of Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 234; S. C., 35 Am. Rep. 779, and note, 781; Calwell v. City of Boone, 51 Iowa, 647; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 153; Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98; S. C., 51 Am. Rep. 105; Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625; S. C., 51 Am. Rep. 857. Cities are universally held not to be liable for the neglect or misconduct of their police officers. Cities ought however to be held liable for the injurious consequences of acts, which they expressly authorize, as in this instance, and which are unnecessary, intrinsically dangerous, and inconvenient to the public. In Town of Rushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 476; S. C., 57 Am. Rep. 124, it was held that a municipal corporation is liable for a personal injury caused by the fright of a horse at a fire kindled in a street, in the conduct of a private business by the permission of the corporation. So for a licensed exhibition of bears in a street. Little v. Madison, 42 Wis. 643; S. C., 24 Am. Rep. 435. If liable for the consequences of a business, why not for a sport in the street?

A meeting was held in Lincoln's Inn Hall on January 29th to establish a society "to encourage the study and advance the knowledge of the English law." Lord Justice Fry presided, and the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Justice Lindley and Minister Phelps were present among others. Lord Justice Fry said: "Some of those present felt that unless an effort was made to found a society of the kind which was proposed, this country would fall behind in the race, as the Germans, and also our cousins on the other side of the Atlantic, were very busy with the early law of England. Those present all knew something of the works of Mr. Biglow and Mr. Holmes; and some of those connected with this movement were apprehensive that unless an effort was made they would be distanced altogether in the race." Minister Phelps said that "although he had given the best days of his life on the other side of the water to the profession of the law, he had not been fortunate enough to satisfy himself that he had attained any very great knowledge of it. But he had a great love for it, and a very great estimation of it for the part it had played in the civilization of the world. It had been the mainspring, the root, the enduring power of the best civilization, in his judgment, which the world had seen." The Lord Chief Justice said: "Any one who had had, as he had had for some years past, to administer a great system like that of the English law, must feel how important it was to know the history and the principles of law, to know the origin of practice, and to know what was the fountainhead of a principle which was to be applied, because it was only by the knowledge of history that they could be preserved from the misapplication of principles. He did not quite agree with the statement which had been made that up to the present time we had had so very little light thrown on the history of the law. It was not at all an uncommon mistake to think that if a book was clear and lu

minous, and threw a great deal of light on a subject, that it was of necessity a 'shallow' book. They had heard observations of that kind made upon our great legal commentator, Blackstone. He had, perhaps, hereditary reasons for admiring Blackstone, and he thought that few persons who knew, or had any idea of that state of confusion, almost of chaos, in which the history of English law was before Blackstone wrote his book, would be inclined to doubt that he threw a masterly light upon a subject which was entangled in darkness and obscurity. It might be that in particular things men had gone into the matter deeper than Blackstone, but it was to be observed that one of the most difficult and obscure points of the law of copyhold, in which Blackstone had differed from Lord Coke, was now supposed by most lawyers to have been rightly determined by Blackstone, and wrongly determined by Lord Coke. There were few competent persons who had studied the sources from which Blackstone had drawn his inspiration who did not acknowledge that we owed a deep debt of gratitude to that very considerable and most beautiful writer. The same kind of things might be said of another great man who had thrown a flood of light over the centuries, which before his time had been immersed in darkness - he meant Gibbon. He did not exaggerate when he said that the last editor of Gibbon a man of enormous learning had put a large number of notes to Gibbon's history, which had shown how much more accurate Gibbon was than those who had come since, and thought they detected inaccuracies here and there. It was in the hope that some such person might rise and make use of the materials which he hoped the society would bring to his hands that he heartily concurred in the movement which they had met to initiate that day. He thought Selden's was an admirable name with which to christen such a society. Selden was a mountain of learning, and was a man of great independence and nobility of mind and character, and although a person to whom ease and leisure was of great value, he had ventured into conflict with the powers of his time, and had distinguished himself by maintaining with moderation the true principles of liberty of all sorts. He had shown, by a book which was eminently readable, his Table Talk,' what a large field of learning he had traveled over, and from that field of learning how much he could deduce. All the works of Selden were the writings of a man of great learning and high character, and in the best sense of true liberality of mind." The society was founded under the name of the "Selden Society," and a provisional committee was appointed, comprising the American minister, Lord Chief Justice, Lord Justice Fry, Mr. Justice Wills, Mr. Cookson, Q. C., Mr. Meadows White, Q. C., Professor A. V. Dicey, Professor W. W. Skeet, Professor F. Pollock, Mr. R. Campbell, Mr. Hyde Clarke, Mr. H. W. Elphinstone, Mr. C. Trice Martin, Mr. Stuart Moore; secretary and treasurer, Mr. P. E. Dove.

EV

NOTES OF CASES.

VEN the Central Law Journal, which does not always see the point of a joke, must confess that we have found a really funny case this week. The case of Jones v. Barron, tried before Mr. Justice Stephen and a jury on February 15th, was to recover 831. for goods supplied to the defendant by the plaintiffs. The defendant pleaded infancy, and alleged that the goods in question were not necessaries. The plaintiffs are a firm of military tailors, and the defendant was aged nineteen and a pupil at a military tutor's. For the defense it was contended that the defendant's father supplied his son with ample money for his requirements, and had also authorized him to deal with a tailor whom the father knew, and whose account he would settle. It was submitted that upon the authority of the case of Barnes v. Toye, L. R., 13 Q. B. Div. 410, the defendant was not liable for any of the things supplied to him by the plaintiffs, which he could have obtained from that tailor. In this category were all the charges for tailoring, viz., 167. 168., as well as the three flannel suits amounting to 147. 108. As to the other articles, viz., two striped dressing jackets with trousers, ordered on the same day, 9l. 48.; cigar case, 21. 88.; two scarf-pins, 17. 48.; six silk shirts, 107. 78.; 18 pairs of gloves, averaging 68. each pair; 17 scarves, at 48. to 5s. apiece; and six pairs of silk socks, 5l., it was submitted that they were wholly or in part unnecessary for a lad in the position of the defendant. The judge in summing up said the first point raised upon the defendant's behalf was that all the out-of-door clothes, and also the three flannel suits, ought to have been got elsewhere; in fact that they were not necessary because other provision for their supply had been provided for the defendant. Upon this point the case of Barnes v. Toye was cited, where in substance it was laid down that where a tradesman deals with any one, however bona fide, he does so at his peril, and takes his chance as to whether or not his custo

mer is an infant. This appeared to be the law upon this point of the case, and applying it here it was said by the defendant's counsel that all the charges for tailor-made articles — amounting to 167. 168.- and also the three flannel suits, which, it was said, a tailor might equally well have supplied amounting to 147. 108.-must be taken to be goods with which the defendant was "already supplied," and therefore within this ruling, because his father, it was said, had made arrangements with his son to obtain all such articles at Mr. Winchester's, the tailor. Of course if the jury adopted this view, and believed that at the time of the order of these particular articles the defendant was, in the above sense, sufficiently supplied with them, it would be a complete answer to so much of the plaintiffs' claim. Then there was the second category of items, which were said on the defendant's behalf to be unnecessary - either wholly or partially with regard to quantity within the limited period of twelve months. It was quite impossible for him to give

them any definition of the meaning of "necessaries," and he would not attempt to do so. It had been sometimes argued that ornaments were not "necessaries," but no doubt there might be cases where there were. Again, as to those two dressingsuits, were they "necessaries?" He supposed they were intended to be worn by the defendant while he was dressing. He must confess he personally found it quite enough bother to dress himself once every morning without first dressing in one suit to be worn while he dressed in a second. However, all men were not alike; some never wore gloves at all, while most did. In dealing therefore with these particular articles, they must exercise their own common-sense as to whether they were necessary or not, and to what extent as to quantity, looking to the circumstances and the position of the defendant. The jury gave a verdict for 477. 98. 1d. It is evident that they threw out some of those luxurious articles—whether the cigar-case or scarfpins, we cannot tell. But what a Spartan the learned judge must be to dress without being dressed!

If we remember right, Mr. Moak and the Law Quarterly Review made a criticism upon Mr. Baker's definition of "moral certainty" in his proposed Code of Evidence. To these critics we commend the reasoning of Chief Justice Gray in Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1. He says: "The phrase 'moral certainty' has been introduced into our jurisprudence from the publicists and metaphysicians, and signifies only a very high degree of probability. It was observed by Pufendorf that 'when we declare such a thing to be morally certain, because it has been confirmed by creditable witnesses, this moral certitude is nothing else but a strong presumption grounded on probable reasons, and which very seldom fails and deceives us.' Law of Nature and Nations (Eng. ed. 1749), book 1, ch. 2, § 11. 'Probable evidence,' says Bishop Butler in the opening sentence of his Analogy,' 'is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees, and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty to the very lowest presumption.' Proof beyond a reasonable doubt' is not beyond all possible or imaginary doubt, but such proof as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support. It is proof to a moral certainty,' as distinguished from an absolute certainty. As applied to a judicial trial for crime, the two phrases are synonymous and equivalent; each has been used by eminent judges to explain the other; and each signifies such proof as satisfies the judgment and consciences of the jury, as reasonable men, and applying their reason to the evidence before them, that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant, and so satisfies them as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible. Accordingly, in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, in which the jury were instructed that the burden of proof was on the prosecutor, and that they must be satisfied to a reasonable and moral

certainty that the defendant had committed the murder for which he was indicted, Chief Justice Shaw concluded this part of his charge as follows: If, upon such proof, there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon consideration of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether. See also Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 14 Gray, 55. Baron Parke, in a case tried before him, expressed the same thought conversely, thus: 'Such a moral certainty as convinces the minds of the tribunal, as reasonable men, beyond all reasonable doubt.' Regina v. Sterne, cited in Best on Ev., § 95, and 3 Greenl. Ev., § 29."

BOYCOTTING.

avail ourselves of Mr. Clarence A. Seward's

cannot protect them." * * "One of the aims of the common law has always been to protect every person against the wrongful acts of every other person, whether committed alone or in combination with others; and it has provided an action for injuries done by disturbing a person in the enjoyment of any right or privilege which he has. Many illustrations of this doctrine are given in Bac. Ab. Action on the case, F., among which are the following: 'If A., being a mason, and using to sell stones, is possessed of a certain stone-pit, and B., intending to discredit it and deprive him of the profits of the said mine, imposes so great threats upon his workmen, and disturbs all comers, threatening to maim and vex them with suits if they buy any stones, so that some desist from working and others from buying, A. shall have an action upon the case against B., for the profit of his mine is thereby impaired.' So 'if a man menaces my tenants at will of life and member, per quod, they depart from their tenures, an action upon the case lies against him.' 'If a man discharges guns near my decoy-pond with design to damnify me by frightening away the wild fowl resorting thereto, and the wild fowl are thereby frightened away, and I am damnified, an action on the case lies against him.' Slander as to one's profession or title is a wrong of a similar character. The illustrations given in former times relate to such methods of doing injury to others as were then practiced, and to the kinds of remedy

Kenna (the opinion in which we published last week), to give a summary of the adjudications on the point in question.

An action in the nature of a conspiracy is given by the common law if the plaintiff has sustained special damage. Saddle v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 378.

A leading case upon such a cause of action is that of Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 6 M. & G. 205, which was an action on the case for conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff, who was an actor, from acquiring fame and profit, and for hiring persons to hoot and groan and yell at the plaintiff during the performance, and for hooting, hissing and yelling at him, and in which the defendant pleaded specially; and the court held their principal plea insufficient, and gave judgment for the plaintiff.

The principle of this case was confirmed in Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Everest, 30 Hun, 588, in which the court said: "Any unlawful act done with a view of injuring another in his reputation, business or property, is actionable if damage results therefrom." And that a conspiracy "consists in the unlawful combination or agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act in itself, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means." In Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 10, Chapman, C. J., said: "If the wrongful acts done are tortious, whether criminal or not, the persons who are guilty of the tortious acts will be civilly liable to those whom they have injured; if the defendants have injured the plaintiff unlawfully the articles of association

to others are invented in modern times, the same principles must be applied to them, in order that peaceable citizens may be protected from being disturbed in the enjoyment of their rights and privileges, and existing forms of remedy must be used." In Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 502, the court states the general principle taken from Comyn's Digest as follows: "In all cases where a man has a temporal loss or damage by the wrong of another he may have an action upon the case, to be repaired in damages." And it therefore held that an action of tort might be maintained upon a count which alleged that the plaintiff was a manufacturer of shoes, and for the prosecution of his business it was necessary for him to employ many shoemakers; that the defendant, well knowing this, did unlawfully, and without justifiable cause, molest him in the carrying on of the said business with the unlawful purpose of preventing him from carrying it on, and willfully induced many shoemakers who were in his employment, and others who were about to enter it, to abandon it without his consent and against his will; and that thereby the plaintiff lost their services and the profits of those which he would have derived therefrom, and was put to great expense to procure other suitable workmen, and compelled to pay larger prices for work than he would have had to pay but for the said doings of the defendants, and was otherwise injured in his business. In Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Monroe, 12, an action was maintained for enticing away workmen from their employment for a pianoforte manufacturer.

They were not hired for any limited time, but worked by the piece. The discussion indicates that damages were considered to be recoverable for the breaking up or disturbance of the business of the plaintiff, whereby he suffered the loss of his usual profits for a long period. The grounds of damages were apparently regarded as altogether independent of the mere loss of any contracts with the workmen.

In Bowing v. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333, it was stated that an action would lie against a third person who maliciously induces another to break his contract of exclusive personal service with an employer, which thereby would naturally cause, and did in fact cause an injury to such employer.

Where two or more persons unite or combine for the express purpose of doing an injury to a man's trade, business or calling, their joint conduct is a tort in the nature of a conspiracy, and is actionable as such. It has been expressly held that such combinations as are alleged in the complaint and affidavits are illegal and wrongful conspiracies, for which, if damage results, an action will lie.

In People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 10, a conspiracy of journeymen workmen, of any trade or handicraft, to raise their wages by entering into combinations to coerce journeymen of master workmen employed in the same trade or business, to conform to rules established by such combination for the purpose of regulating the price of labor, and carrying such rules into effect by overt acts, was indictable as a misdemeanor.

* * *

In the Master Stevedores' Association v. Walsh, 2 Daly, 1, 3, it was said: "It has frequently been held that combinations to prevent a journeyman from working below certain rates or to prevent master workmen from employing one except at certain rates are unlawful. * *Parties engaged in such combination may be indicted for conspiracy. Several convictions in this country have been in cases where coercive measures were resorted to, either to prevent master workmen from employing journeymen except at certain rates, or to intimidate journeymen from engaging below certain rates, or to compel them to become members of the combination. Every man has the right to fix the price of his own labor, to work for whom he pleases, and for any sum he thinks proper; and every master workman has equally the right to determine for himself whom he will employ, and what wages he will pay. Any attempt by force, threat, intimidation or other coercive means to control a man in the fair and lawful exercise of these rights is therefore an act of oppression, and any combination for such a purpose is a conspiracy."

In Johnston Co. v. Meinhart, 9 Abb. N. C. 393; S. C., 24 Hun, 489; 60 How. Pr. 168, the court said, when referring to chapter 19 of the Laws of 1870, that "this statute does not permit an association, or trades unions so called, or any body of men in the aggregate, to do any act which each one of such persons, in his individual capacity and acting independently, had not a right to do before the

act was passed. This act does not shield a person from liability for his action in intimidating or coercing a fellow laborer so that he shall leave his employer's service. Such conduct is in its nature a trespass upon the rights of business of the employer. If he compels by assaults or violence, by threats, by acts of coercion, a fellow-craftsman to leave the employment of another he commits an offense against the rights of such persons which is hardly distinguishable from an act which could itself injure or destroy the product of a man's labor. It is a direct injury to property rights, and may be regarded as the sole proximate cause of such injury. It is the duty of courts to hold alike the employer and the employed for the payment of damages for any violation of contract, and to a responsibility for any acts which immediately and in a legal sense affect the rights of the other.

* * *

In State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151, it was held that it was an indictable conspiracy for several employees to combine and notify their employer that unless he discharges certain enumerated persons, they will in a body quit his employment, the court saying that the alleged aim of the combination was unlawful, the effort being to dictate to the employer whom he should discharge from his employment, and that this was an unwarrantable interference with the conduct of his business.

In Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; S. C., 22 Am. Rep. 475, it was held that when the relation of mas, ter and servant exists by virtue of a valid contract, the master may maintain an action on the case against any person who knowingly and willfully induces the servant to break the contract and abandon the service. When the element of malice enters a case a more liberal rule of damages prevails, and the jury, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the wrong, ought to give as compensation what in their judgment it is reasonable that the plaintiff should receive and the defendant pay. Being intended as a compensation for a wrong, and not as a punishment for the violation of a criminal law, the damages are not open to the objection that they expose the defendant to a double punishment.

In Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 780, it was held that any third person, who without lawful justification induces a party, who for a consideration has contracted to render personal service to another, to quit such service, and refuse to perform his part of the agreement, is liable to the parties injured in damages. That the consideration of the contract is too small, or its terms not honorable, will not justify a court, for the benefit of a third person and not a party thereto, in setting such contract aside.

In Jones v. Jeter, 43 Ga. 331, it was held that where one man employs a laborer to work on his farm, and another man, knowing of such contract of employment, entices and hires or persuades the laborer to leave the services of his first employer during the term for which he was so employed, the law gives to the party injured the right of action to recover damages.

In Dixon v. Dixon, 33 La. Ann., 1261, the defendants were held liable in damages to the plaintiff for having, by threats, persuasion and otherwise, induced the laborers on the latter's plantation to abandon their work and violate their contract of employment, by which fact the plantation was left uncultivated.

Boycotting, as such, is actionable if private and particular damage is shown. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 15 Q. B. Div. 476.

In Baughman v. Richmond Typographical Union, Richmond, Va., Circuit Court, Feb. 8, 1887, an action on the case to recover $30,000 damages for boycotting the plaintiffs' business, Judge Wellford, among other things, said: "As another ground of demurrer, it was suggested that the damages alleged to have been sustained were too remote and uncertain. This objection is clearly untenable. The declaration does not allege damage merely by the prevention of a probable future trade, but by the destruction of an existing profitable trade. There is no element of speculation or contingency involved in the present loss of a valuable patronage. The circular of the defendants addressed every customer as a patron, and clearly contemplated his withdrawal of his dealings with the plaintiffs as an immediate damage to their business. The declaration alleges such damage as the cause of action, and I think, if proven to the satisfaction of a jury, it is sufficient. I am therefore of opinion that the demurrer should be overruled." In a criminal case against the committee of the same union, decided at the same time, Judge Alkins says: "It is contended by counsel for defense that the threats used by the conspirators in the case at bar are not illegal threats, and therefore the means by which the conspiracy is to be carried out are not unlawful. The threats in this case were that the conspirators would do all in their power to break up and destroy the business of the parties to whom the threats were addressed, unless they would do something which they had a lawful right not to do. Are those lawful threats? Has any man, or set of men, the legal right to say to an American citizen: Do as we dictate, or we will ruin you? The enjoyment of life and liberty with the means of acquiring aud possessing property is one of the inherent rights guaranteed to every citizen of this Commonwealth by the bill of rights. The privileges cannot be taken away or abridged except in accordance with law. No class of men can take the law into their own hands. In this case the threat is to break up and destroy the business of the customers of Baughman Brothers. This is an illegal threat, because it is a threat to destroy a right guaranteed to them by the bill of rights. This is a threat to do an injury to a stranger unless he will do an injury to Baughman Brothers, against whom he has no cause of complaint. This is a threat to a party that unless he will co-operate with the conspirators and assist them to injure, ruin, break up and destroy the business of Baughman Brothers, that they will do all in their power to break up and destroy his busi

ness.

Even though they meant that they would break up and destroy the business of the customers by competition, yet if those threats were intended and reasonably calculated to have the effect of intimidating or forcing the person to whom they were made into doing an act injurious to another, which it was his will and legal right not to do, they are unlawful."

In the case of Payne v. Railroad Co., 13 Tenn. 521, it was held that "if the defendants, by means of threats and intimidations,' have driven away plaintiffs' customers, and thus destroyed his trade, they have injured him by an unlawful act, and are liable to him in damages, whether they did it wickedly and maliciously or not. For it is unlawful to threaten and intimidate one's customers; and the loss of trade is the natural and proximate result of such acts."

"Combinations of artisans for their common benefit, or for the development of skill in their trade, or to prevent overcrowding therein, or to encourage those belonging to their trade to enter their guild, or for the purpose of raising prices, are valid, provided no force or other unlawful means be employed to carry out their acts, or their objects be not to impoverish third persons, or to extort money from employers, or to encourage strikes or breaches of contract, or to restrict the freedom of members for the purpose of compelling employers to conform to their rules." Greenhood on Public Policy, 648, citing authorities in support of these rules, and the language of East, J., in Ridge v. Rollins, 17 A. & E. (N. S.) 671, as follows: "The rights of workmen are conceded, but the exercise of free will and freedom of action within the limits of the law is also secured equally to the masters."

To Mr. Seward's authorities we may add Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 415. The eighteen defendants, journeymen tailors, working for the plaintiff by the piece, by conspiracy stopped work simultaneously, and returned their work to the plaintiff unfinished, and worthless in that condition. The plaintiff was unable to get hands to finish it. Held, that an action for damage would lie. This is founded on Jones v. Baker, 7 Cow. 455. Compare Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 373.

There is a learned article on this topic in the current number of The Journal of Jurisprudence and Scottish Law Magazine."