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drawal from the case, with the accompanying instruction, cured the error. It is true, in some instances, there may be such strong impressious made upon the minds of a jury by illegal and improper testimony that its subsequent withdrawal will not remove the effect caused by its admission; and in that case the original objection may avail on appeal or writ of error. But such instances are exceptional. The trial of a case is not to be suspended, the jury discharged, a new one summoned, and the evidence retaken, when an error in the admission of testimony can be corrected by its withdrawal, with proper instructions from the court to disregard it. We think the present case one of that kind. State v. May, 4 Dev. 330; Goodnow v. Hill, 125 Mass. 589; Smith v. Whitman, 6 Allen, 562; Hawes v. Gustin, 2 id. 125; Dillin v. People, 8 Mich. 369; Specht v. Howard, 16 Wall. 564. (3) The instruction to the jury, which is the subject of exception, relates to the meaning of the words "reasonable doubt," which should control them in their decision. The following is that portion which bears upon this subject: "The court charges you that the law presumes the defendant innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That if you can reconcile the evidence before you upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence, you should do so, and in that case find him not guilty. You are further instructed that you cannot find the defendant guilty unless, from all the evidence, you believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further charges you that a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, and which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. And if after an impartial comparison and consideration of all the evidence, you can candidly say that you are not satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if after such impartial comparison and consideration of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt." The word "abiding" here has the siguification of "settled and fixed," a conviction which may follow a careful examination and comparison of the whole evidence. It is diffiult to conceive what amount of conviction would leave the mind of a juror free from a reasonable doubt, if it be not one which is so settled and fixed as to control the action in the more weighty and important matters relating to his own affairs. Out of the domain of the exact sciences and actual observation, there is no absolute certainty. The guilt of the accused, in the majority of criminal cases, must necessarily be deduced from a variety of circumstances leading to proof of the fact. Persons of speculative minds may in almost every such case suggest possibilities of the truth being different from that established by the most couvincing proof. The jurors are not to be led away by speculative notions as to such possibilities. Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 320. In Com. v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1, it was there also said that an instruction to the jury that they should be satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, had often been held sufficient, without further explanation. In many cases it may undoubtedly be sufficient. It is simple, and as a rule to guide the jury is as intelligible to them generally as any which could be stated, with respect to the conviction they should have of the defeudant's guilt to justify a verdict against him. But in many instances, especially where the case is at all complicated, some explanation or illustration of the rule may aid in its full and just comprehension. As a matter of fact, it has been the general practice in this country of courts holding criminal trials to give such explanation or illustration. The rule may be, and often is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition, which

serve to create doubts instead of removing them. But an illustration like the one given in this case, by reference to the conviction upon which the jurors would act in the weighty and important concerns of life, would be likely to aid them to a right conclusion, when an attempted definition might fail. If the evidence produced be of such a convincing character that they would unhesitatingly be governed by it in such weighty and important matters, they may be said to have no reasonable doubt respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, notwithstanding the uncertainty that attends all human evidence. The instruction in the case before us is as just a guide to practical men as can well be given; and if it were open to criticism, it could not have misled the jury, when considered in connection with the further charge, that if they could reconcile the evidence with any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence, they should do so, and in that case find him not guilty. The evidence must satisfy the judgment of the jurors as to the guilt of the defendant, so as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion. The instruction is not materially different from that given by Lord Tenterden, as repeated and adopted by Chief Baron Pollock, in Rex. v. Muller. "I have heard," said the chief baron, addressing the jury, "the late Lord Tenterden frequently lay down a rule which I will pronounce to you in his own language: It is not necessary that you should have a certainty which does not belong to any human transaction whatever. It is only necessary that you should have that certainty with which you should transact your own most important concerns in life.' No doubt the question before you to-day-involving as it does the life of the prisoner at the bar-must be deemed to be of the highest importance; but you are only required to have that degree of certainty with which you decide upon and conclude your own most important transactions in life. To require more would be really to prevent the repression of crime, which it is the object of criminal courts to effect." 4 Fost. & F. 388, 389, note. We are satisfied that the defendant was in no way prejudiced by the instructions of the court. (4) On the final argument to the jury, the counsel for the prosecution alluded to the case as the most remarkable one ever tried in the territory, and to "the many times it had been brought before the tribunals." To this latter remark exception was taken. Thereupon the remark was withdrawn by the counsel, and the court said to the jury that the case was to be tried on the evidence, and that they were not to consider it with respect to any previous trial, but only on the evidence given on this trial. The counsel for the defendant now contends that this

allusion was in contravention of that section of the act of the territory regulating proceedings in criminal cases, which declares that "the granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had," and that "all the testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict cannot be used or referred to either in evidence or in argument." Laws Utah 1878, p. 126, § 317. The object of this law was to prevent the accused from being prejudiced by reference to any former conviction on the same indictment. There was, in fact, no reference to any verdict on a previous trial, but merely a mention of the times the case had been before the courts, so as to magnify its importance. If allusions to previous trials, such as were made, were to vitiate a subsequent trial, a new element of uncertainty would be introduced into the administration of justice in criminal cases. We do not see that the defendant was in any way prejudiced by such reference. The fact that previous trials had proved unavailing may perhaps have induced greater care and caution on the part of the jury in the

consideration of the oa se. March 7, 1887. Hopt v People. Opinion by Field, J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

CARRIERS-OF GOODS-CONNECTING RAILROAD LINES. -A contract for the shipment of live-stock was made by using a printed blank, Following an acknowledgment of the receipt of the stock by the carrier were the printed words, "To be delivered at *

and here were inserted in writing the words, "Consigned to T., B. & Co., Chicago, Ill. The further agreement was expressed, that where stock should pass over more than one road to reach its destination, the company upon whose road any dainage should occur should alone be liable therefor. This contract construed as not being an agreement on the part of the carrier to transport the stock to Chicago, if in fact its line of transportation did not extend to that point. The prevailing rule of law in this country is that a common carrier receiving goods to be transported over several lines, including his own, is not responsible for the negligence of other carriers in the route beyond his own line, unless he has specially contracted to transport the property to its destination; and that receiving goods marked for a place beyond its own terminus does not import an undertaking to carry to the destination named. Lawrence v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 15 Minn. 390, 402 (Gil. 313); Irish v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 19 Minn. 376 (Gil. 323); Burroughs v. Norwich & W. R. Co., 100 Mass. 26; Hadd v. United States & C. Exp. Co., 52 Vt. 335; Root v. Great Western R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524; and numerous cases cited in 3 Wood Ry. Law, 1573, note. In view of the general rule of construction which subordinates the printed terms of a contract, retained in a blank form, to the written terms inserted by the parties, when the two are inconsistent or meaningless when read together, it is at least doubtful whether the first part of this contract, if standing alone, could be fairly read in any other way than this: "Received of Peter Ortt two cars live-stock, as per margin, consigned to Tomlinson, Burkhart & Co., Chicago, Ill." But without now deciding that the words "to be delivered at should be rejected if the defendant's obligation were not otherwise defined, it seems to us apparent that this contract cannot be construed as an undertaking to carry beyond the defendant's line, when the express limitation of its responsibility to its own line is considered. There is nothing in this case to oppose the operative effect, as a part of the contract, of the provision exonerating the defendant from responsibility for the acts or omissions of other carriers. The legal inconsistency of an obligation assumed by contract to transport property, as a common carrier, beyond the carrier's own line. and of exemption, by the terms of the same contract, from the responsibility for negligence which attaches to that relation, is obvious. Our conclusion is, that under this contract the defendant did not undertake to carry the property beyond its own line. Minn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 4, 1887 Ortt v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. Opinion by L.ckin son, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS -LICENSE TO SELL COUPONS.-A statute requiring persons selling coupons cut from Virginia bonds to pay a license therefor, and imposing a tax of twenty per cent on the face value of coupons so sold, payable by the seller, is not unconstitutional. In 1876 the Legislature passed an act imposing a tax on the bonds, and requiring the tax to be deducted from the coupons when tendered by parties other than the holders of the bonds in payment of their taxes or other dues to

the State. And this act was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, to be unconstitutional. But that court did not decide, directly or indirectly, that the State had surrendered its right to tax either the bonds or the coupons. Nevertheless for the defendant in error it is contended that that court in that case decided that the State could not tax the coupons; that they were a non-taxable article; and that it had repeatedly decided that the tax on the business of selling an article is a tax on the article itself; citing Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Webber v. Virginia, 103 id. 350-and from these and like decisious assuming that taxing the business of selling the coupons is a tax on the coupons themselves; therefore the State cannot tax the business of selling them. If the premise was correct the conclusion would also be correct. The premise however is not correct. That court did not decide that the State could not tax the coupons. A brief examination of Hartman v. Greenhow will demonstrate the accuracy of our position. That case arose under the said act of 1876. The decision amounted to this, and nothing more: "That the Virginia act of 1876, requiring the tax on the bonds issued under the funding act of 1871 to be deducted from the coupons originally attached to them, when tendered in payment of taxes or other dues to the State, cannot be applied to coupons separated from the bonds, and held by different owners, without impairing the contract with such bondholders contained in the funding act and the contract with the bearer of the coupons.' See 102 U. S. 685. So far was the Supreme Court of the United States from deciding that the State could not impose a tax on the bouds, or on the coupons, that it expressly declined so to decide. In that case (102 U. S. 683) the court says: "The power of the State to impose a tax on her own obligations is a subject upon which there has been a difference of opinion among jurists aud statesmen. * ** In the case of Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, there are many pertinent and just observations on this subject, which it is not material to repeat, for the question is not necessarily involved in the case before us." And in the case referred to, at page 445, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Strong, said: "Is then property which consists in the promise of a State or of a municipality of a State beyond the reach of taxation? We do not affirm that it is. A State may undoubtedly tax any of its crediors within its jurisdiction for the debt due to him, and regulate the amount of the tax by the rate of interest the debt bears, if its promise remains untouched. A tax thus laid impairs no obligation assumed. It leaves the contract untouched." This language of the Supreme Court is of no doubtful import, nor can it be strained from its one plain meaning. Certainly then it cannot be successfully contended that in either Murray v. Charleston or Hartman v. Greenhow it was held that the State cannot put a tax on her obligations-either a direct tax or an indirect tax by taxing the business of selling those obligations. And it is safe to predict that no such decision can or will ever be made, except in instances where the State attempts to impose a tax on property beyond her jurisdict onal limits, or where the State has expressly or impliedly contracted not to impose such a tax, because it is a settled doctrine that the power of taxation, being vast in its character and searching in its extent, embraces necessarily all subjects within the jurisdictional limits of the State, and that these subjects of taxation are persons, property and business. As applied to them, the power of taxation may be exercised in a variety of ways, and may touch property in every shape, and business in the almost infinite variety of forms in which it is con

ducted-in professions, in commerce, in manufacture, and in transportation. And unless restrained by some provision of the Federal Constitution-the power of the State-as to the mode, form and extent of taxation, is unlimited where the subject to which it applies are within its jurisdiction. See Cleveland, P. & A. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 320. In a word then the power of taxation is a part of the legislative sovereignty of the State. It existed when the bonds and coupons were issued; they having in fact been issued subject to this power of taxation, which was not in any way released or surrendered by their issuance, and being the lex temporis, is part and parcel of the bond and coupon contract. If this power of taxation was not expressly reserved, it matters not, for it need not be reserved; it exists and remains always, unless yielded up. See Cooley Tax. 54, note 2. Then what though the tax imposed on the business of selling the coupons be a tax on the coupons themselves? The State is entitled to tax all persons, property and business within its jurisdiction. The business is done, or proposed to be done, here, within the jurisdiction of the State; and that business is a legitimate subject of taxation. How then can it be said that the statute of 1883-4, which imposes a tax on the doing of the business of selling the coupons, is beyond the limits of the constitutional legislative powers of the State, and void. Va. Sup. Ct. App., Feb. 10, 1887. Commonwealth v. Maury. Opinion by Richardson, J. WILL-CONDITION -IF OPPOSE PROBATE MUST PAY COSTS.— “If any or either of my children shall enter a caveat against this my will, he or they shall pay all expenses of both sides," is a good condition in a will, without a gift over or against a devise taking real estate under the will. Conditions in wills against disputing their validity with the consequences of forfeiture of bequests, or devises therein, if broken, have often been considered in the courts with attempts at artificial distinction between legacies of personal property and of real estate, and whether there be probable cause for contesting the will, probabilis causa litigandi, and any gift over or not. It is said that conditions subsequent as to gifts of personalty are, infaccordance with the rule of the civil law, held to be void, in terrorem, merely, if there be no gift over; but if there be a gift over the condition is good, such gift over being sufficient evidence that they were not meant to be in terrorem only. But it has been held also that this doctrine of the necessity of a gift over has never been applied to devises of real estate. Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90; Lloyd v. Spillet, 3 P. Wms. 344; Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Atk. 404; Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio, 546; Chew's Appeal, 45 Penn. St. 228; Jarman Wills (R. & T. ed.), 582; 2 Wms. Exrs. 1146; 2 Redf. Wills, p. 298, § 34; Theobald Wills, 452-455. Under the case of Cook v. Turner, 15 M. & W. 727; S. C., 14 Sim. 493, a condition for revocation, if the devisee shall dispute the will, is valid by law. Upon another and a broader principle of equity the appellee should not be allowed to defeat the intention of the testator that there should be no litigation over his will at the expense of the estate, or, in this case, at the expense of his widow, the legatee of the portion of his property charged with the payment of debts and expenses. This is not strictly the doctrine of election between repugnant gifts, but a rule of equitable construction that a person cannot accept and reject the same instrument, and that there is an implied condition that he who accepts a benefit under it shall adopt the whole by conforming to all its provisions. This is the rule on which the doctrine of election is founded. Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303; Gretton v. Haward, 1 Swants. 409; Dillon v. Parker, id. 394; Streatfield v. Streatfield, Cas. t. Talb. 183; 1 Lead. Cases Equity, W. & T. 273; 2 Story

Eq. 1077. This devisee has opposed the intention of the testator by disputing his will and casting the burden of the expense of litigation on the estate, thus holding the full amount of his legacy under the will, without any diminution or compen ation for his breach of this condition. It is not a case of forfeiture by the terms of the will but one for compensation out of the fund received by him from the testator, which must be met, unless there be some exception from the abovecited general equitable rule, by which he may keep what he has received and defy the purpose of the giver. N. J. Ct. Errors & Appeals. Nov. 2, 1886. Hoit v. Hoit. Opinion by Scudder, J.

EXECUTION - MARK -FOOT OR END.- A testator two days before his death, being paralyzed on one side and partly speechless, intimated to the two medical men in attendance on him his desire to make a will. They interpreted his wishes by signs and wrote them down on a card. He executed the document by making his mark, which however appeared in the middle of the writing, and they then put their initials as witnesses at the back. Subsequently, after a conversation with one of the testator's relatives, they returned to his room, and telling him that they had taken on themselves more responsibility than they ought to have taken,and that what they had written must be regarded as a memorandum, they erased their initials at the back. The testator seemed to acquiesce in this, but the card was found after his death in a handbag which he kept near his bed, and there was evidence that he had shown it to the lady whom he intended it to benefit, telling her it was for her, and wished her to take it. Held, that the card constituted a valid testamentary paper duly witnessed, expressing the intentions of the deceased, and that what passed at the erasure of the witnesses' initials did not amount to a revocation; but that it was not signed at the "foot or end" within the meaning of the statute, and was therefore not duly executed and not entitled to probate. Margary v. Robinson, 12 P. Div. 8.

THE JOYS OF THE JURYMAN.

THE Mauritius juryman appears to be about as unfortunate a person as the Cape Colony witness, judging from the sketch of him contained in a Mauritius paper, the Mercantile Record, just to hand. The juryman of Mauritius (says the Record), is a person who enjoys exceptional advantages. He is not always rich. More frequently he is rather poor. But he eujoys the privilege of being invited to the metropolis twice, and sometimes thrice, every year, and he enjoys the still greater privilege of paying his own expenses, while on the visit. It should however be understood that the Mauritius juryman, when summoned to attend a levee at the Supreme Court, is not always quite prepared to meet the expense of the trip. His banking account may be overdrawn; or he may not have a banking account at all; or he may be a day laborer who when he lies down at night is sometimes kept awake an hour or two by thinking where the next day's breakfast is to come from. This favored individual suddenly receives the much-dreaded invitation, issued in the name of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, to repair to Port Louis on a given day. He is further informed, that when he arrives there, he will be told what he has to do; he is also informed, that if he does not promptly respond to the invitation, he will be fined one hundred rupees. Well; as he has not got a hundred cents much less one hundred rupees to spare, our jury man puts in an appearance. But before he can do that, he has to enter certain commercial arrangements with certain people. And mark this, although the remarks now being made may appear to

be written in a strain of levity, they are penned in lucky person if he have a trifle to spare for a bed and sober earnestness - being true.

son.

Our juryman has received his summons; he resides in a remote part of the island; and he lives "from hand to mouth." His house is four, six or eight miles distant from a railway station. But that difficulty can be overcome. He has only to rise early, go without his breakfast, walk the requisite number of miles, and catch the first train. For, mind you, he must be at the court at ten A. M.. although the judges, the procureur-general, and other high functionaries do not, as a rule, appear much before eleven o'clock. But we must remember that the Rs. 100 penalty, for late attendance, does not affect them. It is only the thirtysix jurymen upon whom the privilege of paying Rs. 100 each for late or non-attendance has been conferred. If a man happens to live in a remote corner of Savanne - say at Baie du Cap; or upon the slopes of Long Mountain, so much the better. The self-sacrifice involved in a ten-mile walk to the nearest railway station merely enhances the value of the service he is about to render to the State. But before leaving home, he has to summon a committee to discuss the important financial question of "ways and means." In the case now under consideration that committee will as a rule be composed of the juryman and wife. Or the juryman, being an important officer of State, may assume the responsibility of forming a committee in his own proper, and for the time being, legal perHe is a minister of justice, and in virtue of his sublime office is entitled to sit down and decide how he can best provide a handful or two of rice and a scrap of salt fish, wherewith to satisfy the cravings of the half-dozen, or so, hungry mouths he knows he must leave behind him, perhaps for a week. For you see, the Juryman may be a poor man, or an improvident man, and when he thrusts his hands into his trouser's pockets may not always be able to find money. But he is, for the moment, an important personage. He is perhaps about to share in the functions of a chief judge who draws Rs. 20,000 a year. He may come under the notice of the procureur and advocategeneral, who also draws a fat salary. Even the counsel for the defense, who may or may not be paid for his work, will glance at him, and if he does not like his appearance, will tell him to go away. Then there is quite an army of clerks, ushers, and policemen, not one of whom appears to have any thing to do, with whom he will be associated if being cooped up in an uncomfortable thing like a sheep-pen can be called association — for the time being. He may also enjoy the inestimable privilege of being secure for a few hours, from the polite attentions of unfortunate creditors. It is even doubtful whether the procureurgeneral would allow a man to be arrested upon a charge of manslaughter when once he has got him securely penned in a jury box. But the juryman enjoys still further privileges. When the court rises at one o'clock, and the judge retires to enjoy his sherry and biscuit in his chambers, the juryman is placed in charge of an usher, who very politely permits him to enjoy himself in the following way: He may go into a dirty room and sit upon a dirty table - there are no chairs or, if he prefers doing so, may descend into a still dirtier yard and regale himself upon stale tarts and ginger beer, that is to say, if he can afford to pay for those luxuries. He is also permitted to smoke until called upon to resume his duties. Allusion has been made to the trouble to which an impecunious juryman is put in order to provide food for his wife and family during his absence. But there is also another consideration. He has to raise a few shillings for the payment of his railway fare. For although he is travelling on "Her Majesty's Service," he has to pay for his passage. Having done that, he will be a

a little food. Some jurymen have friends in town, upon whom they unhesitatingly quarter themselves. If they are not so fortunate they go to a lodging-house —those who can pay-and if they have neither friends nor money, the streets are open to them to lie down in, the only risk they incur by so doing being that of being hauled off to the lock-up by some enthusiastic policeman, newely enlisted. This supperless lying in the streets business, and rising without breakfast to assist the chief judge in the performance of his important and well-paid-for duties, is no mere stretch of the imagination. It is a sober matter of fact. The thing has occurred more than once lately, and the incidents are again mentioned for the information of those whose duty it is to render the recurrence of such things impossible.-Cape (of Good Hope) Times.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RULE OF PRIMA FACIE EVI

DENCE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The following statute has just been enacted by the Legislature of Maine: "The payment of the United States special tax, as a liquor seller, or notice of any kind in any place of resort, indicating that intoxicating liquors are there sold, kept or given away unlawfully, shall be held to be prima facie evidence that the person or persons paying said tax, and the party or parties displaying said notices, are common sellers of intoxicating liquors, and the premises so kept by them common nuisances," for which offenses the penalty is fine and imprisonment.

Is this statute, or either clause of it, repugnant to the provision in the Constitution of Maine, that the accused shall not "be deprived of his life, liberty, property or privileges but by judgment of his peers or by the law of the land?" Is it distinguishable in this respect from the statute passed upon in State v. Hurley, 54 Me. 562, and Com. v. Williams, 6 Gray 1; or that in State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 211? J.

[It seems to us that the statute in question is constitutional. The inhibition in the Beswick case was against evidence of mere reputation of the premises or of those frequenting them. See Beswick case, 43 Am. Rep. 26, and note. In State v. Higgins, 13 R. I. 330, it was held that a statute enacting that evidence of the sale, or keeping of intoxicating liquors for sale, shall be prima facie evidence that the sale or keeping is illegal, is valid. See State v. Wilson, R. I. Sup. Ct., 4 East. Rep. 743. In Board v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143; S. C., 34 Alb. L. J. 394, it was held that a statute providing that where a person is seen to drink intoxicating liquors on the premises of a vendor, who is only licensed to sell such liquors not to be drunk on the premises, it shall be prima facie evidence that the liquor was sold by the occupant of the premises with intent to be drunk thereon, is not unconstitutional. This statute and the Maine statute both relate to the visible and public use of the premises. As to the effect of the payment of the government tax provided for in the Maine statute, it was held in Com. v. Andrews (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 4, 1886), 8 East. Rep. 349, that an application by defendant for a license to sell liquors at the place described in the complaint, is competent evidence that he kept the place.-ED.]

The Albany Law
Law Journal.

ALBANY, APRIL 16, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

R. GIEGERICH has introduced in the assembly MR. GINGEROICH has introdue no tent probate of wills, and it has been re-committed to the judiciary committee. The preamble is as follows: "Whereas many vexatious and expensive contests are made over the probate of wills, to the damage of legatees and devisees, the diminution and delay in settlement of estates, the promotion of family quarrels and the occasion of much chicanery, bribery and false swearing, and it is desirable, so far as possible, to mitigate such evils." The bill then provides that the testator may have his will proved in his life-time, and that at his death it shall stand as "his last will, except as it may be revoked or affected by an instrument executed in like manner, or by marriage or birth of a child." The modus operandi is provided in detail. We judge this bill to be unwise, especially because it leaves the citizen at liberty to make as many wills as he chooses, and to compel the public to pay for trying the question of his mental capacity as often as he may make a new will. Again, what is to prevent his removing into another State or country, and thus escape the effect of jurisdiction? On both these grounds the Michigan statute, similar to this, was adjudged invalid by the Supreme Court of that State, in Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 235; S. C., 56 Am. Rep. 378. Such a contest as is here rendered possible is there pronounced "a singular," and "a very unfortunate spectacle." The court also lay stress on the fact that "until a man dies it can never be known who will succeed him, even if intestate, and whatever may be the probability, there is no certainty that a single one of the persons who have come in here to oppose the will may survive the testator." Again: "It is also within the power of relator to dispose of his entire property, not merely by a new will, but by sale or gift; and in such event there will be nothing for this will to dispose of, and possibly nothing for these or any other kindred to inherit." A much more effectual way of curing the evils which this bill is designed to cure would be to compel contestants to give security for costs in case of failure, although we are not prepared to say that even this would be politic or just. Finally, what is to be the effect of a finding of want of testamentary capacity upon the testator in his other and subsequent dealings? It would be a queer state of things to see a man transacting business and making contracts, who was deemed destitute of capacity enough even to make a will!

The venerable Judge Treat, of the United States District Court for the southern district of Illinois, is dead, at the age of seventy-five. He was a native VOL. 35-No. 16.

of Otsego county in this State, and went to Springfield, Ill., in 1834. He served as Supreme Court judge from 1841 to 1855, when he was appointed to the post which he held at his death. He was a judge of learning, integrity and firmness, and as a man was courteous, a great lover of books, very charitable in an unostentatious way,- -a quiet, unobtrusive, eccentric old man, who was so familiar to all and yet whom so few really knew, the Chicago Legal News says. At a bar meeting Governor Palmer said: "Judge Treat had reached a condition of age when he was a lonely man. He had no children, and but few relatives. He was never fortunate in making close, warm, confidential friends, and he lived until he became a lonely, desolate old man. A childless wife, who lived with him so long, had passed away; he was left a solitary, desolate old man all that he had loved gone before — left standing alone, without home, without society, without any of the ordinary circumstances that make old age endurable; and when the message was spoken to him that called him away, I have no doubt he passed into that condition where he will find at last congenial society." We dare say that the ven

erable man was content with his books. In them he

found friends who never deceived, criticised, importuned or deserted him. Perhaps he had resources that others knew not of, like Colonna, who, when taken prisoner, and jeered at because he had lost his castle, laid his hand on his heart and said: "I have a castle."

We have received a circular announcing the purposes and advantages of the "National Press Intelligence Co." This enterprise, presided over by Mr. Wm. F. G. Shanks, one of the editors of the Tribune, crowds the Yankees very hard for ingenuity and novelty. To avail ones self of its advantages, one must send the company ten dollars, | which constitutes him a life member, and gives him the privilege of paying for all he gets afterward. Then the company will send him clippings from all the newspapers, journals and magazines concerning him or his business or topics in which he is interested, for the trifling charge of five cents per clipping. The company also furnish back numbers of the principal newspapers, and information on all sorts of subjects, to order. For example, when Mr. Vanderbilt died the bureau furnished the family five thousand obituaries and editorials. They furnished Manton Marble with four thousand clippings from three thousand different newspapers in one year. This is certainly a very ingenious and useful scheme. We wish Mr. Shanks well, but we cannot join his band. Monetary reasons prohibit. It would impoverish us in a short time to pay him even such a trifling sum as five cents apiece for every puff and article about ourselves which we know our friends, the anti-codifiers, are filling the newspapers with. We would recommend him- no charge for the suggestion to get Mrs. Cleveland and Mr. John L. Sullivan for subscribers. This would enable him to retire in a few years and snap his fingers at Jay Gould and such comparatively destitute persons.

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