect and signification. The second prayer, amounting only to an affirmance of the general proposition, as relates to the policy of the 6th May, we are of opinion, ought to have been given. The third prayer, having the same bearing upon the policy of the 24th May, we [*162 are of opinion, for the reasons expressed in the first prayer, ought also to have been given. By the fifth prayer, the plaintiffs ask of the court to instruct the jury. "That if the said Daniel Fitch, at the time of said policies, was legal and equitable owner of part of the cargo owner of the residue, policies, for whom it may concern," do cover the entire cargo; and said Fitch is competent, in law, to recover the whole in his own name; though the belligerent character of a part of said cargo was not disclosed at the time of effecting said policies." A knowledge of the state of the world, of the allegiance of particular countries, of the risks and embarrassments affecting their commerce, of the course and incidents of the trade on which they insure, and the established import of the terms used in their contract, must necessarily be imputed to underwriters. According to a distinguished English jurist, Lord Mansfield, in Pelly v. The Royal Exchange, &c. (1 Burr., 341), "the insurer, at the time of un-insured; and the legal, though not equitable derwriting, has under his consideration the nature of the voyage, and the usual manner of conducting it. And what is usually done by such a ship, with such a cargo, in such a voy161*] age, is understood to be referred to by every policy. Hence, when a neutral, carrying on a trade from a belligerent to a neutral country, asks for insurance "for whom it may concern," it is an awakening circumstance. No underwriter can be ignorant of the practice of neutrals to cover belligerent property, under neutral names, or of the precautions ordinarily resorted to, that the cover may escape detection. The cloak must be thrown over the whole transaction, and in no part is it more necessary than in the correspondence by other vessels so often overhauled by an enemy, for the very purpose of detecting covers on other cargoes. Letters, thus intercepted, have often been the ground-work of condemnation in Admiralty Courts; and underwriters, to whom the extension of trade is always beneficial, must and do connive at the practice in silence. They ask no questions, propose their premiums, and the contract is as well understood as the most thorough explanation can make it. There is nothing in the letter, in evidence, calculated to mislead an insurer of ordinary vigilance, but what was fully explained away by concomitant circumstances. It is true, that in the letter Fitch writes, to have insurance done for him on "the brig Columbia and her cargo:" that he cannot say what amount of cargo to have insured for him. Yet, when the offer was submitted, it was indorsed on the back of this letter, and expressly declared to be upon the same cargo, of "which you have $6,000 insured, some time since. The insurance alluded to, was made "for whom it may concern," and this second policy is expressed in the same terms. Here, then, was a neutral, professing himself to be owner of a cargo, consisting of produce of the hostile island, on a voyage, having for its object to find a market for that produce; most unnecessarily, if himself the real owner, or if there were no owners, but neutrals; most unwisely subjecting himself, or them, to an increase of premium, which could not but result from such an offer. This was a circumstance calculated to induce inquiry. The defendants had a right to make what inquiries they pleased, as to the real character of the cargo; and if they did not make those inquiries, the law imputes to them the use of the phrase, "for whom it may concern,' " The language in which this prayer is couched, obviously imports two propositions: 1st. That a policy, "for whom it may concern, will cover the whole cargo; though the assured had only the legal, without the equitable interest in part, and a legal and equitable interest in the residue; and, 2d. That Daniel Fitch is competent, in law, to recover the whole, in his own name; though the belligerent character of part was not disclosed, when the policies were executed. It is a very great objection to this prayer that the language used is too general and abstracted; and not adapted to the case, with that studied precision which the law requires; thereby rendering it scarcely possible for the court to meet it with a simple, positive, or affirmative answer. To the first of the two propositions, it may be further objected, that it is difficult to perceive how it came to be introduced into the cause. Abstracted from the effect of belligerent interest in the cargo, the defense admits that the policy covers all other interests, whether legal or equitable. And, with regard to the second, it is not easy to perceive why the court should be called upon to charge the jury that Daniel Fitch was competent, in law, to recover the whole in his own name, when the suit is, in fact, prosecuted in the name of the agents; and they count upon the interests of both Medina and Fitch. But the cause has been argued upon the assumption that this prayer brings up the question of insurable interest, in Fitch, by whose instructions, Buck & Hedrick effected this insurance; and, as it is better to follow out the concessions of counsel than to let the cause come up here again, upon this point, we will consider that question as being raised by this, in connection with the other prayers. And here, we think, the facts make up a clear case of insurable interest. The only doubt probably arises from one of the most prolific grounds of uncertainty on many subjects, viz., the use of terms, originally unaptly selected, but now rendered legitimate, by use. It is only necessary to inspect a few cases *on [*163 this doctrine, to be satisfied that the term interest, as used in application to the right to insure, does not necessarily imply property, in the subject of insurance. In the case of Crawford et al. v. Hunter (8 D. & E., 13), the plaintiffs were commissioners appointed by the crown, under an act of Parliament to superintend the transportation, &c.. of Dutch vessels, seized in time of peace, with out any present designation for whom; whether to be held in trust, for the original owners, the crown, or the captor. The vessel had been carried into St. Helena; and the policy was effected, with a view to her safe transportation from that island to England; and after much consideration, it was adjudged that this was a good insurable interest, and the plaintiffs recovered. The same point was afterwards decided, in Lucena v. Crawford et al. (3 Bos. & Pull., 75), on a writ of error, to the Exchequer, after three arguments, and great deliberation; yet the seizures were made before declaration of war; and the interest of the plaintiffs amounted to nothing but a power over the subject, with a claim by quantum meruit, for their services. Putting down the present case, therefore, to its lowest grade of insurable interest, it is equal to that of the plaintiffs, in the two cases alluded to; for Daniel Fitch was, at least, the agent or trustee of Medina, to transport his goods from Porto Rico to a market, and to secure them from the chances of capture and loss. But this case is stronger than the English cases cited; for by the act of Medina himself, Fitch was exhibited to the world, clothed with all the national documents, which evidence an absolute property; and, for many purposes the real owner would have been estopped to deny it. We will instance the payment of duties; for which, either as owner or consignee, our laws held Fitch absolutely liable. We have, there fore, no doubt of the sufficiency of the insurable interest, in this case. The last prayer on which the court below divided, is in these terms: "That the court instruct the jury, that the letter of the 27th April, 1822, with the order written thereon, do not, in law, amount to a representation; that the property to be insured was the sole property of Daniel Fitch; or that the whole, or any part thereof, was not bellig erent. We have already expressed our opinion on the proposition here presented. It is to be regretted that this prayer, also, is so defective in precision. But it was obviously intended, and so argued, to be confined to a representation which would vitiate the policy. With relation to the first policy, we are all of opinion that it was unaffected, by the letter specified; and, 164*]*with regard to the second policy, whatever might have been the effect of this letter, had it stood alone; yet, taken in connection with the concomitant circumstances, it was not fatal to the contract. On this point, a majority of the court would be understood to express the opinion, that this letter connected with the order indorsed upon it, the previous insurance referred to, and, considered in relation to the state of the world, and the nature, character, and ordinary conduct of the voyage insured, was not such a representation as, per se, vitiated the policy. And this opinion will be certified to the court below. This cause came on, &c. On consideration whereof, this court is of opinion, 1. That as the policies of insurance in this cause purport to insure the plaintiffs "for whom it may concern," they are not bound to prove, that, at the time of effecting the said insurance, or any other time, they disclosed to the defendant that Spanish property was intended to be covered by the said insurance, unless inquiries on the subject were propounded by the insurer, prior to the insurance. 2. That if the jury believe the policy of the 6th of May, 1822, was founded on the order of the same date, the said policy being "for whom it may concern," does cover belligerent, as well as neutral interest. 3. That if the jury believe that the policy dated 24th of May, 1822, was founded on the letter of the 27th of April, 1822, and the order written thereon, the policy being "for whom it may concern," does cover neutral, as well as belligerent property. 4. That if the said Daniel Fitch, at the time of the date of the said policies, was legal and equitable owner of part of the cargo insured, and legal, though not equitable owner of the residue, the policies being "for whom it may concern," do cover the entire cargo; and that the said Fitch had a good insurable interest in the whole cargo; and the plaintiffs, as his agents, are competent to recover the whole sum insured thereon, on proof of such legal and equitable interest in the said Fitch. 5. That the letter of the 27th of April, 1824, whatever might be its effect if taken alone, yet, taken in connection with the indorsement thereon, with the previous policy to which it refers, the actual state of the world, &c., and the nature of such transactions, is not such a representation as vitiates the policy. All which is ordered and adjudged by this court to be certified to the said Circuit Court. Cited-8 How., 249; 15 Wall., 674; 20 Wall., 163; 8 Otto, 538, 539; 2 Blatchf., 103; 3 Sumn.. 140. cording to the provisions of the laws of Tennessee, In a trial in an action of ejectment, in which, acthe defendant was held to bail, the declaration stated two demises, by H. & K., citizens of Pennsylvania; and the other, the demise of B. & G., citizens of Massachusetts. The cause coming on for trial before a jury, the plaintiffs suffered a nonsuit, which was set aside; and the court, on the motion of the plaintiffs, permitted the declaration to be amended, by adding a count on the demise of S., a citizen of Missouri. The parties went to trial without any other pleading; and the jury found for the plaintiff, upon the third, or new count, and a judgment was rendered in his favor. The allowance and refusal of amendments in the |