While these matters were pending, the vote of credit for the sum of two millions and a half, brought in and already twice read, was stopped in its progress by Mr. Grey, who contended, from what had passed, that the house ought to be on its guard against the appropriation of money at the will of the minister. A vote of credit, he observed, was to enable the executive power to meet expences unforeseen, and unprovided for, but not to discharge debts already contracted, without the sanction of parliament.

Mr. Pitt replied, that the vote of credit having been specified in the estimate of ways and means, its application was subject to the investigation of parliament. It Constituted a fund ready at hand for exigencies, without encumbering the expences of the ensuing

year.

Mr. Fox observed, that the money voted by a bill of credit was not issuable till an exigency appeared, whereas the money voted upon esti`mate of the expence was immediately provided. Votes of credit were not intended to supply the deficiency of estimates, but merely to answer unforeseen occurrences in the absence of parliament. The bill, after some additional remarks of the same nature by Mr. Sheridan, went through a third reading, by a majority of seventy-seven.

It underwent a similar opposition in the house of lords, where the duke of Grafton and the earl of Lauderdale used much the same arguments against it as in the commons, and took occasion, at the same time, to express their disapprobation of the Hamburgh bills, but it passed in the affirmative.

Some of the new taxes were also opposed in the lower house. That upon tobacco was represented as bearing too heavily upon the lower classes. Through general Tarleton's interference, the soldiers on board were allowed to be sup. plied with it, duty free. The horse-tax was also taken off those employed in the yeomanry cavalry. Free-holders, from ten to fifteen pounds a year, and people holding farms of seventy, or freeholds of thirty-five pounds a year, were also exempted from it; and the tax on printed cottons was entirely given up.

The duty imposed on legacies met with a strong opposition. It was objected to by Mr. Newnham, as of too inquisitorial a tendency into the affairs of families, and particularly of commercial people; it would prejudice illegitimate children, faithful domestick, and old friends. He was ably seconded by Mr. Fox, who enlarged considerably on all his arguments.

They were replied to by the solicitor-general, who observed, that the principle of the bill was founded on a law of the same import already in force. The tax took nothing from actual possession, and its bringing private property to light was no valid objection, as private credit would thereby be confirmed.

The tax was strongly supported by the attorney-general. He particularly noticed the case of illegiti mate children, who, instead of being injured by it, were, if acknowledged by the testator, intitled to the exception allowed by the act to lineal descent. The bill, after some farther discussion, passed by a majority of seventy-eight. [E4]

In

In the house of lords it was vehemently opposed by lord Lauderdale, as tending gradually to diminish the importance of that house, by lessening the opulence of its members, such numbers of whom came to their honours and fortunes through collateral succession. He instanced the duke of Norfolk, who must, if such an act had subsisted, have been a loser by six hundred thousand pounds, taken from the family which he represented. The bill, however, was carried.

The tax on collateral succession to real estates was more successfully opposed in the house of commons, where it evidently appeared so ob noxious, that Mr. Pitt found himself under the necessity of totally relinquishing it.

On the eight of December, a message was delivered from the king to the house of commons, informing them of his disposition to enter into a negociation for peace with the present government of France. Mr. Pitt thereon moved an address, expressive of their readiness to concur in such a measure. Mr. Sheridan avowed himself of opinion, that the intention of the minister was to frustrate the motion for peace of which Mr. Grey had given notice. What other motives could induce the minister to this change of language respecting the French, whom he had so lately represented as unable to continue the war, and on the brink of destruction. The men who governed that country were the same who had put the king to death, and with whom, our ministry had declared, no settled order of things could ever take place. But, whoever were the governors of France, Mr. She ridan insisted, that no reason of

that sort ought to prevent au accom modation, and he moved an amendment to the address, to signify the concern of the house, that any form of government in that country should induce the king to be averse to peace; and to request that, setting aside all considerations of that nature, he would direct his ministers to treat with the enemy on safe and honourable terms. He was seconded by Mr. Grey, who advanced a variety of facts and reasonings upon them to prove the propriety of treating.

was ma

Until the present opportunity, Mr. Pitt replied, none had offered to encourage ideas of peace, which, however, had not been prevented by the mere existence of a republic in France, but by a total absence of any species of regular government. The change now nifest: the new constitution was contrary to the doctrine of universal equality; the French had now a mixed form of government, admitting of distinctions in society; and their legislature was not constructed on a pure democracy. This fully authorized ministry to consider them in quite another light than formerly; but did not furnish any pretence for depriving ministers of their right to act in the name of the executive power, without undue interference, which must certainly be the case, were the amendment to be adopted.

Mr. Fox severely reprehended ministry for pretending that, till now, the government of France was incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity with other nations. They had maintained them successively with every power they had treated with; nor was the character of the present

rulers

rulers of that country more favour able to the preserving of such relations. Ministers ought, in the mean time, to be reminded with what powers they had not scrupled to enter into treaties of amity, and of what deeds they had, in conse quence, been the abettors. Mr. Fox, reviewed the events of the war with great accuracy and precision, with a view of shewing the ill-management of those who had conducted it. He ridiculed the idea that the French were more deserving of confidence on account of their new constitution; their principles were still the same, though they had adopted another mode of ruling. But neither those principles, nor their antecedent government, ought to have been made the pretext for waging a war of extermination. It was time to end it on any conditions, not derogatory to the dignity of this country: and ministry ought no longer to be suffered to protract the war, on the pretence they had so continually, but falsely, alleged, of incapacity in the enemy to maintain a good understanding.

The sentiments of Mr. Dundas were, that to offer terms of peace to the enemy would be attended with no disgrace, but that ministers, in such case, should be left to act discretionally, and not to be compelled to make a peace of which they disapproved. The amend ment, for that reason, was inequitable, as it fettered their operations against all experience and precedent. He denied the object of the war to be the restoration of despotism in France, or that this country could have indulged the hope of an advantageous peace till the present period. Less than a year before,

the successes of the French had rendered them untractable, and it was only since their late defeats that reasonable men had begun to hope for equitable conditions. Never before had they, during the whole of this war, condescended to express the least willingness to reconciliation. The king's message could not have been delivered at a fitter opportunity: the supplies for the continuance of the war had been granted, and the nation had proved itself able and willing to maintain the contest. This was exactly the situation in which we should appear to the enemy, upon whom it would doubtless make that impression which was intended. It would convince the French, that, however we might be desirous of peace, we were ready for war, and not dis. posed to treat on dishonourable terms. The debate closed by rejecting the amendment and carrying the address. A similar one to this was, on the next day, tenth of December, proposed and passed in the house of lords.

On the fifteenth of February, Mr. Grey introduced his motion for peace by a speech, wherein he observed, that, contrary to general expectation, the ministry, in lieu of a negociation for peace, were making preparations for a continuation of the war. But with what well-grounded hope of success could they persist in this unfortunate system? There was no confidence nor unity of views in the remaining parts of the coalition; and yet this country was to hear the weight of this pretended alliance in favour of the common interest of Europe. The public was exhorted to rely on the discretion of ministers: but were they worthy of any trust, after be

ing deceived in their allies in the most material points, and still expressing a forwardness to depend on promises so frequently reiterated and so repeatedly broken, when ever induced by the slightest interest to falsify their word. The French, it was now acknowledged, were in a situation to be treated with; we ought, therefore, no longer to stand aloof. He would consequently move for an address to the king, requesting him to communicate to the executive government in France his readiness to embrace any opportunity of coinciding with them in mutual endeavours for the re-establishment of peace.

The situation of affairs, it was replied by Mr. Pitt, was such, that it could be no humiliation to this country to be the first in profering peace; but the conducting of a negociation, and when to time it, belonged solely to ministers. If they were deemed unworthy of such a trust, their opponents ought to petition for their removal; but while they continued in office, they alone could be the proper agents in such a transaction; they ought, on this principle, to act unitedly, not only among themselves, but with the allies of this country, to whom no cause should be given to suspect us of duplicity, and of not acting in the sincerest conjunction with them. If they remained entire, so powerful a confederacy could not, in the nature of things, fail, by perseverance and unanimity, to obtain, finally, an advantageous peace; but this desirable object depended on the moderation of the enemy. All had been done, consistently with honour and interest, to bring him to this issue; but neither of these would be sacrificed. Considering

the temper of our enemies, and how much they were inflamed by the pressure of circumstances, to give up their inordinate pretensions, peace would probably depend on the difficulty they would find to prosecute the war, and the prospect of it might not, of course, be so near as wished or expected.

Whatever success our arms might have in future, still we ought not, said Mr. Fox, to presume that a better season for treating than the present would occur. There was a time when the enemy could not stand before the confederacy, and was driven from every place he had occupied abroad, and forced to retire for shelter into his own country. What situation could be more prosperous for the coalition? But it did not think the French sufficiently humbled and depressed, and lost an opportunity that would never return. We complained of that decree of the convention, by which they threatened interference in the affairs of other countries; but as they had solemnly rescinded it as offensive to us, why did not we disclaim all interference in their own concerns? why had no steps been taken towards a pacification, as the public had been given to hope? they would certainly be popular in this country, and not displeasing to our allies, nor to all Europe, which looked anxiously for such an event. The great obstacle to peace was the animosity between the French and their enemies. This should be removed preferably to all other obstructions. This might be done by offering them reasonable conditions, which would disarm an enemy much sooner than violence and obstinacy. It was not surprising the French should be exasperated, when we

spoke

spoke of them so contemptuously, and even sent an ambassador to the person who called himself their king. It was illusory, in the mean time, to buoy up the spirits of the people, by telling them to look at the distresses of the French, as if they were any mitigation of their own. These were no arguments to lay before men who had suffered so much for the profusion and ill success that had so usually accompanied ministerial measures. The

opponents to these were arrogantly admonished, that it was the royal prerogative only to decide of peace and when to conclude it: but ministers also should be reminded, that it was no less the prerogative of the commons of England to interpose their advice, both as to the time and the conditions that were seasonable. On closing the debate, fifty divided for the motion, and one hundred and ninety against it.

CHAP.