sub-district, unless a majority of the voters of such district or sub-district shall petition therefor. McClain's Iowa Code (1888), § 516; Lones v. Harris, 71 Iowa 478.

A municipality, which for thirty years subjected land platted as streets and a public square to taxation as private property, was held estopped to claim title thereto. Smith v. Osage, So Iowa 84, citing Simplot v. Dubuque, 49 Iowa 630; Getchell v. Benedict, 57 Iowa 121; Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa 437; Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa 283; 95 Am. Dec. 729.

In Kansas, the statutory procedure for platting controls, and no acts of third parties will effect a division into blocks and lots. Sullivan v. Davis, 29 Kan. 28.

In-Louisiana, the rule that, on the division of a municipal corporation into two separate communities, each holds in severalty the public property that falls within its limits, was applied to a parish courthouse in the town of Floyd, on carving the parish of West Carroll out of Carroll. West Carroll Parish v. Gaddis, 34 La. Ann. 928.

In Maine, municipal officers shall cause town lines to be perambulated quinquennially, with the exception of "towns which since March 22d, 1828, have perambulated, or shall perambulate their lines as by law prescribed, and set up stone monuments, at least two feet high, at all the angles, and where the lines cross highways, or on or near the banks of all rivers, bays, lakes or ponds which said lines cross, or which bound said lines, except once every ten years, commencing ten years from the time that the stone monuments were

SO

erected." Maine Rev. Stat. (1883), p. 88. The proceedings of commissioners appointed to ascertain a town line, were held to be only presumptive evidence of the actual boundary. Magoon v. Davis, 84 Me. 178.

A township bounded easterly and northly on Schoodic river, carries the grant to the middle thread above tidewater. Granger v. Avery, 64 Me. 292. The record of a meeting for organization of a plantation for township purposes, need be only as explicit in description of limits as that in a deed by the state. State v. Woodbury, 76 Me. 457. As to procedure in establishing town boundaries, see Anonymous, 31

Me. 592.

In Massachusetts, as in Maine, the selectmen cause town lines to be per

As to a common boundary of towns being the middle of a stream, see Flynn v. Boston, 153 Mass. 372. As to a boundary upon flats, tidewaters, etc., see Tappan v. Boston Water Power Co., 157 Mass. 24; Russ v. Boston, 157 Mass. 60.

In Michigan, as to the requisites of the laying out of a township line road, see Michigan Gen. Stat. (1882), § 1305; Brewer v. Gerow, 83 Mich. 250.

In Missouri, where the charter of a municipality is amendable by "the lawmaking authorities" thereof, a change made by them in the boundaries fixed in the charter, constitutes an amendment of the charter. Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141.

A false description in an order of the county court incorporating a town-e. g.. "Section 24," instead of "Section 23"-may be stricken out, provided enough remains to ascertain the location. Woods v. Henry, 55 Mo. 560.

In Montana, the county commissioners may "change the boundaries of townships in their respective counties." Montana Comp. Stat. (1887), p. 845, § 756.

In Nebraska, when a surveyed township shall have too few inhabitants for a separate organization, it may be added to some adjoining town, or temporarily divided between two or more towns; and a creek or river so dividing a township as to make it inconvenient for transacting town business may be made the town boundary. Nebraska Consol. Stat. (1891), § 949.

As to

In New Hampshire, the town lines are septennially perambulated by the selectmen. Where a place on a county line is unorganized, the county commissioners perambulate. New Hampshire Pub. Stat. (1891), p. 173. the procedure, see Boscawen v. Canterbury, 23 N. H. 188; Campton v. Holderness, 25 N. H. 225; Gorrill v. Whittier, 3 N. H. 267. As to the determination of the true boundary of a town from records of ancient perambulations, see Wells v. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co., 48 N. H. 491.

In New York, as to special surveys of town bounds, see Bird. New York Rev. Stat. (1890), p. 2759, § 3.

In Ohio, the marked corner is controlled by the actual division lines. Reed v. Marsh, 8 Ohio 147. As to the requisites of the petition to change township boundaries, see Russell v.

Fulton County, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 185.

In Oklahoma, as to the survey, platting and registration of towns, see Oklahoma Stat. (1890), § 732 et seq.

In Pennsylvania, township boundaries may be altered by the courts of quarter sessions, on petition; commission to "three impartial men;" election, etc. Bright. Purd. Dig. L. (1885), p. 371. As to the procedure and requisites in the alteration, see In re Henderson Tp., 2 Watts (Pa.) 269; In re Harrison Tp., 5 Pa. St. 447; In re Limestone Tp., 11 Pa. St. 270; In re Norwegian Tp., 20 Pa. St. 324; In re Clay Tp., 33 Pa. St. 366; In re Wetmore Tp., 68 Pa. St. 340; In re Line, 4 Lanc. L. Rev. (Pa.) 269; In re Exeter Tp., 8 Co. Ct. Rep. (Pa.) 524. For requisites of establishment of township lines, see In re Plunkett's Creek Tp., 148 Pa. St. 299.

In South Carolina, the county commissioners may change the name of any township in their county. South Carolina Gen. Stat. (1882), § 641. As to the proper riparian boundary, under a statute's direction to commissioners to lay off, for a town, a tract two miles square on a certain river, see State v. Columbia, 27 S. Car. 137.

In Utah, an owner of land may get it surveyed, platted, etc., and "such maps and plats when made, acknowledged, filed and recorded with the county recorder, shall be a dedication of all such avenues, streets, commons, or other public places or blocks, and sufficient to vest the fee of such parcels of land as are therein expressed, named, or intended for public uses for the inhabitants of such town and for the public, for the uses therein named or intended. If any person shall sell or offer for sale any lot so platted according to said plat within any town or addition, before the map or plat thereof is made out, acknowledged, filed and recorded as aforesaid, such person shall forfeit to the county in which such town or addition is located, a sum not exceeding $300, for every lot which he shall sell." Utah Sess. L. (1890), ch.

50. The name of a town may be changed on petition of three-fourths of the legal voters. Sess. L. (1888), ch. 21.

In Vermont, as to the duties of the selectmen in adjusting a divisional line, see Vermont Rev. L., § 2755 et seq. Recognition by adjoining proprietors, for twenty years, of a stone wall as the town line, was held not to bind the towns. Smith v. Rockingham, 25 Vt. 645. See requisites of description of village boundaries, in Cutting v. Stone, 7 Vt. 471. For requisites of procedure to establish a divisional line between towns, see Somerset v. Glastenbury, 61 Vt. 449.

In Virginia, the recorded plan of a town "shall be evidence of the boundaries of the lots, streets and alleys thereof." Virginia Code (1887), § 1014.

In Washington, as to the procedure in vacating part of a town plat, see Washington Gen. Stat. (1891), § 749.

In West Virginia, the name of a town or village may be changed on petition to the county court, notice and hearing. West Virginia Code (1891), p. 1025.

In Wisconsin, the United States surveys govern in proving the areas of townships. Wisconsin Annot. Stat. (1889), § 4196.

1. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, vol. 15, pp. 1008, 1013.

In Alabama, the name or boundaries of a town may be changed on petition of ten adult male inhabitants thereof to the judge of probate. Alabama Code (1886), § 1516.

The policy of a change of boundaries by the general assembly cannot be inquired into by the courts. Scruggs v. Huntsville, 45 Ala. 220.

In Arkansas, the act vesting the power in the courts has been upheld. Foreman v. Marianna, 43 Ark. 324. Only residents or property owners of the old town or of the territory sought to be annexed, can petition for certiorari thereon. Perkins v. Holman, 43 Ark. 219.

The legislature may amend town charters, extend or reduce the boundaries, and divide, consolidate, or abolish,

according to public convenience and with the consent of the body politics. Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497.

The Arkansas Act of 1873, assuming to cut off "Du Val's addition" to Little Rock, was held to be unconstitutional. Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark. 166.

For the construction and effect of the Arkansas Act of 1875, as to annexation of contiguous territory to a town, see Dobson v. Fort Smith, 33 Ark. 508. As to procedure upon annexation, see Gunter v. Fayetteville, 56 Ark. 202; Vogel v. Little Rock, 55 Ark. 609; Woodruff v. Eureka Springs, 55 Ark. 618.

In California, as to legislative control of the matter, see Santa Rosa v. Coulter, 58 Cal. 537.

As to the requisites of procedure on change of municipal boundaries, see Wiedwald v. Dodson, 95 Cal. 450.

In Colorado, as to the annexation of contiguous towns, see Colorado Sess. L. (1893), ch. 156; also Valverde v. Shattuck (Colo. 1893), 34 Pac. Rep. 946.

In Connecticut, as to the effect of the division of a town upon a pauper's settlement, see East Hartford v. Hunn, 29 Conn. 500.

As to extending city limits, see Randell v. Bridgeport, 62 Conn. 440.

The town of East Haven, shortly before the chartering of the borough of Fair Haven East, so constructed a highway, afterwards within the borough, and filled an excavation with stones, that surface water finally overflowed and damaged an abutter's cellar. It was held that the borough could not be adjudged liable therefor without proof of its knowledge of the nuisance. Morse v. Fair Haven East, 48 Conn. 220.

In the Dakotas, as to the procedure under Dakota Comp. L., § 705, for division of townships having two or more villages, see Territory v. Armstrong, 6 Dak. 226.

In Florida, as to the power of the county board in the matter, see Pensacola v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 21 Fla. 492. As to legislative control, see Saunders v. Pensacola, 24 Fla. 226. As to the procedure for the contraction or expansion of a town, see Florida Dig. L. (1881), pp. 254-5.

In Idaho," The board of trustees or council may, by ordinance, include in the corporate limits of the city or town, all territory contiguous or adjacent

thereto which has been at any time, by the owner or proprietor thereof, or by anyone by his authority or acquiescence, laid off or subdivided into lots or blocks containing not more than five acres of land each, whether the same shall have been so laid off, subdivided, or platted in accordance with any statute of this state or otherwise;" and the board may compel such owners to lay out streets, etc., corresponding in width, direction, etc. Idaho Am. Rev. Stat., § 2238; Sess. Laws (1891), p. 159.

In Illinois, on petition of threefourths of the legal voters and of the owners of three-fourths in value of the property in any territory contiguous to any incorporated town, the board of trustees may, by ordinance, annex such territory, on filing the ordinance with a certified map in the county recorder's office. Illinois Rev. Stat. (1891), p. 265, § 200. Incorporated towns may be annexed to each other, § 201. A hearing may be had, and an appeal from the decision of the board may be heard, by a court or by a jury of non-residents, § 202 et seq. The act of 1889 provides for the procedure on petition to the county court for an election, p. 268, § 210a et seq. As to payment of the corporation debts, see § 210d. As to change of name, see p. 269, n. As to division of incorporated towns, see p. 269j et seq. As to the power of the county board to enlarge and divide towns, see p. 1490, § 26. As to legislative control generally, see Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 İlÍ. 548; People v. Couchman, 15 Ill. 142.

Where, upon change of Quincy under the Illinois Act of 1877, authorizing the organization of township territory into towns, the territory was found coextensive, a majority of the court held that the city treasurer might be town collector. People v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill. 319.

As to the requisites of procedure in dividing towns, see Woo-Sung v. People, 102 Ill. 648.

On division under the Illinois Act of 1874, both the resulting towns become new ones, and each must contain at least seventeen square miles. Jefferson v. People, 87 Ill. 503.

A village is not exonerated from liability for the unsafe condition of a bridge, by the wrongful act of the town highway commissioners. Marseilles v. Howland, 23 Ill. App. 101.

An election under an unconstitutional enabling act, was held inopera

tive of town annexation. Hyde Park v. Chicago, 124 Ill. 156.

Under the rule that, in the absence of a contrary provision, upon the annexation of part of a township to a city, the residue retains its property, the Illinois Act of 1869, extending the western limits of Chicago, left the rents, issues and profits of Section 16, Tp. 39, to be administered by the trustees of schools thereof for their own uses. People v. School Trustees, 86 Ill. 613. In Indiana, as to legislative control, and as to annexation of platted lots under the act of 1852, see Jeffersonville v. Weems, 5 Ind. 547; Taylor v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274; Stilz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; Cicero v. Williamson, 91 Ind. 541; Terre Haute v. Beach, 96 Ind. 143; Logansport v. La Rose, 99 Ind. 117; Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; Delphi v. Startzman, 104 Ind. 343; Huff v. La Fayette, 108 Ind. 14; Wiley v. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152.

In Indiana, a town and a city may be consolidated upon an agreement between the city council and the town trustees' president, as to the conditions, and an election in favor of the annexation. Indiana Rev. Stat. (1888), § 3233 et seq. "In proceedings before the county commissioners for the annexation of territory to cities and towns, against the will of the owner, the petitioner and the owner of any portion of the territory proposed to be annexed may appeal to the circuit court," pending which, the proceedings are to be suspended. § 3243 et seq. As to the disannexation of suburban tracts, see § 3248. As to construction of the statutes upon annexation, see Elston v. Crawfordsville, 20 Ind. 272. On severance, each township holds in severalty, public property within its territorial limits, and money, choses in action, etc., are to be equitably divided. Towle v. Brown, 110 Ind. 65.

In Iowa, a township of 1,500 inhabitants may be divided by the county board on petition, notice, hearing, etc. McClain's Iowa Code (1888), § 519. The county board, if it refuses a proper petition, may be compelled to make the division. Henry v. Taylor, 57 Iowa 72. As to the procedure for annexation, see McClain's Iowa Code (1888), § 579. As to severance, see § 593; and McKean v. Mt. Vernon, 51 Iowa 306. As to legislative control, see Murford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; Buel v. Ball, 20 Iowa 282; Deeds v. Sanborn, 22 Iowa 214; Tubbesing v. Burlington, 68 Iowa 691; Ford

v. North Des Moines, 80 Iowa 626. As to the effect on homestead rights, see Finley v. Dietrick, 12 Iowa 516; Truax v. Pool, 46 Iowa 256.

Severance in the business portion of a town was held properly refused. Monk v. George (Iowa 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 240. Annexation of territory in another county was held unauthorized. Tabor, etc., R. Co. v. Dyson (Iowa 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 245.

Severance of two villages whose centers were a mile apart, was held to be properly granted. Ashley v. Calliope, 71 Iowa 466.

A town ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors "within the limits of said town," passed before the act extending jurisdictions of towns two miles beyond their limits, was held to apply to the extension. Toledo v. Edens, 59 Iowa 352.

In an agreement for division of a district township, a provision that it draw all the "fund due," was held to embrace assets thereafter to become available; e. g., a railroad tax, assessment thereof had been omitted by mistake. Jasper D. Tp. v. Sheridan D. Tp., 47 Iowa 183.

As to requisites of municipal extension, see Glass v. Cedar Rapids, 68 Iowa 207.

In Kansas, as to the necessity of contest, see Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431. As to the effect on homestead rights, see Emporia v. Smith, 42 Kan. 433. As to when the enlargement does not extend a county seat, see State v. Atchison County, 44 Kan. 186. An ordinance adding lands not properly subdivided, was held void. Stewart v. Adams, 50 Kan. 560.

In Kentucky, additions may be made to towns, upon advertisement and application to the county court, the order whereof "shall vest the title of the land so added in the trustees of the town," Kentucky Gen. Stat. (1887), p. 1242. But see Courtney v. Louisville, 12 Bush. (Ky.) 419, as to constitutional restriction of unequal compulsory taxation. On petition of town trustees, the county court may cause streets to be extended to a river near the town, p. 1242. As to legislative control, see Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 330; Sharp v. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 223.

In Louisiana, as to legislative control, see Stoner v. Flournoy, 28 La. Ann. 850.

In Maine, on severance, the original

town retains all its property, powers, rights, and obligations, unless otherwise provided in the act of separation. North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; 71 Am. Dec. 530; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250. As to the rights of election by any resident as to which town he will belong, upon the division line being drawn, see Blanchard v. Cumberland, 18 Me. 113. Conveyance of a suburban lot with reference to a plat, passes an easement in the streets, which neither the platter nor his successors can interrupt or destroy. Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460. A legislative provision assigning absentees to the town to which the fractional part was to be annexed, was held valid. Wilton v. New Vineyard, 43 Me. 315.

A privilege in the provision law for dwellers on the line to elect to which town their land should belong, was held to be a definitive and perpetual change of the line of territorial jurisdiction. Cumberland v. Prince, 6

Me. 319.

In Maryland, in Prince George County v. Bladensburg, 51 Md. 468, the court, by Irving, J., said: "It is certainly not within the power of the legislature to give to a municipal corporation the power of absorbing as much of the property, and as many of the people, of a county, as it may suit the wishes of the municipal authorities to make subjects of their taxation and ordinances."

In Massachusetts, the legislature can erect a municipal government in a town containing 12,000 inhabitants, after consent had in town meeting. Massachusetts Const. Am., art. 2. This does not apply to annexation of a town to a city. Chandler v. Boston, 112 Mass. 200. It is no obstacle that the annexed portion lies in another county. Justices' Opinion, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 578. But no right of representation must be suspended. Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray (Mass.) 84. There, an annexation act may take effect for different

Upon severance, in absence of contrary provision, lands held for public uses go to the town within whose limits they fall. Lynn v. Nahant, 113 Mass. 433. As to the effect on the title to flats and seashore, see Com, v. Roxbury, 9 Gray (Mass.) 451. The severance does not necessarily effect severance of the judicial district of a district court. Com. v. Brennan, 150 Mass. 63. As to the proportionate division of indebtedness, and the remedy to get the excess reimbursed, see Brewster v. Harwich, 4 Mass. 278.

In the absence of express contrary provision, the old town retains all its property, powers, and privileges. Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 384; Richards v. Dagget, 4 Mass. 539; Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass. 441; Hampshire v. Franklin County, 16 Mass. 86.

Where part of a town was incorporated as a new town, a pauper whose then residence could not be ascertained, was held chargeable to the old town. Westport v. Dartmouth, 10 Mass. 341.

Acquiescence for eighty years, was held to ratify annexation proceedings. Cobb v. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197.

Town division was held not to vacate an equity suit by the old town as to a highway falling within the new town. Springfield v. Connecticut River R. Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 63.

The Massachusetts Act of 1772, having provided for the incorporation of twelve persons as overseers of the town of Boston, and the act of 1822 changing the town to a city, having provided for the election of a board of overseers for the city, "who shall have all the powers, and be subject to all the duties, now appertaining to the overseers of the poor for the town of Boston," it was held that this was a continuance and not a dissolution or suspension of the corporation of 1772; that the bodies were corporations aggregate with perpetual succession; "that a grant to them of real estate carried a fee without being to their successors; that in a writ of right, they can count only upon their own seisin within thirty years." Shaw, C. J., in Boston v. Šears, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 122.

In Michigan, the county board of supervisors may divide a township, on application of twelve freeholders, notice, hearing, etc. Michigan Gen. Stat. (1882), § 486 et seq.