wharf. There has been some conflict of decision with respect to claims for salvage services in rescuing goods lost at sea, and found floating on the surface or cast upon the shore. When they have belonged to a ship or vessel as part of its furniture or cargo, they clearly come under the head of wreck, flotsam, jetsam, ligan or derelict, and salvage may be claimed upon them. But when they have no connection with a ship or vessel, some authorities are against the claim, and others are in favor of it. Decisions in favor of the claim in reference to rafts of timber found floating at sea were made by Judge Betts in the New York district (A Raft of Spars, 1 Abb. Adm. 485), and by Judge Lowell, in the Massachusetts district (Fifty Tousand Feet of Timber, 2 Low. 64), and against it by Chief Justice Taney in the United States Circuit Court for the district of Maryland (Tome v. Four Cribs of Lumber, Taney, 533) and by the English Court of Exchequer, in Palmer v. Rouse, 3 Hur!. & N. 505. Perhaps the decisions in the last two cases were affected by local custom or statutory provisions. None of these cases however throw any light on the subject in hand. The case of Salvor Wrecking Co. v. Sectional Dock Co., reported in 3 Cent. Law J. 640, and the note appended thereto, may be referred to for an interesting discussion of the question. Judge Dillon, in that case, held that a dry-dock is not a subject of salvage service. Cope v. Valentine Dry-dock Co. Opinion by Bradley, J. ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE CISIONS. ance. LICENSE-NUISANCE. A license from a county board of health and vital statistics, authorizing the licensees to carry on the business of manufacturing fertilizers, will not protect the manufacturers from prosecution for maintaining a public nuisance growing out of the business. The defendants invoke in their behalf a recognized principle that a public nuisauce must be occasioned by acts done in violation of law, and that any business or pursuit authorized by law cannot be such nuisance. It is not denied that the Legislature have the power to make lawful, so far as the public is concerned, a work or business which by the common law would otherwise be a public nuisAn instance of the exercise of this power is found in the schedule of powers usually conferred upon the railroad companies, many of which, in their unauthorized exercise, would amount to such public wrong. And it has not been questioned in this case that it is competent for the Legislature, through its selected agents, to determine when, where and in what manner such business may be conducted. Such legis. lation however, being in derogation of the common law, must receive strict construction, and the public injury from which one holding such a grant would be protected must be necessary results of the authorized business after the exercise of proper care, skill and diligence, employing careful servants and using processes least likely to produce detriment to the public. If he fails in any of these, and unnecessary injury results to the public. he becomes liable to indictment. 2 Whart. C. L., § 1424. In the light of these rules, and assuming that the licenses which the plaintiffs in error held were lawful authority for carrying on the business so licensed, is the proposition contained in their requests to charge one that is supportable in law? What he asks the court to declare to the jury as a legal rule for their guidance is that the license of this board to carry on a particular business is under any and all circumstances a protection against an indictment for nuisance growing out of such business. It left no room for the consideration of unnecessary or even reckless injury to the public in the mode of manufacture. This is the plain meaning of this request, and had it been put to the jury as asked, no matter how willful or extensive the offense to the public may have been, it demanded in virtue of the licenses the acquittal of the plaintiffs in error. The proposition can find no support or countenance in any legal rule. But on looking into the licenses, is there any authority given the plaintiffs in error to create noisome odors and smells, and corrupt the air with them, to the inconvenience of the public? The authority is by the licenses to manufacture fertilizers and materials in a certain locality for one year. Is it to be assumed that the necessary consequence of such manufacture was to corrupt the air and produce public annoyances? Are we to infer from this grant that either the Legislature or the board acting in their behalf designed to grant the right under such terms, to create what otherwise in law would be a public offense? Such is not its expression, and on every recognized principle in the interpretation of such grants, the presumption would be against any such intent. The object of the legislation constituting boards of health and marking out their duties, was to prevent nuisances in conservation of the public health. With this purpose as the single object of their creation and sole guide in action, it would be novel indeed to find in such words a license to effect a public nuisauce. In either of these views the judge was clearly right in refusing to charge as requested. I am also of opinion that the objection to the charge as made is not supportable. It is to be observed that the charge given which was objected to was in answer to the plaintiff's request. The judge had in a former part of the charge clearly defined a public nuisance. He had instructed the jury that the business of manufacturing fertilizers was a lawful business when the manner of its conduct was not hurtful or offensive. He had declared the law in this case to the jury in these words: "When a lawful business is conducted in an unlawful manner so that it is injurious and interferes with the rights of those about him, then that offensive method of conducting the business may be abated, and the parties guilty of it may be punished by indictment if it has become a public nuisance." The plain deduction from what was said in answer to the request is that no inference was to be drawn from the license which the plaintiffs held that they were authorized to inflict injury upon the public by their mode of conducting the business, and that they were responsible if thereby they created a nuisance to the public. If the language used can be understood as an instruction that these licenses can in nowise impair the common-law right of the public to be protected against unwholesome and noxious odors, I would still regard it as a correct exposition of the law. N. J. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 1886. Garrett v. State. Opinion by Knapp, J. THE JURY DISAGREE. FROM "RUDDER GRANGE," BY FRANK R. STOCKTON. [The hired girl, Pomona, tells the story to her mistress, Euphemia.] "The case was about a man named Brown, who married the half-sister of a man named Adams, who afterward married Brown's mother, and sold Brown a house he had got from Brown's grandfather, in trade for half a grist-mill, which the other half of was owned by Adams' half-sister's first husband, who left all his property to a soup society, in trust, till his son should come of age, which he never did, but left a will which gave his half of the mill to Brown, and the suit was between Brown and Adams and Brown again, and Adams' half-sister, who was divorced from Brown, and a mau named Ramsey, who had put up a new over shot wheel to the grist-mill." "Oh my!" exclaimed Euphemia. "How could you remember all that?" "I heard it so often I couldn't help remembering it," replied Pomona. And she went on with her narrative. "That case wasn't a easy one to understand, as you may see for yourselves, and it didn't get finished that day. They argyed over it a full week. When there wasn't no more witnesses to carve up, one lawyer made a speech, an' he set that crooked case so straight that you could see through it from the over-shot wheel clean back to Brown's grandfather. Then another feller made a speech, and he set the whole thing up another way. It was jus' as clear to look through, but it was another case altogether, no more like the other one than a apple pie is like a mug o' cider. An' then they both took it up, an' they swung it around between them, till it was all twisted, an' knotted, an' wound up, an' tangled worse than a skein o' yarn in a nest o' kittens, an' then they give it to the jury. “Well, when them jurymen went out, there wasn't none of 'em, as Jone tole me afterward, as knew whether it was Brown or Adams as was dead, or whether the mill was to grind soup, or to be run by soup-power. Of course they couldn't agree; three of 'em wanted to give a verdict for the boy that died, two of 'em was for Brown's grandfather, an' the rest was scattered, some going in for damages to the witnesses, who ought to get somethin' for havin' their char-ac-ters ruined. Jone he jus' held back, ready to jine the other eleven as soon as they'd agree. But they couldn't do it, an' they were locked up three days and four nights. You'd better believe I got pretty wild about it, but I come to court every day, an' waited an' waited, bringin' somethin' to eat in a baskit. "One day, at dinner-time, I seed the judge a-standin' at the court-room door, a-wipin' his forrid with a handkerchief, an' I went up to him an' said, 'Do you think, sir, they'll get through this thing soon?' "I can't say, indeed, said he. Are you interested in the case?' "I should think I was,' said I, an' then I told him about Jone's bein' a juryman, an' how we was on our bridal trip. "You've got my sympathy, madam,' says he, 'but it's a difficult case to decide, an' I don't wonder it takes a good while.' Nor I nuther,' says I, 'an' my opinion about these things is, that if you'd jus' have them lawyers shut up in another room, and make them do their talkin' to theirselves, the jury could keep their minds clear, and settle the cases in no time.' "There's some sense in that, madam,' says he, 'an' then he went into court ag'in. "Jone never had no chance to jine in with the other fellers, for they couldn't agree, an' they were all discharged at last. So the whole thing went for nuthin. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. Elements of Right and of the Law, by George H. Smith. Second edition, Chicago; Callaghan & Company, 1887. The first edition of this book was partly destroyed by the fire in Mr. Bancroft's publishing house, in San Francisco. The second edition is issued nearer our own meridian. The work belongs to the category of analytical jurisprudence, and like all investigations of this character is not devoid of interest to one who watches with confidence and hope the gradual decline of the empirical method. There are many evidences that our lawyers are awakening to the idea, that some rationale of the science of law is a necessity and that the common law is not such a science. Thus far Americans have not contributed much to jurisprudence, but to concrete law not a little. We do not detect in Mr. Smith's contribution to jurisprudence any thing strikingly original and what there is of original is not striking. But the essay is nevertheless to be commended, not depreciated, for it is a reaching toward the empyrean, and not a groveling in the second-hand formulae of the ordinary treatise-writers. When lawyers begin to take broad views of principles, and oblique views of precedents it would be monstrous to criticise even a tentative effort, and Mr. Smith's effort is tentative. In so far as Mr. Smith applies old terms of science to new classifications we cannot go with him. For example jural legistation he divides into administrative' and 'judicial legislation' and 'judicial legislation 'he defines as legislation which establishes rules of decision for the determination of legal (?) controversies. By this he does not mean the subordinate legislation of the courts of justice so fully analyzed by Bentham and Austen, but he applies this well-worded and time-honored term of science to a new and opposed use. This is novel, but it is not justifiable. In this edition Mr. Smith has added what he styles a critical essay on the several theories of jurisprudence. To the student approaching jurisprudence for the first time from the common institutional treatises, this essay may not be amiss, but it is very brief, somewhat inadequate and very far inferior in philosophical grasp to Harrison's English School of Jurisprudence,' published some years ago in an English Review, perhaps the Contemporary. But our best wishes to Mr. Smith's second edition. BISHOP ON CONTRACTS One of the finest treats in life is to get a new book by Mr. Bishop to review. Not to dwell on the great and peculiar merits of his books, the very faults are original, and in his faults as well as in his merits there is a vigor and a sincerity that commend them to earnest attention. We have sometimes thought that we would rather have all his faults and half his merits than all the merits and none of the faults of many other writers. We always enjoy those "slugging" prefaces of his, wherein he essays to "knock out" every other author in four "rounds" or less. And to begin with the present preface we must say that we' enjoy its colossal conceit, because we think the author has some right to be so conceited. He does admit at the close of this preface that there are some other "good men" Parsons, Chitty, Addison, Leake, Pollock. Smith and Metcalf they are all clever men, no doubt, but after all there is only one John L., - we beg, pardon, we mean, only one Joel Prentiss. Once in a while the redoubtable author leaves an "opening" in these prefaces. For example, in the present, in explaining the secret of his conciseness, he compares a dictum of Lord Ellenborough with his own improved version. His Lordship said, "The same sense is to be put upon the words of a contract in an instrument under seal as would be put upon the same words in any instrument not under seal." Mr. Bishop substitutes: "Words signify the same in sealed and unsealed contracts." And he asks: "Is this sentence obscure? Does it lack precision? Is it not as lucid, as exact. and as complete in meaning as that of the learned judge?'" To which we say yes to the first two questions, and no to the last. Of course words mean the same in sealed contracts and they mean the same in unsealed contracts. But that is not what Mr. Bishop means. He means that they mean the same in the one as in the other. But he does not say so. What he meant to say is, "Words mean the same in sealed as in unsealed contracts." Besides what is he doing with that classic word "signify," when "mean" would answer every purpose? So in spite of his sneer at poor old Ellenborough, Mr. Bishop is not quite infallible. Then again such a stickler for conciseness should not say: "It would be useless to prophesy concerning the future." How could even the oracular Mr. Bishop foretell past events? portant subject, comprising some matters never before us. of the whole field. His research has been so thorough This book is a very complete and very admirable sections, he gives an exhaustive and intelligent view digest of the law of contracts. That is all it is. It has 600 pages, and 1471 sections. This tells the story of its character. It is just the sort of work to supplement a code of the law of contracts, and it demonstrates the easy practicability of such a code. There are no words too strong to express our admiration of the precision and order of its arrangement, and the convenience and accessibility of its learning. Especially excellent is his "restatement" of the doctrine of each chapter at the end of each. But if Mr. Bishop or any one else thinks it is going to supersede Parsons and Pollock, the types of the "practical" and the "scientific ". (we know Mr. Bishop thinks these words mean the same, but under our breath we insist that they don't) COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. outhink that he is mistaken. Mr. Bishop is good THE following decisions were handed down Tues enough to say that he does not expect it, nor that "other books shall be changed to imitate mine, or otherwise kneel to them, or adore." But he puts trust in the Future"- with a capital F. We must be allowed to say that there are occasional instances of very bad taste in this book. For example: "And on a just view of things, a judge would better serve the State, and more adorn his office, to go round"-(by going around?) —“with blacking and brush, shining the boots of the officers of his court, than to sit "- (by sitting?) "on the bench enforcing a wager." "The law and his rascality are in sweet accord." And that figure of the man going thrice around a cornfield, blowing a fish-horn,” in the hallucination that this gives him title to the land, although an amusing illustration of the doctrine of "ignorantia juris," is hardly the thing for a grave law treatise, however aptly the blowing may describe the learned and eminent author's estimate and criticism of his own works. The book is handsomely printed by T. H. Flood & Co., of Chicago. TAYLOR'S LANDLORD AND TENANT. The eighth edition of this classic edited by Mr. Henry F. Buswell, and published in two volumes by Little, Brown & Co., is at hand. The editor has added about one thousand new cases to the notes, and prefixed to each paragraph a brief statement of the subject-matter. The notes are very judicious, and are evidently made with the pen and not with the scissors. We miss references to several important cases, such as Fisher v. Lighthall, 4 Mackey, 82; S. C., 54 Am. Rep. 258, on implied covenant of habitable condition; Wolf v. Kilpatrick, 101 N. Y. 672; S. C., 54 Am. Rep. 672, and Ingwersen v. Rankin, 47 N. J. L. 18; S. C.. 54 Am. Rep. 109, on liability of landlord for tenant's nuisance, and Heddrich v. Smith, 103 Ind. 203; S. C., 53 Am. Rep. 509, on a right to remove fixtures under a new lease; but possibly these and some others were too recent to be conveniently brought in. COOK ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS. This treatise, by Mr. Wm. W. Cook, of New York, essays to give a microscopic view of this extremely im day, March 1, 1887: Order affirmed, with one bill of costs in this courtPeople, ex rel. Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburgh Railroad, appellant, v. Parley Haight and others, assessors of Somerset, respondents; Same v. George B. Hood and others; Same v. Peter Smoyer and others, and Same v. Peter Smoyer and others (second case). -Judgments affirmed with costs-Mary Murray, administratrix, etc., appellant, v. Arthur G. Fox and others, respondents; and Same v. Same.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, as of January 25, 1887 (the date of ex-Sheriff Koch's suicide, which by a strange coincidence took place while the appeal was being heard in this court) costs to abide event-Philip Becker and others, assignees, etc., respondents, v. the late Henry Koch, ex-sheriff of Erie county, appellant. -Judgment affirmed with costs-Robert Furey and others, appellants, v. Town of Gravesend, respondent. Judgment affirmed with costs-Thomas McCraith, respondent, v. National Mohawk Valley Bank, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Gezena C. Jones, respondent, v. Ida V. Fleming and others, appellants. Judgment affirmed with costs-Manchester Paper Company, ap pellant, v. Jacob R. Moore, administrator, etc., re- Judg State Bar Association propose to renovate by proper legislation. The following committee, composed of eminent lawyers having charge of the matter, will inspire the public with confidence in their action: Luther R. Marsh, New York; Hamilton Harris, Albany; David Dudley Field, New York; John H. V. Arnold, New York; Augustus Schoonmaker, Kingston; Hooper C. Van Vorst, New York; George M. Diven, Elmira. The matter the committee will have under consideration is of the most vital importance to every owner of land in the State. The State Bar Association has become one of the most important and useful institutions of the times. The many matters touching not only the profession of law, but of the public interests which are committed to the organization, and which are being promptly and ably administered cannot but be beneficial to the people generally."-Brooklyn Eagle. A liberal education is a grand thing. The "New York University Quarterly says, 'As students we have poured over Greek," etc. Beer, probably. "It is English, you know." Gibson's Law Notes says: "A correspondent writes us as follows:- The word cricket,' meaning a low stool,' and used in this seuse by the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, is frequently to be heard in the farm houses and cottages of Cleveland, in North Yorkshire, whence it has, in all probability, been transplanted to America. The joke you reproduced does seem rather remote, and this is increased by the insertion of the definite article before the word 'bench,' and the omission of it before the word appellant. Judgment affirmed-People v. Ogle.Judgment affirmed-People v. Hagadorn. ment reversed and proceedings dismissed-Cunard Steamship Company, appellant, v. John R. Voorhees and others, commissioners of docks, respondents.Judgment affirmed-People, respondents, v. James Meegan, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costsWilliam H. Van Ostrand, infant, respondent, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, appellant.Judgment affirmed with costs-Enos Lee, surviving executor, etc., respondent, v. Amy Horton, administratrix, etc., appellant.- -Judgment affirmed with costs-Erie County Savings Bank, respondent, v. Frank E. Cort and others, appellants.Judgment of General Term reversed and that of Special Term overruling demurrer affirmed, with leave to defendant to withdraw his demurrer and serve an answer within thirty days, upon payment to the plaintiff of all the costs since the service of the demurrerElectus B. Litchfield, executor, etc., appellant, v. Charles R. Flint, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-John Murray, infant, respondent, v. Henry A. Smith, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs - Tallman v. Town of Ramapo. Judgment affirmed with costs-William H. Doran, infant, appellant, v. City of Troy, respondent.-Order of General Term reversed and judgment of nonsuit affirmed with costs -Stephen W. Monk, respondent, v. Town of New Utrecht. -Decision and award of State Board of Claims reversed and ordered back to be reheard, costs to abide the event-Silsby Manufacturing Company,cricket.'" The last sentence makes us almost sorry appellant, v. State, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-People, ex rel. Nicholas Haughton and others, appellants, v. William S. Andrews and John Von Glahn, respondents.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Thomas H. Robbins, appellant, v. William W. Butcher, assignee, etc., respondent.-Judgment of General Term modifying judgment of Special Term affirmed without costs to either party-Association for the Benefit of Colored Orphans in New York, respondents and appellants, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, appellants and respondents. Judgment affirmedPeople, respondents, v. Charles J. Everhardt, appellant. Judgment affirmed-People, respondents, V. Andrew J. Wightman, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Isaac Hayes, respondent, v. Bernard Midas and another, appellants.-Judgment affirmed with costs-George H. Richardson and another, appellants, v. Horace K. Thurber, assignee, etc., respondent.- -Motion to revive and continue granted without costs-Blake v. Griswold. NOTES. The State Bar Association has entered largely on the work of reforming several statutes and laws that are apparently in need of wholesome change. Among the subjects that it has thus taken up is that of land transfers. To this end a resolution was adopted at the last annual meeting of the association that a committee, appointed by the President, consider and report in what manner the present method of transferring land and recording and indexing deeds, mortgages and other instruments relating to land in this State can be improved: that such committee] be requested to prepare a bill or bills embodying such reforms as they may recommend, and present them to the Legislature now in session. There is now much confusion respecting the subject of indexing land records by the different indexes. In the cities there are four kinds of indexes now used in land and county clerks' offices: The nominal index, the locality index, the local index and the file index. All of which, as is generally claimed, are prolix, inconvenient, expensive and very frequently damagingly defective. This the we ever commended one of our jokes to the English market. Those English are too literal for any thing but the plainest dealing. They would require the parables to "go on all fours." The present issue of) the Journal may be called a Code number. One of our contributors makes a plea for the removal of the common-law disabilities of husband and wife as witnesses for and against each other, and another urges certain changes in [civil procedure, and both are addressed to the Code revisors. As to the first, it is understood that the revisors have under serious consideration some change in the present rules, but what the change may be is not yet determined. A relaxation of the rules in some measure seems almost a necessary incident to the new laws respecting the property of married women. As to the subject of changes in civil procedure, it seems to us that our correspondent's suggestions are beyond the scope of the revisors' authority; but we publish his note because the subject is one which must come up for consideration before long in Virginia. There is undoubtedly in this State a growing dissatisfaction with the common-law forms and procedure, to which a conservative profession has so long clung with tenacity or suffered through indifference. We are daily receiving from new and unexpected sources, evidence that the total inefficiency of our judicial system is almost universally recognized. A very few years will see it swept away, and in its place erected a more modern structure, suited to the altered conditions of society and coinmerce. And when this chauge comes the question will be presented, whether we shall allow the antiquated machinery of past centuries to remain, or fit the work-shop of justice with every improvement for the prompt and certain administration of the law. This will not be a step into new and untried fields; it will only be following the lead of all the most progressive States, and of England, the birth-place of the common-law procedure. The spirit of law reform is abroad in the land. Pennsylvania has been almost as conservative as Virginia, but she is now proposing to throw off the yoke by abolishing the common-law forms of action and the distinction between courts of law and of equity.--Virginia Law Journal. The Albany Albany Law A ALBANY, MARCH 12, 1887. CURRENT TOPICS. FTER a hard and a close fight in the Assembly, the Civil Code, thanks to Mr. Ives' excellent and untiring management, secured exactly the twothirds vote necessary to enact it — sixty-five to forty-eight. It had been defeated the day before by fifty-nine in favor to fifty opposed. The vote divided the political parties and the lawyers in about equal proportions. A memorial drawn up by Mr. Edwards Pierpont, signed by him, and by Messrs. Wm. H. Arnoux, Roger A. Pryor, D. C. Calvin, George H. Yeaman, Roger Foster, John Frankenheimer and Robert Ludlow Fowler, and indorsed by Messrs. Leslie W. Russell, Cephas Branerd, Aaron J. Vanderpoel, Ethan Allen and Algernon S. Sullivan, has been addressed to the Legislature and the profession. This paper refers to a protest signed by about six hundred and fifty lawyers outside the city of New York - including at least one dead one- and very pertinently asks, where are the other four thousand or so? We ven ture to assert that not one-tenth of the signers had ever read the Code. We doubt that more than Mr. Justice Bradley has been amusing his leisure by devising a perpetual calendar (not for his court that was already devised) — to ascertain the day of the week of any date from the year one down to 2900 A. D., which seems long enough ahead for all practical purposes. We have consulted in vain however to ascertain on what day the Code is going to pass, and women are to be made voters, and morality is to get the upper hand of rum - the three needed reforms of our time. It is evident from a perusal of the " Report of the Third Annual Meeting of the Georgia Bar Association," held in August last, that that State, which is one having a general Civil Code, is so well satisfied with codification that it is disposed to make its practice conform to the New York model. The report of the special committee on delays in the administration of justice, by Mr. Walter B. Hill, chairman, is a very interesting document. It alleges that "the law's delay" was once indicted as a nuisance by the grand jury of Fulton county, the most populous and wealthy in that State. Mr. Hill says: "Some of the States in the Union have two separate systems of courts law and chancery. They are consistent in requiring the suitor to make a proper election. A majority of States of the Union have abolished the distinction entirely, and simply require the suitor to present his right, whether it was anciently recognized as legal or equitable, in a siraple form of action. The condition of pleading in Georgia by which the two systems are half-way merged, or rather by which they are entirely merged, from the common-law point of view, and kept wholly separate from the equitable point of view, is truly anomalous and inconsistent. The States of the Union which have adopted the system known as the "Code of Procedure," which provides for a simple form of action in every case, whether legal or equitable, are building up a system of procedure which is harmonious and efficient. Every State that has adopted the system is aided by the jurisprudence of every other State in which it is employed. On the other hand, those States which preserve the ancient distinction between two systems are building up systems of procedure in which the jurisprudence of each State is an aid to every other; but by our anomalous 'fish, flesh and fowl' admixture of the two systems, we deprive ourselves Eng-of the benefit of the jurisprudence of other States. We get no benefit whatever from the judicial labors of the American courts; nor indeed of the English courts, for England in 1873 utterly abolished the old English distinction, to which we are clinging with a half-way devotion." that proportion had ever seen it. Mr. Pierpont VOL. 35-No. 11. "The Law of the Land" is the title of an address delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Association in November last by Mr. Phelps, the American minister to England. It is an admirable production, and we wish we had space to republish it in this journal. Mr. Phelps says "that it is not |