probability, that the licence had been used before to cover an antecedent voyage, and against the lawful use of it on this occasion.

It must not, however, be understood from the foregoing that a general licence is available only to the parties to whom it was originally granted; for in The Louise Charlotte de Guldenoroni, the holders had purchased the document in market overt, and there was no suggestion that such a proceeding was improper. In The Acteon (p), where a licence had been issued in London available from America, and had been disposed of in America, Sir W. Scott observed, that “if the licence was general, which it appeared to have been, it could be of no consequence who were the individuals who acted under it, provided they complied with the conditions annexed to it." But in another case (2), where there was granted to a manufacturer a special licence for himself and others to ship certain gunpowder, and he sold the powder to a third party, it was held that the condition that the merchant exporter should give certain security was not complied with, notwithstanding that the manufacturer gave the security, the said manufacturer not being the merchant exporter within the meaning of the licence.

And if the licence contain a condition which is only colourably complied with, it will be voided (r).

The fraudulent alteration of a licence destroys its validity, even where the person claiming its protection is innocent of the fraud. This was decided by Sir W. Scott in a case (s) where the date of the licence had been altered; which licence he pronounced to have become in consequence a mere nullity. A general licence must be construed strictly, in the sense

(p) 2 Dods. 53. See also Butler v. Allnutt, 1 Stark. 222.

(9) Camelo v. Britten, 4 B. & A. 184.

(r) Gordon v. Vaughan, 12 East, 302, note.

(s) The Louise Charlotte de Guldenoroni, 2 Dod. 308.

that it cannot be understood to extend to protect the property of an enemy. Thus, where a licence had been granted. for the purpose of bringing certain gum from the enemy's colony of Senegal, and the master of the vessel, in order to oblige the French governor, who had befriended him, took on board some gum the property of this individual, the Court held that such property was not protected by the licence (†).

A licence must also be construed strictly in the sense that, if granted to a British merchant as such, this merchant cannot use it in his capacity of a domiciled subject of the enemy state (u). Thus, a licence had been granted to one Ravie, of Birmingham, "for the importation of certain goods from Holland into this country," and the question arose whether it could operate to protect a shipment made by him. in person, in Holland, and under papers describing his firm as "Ravie & Co., of Amsterdam." The Court held, that whereas the licence had been granted to Ravie as a British subject to import goods from Holland, he had practically, in the capacity of a Dutch merchant, exported goods from Holland. He had no right to engraft the character of a Dutch exporter on a licence granted to him as a British importer. He was a merchant of both countries, and must be liable to be considered as a subject of both.

A licence to trade with the enemy will cover the enemy's ship carrying the goods licensed to be conveyed. This was illustrated in Kensington v. Inglis (x), which case establishes that an insurance on an enemy's vessel is, in such circumstances, lawful.

To authorize trade with the enemy, and to exempt his property from the effect of hostilities, is a very high act of

(t) The Josephine, 1 Act. 313.

(u) The Jonge Klassina, 5 Rob. 297. And see the reference to this case, sub Domicile, p. 17. See also The Rose in Bloom, 1 Dods. 57.

(x) P. 290, infra.

sovereign authority; and such a licence, to be effectual, must come from those who have a competent authority to grant this protection. In The Hope (y)-the leading case on the subject-an American vessel, carrying provisions from the United States to Peninsular ports occupied by British troops, on being seized claimed to be protected by a licence granted by the British consul at Boston, in conjunction with a letter from the admiral on the Halifax station. Sir W. Scott pronounced the documents in question to be insufficient, as coming from persons vested with no competent authority to grant them. It was quite clear, said his lordship, that no consul in any country, particularly in an enemy's country, is vested with any such power in virtue of his station; and that the admiral was also without this authority. But inasmuch as the British Government had by a special Order in Council confirmed the acts of its officers, the property was ordered to be restored. In other cases (≈), where similar irregularities had not been ratified by the government, condemnation was decreed. In America it has been specifically determined that the President is the only functionary who can grant a licence to trade with the enemy (a).

When allies are jointly engaged in waging war, it is illegal for one of them to authorize trade with the enemy, unless with the previous consent of the other. An implied contract exists that neither state shall do anything to defeat the object common to both; and it is a recognised principle of the law of nations that one of conjoint belligerents may seize and confiscate the property of any subjects of the other engaged, without the consent of the co-allies jointly, in trade with the enemy.

If a licence to trade be on the condition that a bond in a

(y) 1 Dods. 226. See also Johnson v. Sutton, Doug. 254.
() For which, see Wheaton's Int. Law, 2 Eng. ed. p. 473.
(a) Ibid. p. 474.

penalty be given that the goods shall be exported to the places specified; if the bond be not given, then the licence becomes void, and the voyage illegal (V).

A licence must be so intelligibly worded as not to keep the parties in the dark as to its extent. Thus, where a licence had been granted to the ports of the Vlie, Sir W. Scott held that Amsterdam was included, and that it was no material deviation to have entered this port by another passage (c).

In Fenton v. Pearson (d), it was decided by Lord Ellenborough, that where a licence in effect legalized purchase from and sale by an enemy, it also impliedly legalized the enemy's right by his agent here to stop the goods in transitu after their arrival, on the insolvency of the vendee. "To maintain the contrary," said his lordship, "would be to hold out to Europe that this country would allow foreigners, by the royal licence, to send their goods to this country, and then take the goods without paying for them."

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Dispensations from the general prohibition to trade with the enemy, that affect whole classes of cases, as dispensations by licence affect individuals, are granted from time to time, as the exigencies of the case shall require, by the sovereign, with the advice of the Privy Council, and are promulgated by proclamation, as Orders in Council. The fundamental principle on which this new system of commercial policy is founded,' said Lord Brougham, in his great speech on Orders in Council and the Licence Trade (March 3, 1812), 'has always professed itself to be a retaliating principle.' The power to make these Orders of Council, and to grant licences in pursuance of them, being derived from special Acts of Parliament, is of a limited nature, and cannot be extended

(b) Vandyck v. Whitmore, 1 East, 475.

(c) The Juno, 2 Rob. 117.

(d) 15 East, 419. Also Morgan v. Oswald, 3 Taunt. 568.

further than the Acts themselves permit. The construction of licences granted by virtue of the King's prerogative will, in general, be applicable to licences founded on these statutes "(e). The royal proclamation of 15th April, 1854, referred to on p. 268, affords an instance of such a general dispensation.

By an Order in Council (ƒ) at the commencement of the war with Russia, six weeks' grace was allowed in which Russian vessels in British ports could load and depart, free from molestation. In Clementson v. Blessig (g), the plaintiff supplied for shipment to a firm in Odessa certain goods which had been contracted for before the declaration of war. The goods were provided in time to be lawfully shipped under the above order, and the sale was held to be good.

Where there is neither licence nor dispensation, a case may still arise which the Court will place on the footing of being protected, as, for example, if the circumstances of the alleged trading be such that, if a licence had been applied for, it would undoubtedly have been granted. Thus, one Gregory, British consul at Barcelona, had purchased a quantity of wine for the sole purpose of supplying the British fleet in the Mediterranean. On hostilities occurring between this country and Spain, Gregory was forced to leave his domicile, and he left behind him, in his private store, a quantity of this wine. After a considerable interval of time, an opportunity occurred to get possession of the goods, which were shipped on his behalf to Leghorn. On the voyage, they were captured on the ground of unlicensed trading with the enemy. Sir W. Scott, in decreeing restitution, observed that the claimant had purchased the wine solely for the supply of the British fleet before the outbreak

(e) Maritime Warfare, p. 372.

(f) Vide p. 53, supra.

(g) 11 Ex. 135.