Knox Common Pleas. July 5, 1907, and was therefore given in time. The statute not requiring notice of intention to appeal, we hold that the statement in the order and entry of June 20 with reference to the notice of appeal is mere surplusage. To determine what is appealed from and who has appealed, we must look to the entry of July 6, and the bond. The entry of July 6 recites that the appellants appealed from "the judgment of the court heretofore rendered in the above-named cause on June 20, A. D. 1907"-that is, the whole order and judgment. It is argued by counsel for Grubb and Bishop that nothing was appealed from but the finding of the court that Grubb and Bishop were preferred claimants and ordering their claims paid as preferred, and that therefore it is ineffectual as an appeal, and the motion should be sustained on that ground. But a part of the judgment of the probate court may be appealed from. The language of the statute is, "from any order or decision in the administration of insolvent estates," etc., and that has been construed to mean any part of an order or judgment. State v. Goebel, 1 Circ. Dec. 307 (1 R. 550). So that we consider it immaterial whether it is regarded as a whole order appealed from, or only the part above mentioned. We have said that we must look to the bond to determine who the appellants are. The bond sets forth the names of six appellants "and others." This brings the matter up to this court as to the appellants named, and the sole remaining question on the motion to dismiss the appeal is whether it brings it up as to "the others," the additional twenty-one plaintiffs named in the petition. We have not been able to find any authority directly in point, but our construction is that "the others" necessarily mean the other twenty-one petitioners, and we hold it is not necessary to name all the petitioners as appellants in the appeal bond. Where parties are numerous, a part may appeal for the whole number. All persons are affected by the order or judgment, and even if it were not so, and it was necessary to name all of the parties appealing in the bond, it is not a Fairview Glass Co. In re. defect which would defeat an appeal, but an amendment would be allowed on application, and the names inserted. Our judgment is that the motion to dismiss the appeal should be overruled. Are Grubb and Bishop operatives, and are their claims therefore preferred claims, within R. S. 6355 (Gen. Code 11138) ? Grubb was a stockholder, director and bookkeeper. Bishop was a stockholder, president and general manager or superintendent. Grubb's services were the keeping of books, and acting as shipping clerk occasionally. Bishop did whatever he found necessary to do in the management of the concern and performed some menial labor; but our opinion is that neither one of them can properly be designated an operative, and that the case is controlled and the question determined by the case of Green v. Weller, 3 Circ. Dec. 488 (6 R. 351), and all that is said in that case by the court in their opinion is applicable to Grubb and Bishop. Our judgment is, therefore, that the motion to dismiss the appeal be overruled, with exceptions, and our finding is that neither Grubb nor Bishop are operatives, nor their claims preferred under R. S. 6355. The assignee should be ordered to pay the claims of the laborers who filed their petition in the probate court in full, so far as the fund in his hands will do so, and counsel may prepare and file an entry in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Counsel suggest that the preferred creditors have not complied with R. S. 6353 (Gen. Code 11136). We have examined that section of the statutes, and are of the opinion that it is not applicable to this case. This is not a proceeding to determine the validity of a claim, but the priority between rival claims. Clapp v. Banking Co. 50 Ohio St. 528, 534 [35 N. E. Rep. 308]. Knox Common Pleas. CONTRACTS-WORK AND LABOR. [Knox Common Pleas, May Term, 1909.] J. B. SCOHY V. CHARLES W. COLE, VALIDITY OF AGREEMENT TO PAY ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION TO SUPERINTENDENT TO "EXERT UTMOST EFFORTS." "To exert his utmost efforts to manage and superintend" defendant's factory requires longer hours of service and the doing of everything possible for the benefit of the employer at whatever cost of comfort, time and labor; hence, a contract binding the employer to pay an employe at the end of a stipulated term a sum in addition to his regular compensation on condition that he should put forth his utmost efforts is not void for want of consideration. L. C. Stillwell, for plaintiff. H. C. Devin, for defendant. WICKHAM, J. This cause is submitted to the court on a general demurrer to the petition. The facts as shown by the petition are: that on November 19, 1904, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract in writing as follows: "This agreement made October 1, 1904, by and between C. W. Cole, banker of Upland, Indiana, party of the first part, and J. B. Scohy, of Mathews, Indiana, party of the second part, witnesseth: that the party of the first part shall pay to the party of the second part $150 per month from October 1, 1904, until July 1, 1905, and in consideration of the above, the party of the second part agrees to manage and superintend the factory known as the 'Sun glass factory,' situated in Mathews, Indiana, owned and operated by the said party of the first part. "In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 18th day of November, 1904. "(Signed) C. W. COLE, JOHN B. SCOHY. "Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of Scohy v. Cole. On the next day, November 19, 1904, the following written agreement was entered into by them: "Whereas, on June 2 the Sun Glass Company, a corporation of Indiana, was indebted to Charles W. Cole, of Grant county, Indiana, in the sum of $10,000, with 6 per cent interest from July 15, 1902, and, 'Whereas, on the day of 1904, the Sun Glass Company transferred to the said Charles W. Cole the Sun glass factory, to secure the payment of said indebtedness, and "Whereas, it was agreed by and between the Sun glass factory and the said Charles W. Cole, that the said Charles W. Cole should operate the said factory until all the indebted. ness to the said Charles W. Cole and all expenses of operating the same were satisfied in full and all money be expended in procuring gas for said Sun Glass Co., if he could do so by July, 1906. "Whereas, the said Charles W. Cole agreed on November 18, 1904, to employ one John B. Scohy, for nine months from October 1, 1904, at the rate of $150 per month to manage and superintend said factory until all debts against said factory were paid and fully discharged. "Now, therefore, this further agreement made and entered into November 19, 1904, by and between Charles W. Cole and John B. Scohy, witnesseth: "That as an inducement and further consideration for John B. Scohy to exert his utmost efforts to manage and superintend said factory well and to satisfy the existing debts as soon as possible, the said Charles W. Cole hereby agrees to pay the said John B. Scohy the sum of $2,000 as a bonus at the time said debts are paid and discharged. "In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals this 19th day of November, 1904. "JOHN B. SCOHY, In pursuance of the agreements the plaintiff superintended and managed the factory for the nine months from October 1, 1904, to July 1, 1905, "and did exercise and put forth Knox Common Pleas. his utmost efforts and rendered the defendant extraordinary services therein, and did pay off and discharge all of the debts and obligations." The defendant paid the plaintiff the $150 per month for the term of employment, according to the terms of the first contract, but refused to pay $2,000 mentioned in the second agreement, and the suit is to recover that sum. The ground of the demurrer is, that there was no consideration for the promise to pay the $2,000; that the plaintiff did not agree to do, and did not do anything more than he was legally bound to do under the first agreement. Counsel for the demurrer in support of their argument cite the case of Harris v. Watson, 1 Peake N. P. (ed. 1795) 72. In that case it appears that the master of a ship promised his crew an addition to their fixed wages, in consideration of, and as an inducement to their extraordinary exertions during a storm. This promise was held to be nudum pactum; the voluntary performance of an act which it was before legally incumbent upon the party to perform, being in law an insufficient consideration. Storms and their consequent perils at sea are incident to the employment of sailors, and in their contract of employment seamen impliedly agree "to put forth their utmost efforts, and render extraordinary services," when the necessity arises, to save the ship and cargo from wreck and loss. It was on this ground that, in the case cited, the court held the sailors not entitled to recover; otherwise, it would not have been "an act which it was before legally incumbent on them to perform." We are unable to see the analogy between the case cited and the case at bar, claimed by counsel for the demurrer in his argument. The facts of the petition do not show that the Sun glass factory, or the defendant's claim against the company, was a distressed vessel tossed about upon the angry and tempestuous financial waves of the times, which threatened immediate destruction. And if so, then that condition existed when the first contract was made, and that fact destroys the analogy. The case of Ward v. Toledo (Bd. of Ed.), 11 Circ. Dec. 671 (21 R. 699), is cited. Ward was employed as the super |