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pointed out, the criterion of virtue laid down by Paley is brought under examination. This criterion is general utility. The difficulty of afcertaining what will promote general utility is infurmountable; and the author, both from good authority as well as found reafoning, fhows clearly, that this general utility, even if it could be at all times afcertained, cannot be a fafe guide to virtuous conduct. Having exploded this and other criteria, and proved that a criterion, or rule of virtue of univerfal application, is not to be difcovered, he comes to this conclufion:

The refult is, that, in order to act virtuoufly, we must always have in view obedience to the will of God; but that, in order to difcover what his will is, with refpect to any particular action, we are not confined to one mark or criterion of it, but are at liberty to make ufe of any of the methods, by which, as we conceive, it may be difcovered with the greateft eafe and certainty. Different men, according to their refpective habits, and according to the nature of the cafe, may fafely have recourfe to the rule of general utility, conformity to truth or the eternal differences of things, the moral fenfe, or any other rule of fimilar tendency, as each may be of more convenient application, fo long as it is, and is confidered to be, expreffive of the will of God. Even the same perfon, at different times, and on different occafions, may be permitted to fay," This action is conformable to the natural differences of things; this is agreeable to truth; this has a tendency to general good; this is the refult of my fenfe of right and wrong; and fo on ;" and may thence juftly conclude, with refpect to each of them, that it is agreeable to the will of God, and therefore a virtuous action. If he proceed to act under that perfuafion, he acts virtuously; but, if I mistake not, where there is no reference, immediate or mediate, to the will of God, there, whatever may be the rule of action, and whatever may be the action, there is no virtue, P. 82.

This conclufion neceffarily follows, from his own definition of virtue; and, in our progrefs towards it, occurs the following important remark, which we with pleasure transcribe.

In short, virtue and vice have a necessary relation to a state of difcipline; to that ftate, in which the agents, by a series of particular actions, are gradually formed to a character either of virtue or of vice, of goodnefs or badnefs; after which, their actions become the natural, not to fay neceffary, effect of their refpective characters. This idea, if I mistake not, opens to us the whole bufinefs of morality, and the defign of the different fituations, in which we are here placed, calculated, as they evidently are, to call

forth the different virtues into ufe, and to improve them into lafting habits.' P. 79.

From a note in the chapter on the rule of virtue, it seems that this work has been prefented to the fyndics of the prefs at Cambridge; and we are not at a lofs to conjecture the reafons for its not being retained; nor can we difapprove the conduct of the fyndics in returning it to its author. They have already published a work for the tutor of the prefent writer, in which it could not have been a pleafant fight to obferve a note, intimating that the fentiments of the patrons of the work thus publifhed did not concur; and they might well be apprehenfive of danger, from the ftyle and language of the difciple. This might have been avoided, probably, by a little more care on his part; and, if he wifhed for patronage, his chapter on the obligation to obtain the knowledge of virtue fhould have been differently modified. Must not many of them have been thocked by fuch an expreffion as this :-- I am of opinion, not only that there is no one certain method of difcovering the will of God, but that it cannot, strictly fpeaking, be certainly difcovered at all." "What!" they would fay, "is virtue a voluntary obedience to we know not what, and to what we cannot know?" Virtue and vice, then, what are they but mere names." Surely this is an improve. ment in morality which favours too much of modern philofophy, and cannot be recommended by us to the ftudious youth of the univerfity. We felt exactly as, we fuppofe, the fyndics did on reading this paffage; for, coming upon us with fuch ftrength of affirmation, it engroffed, for a time, the whole of our attention, and we fhut the book while we were collecting ourfelves, under the impreffion made fo fuddenly on our feelings, and comparing in our own mind this paffage with the reflexions in the preceding parts of the work. Accustomed, however, to the language of this fchool, we refumed our occupation, and, rather to our furprife, found that the very next paffage foftened down entirely the fingularity of the preceding remark. In other words, I do not think that morality is matter of demonftration.' This leads our author into an inquiry, in which we think he gives feveral good reafons for differing from Locke, all of which would have been equally valid, and in place, if they had been introduced lefs violently, and without the appearance of an infidel

maxim.

On the motive to virtue, our author fhines to much greater advantage; and, in making fome judicious diftinctions between motive and principles, he combats, with great fuccefs, Paley's notion of obligations. His peculiar fentiments ma be feen in the following paffage.

. 'I do not hesitate to pronounce, that the end of virtue is the happiness of individuals. This happiness may confift in various particulars, but chiefly in the exaltation of character; and this exaltation is to be effected by the repetition of acts of obedience to the divine will, until a habit of obedience to that will is formed, and that likeness to God, of which the particular beings, from their nature and conftitution, are capable, is perfected in them. This, if I mistake not, is the end of all human virtue, from the duty of Adam, in paradise, which confifted in the obfervance of a single precept, to the duty of perfons in the most complicated fituations of life. In the mean time, whatever is the character of men, at any stage of their progrefs towards perfection, there is a proper happinefs belonging to it, the confideration of which is not to be neglected. It hence follows, that private happiness is the proper motive to virtue. For though, in fact, the end, which God defigned in the actions of men, is not always the motive to the agent; yet we may fafely affirm, that, when known, it ought to be fo. That all motives are not inconfiftent with the moral principle, will appear from confidering the effect of motives in the production of any particular action. In a cafe of diftrefs, we may afford relief from a fentiment of compaffion, from a fenfe of duty, or from the expectation of reward. If we are led to afford relief merely from the fentiment of compaffion, the action is not, ftrictly speaking, virtue; but fomething lefs or fomething more. For, if the fentiment of compaffion, by which we are actuated, be the mere effect of the moral fenfe, as implanted by nature, the action refulting from it implies no volition, and is confequently deficient in an effential part of virtue. If it be the effect of that fenfe improved by repeated acts of virtue, fo as to have become the habit of the mind, it is rather an expreffion of that godlike difpofition, which it is the intention of virtue to produce, than a particular act of virtue.' P. 141.

But here we come to a very difficult point, and the virtue of the ancients prefents an obftacle not eafily to be furmounted. According to our author's fyftem, the heathens might have been virtuous; and he is in danger, not only of oppofing Dr. Paley, but of running counter to the articles of the church. The truth is, Dr. Paley makes morality to depend too much on the credibility of the Chriftian revelation." We must separate then, it fees, the Chriftian religion from our morality; and, having done this, we are told that we have no authority for afferting that the grace, in the thirteenth article of our church, which is here fuppofed neceffary to render actions pleafing to God, was not beftowed on many before the appearance of Chrift on earth.' To fupport this opinion, we are referred to the explanation given of the article by Dr. Hey, a reference fo very fufpicious, that we are naturally inclined to be more attentive to our author's lau

guage, which, However confiftent with Dr. Hey, appears to us to be entirely repugnant to the principles of the Reformation, and the language of the church articles.

In the last chapter is given a divifion of virtue, under three claffes our duties to God, to our neighbour, and ourselves; and each clafs is fubdivided into three heads, confisting of duties, of thoughts, words, and action. In this part there is nothing peculiarly diftinguifhable; nor do we, from the fpecimen produced of Dr. Balguy's lectures, entertain fuch fanguine hopes as the author, that the publication of them will be very beneficial to the public. The chief peculiarity in the work is ftated by the author himself in the conclufion of the whole.

The peculiarity, therefore, of what I have attempted, confists in this, that, whereas others have admitted into their systems of morality, whether as the foundation, the rule, or the motive of virtue, obedience to the will of God, conformity to truth, conformity to the eternal fitness of things, the moral fenfe, regard to the good of mankind, regard to private happiness, &c. but have admitted one or more of these particulars feparately, always to the difparagement, and generally to the exclufion, of any other, I have endeavoured to fhow, that there is not such an incompatibility between them as has been fuppofed; that the admiffion of fome does not neceffarily imply the exclufion of the reft; but that, when they have their proper place in the subject, they are all perfectly confiftent with each other, and contribute their parts towards the formation of one harmonious whole.' P. 233.

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To us, a very striking peculiarity occurs, from comparing the work with a fentiment of the author's, maintained in a note, which is to us not indeed very intelligible. I would not,' fays the writer, altogether difcourage fpeculation, but I cannot help thinking that it would be useful to put fpecula tion under a greater check than it is under at prefent.' This is indeed a moft extraordinary affertion in a book of this defcription. By what fhackles is the author reftrained himself? And if he admit of none in his own cafe, why then does he wish to shackle others? He has taken virtue for the fubject of his fpeculations: he has purfued her to the utmost limit of his thoughts: he has bounded himself in his inquiry by no authorities, whether individual or collective; he brings all to the teft of his own opinion, and pronounces with an authoritative I, as decifively as the moft egotic philofopher. What is the nature of the check that he would impofe upon fpecu lation? We profefs ourselves entirely at a lofs to conjecture. To us there appears to be no restraint defirable. We with that every Chriftian writer fhould keep himfelf within the li

mits of fcripture; and, if he is a clergyman of the church of England, that he fhould confine his interpretation of fcripture to the limits of the thirty-nine articles.

Our readers will fee, then, that we do not approve entirely of the latitude taken in thefe fpeculations; yet there are many parts of the work which we cannot too highly applaud. It is not written in a manner likely to recommend itfelf to young readers, nor in an ornamented and popular ftyle. The investigation is dry and minute, and in feveral parts uninterefting. The author's definition of virtue is the beft part of his book; and when it is confidered as the virtue of a Chriftian, we apprehend no danger in tracing it to its remoteft connexions. The teachers of morality may derive many useful hints from this work, even while they make Paley's philofophy the bafis of their fyftem. The corrections fuggelted in the pages we have juft perused will improve their lectures; but the work itfelf is to be put into the hand of the teacher, not into that of the learner.

Memoirs relative to Egypt, written in that Country during the Campaigns of General Bonaparte, in the Years 1798 and 1799, by the learned and feientific Men who accompanied the French Expedition. 8vo. 8s. 6d. Boards. Phillips. 1800. WHATEVER opinion may be formed of the attempt, or whatsoever may be the refult of the French expedition to Egypt, the uniting scientific philofophers to a conquering army deferves commendation. Had Ariftotle followed the expedition of Alexander, what valuable additions might not have been made to the remarks of Arrian? and had Genferic been accompanied by able obfervers, we fhould not at this time have remained in ignorance of many parts of Africa or Afia. That we reap fo little benefit by this union of fcience and arms, for the prefent volume is neither peculiarly valuable nor interefting, may easily be accounted for. The din of arms is not favourable to fpeculative inquiries; and while conftantly engaged in repelling active force or guarding against treacherous. affaffination, the mind is feldom in a flate to obferve with coolnefs and precision. Urgent neceffities feelingly afferted their claim, and the languor of difeafe repreffed often the active energies of the intellect. Such must be the apologies for the defects of the prefent volume: we fhall now more particularly attend to what it contains.

The formation of the Inftitute, and the hiftory of its proceedings, need not delay us, except when connected with the. progrels of fcience, or where it contains remarks not after

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