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pressly repealing the former only so far as inconsistent therewith. Under the former act alien heirs, by the law of whose country aliens cannot inherit real estate, obtain a defeasible title to lands in Texas good for nine years at least, and which will ripen into an indefeasible title, if before the expiration of the nine years the law of their country is so changed as to enable aliens to inherit. (3) A deed executed abroad is properly proved by testimony that the grantor and subscribing witnesses reside abroad, and that the testifying witness is acquainted with the handwriting of one of the subscribing witnesses, and believes that appearing on the deed to be genuine. Erasures changing the name of the grantor from Elizabeth to Eliza are sufficiently explained by showing the identity of the two. (4) Although by Texas law property purchased during marriage is prima facie community property, whether the conveyance be to the husband or wife, yet the presumption may be rebutted, in case of a conveyance to the wife, by proof that the consideration was nominal, and that the conveyance was intended as a gift to the wife. (5) A power of attorney given by three persous is by the death of two of them revoked at least as to the two. (6) A power of attorney to recover the interest of heirs in an estate, and for that purpose to do all acts that may be necessary, including the execution of conveyances, does not empower the agent to give away lands inherited by the donors of the power. (7) A warranty deed of the grantor's “right, title and interest in and to" certain described premises will not convey an after-acquired title, if the deed recites the title then possessed by the grantor, or contains no recital as to the character of his title. Nov. 29, 1886. Hanrick v. Patrick; Branch v. Same. Opinion by Matthews, J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

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· INTOXICA

CONTRACT --VOIDABLE- VOLUNTARY TION.-A contract made by a person so destitute of reason as not to know the consequences of his contract, though his incompetency be produced by intoxication, is voidable, and may be avoided by himself, though the intoxication was voluntary, and not procured be the circumvention of the other party. If he was without reason and understanding, the payment of the money ought not to be treated as voluntary, nor his signature as creating a new obligation. The conditions of sale may have been read in his hearing at the auction, and be may have understood them when he bid; but he paid no money until the time of signing the alleged contract, and if he was then bereft of reason, he may avoid the apparent obligation made while in that condition. It is not a question whether what he did was the carrying out of a fair and reasonable oral contract, or whether the property was worth the sum bid; it is a question of his capacity to make a contract at the time he signed the conditions and paid the money. The subject of the contract was not necessary for himself or family. He took nothing into his possession, and therefore had nothing to restore in the act of rescission; and he brought suit so promptly that at the trial the question of delay in rescinding was not raised. The rule formerly was that intoxication was no excuse, and created no privilege or plea in avoidance of a contract; but it is now settled, according to the dictate of good sense and common justice, that a contract made by a per800 so destitute of reason as not to know the consequences of his contract, though his incompetency be produced by intoxication, is voidable, and may be avoided by himself, though the in

toxication was voluntary, and not procured by the circumvention of the other party. 2 Kent Comm. 451. A drunkard, when in a complete state of intoxication, so as not to know what he is doing, has no capacity to contract in general; but his contract is voidable only. and not void, and may therefore be ratified by him when he becomes sober. Benj. Sales, par. 33. The learned judge of the Common Pleas instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover only on the ground that the contract did not bind because he was intoxicated to a degree that he did not know what he was doing at the time he affixed his seal and gave the money; that if he was in such a state of drunkenness as not to know what he was doing, he cannot be compelled to perform the contract; and that if at the time of signing the contract he was able to comprehend the nature and effect thereof, the alleged intoxication is no defense. All that accords with principles so well settled as to be found in approved text-books. They apply to a case like this; not where an intoxicated man gave his negotiable paper which had passed to an innocent holder for value, as was the case in State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Penn. St. 204. Penn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 4, 1886. Bush v. Breinig. Opinion by Trunkey, J.

CRIMINAL LAW-EMBEZZLEMENT-TAXES DEPOSITED IN BANK.-Where money for taxes has been deposited in a bank, for years, under an arrangement with a city treasurer, to be refunded to the city or its treasurer when called for, in the funds of the bank, the money so deposited is a loan to the bank, and when the banker has paid out the same to other depositors, in the usual course of business, without any fraudulent intent, he is not guilty of embezzlement. The case is one of a failing debtor borrowing money of one to pay a loan to another, with the reasonable hope of being speedily able to meet all his obligations. This is not the case where one, in violation of the law, or of his duty to his employer, uses money not his own, and which he borrows. He has no right to use it in speculation for his own profit, or in pandering to his appetites, or love of luxury, with the hope of being able to replace it before its use is discovered, and concealing the taking of it by false entries, or otherwise. It is a case where a banker, known to be doing business, in part at least, upon the profits arising from the use of the deposits in his bank, is unable to meet his obligations, and fails. The depositor in such a case is a creditor of the bank, and there is nothing about his relation with the bank that can make its failure an embezzlement of the funds he has voluntarily placed there in the usual course of business, without any special agreement that his money shall be kept separate from the other funds, and not used as are all general deposits. Deposited without such agreement, he parts with his title, and loans his money to the bank. The bank therefore cannot embezzle his money, because he has none in its hands. The bank owes him a certain amount, to be paid when called for. A mere failure to pay a loan can never be an embezzlement. Mich. Sup. Ct., Nov. 4, 1886. People v. Wadsworth. Opinion by Morse, J.

INSURANCE-WIND AND LIGHTNING—EVIDENCE.-In an action to recover under a policy insuring animals against lightning and high wind, evidence that on the morning after a storm of wind and lightning a colt insured appeared dumpish, and as if shocked by lightning, and was somewhat cut as if by the wire fence near which it was, and that a mare insured was badly cut by the wire, and that there was a mark in the ground near the animals as though produced by the descent of lightning. is insufficient to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, especially in the absence

of any evidence as to the character of the storm. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 28, 1886. Wilson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co. Opinion by Beck, J.

LIEN-REPAIRS ON SLEIGH-ASSIGNEE OF INSOLVENT PARTNERSHIP.-An insolvency assignee of a partnership has no possessory lien on a physiciau's sleigh for repairs made upon it by the firm, and paid for in the execution of an agreement between the firm and the physician that his services, to be rendered for one of the partners, should be applied in payment of the repairs to be made by them. The defendant. as assignee of the firm, claims a lien enforceable without legal process, for repairs made by the firm on the plaintiff's sleigh. The defendant admits that the firm had no lien because the agreement provided means of payment inconsisent with such security (Stillings v. Gibson, 63 N. H. 1, 2), and that their creditors had no lien. The plaintiff had paid for the repairs by rendering services according to his contract with the firm, and they had no cause of action against him, and no lien.

Their creditors had not a bailee's common-law lien enforceable on the plaintiff's sleigh without legal process. And whatever rights of action and attachment may be vested in the assignee as the representative and trustee of the firm and the creditors (Whitney v. Dean, 5 N. H. 249; Badger v. Story, 16 id. 168, 177; Holton v. Holton, 40 id. 77; Lovett v. Brown, id. 511; Kidder v. Page, 48 id. 380, 384; Caldwell v. Scott, 54 id. 414, 418; Parker v. Bowles, 57 id. 491; Chase v. Bean, 58 id. 183; Farwell v. Metcalf, 63 id. 276; Freeland v. Freeland, 102 Mass. 475; Farley v. Lovell, 103 id. 387; Locke v. Lewis, 124 id. 1; Catzhausen v. Judd, 43 Wis. 213) he did not, by the assignment, acquire against the plaintiff a possessory lien that did not exist before the assignment. By painting the sleigh, the defendants acquired no cause of action against the plaintiff. There was no privity of contract between them, and no debt to be secured by a bailee's lien. N. H. Sup. Ct., July 29, 1886. Morrill v. Merrill. Opinion by Doe, C. J.

MARRIAGE-DURESS.-The bill is filed to annul the marriage between the parties upon the ground of fraud and duress. The complainant admits that he had illicit intercourse with the defendant before the marriage. She subsequently alleged that she was pregnant by him. He declined to marry her, but made provisions for her, by an agreement, up to and during her contemplated confinement. He fulfilled the agreement. Afterward she made a complaint against him before a justice of the peace that he had furnished her with medicine to produce abortion. He was arrested upon the charge. Being unable to procure bail, he went to the defendant's house, and asked her to withdraw the charge. She did not consent to do so, but went with him, and the officer, in whose custody he was, to the office of the justice. After they arrived there the officer said to the magistrate that she wished to withdraw the charge, to which the justice replied it could not be done, and informed the accused that he must marry the woman, give $1,000 bail, or go to jail. The accused being unable to

get bail, offered to marry the woman. He asked her if she was willing to marry him, and she answered, "just as you like." After she had thus given her consent they were then and there married accordingly. The evidence is contradictory as to whether they lived together after the marriage. It is proved that the accused gave the medicines to the woman, and it is admitted that one of them, at least, was such as is given to produce miscarriage. It was undoubtedly furnished to her for that purpose. The complainant insists that the circumstances establish the fact that the marriage was the result of unlawful duress by means of criminal proceedings. Where a man who has been

guilty of illicit intercourse with a woman marries her under the constraint of proceedings against him in bastardy, lawfully instituted, in respect of the actual or apprehended result of such unlawful commerce, or where he marries her under the constraint of arrest in a suit for damages for seducing her, such constraint does not of itself constitute a valid ground for aunulling the marriage. Sickles v. Carson, 26 N. J. Eq. 440; Seyer v. Seyer, 37 id. 210; Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47; Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige, 43. Where a man who has been guilty of illicit intercourse with a woman, and supposing her to be pregnant as the result thereof, furnishes her with the means of producing abortion for the purpose of preventing the apprehended birth of the offspring, and criminal proceedings are lawfully instituted against him with a view to punishing him for the latter offense, and being under arrest thereon, he chooses, as a means of release, to marry the woman, the constraint under which he enters into the marriage constitutes no ground, either in law or morals, for annulling it. In this case it is not denied, that if the arrest had been in lawful proceedings in bastardy, the constraint would not have constituted unlawful duress; but it is urged that the fact that it was under criminal proceedings makes an essential difference. I cannot see the distinction. The charge was not a false It was true. The accused had, by his conduct toward the woman, rendered himself liable to the penalties of the criminal law. To obtain his release, and immunity for his criminal conduct, he deliberately chose to marry her. There is no evidence of any conspiracy, nor of any fraud. If a man who has committed a rape should, after his arrest for the crime, seek to escape the consequences of his offense by marrying the victim of his violence, he could not in a court of conscience obtain a decree nullifying the marriage on the ground that he was under duress when he entered into it, and that but for the duress he would not have been willing to marry the woman. This case does not differ from that in principle. The dictates of justice, no less than the policy of the law, forbid that a man should in any such case be permitted to annul his marriage on the ground of the duress of his imprisonment for his crime. N. J. Sup. Ct., Oct. 30, 1886. Frost v. Frost. Opinion by Runyon, Ch.

one.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-REPORTING GRADE OF STREET TO LOT-OWNER-MISTAKE.-A city is not liable for the negligence or want of skill of a city engineer who incorrectly reports to a lot-owner the grade of the street in front of the owner's lot, although by ordinance of the city it is made the duty of the engineer to make such reports to the lot-owner. The benefit of the performance of such duty accrues only to the lotowner, and not to the city in its corporate capacity. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 1886. Waller v. City of Dubuque. Opinion by Adams, C. J.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT LIABILITY OF RAILWAY COMPANY FOR SERVICES TO INJURED EMPLOYEECONTRACT-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON FOR AGENT'S CONTRACT-RAILROAD COMPANY.

(1) Where an employee of a railway company was injured by an accident for which the company was re

sponsible, it will not be liable for services and meals furnished nurses and others in attendance by the physician's orders, unless he was expressly authorized to make a contract for them. (2) A person cannot recover from a railroad company for ties furnished it, unless the contract was made with an authorized agent of the company. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 21, 1886. Bushnell v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. Opinion by Seevers, J.

RAILROAD COMPANY-NEGLIGENCE -OBSTRUCTING CROSSING-INFANT.-A railway company, for the pur

pose of breaking up a freight train, halted it for about ten minutes upon a street crossing in a populous part of the city of Philadelphia; that portion of the train obstructing the crossing was a car loaded with lumber and a box car, the two attached by a coupling pole, which pole stood immediately over the crossing; there were no gates to prevent the public from going on to the crossing in time of danger, nor was there a watchman stationed at the point; numbers of adults from time to time passed on to the crossing whilst it was so obstructed, and clambering over the coupling pole crossing the railroad safely. C., a boy between six and seven years of age, entered upon the crossing to pass over: being unable to climb over the coupling pole, he placed his arm upon it and was about crawling under it, when the train, without warning or signal, was started, and C. was thrown down, the wheels of the lumber-car passing over his hands, severing one entirely and crushing off the fingers of the other. In an action brought by him to recover damages for the injury the defendant asked the trial judge to affirm the following point: "It being conceded that the child crossed between the cars, taking hold of the coupling just as the train started, there was no duty of the defendant to it, and the verdict should be for the defendant." This the judge refused to do. Held, not error. Whether or not an attempt on the part of an adult person to cross over or under a train obstructing the crossing of a public street, in case of injury, is negligence per se, or merely evidence of negligence, we are not called upon to decide. We are now considering the duties and responsibilities of the railroad company with reference to a case where contributory negligence cannot be asserted. The plaintiff was at the time of the injury a child of tender years without the experience and discretion which would enable him to understand the dangerous character of the act which resulted in his injury. A child's, capacity is the measure of his responsibility; if he has not the ability to foresee and avoid danger, negligence will not be imputed to him. Phila. Pass. R. Co. v. Hazzard, 25 P. F. S. 367; Penn. R. Co. v. Kelly, 7 Casey, 372. He was not a mere trespasser; he had a right to pass along the highway; he was in the exercise of that right; being a mere child, he was not negligent; hence the whole question turns upon the neg. ligence of the company; if there was evidence on that point, the cause was properly submitted. Judgment affirmed. Penn. Sup. Ct., April 19, 1886. Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore R. Co. v. Layer. Opinion by Clark, J.

SALE-TITLE TO REMAIN IN VENDOR-REPLEVIN.-A. received from B. a hack, harnesses, blankets and whip and a horse, under a written agreement in the form of a lease, by which they were to remain the property of B. until a certain agreed price was paid for them. The price was never paid. While this agreement was pending, B., at the request of A., sold the property to the plaintiff, in whose barn it had been kept by A. B. gave plaintiff a bill of sale, acknowledging the receipt of price. Plaintiff at the same time agreed to sell it to A., the title to remain in plaintiff till the price was paid, but A. to pay $5 a week, to be taken as rent for its use, until it was paid for. Under this arrangement A. gave his note to plaintiff for the purchase-price. The property after this was kept in plaintiff's barn as before. The note had not been paid when the defendants attached the property. In an action to replevin, held, that the sale was conditional, title remaining in the vendor, and that he was entitled to recover. July 9, 1886. Cooley v. Gillan. Opinion by Granger, J.

TAXATION-GEN. STAT. 154, § 12--CHURCH PURPOSES

-LOT ON CAMP-MEETING GROUND-TAXABLE TO LES

SEE. (1) A camp-meeting association erected upon grounds owned by them a building known as the pavilion or tabernacle," which was used on Sundays solely for religious worship and on week days when required, but otherwise it was open to public amusement and for pecuniary profit. Held, that it was not exempt as a building or portion of building exclusively occupied as a church. (2) Cottages erected on the grounds of the association by lessees of the lots were leased to the lessees, their "heirs and assigns forever," but forfeiture upon the breach of certain conditions. Held, that the title of the lessees was a base or determinable fee, and that the lots and the buildings upon them were to be taxed as their property, and not as that of the association. Conn. Sup. Ct., July 27, 1886. Conn. Spiritualist Camp-Meeting Association v. Town of East Lyme. Opinion by Pardee, J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

APPEALS FROM DEMURRERS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

There has been a learned discussion in your columns as to what is the proper practice, under the present obscure provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, in appealing from a decision on demurrer. Would it not be better pro bono publico to spend our time in ascertaining what would be the clearest, cheapest, and most expeditious practice, and in laying the results of our inquiry before the judiciary committees of the coming Legislature?

Why should not the appeal be taken directly from the order entered on the decision? Why should there be an interlocutory judgment between the order and the final judgment? It is but a superfluity. An appeal from the order would present every question clearly to the appellate court, and it would have preference which would insure early hearing, probably there is not often more work for the appellate court to do in hearing an appeal from a demurrer, than in hearing one from an injunction or receivership, and there is no reason for applying a different rule. All interlocutory questions in a case should be quickly disposed of, that the main issue be not delayed. A demurrer is a most useful invention. It is much better thus to dispose of the case or cut down the issues when possible, and save expense of a trial with counsel's, referee's or jury's, witnesses', and stenographer's expenses. It seems to me unfortunate that demurrers are so much discouraged. The cause of discouragement is not in the demurrer itself, but in the present system of procedure upon it. There is no sensible reason why in New York city a bad demurrer served thirteen days before the first Monday in June, and not so absolutely frivolous as to require no argument, should delay the trial until November at the earliest. I would respectfully propose: (1) That a demurrer be brought up as a motion on eight days' notice, for any day in the term (like the practice in the New York City Court); (2) that an appeal from the decision be an appeal from an order, with preference as such; (3) that the General Terms hold frequent short sessions, at least once a month, to hear appeals from interlocutory orders, thus avoiding the common dilemma between a long stay of proceeding, and a refusal of any stay, in a situation really calling for an appeal, a short stay, and a quick decision. The English counterpart to our General Term is always in session during the calendar year, Saturday included. See article by Lord Justice Bowen in Law Quarterly Review for January, 1886.

NEW YORK, Dec. 22, 1886.

W.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

MORRILL ON COMPETENCY AND PRIVILEGES OF WITNESSES.

This book, of 150 pages, written by William W. Morrill, and published by S. S. Peloubet of New York, is confined to the rules of the New York Codes. The changes from first to last in section 829 of the present Code of Civil Procedure and the corresponding section of the old Code have alone given rise to a large amount of construction, and this, with the decisions on other sections in this and the Criminal Codes, justifies this well-considered treatise. It is one of the most thorough, systematic, and exact pieces of analysis and explanation that has ever come under our notice. The writer should essay a larger work, for he has the equipment of a first-rate law writer.

NOTES.

A dozen Chinamen the other day at the Thames Police Court swore, a dozen saucers had to be cracked, for a Chinaman's oath must be made on a cracked saucer. If many more Chinamen are going to swear at the Thames Police Court the officials will be wise to lay in a supply of bottles of Diamond Cement, a dozen cracked saucers a day is too expensive!-Gibson's Law Notes. Witnesses in our courts do not break any thing but the ninth commandment.

Judge McCallum's (of Iowa) first case was before a justice who was extremely harsh with criminals. The weakness of the old Puritan was his veneration for veterans of the war. The Philadelphia News tells this anecdote of the judge: McCallum had fought four years. His client was a thief. "The only thing I can do for you," said McCallum, after having gained the man's confidence, "is to implore the mercy of the

court.

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When you go on the stand tell the whole truth." The man had stolen a cow, killed it, sold the hide, and taken the carcass home to his family, which was really suffering for the necessaries of life. "Now, your honor," said McCallum, "the defense has no witnesses. My client is guilty. He has hid nothing from this court." Then turning to the prisoner as if the fact had nearly escaped him, McCallum said: "By the way, you were a soldier in the late war, were you not?" 'Yes, sir." "Weren't you at Gettysburg?" "Yes, sir." So was I. And you were in other historic battles, fighting for your country, while your wife and family suffered from want at home?" "Yes, sir." The prosecution at this point saw the way the case was drifting, and attempted to ridicule the "old soldier" defense, as the prosecuting attorney named it. The effect on the old justice was to arouse all his loyalty and indignation. "Enough of this," said he, bringing his hand down on the desk in front of him with a thundering thud. "No soldier, no man who has shed his best blood for his country, not even if he be a criminal, can be reviled in my presence. The prisoner is discharged. And, sir, when you are suffering for the necessaries of life again come to me.' joke was too good to keep. McCallum told the justice one day that the old soldier was an ex-Confederate, but never again did McCallum practice in that

court.

The

The late Judge Samuel Hand, notwithstanding his great industry and activity of mind, was the laziest man physically, or at least the most averse to the taking of even ordinary exercise, that we have ever known; and it is quite possible that his death in the full pride and vigor of his usefulness was at least hastened by the masterly inactivity of his body. His brother-in-law, Hon. Matthew Hale, who is passionately fond of physical exercise, and rides his steed like an Arab, once, after a very long and convincing

argument, prevailed with the judge to purchase a valuable horse. The animal was a superb one, and Mr. Hale succeeded in getting the judge to mount and take a daily canter with him for several successive months, the judge intimating that he enjoyed the sport vastly, and felt better for the exercise. One morning the groom, pale and trembling, rushed into the judge's office, and holding open the door so as to secure a rapid exit in case of need, announced that the noble steed was dead. Judge Hand raised his fine head from his papers, and with joy beaming all over his face, exclaimed, "Thank Heaven! I shall not have to ride that beast again."-Troy Press.

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Since the days of Stradling v. Stiles and the bequest of "all my black and white horses," no testatrix with all the ingenuity of the sex has propounded so nice a problem as that in Cloak v. Hammond. The residue was left to "my cousin Harriet Cloak." Now there are two Harriets, one of whom was a cousin, but not a Cloak, the other was a Cloak, but not a cousin. The first had been named Cloak, but had become Mrs. Crane, and the other had obtained the name of Cloak and the cousinship by marriage. Did “ "my cousin Harriet Cloak mean my cousin by marriage Harriet Cloak, or did it mean my cousin Harriet, nee Cloak? The late Mr. Justice Pearson and Lord Justice Bowen thought the latter, but Lord Justices Cotton and Fry the former. If evidence were admissible, the cousin by marriage was more likely to have been benefited by the testatrix, but evidence was only admissible if both persons equally answered the description in ordinary language. Sympathy will be felt with Lord Justice Bowen in insisting that cousin means consanguinea, and nothing else, so that "cousin Harriet " cannot mean cousin-in-law, but the learned judge has perhaps too little regard for less accurate speakers and writers. Uncle, nephew and niece are no doubt applied so as to include analogous relations by marriage, and "cousin" is sometimes used in English where there is no relationship. It is applied by sovereigns to one another on the assumption that great potentates must necessarily be related, as they can have no blood connections with meaner personages; and it is applied by the sovereign to peers of the realm, and according to Lord Justice Cotton, who ought to know, the polite fiction condescends so far as to include all privy councillors. This is not so in official documents, at all events not in royal commissions, in which privy councillors are styled our right trusty and well-beloved councillor," while every one else is only "trusty and well beloved."-Solicitor's Journal.

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A case of importance to theater managers and the play-going public was heard on Wednesday by his honor Judge Bayley at the Westminster County Court. Mr. Bertram van Praagh, solicitor, purchased four balcony stall tickets at the Gaiety Theatre shortly after the production of "Dorothy." Finding that he could not use them, the plaintiff returned the tickets to the theatre, and asked to have his money returned or the seats exchanged for another evening. This request was not acceded to. Eventually it was arranged that the box-office keeper should endeavor to sell the tickets. If the tickets were thus sold the official was to send the plaintiff a telegram, which was duly done, the "wire" running: "Seats sold to-night. Henderson, Gaiety." This being so, plaintiff demanded the return of his money, £1 3s. 6d., and the management declining to refund, on the ground that their boxkeeper had not promised to give back the cash, and that it was the invariable theatrical custom to exchange unused tickets for another night, but not to return any money, this action was brought. The plaintiff's contention was that "custom" did not enter into the express contract, and his honor gave him a verdict with costs.--London Law Times.

The Albany Law Journal.

JUDO

ALBANY, JANUARY 8, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

He

[UDGE LOWELL, in a recent number of The Independent makes some suggestions for the relief of the Federal Supreme Court which mainly coincide with the provisions of the Davis bill. He does not believe in increasing the number of judges, nor in dividing the court into sections, but would have an Appellate Circuit Court, with final jurisdiction on all questions of fact, extending the rule in common law and admiralty to equity cases. recommends restricting appeals from the territories and the District of Columbia. He recommends relieving the appellate judges from circuit duty. He deprecates raising the unit of value authorizing appeal above the $5,000 at which it is now fixed. We have never been in favor of the Davis bill, but it is better than the present disgraceful slough of despond, and we hope Congress will pass it or contrive some other scheme of relief this winter. cordially agree with Judge Lowell about questions of fact, circuit duty and pecuniary limitations.

We

The ninth and concluding volume of Messrs. Putnam's sumptuous edition of Alexander Hamilton's works is devoted to "The Federalist." An introduction by Mr. Lodge treats of its authorship, its bibliography, and its text. The question of authorship, he pronounces "almost as hopeless of settlement as the identity of Junius or the guilt of Mary, Queen of Scots." If by "settlement" Mr. Lodge means the cutting off of dispute, we should agree with him; but if in this disputed authorship there is nothing more difficult of solution than the two problems which he instances, it ought not to give him much trouble. If Sir Philip Francis was not "Junius," and if Mary was not guilty, then there is no use in writing history. After all, the question is not very important, although curious. Hamilton undoubtedly wrote the great majority of the numbers, and Jay and Madison the rest. There have been twenty-four editions, it seems, including one French and one Portuguese, and seven published at Hallowell, Maine, by the purchasers of the copyright of Gideon's edition, the ninth, which is said to have had the sanction and approval of Madison. That this great and immortal work should so long have hailed from a little down-east town will always be one of the curiosities of publishing. "The Federalist" is the most influential work on government ever written, certainly in this country, perhaps in the world, and will always continue to be the admiration of statesmen and lawyers. We take great pleasure in recommending this beautiful and accurate edition of the works of the greatest genius in government who has ever adorned our history. VOL. 35-No. 2,

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For true gallantry and tenderness to women give us the wild West - say Illinois. The courts out there do not justify a husband in playing jokes on his wife. In Sharp v. Sharp, 116 Ill. 509, a divorce case, the court said: "He complained often of her medical expenses, and said he didn't believe in paying doctor's bills,' and that she ought to die and go to heaven"- evidently supposing there are no doctors there. "On one occasion, when she had the neuralgia she wanted the 'extract of lettuce.' He took an empty bottle and pretended to get it for her, but instead of doing so he filled the bottle with foul water taken from a tub that stood outside of the house. After she had used it he said she expressed herself as much benefited by its use, and according to his own testimony, he then told her it was not the extract of lettuce' at all, but that it was a vile liquid the name of which was too vulgar to be repeated. The excuse given for the deceit practiced upon her in this respect does not relieve defendant from the severest censure. No doubt the liquid was what he says it was foul water taken from a tub and was not as bad as he told her it was. The least that can be said of it is it was a 'practical joke,' the perpetration of which shows he is a coarse man. No one of any refined sensibilities will ever practice a 'practical joke' upon or relate one concerning his friend. It ought to be remembered that anger dwells near by where ridicule enters and wounds the sensibilities, and his friend is either estranged or made angry by the reckless disregard of his feelings. No matter what his motive may have been, his wife had serious ground for complaint on account of the deception practiced upon her. It was very unkind to say the least of it." The court also censure the husband for undue reticence. They said: "Although these parties resided in the same house for two years after this letter was written, it does not appear from this record he ever addressed a single word to her either in anger or in kindness. This treatment ill accords with the duty of a husband owes to his wife, and surely is not that conjugal kindness implied in every act of condonation. It is difficult to imagine any thing more disagreeable and exasperating than the presence of one who from mere sullenness will not utter a word. The veriest solitude, where no living creature is visible, would be preferable." There were other and weightier matters however, which added to the above, gave Mrs. Sharp her divorce.

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