only by his individual productions, and whose attributes, therefore, cannot be extended by analogy. But it is by no means clear that it is, as Hume pronounces, an established maxim, that when any cause is known only by its particular effects, it is impossible to infer any new effects from that cause;-it being understood that new does not here mean superior or intrinsically different, but strictly a repetition of the same or like or inferior effects produced by an exertion of a similar energy in a different period of space or time. Nor is it at all clear that attributes which may not be extended by analogy, cannot be illustrated and explained by it.

A fundamental principle of human nature is assumed throughout, as the basis of reasoning on uniformity of causation. On this supposition, such an opinion as the above can only be plausibly maintained by confounding together different kinds of causes-between which, nevertheless, an important distinction is felt, and is recognised to exist. Experience, and the customary transition in our minds from one object to another, are not always so absolutely wanted, as is stated by Hume, in order to create the sense of that supposed dependence by which we feel that if the first had not been, the second would not have existed. There are many cases, in which the observation of a particular event following upon another, although the observation were made in a single instance only, might yet be so novel and so isolated from all co-operating circumstances, that their conjunction would raise, and justly raise, the idea of a necessary connexion, as absolutely as if their relation had been the subject of a hundred experiments.

So far from there being any one general rule or instinctive principle on this subject, it is one of the main offices of experience and reason to teach us the necessity of different degrees of caution according to circumstances; and to protect us against the great tendency of our nature towards forming inconsiderate associations. Our first impression, on any change taking place in the appearances of things around us, is to look out for what two objects stand in such a position to each other, as to account for this change, under the agency of causation. When these are ascertained, all further sentiment or reasoning must depend upon the nature of the preceding object, which we consider as having been the cause. Take the supposition (as is assumed in the instance of the operations of the Deity) that we have no key to his nature but the particular effects. In case the effect were to lead us back to a mere elemental combination of substances, which had exploded, whether in the clouds

or in a chemist's shop, we should certainly expect, in the cause thus ascertained, no repetition of the explosion from these identical materials. The energy, which depended on the combination, would perish with it. But suppose that, in tracing the particular effect up to its cause, we observed the exercise of power, and contrivance in the adaptation of means towards the accomplishment of an end-surely an entirely distinct consideration immediately and irrepressibly arises in our minds. It is not of the nature of moral power, intelligence, and goodness, to exhaust itself in a single effort. The enquiry we could not but instantly undertake, would be the degree to which these attributes were invested and exemplified in the case submitted to our observation. As far as we found from the proof of the particular effect, that this degree extended, we should be satisfied, that so far at least, we had discovered a source whence a similar energy, on suitable occasions, might issue forth. If it be allowed (and thus much both Hume and our author seem to allow) that the particular effects visible in the laws of nature, prove the existence of a first cause, and the possession of certain attributes in proportion, at least, to the extent that they have been exercised;-again, if it be further agreed (and otherwise all human discussion on the subject is beating the air) that the existence and the attributes here spoken of, are meant to convey such ideas as, being derived from our own nature and experience, the human understanding can comprehend ;-it seems to follow on these admissions, that, in the same way as we should infer from a single elaborate specimen of human mechanism, that its author could pull to pieces, mend, or reconstruct his own workmanship, or as a stranger who might hear Cicero for the first time in the Forum, would have concluded. that he could speak as well on other occasions-so from the particular effects manifested in the laws of nature, we must infer a similarly existing and enduring power on the part of their great Author.

Nor is the inference confined to the conclusion, that such a power is competent merely to the reproduction of the self same acts. It also comprises the possible performance of similar acts; that is, acts of the same description, and implying only an equal degree of power. We question whether any one can be found, whose understanding is so framed, that, after having once admitted, from the evidence of the design manifested in the laws of nature, that a superior Being must have been their author and designer, he should, on calmly reconsidering the whole case, feel bound to deny Him the similar or less degree of energy necessary for the suspending or modifying those laws.

When, by reasoning from visible effects to causes, we have once ascertained the nature and efficiency of the cause in question, it will not be necessary, in case we come to reverse the process, and to deduce other possible consequences from the cause, whose existence is thus supposed to have been established, that these consequences should be, in point of fact, called into operation. Some there are which must result; others which only may. There can be no ground for conjecturing that the power of the Creator over his own laws has been lost or become obsolete because it may have been kept latent-that is, may have been employed in maintaining them, and not in altering them for

ages.

The science of geology is very properly referred to, for the striking example which it offers of the successful application of the hypothesis of uniform causation properly understood. Present phenomena, and their causes, have been most skilfully combined and used, so as to furnish us with the story of a period, which has itself transmitted for our information, nothing but mere strata and deposits. But the late discoveries in geology, lead irresistibly to another observation, which does not seem to have occurred to our author. It is one, however, of still greater importance; for it seems to us to be fatal to the theory which we have presumed to call a misconception of the uniformity of causation, as signifying an unalterable sequence of causes and effects. Those who have read neither Cuvier nor Lyell, are yet aware that the human race did not exist from all eternity. Certain strata have been identified with the period of man's first appearance. We cannot do better than quote from Dr Prichard's excellent book, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind, his comment and application of this fact. It is well known that all the strata of which our continents ' are composed, were once a part of the ocean's bed. There is 6 no land in existence that was not formed beneath the surface of the sea, or that has not risen from beneath the water. Man' kind had a beginning; since we can now look back to the period 'when the surface on which they live began to exist. We have ' only to go back in imagination to that age; to represent to ' ourselves that at a certain time there existed nothing in this globe but unformed elements; and that, in the next period, 'there had begun to breathe, and move, in a particular spot, a 'human creature; and we shall already have admitted, perhaps, the most astonishing miracle recorded in the whole compass ' of the sacred writings. After contemplating this phenomena, "we shall find no difficulty in allowing, that events which would now be so extraordinary, that they might be termed almost

'incredible-our confidence in the continuance of the present order of things having been established by the uniform experience of so many ages-would at one time have given no just 'cause for wonder or scepticism. In the first ages of the world, events were conducted by operative causes of a different kind 'from those which are now in action; and there is nothing contrary to common sense, or to probability, in the supposition, that this sort of agency continued to operate from time 'to time, as long as it was required—that is, until the physical and moral constitution of things now existing was completed, and the design of Providence attained.'-(Vol. ii. p. 594.)

No greater changes can be well imagined in the ordinary sequence of cause and effect, such as constituted the laws of nature, as they had been previously established, than took place on the day when man was, for the first time, seen among the creatures of the earth.

We should have thought the conduct of a person sufficiently unreasonable, had we fallen in with any one who believed in a Creator generally, and yet either denied that he had the power to modify the rules originally given to his creation, or maintained that man, in case any such modification of physical events should ever take place, was left so miserably unprovided, that he had not faculties and means for discovering the fact. Nevertheless, one, if not both, of these dilemmas, seems to be the necessary consequence of the mode of argument adopted by the author of this essay. But the discovery to which we have alluded, imposes a still further degree of unreasonableness on the supporters of the uniformity of causation in its ill-extended sense and application. The circumstances of the remarkable evidence thus wonderfully brought to light, seem to leave the recusants only this alternative:-Either out of compliment to a refinement of metaphysical ingenuity, they must, in spite of the concurrent testimony of philosophers, disbelieve the fact that the prior state of nature was broken in upon to make room for man; or, in case an interruption, that is, a miracle, be admitted to have taken place in this instance, they must take for granted (and this without any satisfactory distinction being suggested) that it cannot be repeated, or, if repeated, must not be believed.

The only point with which we have here meddled, is the one-whether man with his present faculties, and in his present state, has competent jurisdiction to entertain the question of miracles at all. Our author has done little more than recast Hume's objections in a plainer form. Hume flattered himself (rather prematurely, we think) on having discovered an argu

ment which, with the wise and learned, was to be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion; and, consequently, was to be useful as long as the world endured. The argument is far from satisfying us, either in its old form, or in its new one, that miracles are in themselves impossible; or, being possible, are yet incapable of proof. Nothing but the sense of an argumentative compulsion, from which there was no escape, ought to be allowed, either in this, or in any other case, to debar the human understanding from going into the freest enquiry, by thus putting in a general demurrer. It is quite another question, what ought to be the nature of the evidence, to render miracles at all probable; and what may be the accompanying conditions necessary to support a claim, which, by its very nature, is subject to the greatest difficulties, and on which the boundless fraud and folly of mankind have accumulated the greatest possible quantity of suspicion.

Art. VII.—Anti-Draco; or, Reasons for abolishing the Punishment of Death in Cases of Forgery. By a Barrister. 8vo. London : 1830.

IT

is understood that the manuscripts of Sir Samuel Romilly contain matter of a very high interest to the science of jurisprudence. They are said to comprise his speculations upon all the most important questions which have of late agitated men's minds connected with this subject. He had directed his attention to the amendment of the law, especially the criminal law, from a very early period; and had perceived the expediency of some reforms, and the necessity of others, long before it ever entered into the imaginations of most other men that any juridical thing could be different from what it is, or that any thing could be better than the provisions of the English law in all its branches. Of the various improvements which he proposed, and which would all have been thought wild imaginations of a visionary speculator had they been made public at the time, it is remarkable that a large proportion are now either the law of the land, or almost certain of speedily becoming so. From hence we might draw a very favourable inference touching the rest which are still resisted, and predict their soon being accepted, if we were made acquainted with their nature and purport.

Can any one doubt that it would be of the greatest benefit to the community to have access to these important manuscripts, were it for no other reason than to give the proposed reforms of the law the advantage of such high authority in their favour?