JOHN FREDERIC HERBART.

MEMOIR.

JOHN FREDERIC HERBART, the philosopher, was born on the 4th of May, 1776, at Oldenburg, where his father held the position of Justizrath. After finishing his preliminary studies at the gymna sium of his native city, he entered the University of Jena. His father had intended him for the law, and it was only with difficulty that he obtained permission to study philosophy. He soon had personal relations with Fichte, whose Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Sciences) awakened in him a spirit of opposition. His independence of thought showed itself in his critique of Schelling's two articles, 'On the possibility of a Form of Philosophy,' and ‘Of the I' (Vom Ich), which he submitted to Fichte. In 1797 he accepted the position of private tutor in Berne, and during four years continued his studies with his peculiar energy. He considered it necessary to return to the original problems of philosophy, and studied the philosophy of the ancients, particularly the period previous to Socrates and Plato, also mathematics and natural sciences, and even at that time laid the foundations of his mathematical psychology. It was here, too, that he developed his deep interest in education. He not only became acquainted with the pedagogical publications of Pestalozzi-The Evening Hour of a Hermit, first printed in 1780; the first part of Leonard and Gertrude printed in 1780; Christopher and Alice, issued in 1782, and Figures tọ my A B C Book, published in 1795, but visited in person the great Educator himself, at Burgdorf, in 1799, and received from his own lips an explanation of the New Education, based on the proper exercise and training of the senses, and of the methods by which he developed in very young children the ideas of number, form, and language. He felt that there were certain deficiencies in the views of Pestalozzi which it was his duty to supply.

In 1800, he returned to Germany, and after a brief residence at Bremen, settled in Göttingen. Here, until 1809, when he accepted a call from Königsberg as professor ordinarius of philosophy and pedagogy, he published the first results of his mature thought.

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Among them may be mentioned 'Pestalozzi's Idea of the ABC of Observation Scientifically Treated '-(Gött. 1802, 2d Ed. 1804); De Platonici Systemati Fundamento; Universal Pedagogy;' 'On Philosophical Study;' 'Principles of Metaphysics;' 'Universal Practical Philosophy.' In Königsberg he divided his time between his own researches, his academic duties, and work as a practical teacher in directing a seminary of teachers founded at his instance, and held after 1812 in his own house.

In thus uniting under his own roof the advantages of school and family, Herbart endeavored to utilize the powerful forces of each by making them supplement and assist each other. He saw the advantages of each; but in the school, owing to the number of pupils, each one can not receive that care and attention which his individual peculiarities call for, while the force of family influence is too frequently wasted from the incapacity of those who are called to direct and apply it. His ideal was education in the family, guided and assisted by the counsel of an experienced and professional teacher, not necessarily residing immediately in the family circle, but one whose occasional instruction of the children would indirectly find additional strength and usefulness through the cooperation of the parents whose daily influence he should assist and direct. His ideal method embraced brevity and vividness-the first, because children should not be confined long to one position or one subject, and the method should find and leave the mind of the pupil fresh; the impression thus made of any subject in even a brief period will be worth hours of forced attention.

Besides a great number of essays and lectures, he published among others: Handbook of Philosophy,' and 'Handbook of Psychology,' 'Psychology as a Science upon a new basis of Experience, Metaphysics and Mathematics,' and 'Universal Metaphysics with the Elements of Natural Theology,' and lastly, 'Encyclopedia of Philosophy from a Practical Point of View.'

The desire to work in a University with more intellectual life led Herbart in 1833 to accept a call back to Göttingen, where he died Aug. 14, 1841. While in Göttingen he published several small treatises, among which are 'A Plan of Lectures on Pedagogy,' 'Lessons on the Theory of the Freedom of the Human Will,' etc.

His biography is contained in Herbart's Minor Philosophical Essays and Treatises,' published in 1842-43, by Hartenstein. A complete edition of his works was published by the same editor in twelve vols., Leipsic, 1850-52.)

HERBART, BENEKE, AND FICHTE.

Herbart's Ideas of Education.

[In the Journal of Speculative Philosophy for April, 1876, there is a sketch, by Dr. Karl Schmidt, of Herbart's Pedagogics, translated by Prof. Hannel of St. Louis. We give a few extracts introductory to a more formal treatment to appear in a subsequent number of this Journal. The words in brackets are partly explanatory and partly critical by the translator.]

Herbart considers an outside influence upon the person under age necessary in order that he may grow mentally in the same [continuous] manner as he does physically, because he (Herbart) maintains, as a principle of his psychology, that there are by no means fixed, predetermined capacities in the human soul, similar to those in plants and animal bodies; that man— only as far as his body is concerned-brings his future form with his germ into the world; that the human soul on the contrary, resembles rather a machine entirely constructed out of perceptions. The translator adds in a note:

["This should read: That the human mind may be made to resemble an organism, but under different circumstances with very different degrees of perfection, and that this mental organism or system is created by the soul out of the material furnished to the senses. Herbart holds that the soul is active, not passive, in forming perceptions out of the momentary sensations of color, sound and the like, that these elementary sensations are reactions of the soul, corresponding to outside influences; that we know nothing of soul, self, or faculties, save what we have learned by induction from the works of the human mind; that other faculties-being likewise the result of work and comparison-may be produced, purified, and strengthened, but in no other manner than by induction, and that the faculties both as regards their separate functions and their joint operation, will approach the closer to the perfection of a living organism, or of the system of mathematics, or of a machine, the more thoroughly we use our energies in the removal of definitely given difficulties and the solution of definitely given problems, first and before such application is followed up by broad and exhaustive comparison with other objects operated upon by the same energies of the soul; whereas a psychological theory which rests satisfied with a number of disconnected faculties for an ultimate basis, to the neglect of their unity in application, and without inquiring into the cause of their unity in the soul, is apt to unfit man for the business of life, and at best to degrade him to the rank of a laborer, whose sense of freedom, and natural enthusiasm for unity in the different departments of society is reduced to smoking embers."]

Pedagogics is, according to Herbart, closely connected with ethics and psychology; it really depends upon both. He commences by showing that pedagogics depend upon ethics, and proves [indirectly] that those opinions are erroneous which do not let the process of education begin and continue as well as terminate in the individual subject, but which place the pupil in such a relation to certain ideal objects (happiness, usefulness, family, State, humanity, God) that the future actions of the individual are defined by such objects as the end and aim of educat on. This proceeding has to be reversed, and it must be maintained that the individual person is and remains the exclusive and true centre for the purposes of education.

Hegel and Herbart agree that the chief end of education is to raise the individual to fixed habits of subordinating all to moral activity; neither of them proposes to attain that end by the explanation of moral texts; the spirit of their systems is evidently in emphasizing correct habits of methodical observation and work, which, at the age of mature reflection, may be employed in the culture of our moral self, directly and systematically; both undertake to educate by means of instruction, and to develop the moral judgment of the individual while it is assisted in taking possession of the indispensable results

and conditions of civilization. They further agree that the life of the individual owes fruitfulness and scope to society, while unity and harmony of the departments of society rest upon the moral strength of the individuals, and furthermore that the perpetuity of life, whether of society or of the individual, depends upon the "idea," if we understand by the term "idea" the corsciousness of the necessary conditions of such perpetuity. We may therefore conclude that if Hegel had elaborated pedagogics himself, the speculative problem would have been for him as it was for Herbart, how to realize the "idea" within the province of education. Now, though Hegel subordinates everything to one absolute idea, while Herbart co-ordinates his five ideas, viz.: Freedom, Perfection, Right, Equity, and Benevolence, it is nevertheless not difficult to harmonize the latter five with the one absolute idea, for practical purposes. For, whereas complementary opposites are equally necesary to life, and the knowledge thereof to responsibility, non-interference between such co-ordinate powers constitutes the basis of rights; compensation in proportion to the number of complementary opposites united in any purpose and multiplied by the number of actual repetitions, constitutes equity of reward and punishments; both, Rights and Equity limited to the domain of intention and spiritual intercourse, i. e., where the assistance of physical organs and forces is precluded, constitutes Benevolence, the principle of morality in contradistinction from those applications of Rights and Equity which may be enforced; the agreement between intention and action, both being governed as stated above, constitutes individual Freedom. All subordination is governed by the relative term Perfection. Setting aside differences of quantity, any one of the complementary opposites is imperfect as compared with their unity; the richer unity is perfect in comparison with the object embodying a less number of complementary opposites. But whatsoever severs that which is jointly necessary for life, liberty and happiness, actually and with the intention of keeping it severed, is physically bad, legally wrong, spiritually untrue, and morally sinful.

The complete work of education may be divided into discipline (Regierung), instruction (Unterricht), and training (Zucht). The child comes into the world without ability to concentrate the action of his organs upon one object, to the exclusion of the rest; his individual will is the result of practice; this gradual result is interrupted by all manner of disordered inclination; to hold the latter within proper bounds, is the office of discipline. What experience and society teach, outside of school, is too one-sided and desultory; it is disconnected and fragmentary; a systematic activity must supervene which is able to complement, to digest and to unite the material collected as a mere aggregate. This methodical business, complementary of experience and society, is instruction. The term training (Ziehen, duco, educo, education) contains allusion to that which is not yet existing [the harmony of opposites controlling insubordinate tendencies] something hoped for [the strength of the complementary opposite, now being weak in the individual] which exists only as purpose, and toward which the pupil has to be led; this action, devoted more especially to the culture of the will, but also, in part, to knowledge and understanding, is designated by "training."

1. It is the office of discipline to keep order, and to subject the naturally predominant and unruly inclinations of the individual. Such subjection has to be effected by a power strong enough, and acting so frequently as to be completely successful, before indications of a genuine will (persisting in wrong] are exhibited by the child. Measures within the reach of discipline are: (a) to keep the pupil so busy that he can find no time for mischief; (b) detective

supervision which, however, is useful only during the first years of life, and during periods of special danger; (c) commanding and forbidding, with respect to which great caution has to be exercised, lest discipline be rather weakened by it; (d) threats and punishments, which must be superseded by respect and love, wherever possible. Discipline [assisted by physical means] has, at all events, to cease long before training ceases, and should, as soon as possible, be relieved by the latter. The [apparently] limiting power of discipline [resembling the restraint of prison] cannot be discontinued sɔ long as great temptations are offered to tho pupil by his surroundings.

2. Instruction ought to be and must be educative; the aim of instruction should not be solely, or even predominantly, the amount of knowledge, nor should it be the acquisition of merely technical skill, but culture of the Personality [executivo ability for ethical ideas]; this most essential part of education should be rooted and grounded. To be more definite, instruction is methodical production and culture of representations of objects [as definitely constructed applications of the categories and ethical ideas], such representations being the true germs from which to develop the unity of all faculties until said elementary unities of object and subject seem to assimilate subordinate facts with spontaneous rapidity, embracing the complementary opposites in such an exhaustive manner that executive ability and energy for action are the direct resuit, as well as tact or [more generally] the quick decision as to the ethicoaesthetical value of a given fact.

3. The term [dialectic]training embraces all direct action upon the disposition of the pup'l which is prompted by the intent on to purify and supplement his energies, and to lead him towards objective liberty. Dialectic training has to deal [with the limitations of the person fixed by way of inheritance or association] or, in other words, it has to deal with the character of man. Character manifests itself by individual preferences [and is two-fold, either objective or subjective. The objective portion or factor of character consists of] the individual's particular construction of inclination, indicated by the relative proportion or percentage of action; the subjective factor of character consists in the enjoyment of complementary opposites criticising the individual inclinations. The historical conception of both our objective and subjective character Silz centre of geometrical locus) constitutes the totality of actual energy, and this is producel continuously by means of complementary natural desires into acts of responsibility. The difference of the causes wherewith persons identify themselves, defines such or another character. It is, nevertheless, the internal act, as described, whether purely internal or whether conceived as possibly external, which produces balanced energy out of the material of desires [in every species of character].

Distinct measures of dialectical training [to be carried into effect by the teacher in separate lessons] are required, on account of faults inherent in all schooling [more particularly in schooling of a higher order, where the culture of directive energy by means of composition is not made the leading am, and the necessary faults referred to arise from the fact that systematic excellence in the plan of studies, together with the best possible standard in the separate lessons, cannot alone, and without aid from systematic use of know'elge in lessons on composition, overcome the discrepancy between the claims of practical Life and the one-sided culture of theoretical or abstract judgment, which results from any division of labor by means of teachers, subject-matter, time and methods, without adequate an 1 scientific correction].

[The above extracts are not a fair exhibit of Herbart's educational views, which cannot be presented in isolated passages. Ed. of A. J. E.]