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stocks, as here, is declared in the leading case of Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, defining the relative rights and duties of the broker and customer. It is there laid down that in advancing the money by the broker to complete the purchase of stock, the relation of debtor and creditor is created, and that thereupon the broker becomes a pledgee of the stock for the money advanced in its purchase; that the contract between the parties is in spirit and effect, if not technically and in form, a contract of pledge. And it was there held that for selling the pledge without authority the measure of damages would be the difference between the amount for which the stock was sold and its highest market value down to the time of trial. This rule of damages was modified in the subsequent case of Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211. It was there said: "Assuming that the sale was in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, what was the extent of the injury inflicted upon him? * *If upon becoming informed of the sale, he desired further to prosecute the adventure, and take the chances of a future market, he had the right to disaffirm the sale, and require the defendants to replace the stock. If they failed to refuse to do this, his remedy was to do it himself, and charge them with the loss reasonably sustained in doing so.

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The advance in the market price of the stock from the time of the sale up to a reasonable time to replace it, after the plaintiff received notice of the sale, would afford a complete indemnity. *

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If the broker has vioiated his contract, or disposed of the stock without authority, the customer is entitled to recover such damages as would naturally be sustaiped in restoring himself to the position of which he has been deprived. He certainly has no right to be placed in a better position than he would be in if the wrong had not been done." The same rule was held in Gruman v. Smith, 81 N. Y. 26. In Colt v. Owens, 90 id. 368, the defendants purchased and agreed to carry certain shares of stock for the plaintiff until instructed by him to sell, or for a period of six months. Defendants sold the stock without authority, and notified the plaintiff. In an action by the plaintiff the testimony showed that for thirty days after the sale the stock could have been purchased in the market for the price at which it was sold, or a less sum, and the court below held that only nominal damages could be recovered, and directed a verdict accordingly. The judgment was affirmed. In Sturges v. Keith, 57 Ill. 452, it was held that in an action for the conversion of personal property, the proper measure of damages is the market value of the property at the time of the conversion, and the court recognized no distinction when the property converted was stocks. In Smith v. Dunlap, 12 Ill. 184, it was held that the measure of damages in the case of a breach of contract for the sale of a chattel is the cash value of the article at the time it should have been delivered. And it was said: "We have no hesitation in holding the rule applicable to contracts for the sale or delivery of personal property, without regard to the circumstance whether the price has been paid or not. If unpaid, the purchaser recovers the difference between the price he agreed to pay and what the commodity was worth when it should have been delivered; if paid, he is entitled to recover the market value of the article when the delivery ought to have been made, and interest in the way of compensation for the delay." He may recover the market value of the article, and not the purchaseprice paid for the article; contrary to what is asserted in the present case to be the rule, that where on party to a contract refuses to complete it, the other party, being without fault, may sue for and recover back any money paid upon the contract. Appellee's real grievance is the not carrying the stock until he should pay for it or order it to be sold; that instead of so carrying

it, appellants sold it without his authority; that there has been a disposal of the stock without authority-a conversion of it. Suppose the stock had been carried as appellee claims it should have been, he would then have had his stock when he had paid for it, and nothing more. In not having the stock, the loss which he suffers is the value of the stock, and nothing more. All that he can be justly entitled to have is the stock. And he is not in justice entitled to be placed in a better position than if he had the stock. The injury sustained is the being deprived of the stock, and the compensation which the law gives for the deprivation of property is the value of the property, and never the price which the owner had paid for the property, which latter was the rule of recovery laid down in this case. Ill. Sup. Ct., Nov. 13, 1886. Brewster v. Fan Liew. Opinion by Sheldon, J.

WATER AND WATERCOURSE-DIVERSION-PUMPING WATER FROM DAM.-A. owned a paper mill operated by water power, the supply of water being obtained the backwater of the dam, several hundred yards befrom a dam, the breast of which was on the land of A.; low its head, was crossed by a bridge owned and used by B. railroad company. B., in order to supply its necessity for water, inserted an iron pipe in the slack water near its bridge, and erected an engine on its bank and pumped out water which it conducted to its tanks a mile distant; the result was a serious diminution of the supply of water to the mill of A. Held, that A. might recover damages from B. The princi ple established by a long line of decisions is that the upper riparian owner has the right to the use of the stream on his land for any legal purpose, provided he returns it to its channel uncorrupted and without any essential diminution; that in all such cases the size and capacity of the stream is to be considered; and that any interruption of or interference with the rights of the lower riparian owner is an injury for which an action will lie, unless too trifling for the law to notice. Wheatley v. Christman, 24 Penn. St. 298. The size and capacity of the stream has always an important bearing upon questions of this nature. Every riparian owner has the right to use the water of the stream passing over his land for ordinary domestic purposes, and if the stream be so small that his cattle drink it all up, while it may be a loss to the lower riparian owner, it is damnum absque injuria. But where the upper riparian owner diverts or uses the water, not for ordinary domestic purposes, such as are inseparable to and necessary on the use of the land, but for manufacturing or other purposes having no necessary relation to his use of his land, the case is different. In Wheatley v. Christman, supra, it was held that "a proprietor of land over which a stream of water runs has, as against a lower proprietor, the use only of so much of the stream as will not materially diminish its quantity. His right is not to be measured by the reasonable demands of his business." In that case the allegation was that the stream had been diverted by one riparian owner in order to work his lead mine "to such an extent as to sensibly diminish the supply to the lower owner; and that such use was necessary in order to enable him to carry on his business." It was said by this court: "The proposition of the defendant was that he had a legal right to use a reasonable quantity of,the water for the purposes of his business. The court below replied that his business might reasonably require more than he could take consistently with the rights of the plaintiff. We cannot see how or on what principle the correctness of this can be impugued. The necessities of one man's business cannot be the standard of another's rights in a thing which belongs to both. * ** The defendant had a right to such use as he could make of the water without materially diminishing it in quantity. *** If he

needed more he was bound to buy it. However laudable his enterprise may be, he cannot carry it on at the expense of his neighbor. One who desires to work a lead mine may require land and money as well as water, but he cannot have either unless he first makes it his own." Penn. Sup. Ct., April 19, 1886. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller. Opinion by Paxson, J.

WILL-RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE.-A devise of land by a husband to his wife, so long as she remains his widow, is not upon a condition in restraint of marriage. In 4 Kent Comm. 126, Chancellor Kent defines the distinction between words of limitation and words of condition, as follows: "Words of limitation mark the period which is to determine the estate, but words of condition render the estate liable to be defeated in the intermediate time, if the event expressed in the condition arises before the determination of the estate, or completion of the period described by the limitation. The one specifies the utmost time of continuance, and the other marks some event, which if it takes place in the course of that time, will defeat the estate." This statement, of itself, of the distinction between words of limitation and words of condition, settles the point of contention under consideration adversely to the views and argument of appellant's counsel in the case now before us. The words "so long as she remains my widow," are, in the strictest sense, words of limitation, and not of condition. Clearly and unequivocally, these words specify the widowhood of appellant as the utmost time of continance of the estate devised to her, and they do not mark or indicate any event the occurrence of which in the intermediate time will defeat such estate. The terms of the testator's devise to his wife, the appellant, are not distinguishable, in legal effect, from those of the first devise copied in the opinion of the court in Harmon v. Brown, 58 Ind. 207, as follows: "First, I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Penina, during her widowhood, all my real and personal estate, to be held, and freely possessed and enjoyed, during her widowhood." There, as here, the testator's widow terminated her widowhood by her subsequent marriage, and there, as here, the question was presented for our decision whether the words "during her widowhood (which do not differ in meaning from the words "so long as she remains my widow") were words of limitation or words of condition. In the case cited, it was held, upon full consideration, that the words "during her widowhood" were words of limitatiou, and not of condition, within the meaning of section 2567, supra. The court there said: "A man may devise property to his widow during her widowhood. He is not obliged to devise to her a larger estate, as for life or in fee, in order to accomplish that purpose. But if he desires to devise her a larger estate, as for life or in fee, and so expresses himself in his will, but makes it dependent upon the condition that she should not marry, the condition will be regarded as in terrorem, aud void. Such condition will not cut down an estate to a period less than that to which it is limited." To the same effect, substantially, are the following more recent cases: Coon v. Bean, 69 Ind. 474; Stilwell v. Knapper, id. 558; Brown v. Harmon, 73id. 412; Tate v. McLain, 74 id. 493; O'Harrow v. Whitney, 85 id. 140; Hibbits v. Jack, 97 id. 570, and authorities cited. Ind. Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1886. Summit v. Yount. Opinion by Howk, J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

JUSTICES' Courts.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The justices' courts of this State are organized upon a plan that effectually excludes qualified men. There

are four justices in each town to compete for and divide the trifling fees. We see the effect. Men are set to expound law and administer justice who comprehend neither. Their sincerity emphasizes the absurdity of the system. A suit in one of the higher courts receives the careful study of a judge who is a profound lawyer. A justice of the peace-without legal training-very likely a mau who has failed in all elseconfidently sits in judgment upon a case involving equal difficulties. The evil has long been admitted, why then should the remedy be delayed?

This is an inviting field for a competent legislator, and the one who shall devise a good system of inferior local courts, and procure its establishment by law, will render valuable service. The end to be sought is a competent judiciary, and this without unnecessary change in the existing and familiar practice.

It is not a difficult work. The District Courts of the city of New York afford the model. Some changes should be made in applying that system to the other counties, except perhaps Kings. The volume of business in New York justifies an establishment which, by reason of its expense, would be unsuitable for other parts of the State. A slight modification of the New York system, in its application to other counties, will afford about all of its advantages with much less expense.

To outline the plan: Divide each county into from three to six districts. Provide a county justice for the county, who should be a lawyer, and a district justice for each district. A district justice should attend daily at the district court-room, and have the jurisdiction that justices of the peace now have in towns and cities. When an issue of fact is joined, if both parties, or a defendant who is under arrest, demand an immediate trial, let it be had before the district justice. In other cases an issue of fact should be entered on a trial term calendar, and there remain until tried. The county justice should hold a trial term in each district about once a month. In case of his absence or inability a district justice should preside. The salary of the county justice should be sufficient to command the services of a competent man. Those of the district justices could be much smaller, but could be graded to the population and business of the districts. A district justice, in most districts, would really be the clerk of the court, with some judicial duties. Warrants of attachment, orders of arrest, and similar matters, could be attended to by the district justice or county justice. The fees now allowed to justices of the peace should be collected and paid to the county treasurer. Such a system would be efficient, convenient, and probably self-supporting. Details can be added and improvements made from time to time. This is a plan, perhaps not the best. If others are suggested, select the best, or from all construct a better. L. B. C. CATSKILL, N. Y., Jan. 15, 1887.

FRIENDLY WITH THE JUDGE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: This morning on reading in the LAW JOURNAL, the sentence quoted from Governor Hill's admirable address, recently delivered before the Bar Association, of the danger our judges are supposed to encounter by admitting suitors and lawyers to their close friendship, and your comments thereon, I was reminded of an instance in point which seems to favor your view of the case. The late Judge Abram B. Olin, as is well known, was for many years a very prominent lawyer in this city. His brother, the late Job Olin was, at the time spoken of, recorder of this city, and many causes of more or less importance were tried in the Recorder's Court. It occurred to a defendant in one of such cases, that it

might be a politic move to retain, not only an intimate friend, but also the brother of the recorder. So he chose the intimate friend of the recorder for his attorney, and to make things doubly sure, secured "brother Abe" as counsel. Trial came on. Intimate friend moved to dismiss complaint on certain grounds. At length the recorder began to shake his head, and in an instant "brother Abe" was on his feet and made one of his most sarcastic and powerful arguments in aid of intimate friend. Recorder Job, with a patience that would have been creditable to the much afflicted man from whom he took his name, listened anxiously to the end, and then shook his head more vigorously than before, and denied the motion. Intimate friend looked glum, and brother Abe gave one of those indignant snorts, followed by a prolonged growl, that the members of our bar so well remember. Job Olin was a perfectly honorable man, but not a great lawyer; and he was too fearful of showing any bias toward a friend or brother; and it was plain to the legal mind that the motion ought to have been granted. The trial proceeded. Several other motions were made, and earnestly argued by intimate friend and brother Abe, and promptly denied by Recorder Job. The late Job Pierson was the opposing counsel, and he took in the situation at once, and sat silent, but with that peculiar twinkle in his expressive eye, so habitual with him when matters were proceeding to his entire satisfaction. Presently another motion was made, promptly followed by a ruling against intimate friend and brother Abe. This was too much. Abe, as everybody called him, gave one of his fiercest and most prolonged growls, then seized his hat and made for the door, muttering audibly: "He wants to stand so'dd straight he leans 'tother way!"

The lawyers, the recorder, and the parties litigant, connected with this anecdote, have all passed from earth, but if living, there is not one that would not have enjoyed it as he did at the time it occurred. Yours truly, FRANK J. PARMENTER.

TROY, Jan. 29, 1886.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

HARE ON CONTRACTS.

It is a novelty, if not a luxury, to get a treatise on Contracts in a single volume. This work is by J. I. Clark Hare, favorably known to the profession as one of the editors of Smith's Leading Cases. It originated in lectures delivered by the author in the law school of the University of Pennsylvania, and his main object is to trace the doctrine of consideration, and show how large a part it has in the theory of contracts at common law." Comparison with the civil law is instituted, and much attentian is given to the doctrine of sales. The division of the work is as follows: The Growth of Jurisprudence, The Formulated ligation, Justinian's Legislation, Development of Ob

at Roman The Consensual Contracts, Modern Application of the Roman Law, Assumpsit, Trespass on the Case, Roman and Common Law Contrasted, Consideration, Implied Promises, Antecedent Consideration, Moral Obligation, Ratification and Waiver, Unilateral Contracts, Bilateral Contracts, Mutuality, Sale of Specific Goods, Sale by Description, Sale by Sample, Warranty, Remedies of the Vendee, Performance, Dependent and Independent Covenants and Promises, Entire and Divisible Contracts, Impossibility. This is an interesting scheme, but it is evident that the work is designed and fitted for scholars and historians of the law rather than for practitioners. This is the only opinion that we can

confidently express from a necessarily cursory examination, but from such an examination and our acquaintance with the author's previous work, we are led to suppose that it will prove a valuable adjunct. We are sorry, but not surprised, to see that the learned writer does not think much of codes, and is so blind a worshipper of the common law as to write: "Codification is liable to err by erecting principles into rules." We are so unlearned as to have believed that law is founded on principles, and is a rule of action. But there is no accounting for what a "learned professor" can bring himself to think he believes. The book is published by Little, Brown & Co. of Bos

ton.

BLISS ON CODE PLEADING.

The second edition of this work, by Judge Bliss, of Missouri, appears some nine years after the first. The work essays to treat of the subject as applicable to the practice of the twenty-three States and Territories, and as these are substantially copied from the New York Code, there is no difficulty in its comprehensiveness. We esteem the work as most admirable; certainly there is nothing better of the kind, probably nothing nearly so good. It should be put in the hands of every student of the law in these States and adopted in our law schools as the latest, most methodical and best arranged of all of this class of treatises. Published by F. H. Thomas Co., St. Louis.

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

ROOMS OF STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
CAPITOL, ALBANY, N. Y.,
January 27, 1887.

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association, held at the office of Moak & Buchanan, in the city of Albany, January 17, 1887, the recording secretary was, by resolution, requested to publish the following notice in the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL:

"Members of the New York State Bar Association having papers to serve in the city of Albany, or business in the Executive Chamber, or any of the different departments in the Capitol, with the clerk of the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, or any ex parte business in any of the courts of Albany, will have it promptly attended to without any charge by addressing the said secretary." 'L. B. PROCTOR, Recording Secretary, Capitol, Albany, N. Y.

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Judgment affirmed, with costs-Geo. Lahr, respondent, v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., appellant; Wagner v. Same; Michael Coffee, administrator, respondent, v. N. Y., B. & P. R. Co., appellant; Nicholas Ruch, administrator, respondent, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellant; Patrick Leary, an infant, appellant, v. D. & H. C. Co., respondents.- -Order affirmed, with costs-People ex rel. Panama R. Co., appellants, v. Commissioner of Taxes of New York, respondents; In re Will of Mary McPherson, etc.-Judgment of General Term and decree of surrogate reversed and new hearing ordered before the surrogate, without costs-In re Accounting of David Hawley, testamen

tary guardian of Singer.- -National Park Bank of New York, respondent, v. James D. Whitmore et al., appellaut; In re Estate of Nathaniel Tilman, deceased.

- Appeals dismissed with costs-Margaret Kearney, administratrix, respondent, v. Geo. H. Thompson et al., appellants. Judgmeut affirmed and judgment absolute ordered for defendants on the stipulation, with costs-Susan Raynor et al., administrators, appellants, v. Samuel S. Carman et al., respondents.Judgment affirmed, without costs-Samuel Weeks et al., appellants, v. Jacob Weeks, respondent, and Geo. W. Weeks et al., appellants.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-John B. Kunz, appellant, v. City of Troy, respondent.-Motion for reargument denied, with costs-Holcomb v. Munson. The order of reversal states merely that it was made on questions of law. It does not state that the court has considered the questions of fact, or exercised the discretion which the statute confers upon it. We have decided that this court will not review an order of reversal in such a case, unless it shows that the court has exercised its discretionary powers. See People v. Boas, 92 N. Y. 560-564; Same v. Couroy, 97 id. 62-72; Harriss v. Burdett, 73 id. 136. Although the court in the present case put its decision upon a question of law, we cannot say it would not have reached the same result, had it exercised its discretion and entertained a different opinion on the question of law. The prisoner was entitled to a review of the facts, and the exercise of the discretionary power of the court, which he might lose if the case should be disposed of solely on a question of law. The case should therefore be remitted to the General Term to consider the questions of fact and exercise its discretion-People, appellants, v. Henry K. Stevens, respondent.

NOTES.

The last case tried in the United States District Court on Saturday turned the court-room into a circus during its trial, and was almost too much for the risibilities of the judge himself. The defendant was William Bradley, a middle-aged negro, who was charged with selling liquor to the Indians on the Erie county reservation. Bradley had not the money to employ counsel, and at his own request Judge Coxe allowed him to conduct his own case, which he did in a manner at once so decidedly original and so ludicrously funny that the court was unable to prevent the uproar incident upon his examination of witnesses. He would explode a question with startling suddenness, and follow it up with a rattling fire of comment upon the Indian witness and asides to the spectators. One big brave who was in the chair had testified that the sale occurred in the morning near a bridge, and named several witnesses who were present, when Bradley popped up like a Jack-in-the-box, and talking so rapidly as to almost run the words together, began: "I say, Injun, how yo' know 'twas mornin'? By de sun? Yo' tell time by de sun? No? Den how yo' know 'twas mornin'? Yo' do'no' nuthin 'bout de time." So rapid were his questions that the poor brave could only reply in monosyllables, and these the examiner snatched almost from his mouth and incorporated with the next question. In this way he completly broke down two or three witnesses. Each new victory was treated with a howl of delight from the crowd in the room. Throughout the examination he stood with his shoulders slightly rounded in, his head thrust forward and cocked slightly to one side, and rolled up his eyes sideways at the witness. When the testimony was closed, and he was told by the court to address the jury, he walked over, and leaning upon

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the rail of the jury-box, thrust his head forward, and queried in a stage whisper, "I say, gemmen de jury, wha'd yo' tink er my case?" Then he was informed that that was not the proper way to do, and be began in the regular way. His strongest and most conclusive argument was: Gemmen de jury, I runs a milk route. I got no time ter be foolin' roun' Injuns. I'm round tendin' ter my own bus'ness early in de mornin' 'fore the Injun is up, an' 'fore deres any stores open; an', gemmen de jury, I didn't sell 'em no whiskey." As one of the witnesses was leaving the stand he said in an insinuating tone: Say, Injun, yo' mad at me; don' yer like me?" The Indian said he had no illwill against him, and Bradley asked, with mingled anger and contempt: "Whoffer yo' come here'n lie agin me, hey?" The evidence showed that Bradley had been an honest, hard-working man, and bad driven a milk wagon for eight years; and the jury, after being out about three minutes, came in with a verdict of "not guilty." In an instant the room was in an uproar, and Bradley, highly elated, started on a handshaking tour of the room, smiling from ear to ear. As he was about to leave the room, Judge Coxe asked him how he would get home. "Dunno, boss." "Have you any money?" "No, boss; been in jail two monfs; aint got er cent." He was given $10, and a happier man never walked out of court.-Albany Evening Journal.

Serjeant Ballantine was not an actor who pretended to feel what he did not, but one who pretended to be much inferior to himself. This appeared in the robing room and at the club, for the serjeant could not possibly be so cynically wicked as he ingeniously professed. In court it was the serjeant's way to lie low. When he examined a witness he would assume an expression of vacuity which disarmed opposition. With a drawl and a stutter, he would put questions of so apparently artless a kind that witness had not the heart to deny a gentleman who was probably doing his best, however stupid he was. In his power of drawing out witnesses he was something like the late Sir John Holker, but Sir John's heavy manner was natural, while that of Serjeant Ballantine was assumed, although so inveterately as almost to be a part of himself. The initiated could see, by a little jerk in his lip, when he had made a point, and he would finally dismiss the witness with an affected "Thank you," having extracted every thing that was necessary to his case. Like all good cross-examiners, Serjeant Ballantine was great in examination-in-chief. In crossexamination he seldom put a dangerous question. In criminal cases, which are all very much of a pattern, he was believed to be possessed of a series of questions the answers to which, if given either way, would help his case. In cases involving the relations of the sexes, Serjeant Ballantine was especially at home, a wide experience of life having given him the key to a large range of human motives. He was not one of those advocates who believe in their clients because they are theirs. The claimant could not have had a greater contrast in this respect than when he changed Ballantine for Kenealy. His fault was rather not to believe in the good motives of any one, last of all his own client. This habit was not on all occasions pleasing to his clients. Serjeant Ballantine was counsel in the Divorce Court for a petitioner against whom the plea of connivance was set up. In his speech to the jury he dwelt much on the apparent fact that his client was a fool, equalled only in folly by his mother. In going out of court the petitioner pathetically appealed to his friends whether it was for this that he had paid the serjeant two hundred guineas-that not only he should be abused as a fool, but his poor mother too.-Law Journal.

Even now the wife can cut off the right by grant or

The Albany Law Journal. devise, and this fact shows the absurdity of pre

ALBANY, FEBRUARY 12, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE is a bill pending in our Legislature to ren

serving the right when she does not choose to take that course. But if this tenancy is abolished the husband's liability for the wife's torts, which is undersood to be still subsisting in this State, should also be abolished. And the bill now pending to allow conveyances directly between husband and should also be adopted. Then our system

Tder masters liable for all injuries sustained by will be very nearly if not quite consistent and just.

their employees solely in consequence of the negligence of their co-employees, without regard to any

negligence on the part of the masters in selecting or retaining the co-employees. This seems to us a most unwise and impolitic measure. We believe it to be utterly indefensible in principle. It makes the master the insurer of careful conduct of his servants, which he cannot possibly regulate or control. The most he can do is to select skillful and careful servants, and to dismiss them if to his knowledge they become unskillful or careless. There is no more justice in imposing the proposed measure of liability than there would be in making the proprietor of a theatre responsible for the good behavior of the audience toward one another. Why should a man be held responsible for what is not his fault? The servant enters the employment knowing that his co-servants, however skillful, will sometimes be careless, and that he is liable to injury in consequence. That is one of the dangers of the service for which he is paid, and which he ought to face. To impose the liability of an insurer on the master is as unjust as to compel the servant to take all the risks of injury by co-servants carelessly selected or retained. The true rule is to subject men to responsibility for their own negligence, and nothing beyond. So we say the proposed legislation would be very unjust. It would be impolitic because it would crowd our courts with causes of the most unmeritorious and trifling description. As it is, this class of cases is the most numerous, and growing more numerous every day. There is hardly any thing for which a servant is not now-a-days suing his master. By the aid of lawyers willing to "take their chances" our courts are filled with suitors against corporations and other wealthy employers, and this modification of the law would render them legion. The next step would be to make the master an insurer of the safety and fitness of his machinery, appliances and works, and then the judges would have no time for any thing else. Then add the doctrine, prevailing in some jurisdictions, that the master may not contract with his servant that the new liability shall not be enforced, and we should have a species of workman tyranny more abominable than that of soulless corporations. The law would better be left as it is.

A bill is pending in our Legislature to abolish tenancy by curtesy. It should prevail. This spccies of tenancy is a survival of the time when a hus. band was liable for all the wife's debts, and the reason for it has passed away with the liability. VOL. 35- No. 7.

and most influential lawyers in the west, does not agree with our Mr. Carter in his notion that the common law is well settled, accessible and convenient. Mr. Bonney, we believe, is not an advocate of codification, but he thinks the administration of So he has justice stands in urgent need of reform. prepared a bill to be introduced in the Illinois Leg

Mr. C. C. Bonney, of Chicago, one of the ablest

islature to establish a law reform commission, consisting of three members, to be appointed by the governor, whose duty it shall be "to examine, from time to time, the decisions of the Appellate and Supreme Courts of this State, and to note, as may be disclosed thereby, or otherwise, any defects in or omissions from the laws of this State; and the causes of any such delay, uncertainty, inadequacy or expense; and thereupon to consider the same and prepare bills for the remedy thereof, so far as may seem practicable, with a brief statement of the reasons in support of such bills respectively." In support of his measure Mr. Bonney declares: "Under existing circumstances legal remedies are practically worthless to the poor and friendless, and suitors who are able to bear the delays, expenses and uncertainties which legal proceedings commonly involve, find that in many cases the actual results are not worth what they have cost. So the poor shun the courts because they cannot afford the luxury of justice, and others avoid them, so far as practicable, because almost any settlement of a controversy yields better practical results than a course of litigation. The cases now brought are for the most part such as cannot be settled, or such as drift into the courts in a sort of matter-of-course way, for want of any better mode of determining them. * * * Litigation is not, and should not be permitted to become a private business. * When government forbids the members of a community to settle their conflicts of interest or feeling by physical strife or retaliation, it necessarily assumes the duty of providing adequate means of speedily determining all proper controversies in impartial tribunals, and giving a practical and efficient redress of grievances. The general cause of the evils we deplore is the fact that judicial remedies and means of administration have not kept pace with the enormous advance in population and business, wealth and power. Our judicial force is much too small, and not properly compensated. * * * The laws are made with undue haste, and without proper revision; and are administered by very inadequate executive as well as judicial forces."

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