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Opinion of the Court.

legislation change the mode and the means for the assessment, levy, and collection of county taxes, as in its judgment the public interests should require. Any such changes, made in view of public interests, not substantially to the prejudice of public creditors, might be considered, in respect to them, as the legal equivalent for the particular mode in force in 1868, and a fair and reasonable substitute therefor. Ordinarily, it would be true that such altered provisions would not be injurious to any private rights, for the creditor would at all times have the guaranty of as prompt and speedy a collection of a tax in satisfaction of his claim as is secured by law for the collection of the revenues of the county, most important for the support of its government.

It may, therefore, be considered as a most material and important part of the contract contained in the second section of the act of March 23, 1868, not, perhaps, that the creditor shall always have a right to have taxes for his benefit collected in the same manner in which county taxes were collectible at that date, but that he shall at least always have the right to a special tax to be levied and collected in the same manner as county taxes at the same time may be levied and collected. In other words, the essential part and value of the contract is, that he shall always have a special tax to be collected in a manner as prompt and efficacious as that which shall at the time, when he applies for it, be provided by law for the collection of the general revenue of the county. His contract is not only that he shall have as good a remedy as that provided by the terms of the contract when made, but that his remedy shall be by means of a tax, in reference to which the levy and collection shall be as efficacious as the state provides for the benefit of its counties, without any discrimination against him.

It is in this vital point that the obligation of the contract with the relator has been impaired by the section of the law under which the respondent seeks to justify his disobedience of the mandate of the Circuit Court. Those sections provide one mode for the collection of county taxes by the direct action of the county court; they provide another mode for

Opinion of the Court.

the collection of the special tax for the payment of obligations such as those held by the relator and merged in his judgment. They expressly declare that he shall not be entitled to a tax collected in the same manner as county taxes, but add limitations and conditions which, whatever may have been the legis lative motive, compared with the original remedy provided by the law for the satisfaction of his contract, cannot fail seriously to embarrass, hinder, and delay him in the collection of his debt, and which make an express and injurious discrimination against him.

We are referred by counsel for the plaintiff in error to the case of Hawley v. Fairbanks, 108 U. S. 543, as an authority in support of his contention. In that case, however, a peremptory mandamus was awarded to compel the levy and collection of a tax for the payment of a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States, notwithstanding an injunction to the contrary issued out of the state court. And it was there held that the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States against the municipality was a sufficient warrant and authority to the county clerk to make the assessment of a tax for its payment, notwithstanding the omission of the preliminary certificates of the town clerk and the allowance by the board of auditors of the town, which in other cases the law made necessary to the orderly levy and collection of the tax.

We have also been furnished with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, in the case of State ex rel. Cramer v. Judges of the County Court of Cape Girardeau County, 8 Western Reporter, 626, delivered March 21, 1887, affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Cape Girardeau County, perpetuating the injunction set up in the return of the respondent in this case as an answer to the alternative mandamus. The judge delivering the opinion of the court says: "It has been ruled by this court that taxes of the nature now in question can only be levied and collected in the manner provided in said section (§ 6799), and that unless the methods prescribed are pursued, the failure to pursue them, when, as here, they are the conditions essential to the exercise of the power, will render the tax invalid. State v. Hannibal & St. Joseph

Opinion of the Court.

Railroad, 87 Missouri, 236. Here, those methods, those conditions precedent, were not followed; and hence the county court, having no inherent power to levy a tax, and deriving its only authority from the state, must of necessity pursue the course in this regard marked out by the sovereign authority - by its laws." The court further proceeds to say that the matter is not affected by the mandate of the Federal court, in reference to which the opinion proceeds as follows: "If, as already seen, the county court was powerless to act, except when acting in conformity to express statutory conditions, it was still the duty of the judges to comply with those conditions while yielding obedience to the mandate aforesaid; for, outside of those statutory conditions, they were utterly powerless to act. Indeed, under § 6800, they were punishable for a misdemeanor in failing to comply with the provisions of § 6799 before levying the tax. It does not stand to reason that their act could be valid, and at the same time punishable as a crime. State v. Garroute, 67 Missouri, 445, 456. If the statutory provisions being discussed were of such a nature as to cut off those who obtained the judgments from enforcing the obligations held by them, then the authorities cited on their behalf might apply. I understand that it is within the power of the state to change the remedy, so long as it does not essentially affect the right embodied in the contract; and that such change, thus made, does not infract the rule that forbids the contract to be impaired.”

The opinion assumes that the remedy for the collection of the tax provided by the sections of the Revised Statutes of Missouri referred to is legally equivalent to that contained in § 2 of the act of March 23, 1868, the differences between them not appearing to have been considered. It also assumes, for that reason, that those provisions of the Revised Statutes are the only laws in force for the collection of such a tax-those in force in 1871, when the judgment of the Circuit Court was rendered, having been repealed.

For the reasons which we have pointed out, we are unable to concur in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and are constrained to hold that the sections of the Revised Statutes in question impair the obligation of the contract with

Statement of the Case.

the relator under the act of March 23, 1868, and as to him are, therefore, null and void by force of the Constitution of the United States; and that the laws of Missouri, for the collection of the tax necessary to pay his judgment, in force at the time when it was rendered, continue to be and are still in force for that purpose. They are the laws of the state which are applicable to his case. When he seeks and obtains the writ of mandamus from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the purpose of levying a tax for the payment of the judgment which it has rendered in his favor, he asks and obtains only the enforcement of the laws of Missouri under which his rights became vested, and which are preserved for his benefit by the Constitution of the United States. The question, therefore, is not whether a tax shall be levied in Missouri without the authority of its law, but which of several of its laws are in force and govern the case. Our conclusion is, that the statutory provisions relied upon by the respondent in his return to the alternative writ of mandamus do not apply, and do not, therefore, afford the justification which he pleads.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is accordingly affirmed.

MINNEAPOLIS GAS LIGHT COMPANY v. KERR MURRAY MANUFACTURING COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.

Argued May 9, 1887.- Decided May 27, 1887.

From the evidence in this case the court is satisfied that the verbal contract which forms the subject of the controversy did not fix any time for the completion of the work, and that the work was completed within a reasonable time; and it affirms the decree of the court below.

IN equity to enforce a mechanics' lien. Decree for the complainant. The respondent appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Opinion of the Court.

Mr. Anson B. Jackson for appellant. Mr. P. M. Babcock was with him on the brief.

Mr. George C. Squires for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a bill in equity filed by the appellee, who was complainant below, a corporation of Indiana, and a citizen of that state, for the purpose of enforcing a mechanics' lien under the laws of Minnesota for the price and value of a certain gasholder, alleged to have been constructed and erected by it upon the premises of the appellant.

The bill avers that on or about the 19th day of February, 1881, at the instance and request of the defendant, the plaintiff erected and constructed for the defendant one telescopic gas-holder, at the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota, at the agreed price of $9070, and that said gas-holder was in all things manufactured, put up, and erected in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner, and was reasonably worth said sum of $9070; that the defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiff the expense of labor and material expended by the plaintiff in erecting the scaffolding for the construction of said gas-holder, and that said cost was the sum of $138.25, and that said gas-holder was erected upon certain described real estate belonging to defendant; that the defendant has paid on account of the construction of said gas-holder and cost of said scaffolding the sum of $3792.74, and no more, and demands judgment against the defendant for the sum of $5415.51, and that such judgment may be decreed to be a lien upon the said gas-holder and the lands upon which the same is situated.

The answer admits that the contract price of said gas-holder was the sum of $9070; denies that the defendant agreed to pay for such scaffolding, and denies that said gas-holder was worth the sum of $9070, and avers that the same was of no greater value than the sum of $4070; avers that the defendant has paid the plaintiff on account of said gas-holder, in cash, the sum of $1953.84; that the defendant delivered the plaintiff

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