Statement of the Case.

notes, if possible, a sufficient statement of some ruling in matter of law.

But to assume to do that would be to take upon ourselves the duty of drawing up a proper bill of exceptions, a duty which belonged to the excepting party, and should have been performed before suing out the writ of error. This we are not authorized to do. Our duty and authority are limited to determining the validity of exceptions duly framed and pre

sented.

The defendants having failed to reduce their exceptions to such a form that this court can pass upon them, the judgment must be affirmed. Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How. 427; Insurance Co. v. Sea, above cited.

Judgment affirmed.

GIBSON v. SHUFELDT.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.

Submitted April 11, 1887.- Decided May 23, 1887.

In a suit in equity brought in the Circuit Court by two or more persons on several and distinct demands, the defendant can appeal to this court as to those plaintiff's only to each of whom more than $5000 is decreed.

A debtor having made an assignment of his property to a trustee to secure a preferred debt of more than $5000, other creditors filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court against the debtor, the trustee, and the preferred creditor; the defendants denied the allegations of the bill, but asked no affirmative relief; and the decree adjudged the assignment to be fraudulent and void as against the plaintiff's, and ordered the property to be distributed among them. Held, that this court had no jurisdiction of an appeal by the defendants, except as to those plaintiffs who had recovered more than $5000 each.

THIS was a motion to dismiss an appeal in equity. The material facts, appearing by the record, were as follows: Jenkins made a deed of assignment of a large amount of property to Watkins, in trust to sell it and to apply the proceeds to the

Opinion of the Court.

payment of his debts, first, to Gibson for more than $20,000, next, to other persons named, and lastly, to his creditors generally. Shufeldt & Co. filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court against Jenkins, Watkins and Gibson, to have the assignment set aside as fraudulent and void against themselves and other unpreferred creditors of Gibson, and for general relief. The Mill Creek Distilling Company filed a similar bill. The defendants answered severally, denying the allegations of the bills, and praying to be dismissed with costs. By consent of the parties and order of the court, the two bills and intervening petitions of other unpreferred creditors were heard together as one cause. At the hearing upon pleadings and proofs, a receiver was appointed, the assignment was adjudged to be fraudulent and void as to the plaintiffs and petitioners, and the case was referred to a master; and upon the return of his report a final decree was entered for the distribution of the fund in the receiver's hands, paying $6756.22 to the Mill Creek Distilling Company, $3943.21 to Shufeldt & Co., and a less sum to each of the petitioning creditors. Gibson and Watkins appealed to this court, and the appellees now moved to dismiss the appeal as to all of themselves except the Mill Creek Distilling Company.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury (with whom were Mr. William W. Crump and Mr. John A. Coke) for the motion.

No one opposing.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented by this motion can hardly be considered an open one. But the subject has been so often misunderstood, that the court has thought it convenient to review the former decisions, and the grounds on which they rest.

By the act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, § 3, which differs from earlier laws only in increasing the amount required to give this court appellate jurisdiction from a Circuit Court of the United States, it is necessary that "the matter in dispute

Opinion of the Court.

shall exceed the sum or value of five thousand dollars, exclusive of costs." 18 Stat. 316.

The sum or value really in dispute between the parties in the case before this court, as shown by the whole record, is the test of its appellate jurisdiction, without regard to the collateral effect of the judgment in another suit between the same or other parties. Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U. S. 578; Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165; The Jessie Williamson, Jr., 108 U. S. 305; New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Trotter, 108 U. S. 564; Opelika v. Daniel, 109 U. S. 108; Wabash, &c., Railroad v. Knox, 110 U. S. 304; Bradstreet Co. v. Higgins, 112 U. S. 227; Bruce v. Manchester & Keene Railroad, 117 U. S. 514.

The value of property sued for is not always the matter in dispute. In replevin, for instance, if the action is brought as a means of trying the title to property, the value of the property replevied is the matter, in dispute; but if the replevin is of property distrained for rent, the amount for which avowry is made is the real matter in dispute, and the limit of jurisdiction. Peyton v. Robertson, 9 Wheat. 527.

When the object of a suit is to apply property worth more, to the payment of a debt for less, than the jurisdictional amount, it is the amount of the debt, and not the value of the property, that determines the jurisdiction of this court. This is well illustrated by two cases, in one of which the appeal was taken by the creditor, and in the other by a mortgagee of the property.

In Farmers' Bank of Alexandria v. Iooff, 7 Pet. 168, this court dismissed an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, dismissing a bill to have land, worth more than $1000, sold for the payment of a debt of less than $1000, which was the limit of jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall saying, "The real matter in controversy is the debt claimed in the bill; and though the title of the lot may be inquired into incidentally, it does not constitute the object of the suit."

In Ross v. Prentiss, 3 How. 771, land worth more, and mortgaged for more, than $2000, was about to be sold on execution

Opinion of the Court.

for a debt of a less sum, and a bill by the mortgagee to stay the sale was dismissed. He appealed to this court, and insisted that its jurisdiction depended on the value of the property and the amount of his interest therein, and that he might lose the whole benefit of his mortgage by a forced sale on execution. But the appeal was dismissed, Chief Justice Taney saying: "The only matter in controversy between the parties is the amount claimed on the execution. The dispute is whether the property in question is liable to be charged with it or not. The jurisdiction does not depend on the amount of any contingent loss or damage which one of the parties may sustain by a decision against him, but upon the amount in dispute between them; and as that amount is in this case below two thousand dollars, the appeal must be dismissed."

When a suit is brought by two or more plaintiffs, or against two or more defendants, or to recover or charge property owned or held by different persons, (which more often happens under the flexible and comprehensive forms of proceeding in equity and admiralty, than under the stricter rules of the common law,) the question what is the matter in dispute becomes more difficult. Generally speaking, however, it may be said, that the joinder in one suit of several plaintiffs or defendants, who might have sued or been sued in separate actions, does not enlarge the appellate jurisdiction; that when property or money is claimed by several persons suing together, the test is whether they claim it under one common right, the adverse party having no interest in its apportionment or distribution among them, or claim it under separate and distinct rights, each of which is contested by the adverse party; that when two persons are sued, or two parcels of property are sought to be recovered or charged, by one person in one suit, the test is whether the defendants' alleged liability to the plaintiff, or claim to the property, is joint or several; and that, so far as affected by any such joinder, the right of appeal is mutual, because the matter in dispute between the parties is that which is asserted on the one side and denied on the other.

In the leading case of Oliver v. Alerander, 6 Pet. 143, upon a libel in admiralty against the owners of a vessel to recover

Opinion of the Court.

seamen's wages, and an attachment of the proceeds of the vessel in the hands of assignees, the libellants obtained a decree for the payment out of those proceeds to them respectively of sums less than $1000, but amounting in all to more than $2000, and the assignees appealed. This court, at January term 1832, in a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Story, dismissed the appeal, for the reasons that the shipping articles constituted a several contract with each seaman to all intents and purposes; that, although the libel was in form joint, the contract with each libellant, as well as the decree in his favor, was in truth several, and none of the others had any interest in that contract, or could be aggrieved by that decree; that the matter in dispute between each seaman and the owners, or other respondents, was the sum or value of his own demand, without any reference to the demands of others; that it was very clear, therefore, that no seaman could appeal from the Circuit Court to this court, unless his claim exceeded $2000; "and the same rule applies to the owners or other respondents, who are not at liberty to consolidate the distinct demands of each seaman into an aggregate, thus making the claims of the whole the matter in dispute; but they can appeal only in regard to the demand of a seaman which exceeds the sum required by law for that purpose, as a distinct matter in dispute."

Upon like reasons, in Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347, where a libel by several owners of cargo against the ship to recover damages by improper stowage had been consolidated by order of the court with similar libels by other owners of cargo, and a decree entered awarding to the libellants respectively various sums, some more and some less than $2000, but amounting in all to more than $10,000, an appeal by the owner of the ship was dismissed as to all the libellants who had recovered less than $2000 each. Similar decisions were made at October term 1882, in two cases of libels to recover damages to ship and cargo by collision, in one of which the appeal was taken by the libellants, and in the other by the owner of the vessel against which the suit was brought. Er parte Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 106 U. S. 5; The Nevada, 106 U. S. 154. See