LEGISLATURE, 1864. } SENATE DOC. [N. 5.] REPORT of the Committee on the Judiciary, relative to the Constitutionality of any law to enable the qualified electors of this State, in the military service of the United States, to offer their votes and to vote in places beyond and out of the jurisdiction of this State, and in places other than the place of their actual residence. The committee on the judiciary, to which it was referred, by a resolution of the Senate, to consider and report "as to the constitutionality of any law to enable the qualified electors of this State, in the military service of the United States, to offer their votes, and to vote in places beyond and out of the jurisdiction of this State, and in places other than the place of their actual residence, at any elections of this State," would respectfully REPORT: The full power to legislate in all matters of State concern for the State, is in the Legislature. This power is unlimited, except so far as it is restricted by the National or the State Constitution. These Constitutions contain restrictions upon the legis lative power, in some respects, for the protection of individual rights; as in the case of prohibition of ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. There are also restrictions springing from considerations of State or legislative policy-like the provision that no law shall embrace more than one object, and that the Legislature shall not allow extra compensation to any public officer, agent or contractor, after the service has been rendered or the contract entered into-and that divorces shall not be granted by the Legislature. When, therefore, we would determine whether the Legisla ture has power to enact a particular law, we look into the Constitution, not for the purpose of seeing whether the power has been conferred upon the Legislature, but to see whether it has been taken away. Having the full power of legislation, except as prohibited, any legislative power which it undertakes to exercise is presumed to be lawfully possessed by it, until the clause in the Constitution can be pointed out which takes that power away. The Supreme Court of this State has on several different occasions announced as a fundamental principle of constitutional law, that "to authorize a court to declare a statute unconstitutional, it should be able to point out the part of the Constitution which is violated, and the infraction should be clear and free from reasonable doubt." (Tyler vs. People, 8 Mich., 320; Scott vs. Smart's Exrs., 1 Mich. 295; People vs. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Sears vs. Cottrell, 5 Mich., 251.) And they have further declared, that " in case of doubt, every possible presumption, not clearly inconsistent with the language and the subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of State legislation." (Sears vs. Cottrell, 5 Mich., 257.) The inquiry then is, whether the Legislature of this State is by any clause in the Constitution prohibited, in express terms or by necessary implication, from providing for the exercise of the elective franchise by persons not personally present in their respective townships or wards on the day of election, for if not thus prohibited its power to do so is unquestioned under the principle thus settled. On the contrary, if there be such a mandate, however much it may be regretted-as depriving a large class of loyal citizens of this right at a time when their votes are of inestimable importance to the nation-it is nevertheless the duty of the Legislature to abide by it, regardless of popular demand. It has no right to overlook the clear command of the Constitution on the plea that the courts will adjudge and settle the question correctly. The clauses of the Constitution supposed to have a bearing upon this subject are as follows: "No elector shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his being employed in the service of the United States, or of this State," &c. (Art. 7, sectoin 5.) It was clearly the intent of this law that no man should lose the right to exercise the elective franchise simply because he had engaged in the service of his country away from his place of residence. The soldier's right to vote, then, is preserved by the express terms of the Constitution itself, and it would seem that any legislation designed to secure the exercise of this right would be simply giving effect to the purposes of the people, as embodied in the Constitution. "In all elections, every white male citizen, every white male inhabitant residing in the State on the twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five; every white male inhabitant residing in the State on the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and fifty, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, pursuant to the laws thereof, six months preceding an election, or who has resided in the State two years and six months, and declared his intention as aforesaid, and every civilized male inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of the United States, and not a member of any tribe, shall be an elector and entitled to vote at any election, unless he shall be above the age of twenty-one years, and has resided in the State three months, and in the township or ward in which he offers to vote, ten days next preceding such election." The evident purpose of this clause was to prescribe what should be the qualifications of electors. It fixes the qualifications of age, sex, citizenship and color; and it also prescribes that his right to vote shall extend only to the township or ward in which he has his residence. In thus prescribing his qualifications, and designating at what elections his vote may be received, the Constitution employs terms requiring his residence to be in the township or ward in which he "offers" to vote, and these words are supposed to require a personal presence, and a tender by himself of his vote in that township or ward. It is evident, however, that the use of this phrase was merely incidental in fixing the qualifications of voters, and that it was employed for the purpose of designating whose votes should be received at the elections in that township or ward, and not as fixing the manner of exercising the right to vote. If we are correct in supposing that the sole purpose of this clause was to fix qualifications, then the whole manner of voting must be left open, under the Constitution, to the Legislature; for no one will claim that a clause in the Constitution prohibits the Legisla ture from acting on the subject, which that clause was in no respect designed to affect. This view of the clause in question is strengthened by the consideration of the clause before quoted, which we have seen was designed, among other things, to preserve to those in the national service the right to vote. It is a general principle of construction that all parts of the instrument are to be examined, and each clause is to be so con strued as to give full effect to every clause, if possible. As full effect could not be given to the clause first quoted, without the power in the Legislature to provide for receiving the ballots of the persons therein described, away from their residence, while they remain in the service, we must construe this clause in such a way as to allow the Legislature this power, if possible. It is not to be supposed that it was the purpose of the Constitution to preserve a naked right to vote, but with restrictions preventing its exercise. This view is still further strengthened by a reference to the |