treat at last upon a footing of equality with that one, which, while it remained unvanquished, would always prove an effectual obstacle to, that plan of universal influence over all the governments of Europe, which France bad, since the unexpected success of its arms, kept constantly in view. However the French might exult the triumphant career of their armies, it plainly appeared, by the sentiments repeatedly expressed by the principal speakers of the conventon, and in the councils, and upon all public occasions, to be their intimate persuasion, however averse to avow it, that while England stood its ground, they would never totally accomplish those mighty schemes of Conquest and influence. To execute them partially, would only involve them in perpetual quarrels with those powers whose interest required their depression, and whose cause England would never fail to support. Thus it was clear, that unless the strength of this ancient tival were effectually broken, and it were reduced to sue for peace on such terms as France should dictate, the proposed effect of so many viclories would be frustrated, as the humiliation of all its other enemies would not secure to the republic those objects at which it avowedly aimed. The prolongation of the war, in order to attain these, might be attended with such vicissitudes of fortune, as would entirely change the circumstances of affairs, and oblige the republic, in its turn, to abate of its high pretensions, and even to compound for its existence, and the preservation of the ancient limits of France. That these ideas frequently occurred to the most sagacious of the French, is incontestible, from the various publications of the time, and no less from that remarkable anxiety with which their rulers canvassed every subject relating to England. How to compass its depression was the chief object of their councils; and every fortunate event that befel them, in their numerous enterprizes, employed their consideration in what manner to convert it to the detriment of England. Among the various means of obtaining that important end, the annoyance of the English maritime commerce had long been tried, certainly not without some degree of success but in no degree sufficient to weaken the naval power of England, which continued to rule the seas in every quarter of the globe, with irresistible sway. It was indeed from this very circumstance, that France derived a multiplicity of arguments in its manifestos and exhortations, both to its own people, and to the other nations of Europe. Their tendency was to prove, that England was the tyrant of the sea, and that all the European powers were interested in repressing that tyranny. To effect this, they ought to unite cordially with France, and second its endeavours to restore the freedom of the seas, by abridging, through every means in their power, the commercial resources of England. The actual strength of its navy was so great, that it could not at present be opposed with much hope of success: but other methods might be used, not less effectual in their ultimate issue, and these were in the option of every state. the power which commanded the seas, commanded also, the shores, and that naval power was of more importance than dominion at land, [M 3] That had had passed into a kind of political maxim for ages. It was, in fact, a superiority of naval power that subverted the Roman empire. The irruptions of the Gauls, the Cimbri, and Teutones, by land, were repelled, and might have been repelled had they been repeated. The necessity of subsistence drove them quickly to the necessity of committing their fortune to the issue of a battle, in which the invaded derived an advantage over the invaders from the possession, and from the knowledge of the country. But when the barbarians began to combine their military operations with naval expeditions; when stores, as well as troops, were poured upon the Roman frontier, from the Baltic, the Dwina, the Elbe, the Danube, and the Euxine seas, then, and not till then, they began to be wholly irresistible. It was the maritime habits, and the naval power of the Scandinavians, under the appella tion of Normans, Danes, Picks, and other names, that enabled them, for the space of six hundred years, to harrass, over-run, and rule the greater part of the sea-coasts of Europe. The trade of a pirate became an honourable profession. The sons of kings, at the head of pirates, sought and obtained at once settlements and renown. Since the revival of letters, the modern im-provements in arts and sciences, and the vast extension of commerce, the superior importance of naval power seemed to be farther illustrated, and more certainly established. It was not among the least striking instances of that fertility of imagination which supported the French under all difficulties, that they found means, as they conceived, to oppose power at land to power at sea: to raise the naval power of France, and to undermine that of England, by excluding her trade from the great inlets of Europe. This would give England a blow from which it would not easily recover. It could not fail to produce an immediate alteration in its commercial circumstances; the depression of which would in. fallibly create a discouragement and despondency in the English government, that must induce it, at once, to remit of the haughtiness with which it exercised its naval superiority over other nations. Such was the purport of the va rious publications issued by autho rity, or proceeding from the many individuals, who busied themselves with compositions of this nature. The impression which they made upon the generality of European. states, was very feeble. None, in deed, appeared to pay them much attention, but those on which France possessed the forcible means of influence. The others were convinced, that the motives of the French, in those warm addresses to the continental powers, were dic tated by selfish views, and that, were they to succeed in overthrowing the maritime power of England, they would doubtless transfer it to themselves, and employ it to the. same ends to which they had so no toriously converted the superiority they had acquired at land. It was doubtless inconsistent, on the ground of morality in the English nation, to arraign the ambition and tyranny of the French, while they themselves, pursued schemes of tyranny and ambition on the main ocean, and in every quarter of the globe. If the French were plunderers at land, the Eng lish were plunderers on too many occasions, and dictators at sea. Still, however, they had done no more in the present war, than what had been authorized by long established custom; and under every restraint, a commercial correspondence with England had been, experimentally, found extremely profitable. If their industry enabled them to derive benefit from other nations, these also received no less profit from them. An exclusion of their trade would redound, therefore, equally to the detriment of both parties. Foiled in their endeavours to shut all the European ports against the English, the French determined, however, to exclude them from those of which they had the command. A proclamation had been issued by the English government, permitting the exportation of mer chandize to Flanders and Holland. But the Dutch convention was directed to publish a counter proclamation, prohibiting the importation of goods from England, under severe penalties; and enjoining the people of the united provinces to renonuce all commerce with a nation that had treated them so inimically, and whose intentions were to deprive the Dutch republic of its trade, after depriving it of its ancient freedom, by the forcible establishment of a stadtholder. Having expelled a sovereign imposed upon them against their consent, they were bound in duty and honour to refuse all connections with those, who were endeavouring to subject them again to his yoke. A similar prohibition of English manufactures had taken place in France, during the administration of Roberspierre, and had for some time been strictly enforced. But the advantages resulting from a commerce with England had gradually superseded the fear of offending against this prohibition; and it was little attended to at this time. A weighty motive for not enforcing it was, the necessity of giving vent to the cargoes of the English vessels captured by the French privateers. But after the government in Holland had come to the deter mination of forbidding the entry of English goods, it thought itself the better entitled to require the adop tion of the like measure in France, as Holland, in adopting it, had complied with the requisition of the French government. This appeared so unanswerable a mode of reason. ing, that the directory, however disinclined to compliance, found itself under the necessity of giving satisfaction to the Dutch confede rates, who were so determined as to admit of no denial, that they threat. ened to rescind their resolutions, unless the same were taken by the French government. The regulations proposed on this occasion were very severe; they not only prohibited the importation of English merchandize in future, but ordained the re-exportation of what had been imported. Harsh methods were, at the same time, adopted, to secure the obser vance of these regulations; and though they were unacceptable to multitudes, so intent was the legis lature on diminishing the resources of England, that the prohibitory decree, together with the heavy penalties annexed to its infringement, was carried by a large majority. Great were the expectations of the enemies to England, that this exclusion of its merchandize and [M 4] manufactures which, while it continued open, would always prove an inlet for English goods to all parts of Germany': and the princes and states of the empire were no ways disposed to gratity, the French with an exclusion of the English from that only medi um of commercial communication between Germany and the other trading countries in Europe. The disappointment of the French government, in the sanguine hope it had entertained of destroying the commerce, and through it the finan ces of England, was farther aggravated by the disorder of its own. Notwithstanding the indefatigable efforts used to place them on a footing of stability, temporary expedi manufactures would, in a short time, reduce it to such distress, as to disable it from carrying on the war, and oblige it to submit to any conditions, for the sake of recovering its trade. It cannot be denied that appearances militated strongly in favour of these consequences. Spain and Italy, two capital marts for the sale of English commodities, especially the first, were now almost entirely shut to their admission. Genoa and Leghorn, the two principal seats of the trade between England and Italy, were under the immediate controul of France; the former was compelled, through the terror of its arms, to exclude England from its ports, by a formal treaty to that purpose; and the latents were still the only props of goter was in the possession of a French garrison. Corsica was, at the same time, no longer in the hands of the English but Naples and the papal territories still remained open to them in Italy; and Portugal afforded an ample channel for the introduction of every article of commerce from England, not only into that kingdom, but also into Spain, its adjoining neighbour, with which its immediate communication would always procure either an open or clandestine entrance for English merchandize of all kinds. Thus, on a considerate examination of the consequences resulting from this famous decree, they did not meet the expectations of those who framed it. It was found that as power shut one door against commerce luxury opened another. Little was the diminution of the English trade to the southern parts of Europe, while in the north it remained uninterrupted. From this quarter it was that England drew the most essential articles it wanted. Hamburgh was a port, vernment, which had no fixed prospect of supporting itself by other than precarious and uncertain means. But as these could not again be resorted to, the state still reverted to the dangerous situation it had just escaped, and was liable to experience still greater difficulties, from this successive abridgment of its remaining resources. In this alarming situation the directory resolved to call a meeting of the great bankers and merchants, to consult with them on the means of restoring the pecuniary credit of the nation, and circular letters were dispatched to them for that purpose. On the tenth of December a message of a most pressing nature was sent to the council of five hundred. It was seriously urged by the directory, to come without delay to the assistance of the state, the wants of which were such, that if not immediately relieved, it would be exposed to certain ruin. The only remedy that could be proposed, in this extremity, was, to authorize the di rectory rectory to receive the last instalment due on the sale of the national do mains, amounting to eighty millions, and which, being payable in specie, might be appropriated with effect to the extinction of the debts that lay most heavy on government, and the liquidation of which appeared the most indispensible. speedily healed, by the discretion of both parties, might be productive of the most serious evils. The ne cessity of acting in concert prevent This message was communicated to a secret committee of the council of five hundred: but contrary to the expectations of the directory, it was treated with slight, and as undeserving of attention. Equally astonished and offended at this reception of a message, from which far different effects had been hoped, the directory published this transaction upon the following day, as an appeal to the public on the conduct of the council. But this step was judged to have been too hastily taken. It seemed intended to bring the council into disgrace, as refusing to concur with the directory in a necessary measure, and it evidently tended to occasion a variance between these two branches of government, an evil that ought of all others to be the most studiously 1 ed farther altercation: but the council of five hundred became extremely watchful of the motions of the directory, and resolved to con fine it with the utmost strictness, to the powers assigned to it by the constitution. During the cruel administration of Roberspierre, multitudes had fled to foreign countries, or concealed. themselves in various parts of France, in order to escape the fate that would otherwise have attended them. The revolutionary committees of the districts to which they belonged, actuated by the barbarous spirit of the times, had entered the names of these unhappy persons on the list of emigrants, by which they were subjected to the punishments enacted by the law, against individuals of this description. After the overthrow of this sanguinary system, several decrees had been passed, to rescue those who had suffered unjustly, through its tyranny, from the wretched condition to avoided in the present circumstances which they had been reduced. of the nation. Those who had expatriated themThe committee, thus brought for- selves since the last of May, 1793, ward before the public, exculpated when this dreadful system comitself for the rejection of this mes the state in menced, were permitted to return sage, by asserting that it represented to their country, and those who had been falsely entered on the list of emigrants, were cleared from the penalties annexed to emigration. a care situation than consisted with reality. It was with much concern that the public beheld a rupture between the legislature and the executive department, which, unless it were But, in the numbers that appealed to the laws, enacted to reinstate in their rights those who had been unjustly deprived of them, there were many who came strictly under the denomination of emigrants, but who found means, though partiality or bribery, to procure testimonials of their not having left France be fore |