The Constitution As Political Structure
Oxford University Press, 1995 M01 5 - 240 páginas
Over the last forty years modern constitutional scholarship has concentrated on an analysis of rights, while principles of constitutional law concerning the structure of government have been largely downplayed. The irony of this interpretive emphasis is that the body of the Constitution contains relatively little dealing directly with rights. Rather, it is primarily a blueprint for the establishment of a complex form of federal-democratic structure. This work emphasizes the central role served by the structural portions of the Constitution. Redish argues that these structural values were designed to provide the framework in which our rights-based system may flourish, and that judicial abandonment of these structural values threatens the very foundations of American political theory.
Comentarios de la gente - Escribir un comentario
No encontramos ningún comentario en los lugares habituales.
2 Federalism the Constitution and American Political Theory
3 The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism
4 Pragmatic Formalism and Separation of Powers
5 Legislative Delegation Pragmatic Formalism and the Values of Democracy
Liberalism Constitutional Theory and Political Structure
Table of Cases
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
action American political theory analysis argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority basis Choper commerce power common law concept Congress congressional Constitution's text constitutional text decisions democratic discussion in chapter discussion infra discussion supra dormant Commerce Clause dual federalism effectively enact enforcement enumerated powers exclusive executive branch executive power exercise federal courts federal government federal power federal system Federalist footnote omitted Framers function goals governmental imposed inherent interpretation invalidation issues judicial review judiciary jurisdiction Justice Korematsu League of Cities legislative power limited Madison majoritarian Martin H ment Montesquieu National League Necessary-and-Proper Clause nondelegation doctrine normative originalist policy choices political commitment principle power to regulate pragmatic formalism pragmatic formalist president Privileges-and-Immunities Clause Professor prohibition protection reason Redish regulate interstate commerce rejected representative require role separation of powers separation-of-powers statute substantial supra note Supremacy Clause Supreme Court t]he Tenth Amendment tion tional tive tutional tyranny U.S. Const undermines United voters Wickard
Página 50 - We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.
Página 68 - In imposing taxes for state purposes they are not doing what congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states.
Página 208 - The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Página 68 - They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves.
Página 51 - Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.
Página 179 - The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other.
Página 70 - Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
Página 106 - If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this : you must first enable the government to control the governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
Beyond the Republic: Meeting the Global Challenges to Constitutionalism
Charles J. G. Sampford,Tom Round
Sin vista previa disponible - 2001
Todos los resultados de la Búsqueda de libros »
Fundamental Rights and Democratic Governance: Essays in Caribbean Jurisprudence
Simeon C. R. McIntosh
Vista previa limitada - 2005