age, and in appearance entirely so, and thus deceive the most diligent by his representations. Suppose a minor who is really twenty years and ten months old, but in appearance a man of full age, should obtain goods by falsely and fraudulently representing that he is twenty-one years of age, ought he not, on the plainest principles of natural justice, to be held liable, not on his contract, but for the loss occasioned by his fraud? The rule which we adopt will enable courts to protect, in some measure, the honest and diligent, but none other, who are misled by a false and fraudulent representation; and it will not open the way to imposition upon infants, for in no event can any thing more than the actual loss sustained be recovered, and no person who trusts where fair dealing and due diligence require him not to trust can reap any benefit. It will not apply to an executory contract which an infant refuses to perform, for in such a case, the action would be on the promise, and the only recovery that could be had would be for the breach of contract, and the terms of our rule forbid such a result; but it will apply where an infant, on the faith of his false and fraudulent representation, obtains property from another, and then repudiates his contract. Any other rule would, in many cases, suffer a person guilty of positive fraud to escape loss, although his fraud had enabled him to secure and make away with the property of one who had trusted in good faith to his representation, and had exercised due care and diligence. We are unwilling to sanction any rule which will enable an infant, who has obtained the property of another by falsely and fraudulently representing himself to be of full age, to enjoy the fruits of his fraud, either by keeping the property himself, or selling it to another, and when asked to pay its just and reasonable value, successfully plead his infancy. Such a rule would make the defense of infancy both a shield and sword, and this is a result which the principles of justice forbid, for they require that it should be merely a shield of defense.

C. A. Seward, for appellant.

J. D. Dean, for respondent.

BRADY, J. The plaintiff is a social club organized under the laws of the State, and owns the real estate in this city, where it has its office and meeting rooms, which are regularly used by its members, and their guests. It has been accustomed usually for many years past to give a ball, aud to rent for that purpose the large building known as the Academy of Music, the club house being too small for the purpose. In connection with this ball, the plaintiff has been in the habit of furnishing its members and their guests with refreshments on the night of the ball, and from one A. M., until five P. M., and this included wines and

liquors of different kinds. The Academy of Music have a license to sell liquors. The plaintiff proposing to give a ball on the 20th January, 1886, duly obtained a license therefor from the board of police, leased the Academy for the night, paid the rental of $1,000, and invested some $7,000 in provisions, wines and liquors to be used by its members and their guests at the ball. The police department, under whose supervision the ball must take place, have the right and power to close the same whenever any illegal act shall be committed. These authorities on the day the ball was to be given which they had duly licensed, notified plaintiff's officers of their intended interference with and arrest of the plaintiff's members for using and distributing their liquors, and that too without obtaining a warrant. This action was then commenced to prevent these contemplated acts, and an injunction obtained until the hearing of a motion to make that remedy perpetual. It was not intended to present the wines and liquors to the members and their guests, but to sell them at a price to be determined. Upon the hearing of the motion, it appeared by the affidavit of William H. Clinchy, who is a captain of the police, that he was in charge of the police force on duty on the night of the ball and morning following; that the ball was carried on by the plaintiff and attended by a large number of persons, according to his estimate about 4,000 or 5,000 persons, that a box office was kept in the lobby of the Academy, at which checks or tickets were sold to all persons applying therefor, who were thereafter admitted to the ball, and that between the hours of one and five A. M., on the 28th January, wines and intoxicating liquors were publicly sold and furnished to the persons attending the ball, and that payment therefor was then and there required and taken by the persons selling the same. The statements thus made by the captain were not gainsaid, and the motion was denied.

The proposition that the police authorities may be prevented from invading the precincts of a private club house when the intention is to interfere with its festivities, properly conducted and not amounting to a nuisance or such a clamor as creates a breach of the public peace, and particularly when the intention is to interfere with its property of any kind cannot well be doubted. The authorities so ably collated by the learned counsel for the plaintiff are conclusive on the subject. Serin v. State, 55 Md. 566, 571; Commonwealth v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144; Commonwealth v. Comphret, 137 id. 564, 566; Graff v. Evans, 8 Q. B. Div. 373, 377; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 551, 558; People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 390,393; Davis v. American Society, 75 id. 362, 369; People v. Dwyer, 90 id. 402, 409; State Lottery Co. v. Fritzpatrick, 3 Woods, 222.

But as shown by the affidavit of Captain Clinchy, the ball was not confined to the members of the club, inasmuch as the tickets were publicly sold to any one who sought one, and the liquors were indiscriminately sold to the persons admitted and desiring them. These facts prevented the application of the rule established by the cases cited and the continuance of the injunction for the reason that the Academy of Music ceased to be a private club house for the period during which the ball continued, the entrance to which and privileges therein were not confined to its members and their guests in the proper and legal sense of that term. It thus became a public festivity held in a public, not private building, to which all could have access who paid for admission. The question therefore whether the police authorities have the right to invade a private club house is not strictly presented on the facts which appear in the record. The question we are now called on to consider is not whether under the facts and circumstances disclosed, an injunction should

CARPENTER, J. [Omitting some immaterial matter.] We will next inquire what is a criminal conspiracy. We will not attempt to formulate in a single sentence a definition which will embrace every case of conspiracy which the law will regard as criminal. Such a definition will of necessity embrace not only a great variety of subjects, but also many distinct and independent classes of subjects. We shall therefore have a better understanding of the matter if we consider each part of such definition by itself, each part having reference to a class of objects or purposes which may form the subject of a conspiracy. In the first place it seems to be generally conceded that if two or more persons confederate and agree together to commit some crime or misdemeanor, such confederation or agreement is itself an offense. Here we are hardly on debatable ground and here we will pause and apply this partial definition to this information. A statute passed in 1878 provides that "every person who shall threaten to use any means to intimidate any person, to compel such person against his will to do, or abstain from doing, any act which such person has a legal right to do, or shall persistently follow such person in a disorderly manner or injure or threaten to injure his property with intent to intimidate him shall, upon conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding $100 or imprisonment in the county jail six months. This statute is unquestionably designed as a substitute for the act of 1877, which doubtless had its origin in the apprehension which prevailed throughout the country at the time of and soon after the trouble on the Pennsylvania railroad, during which there was such an immense destruction of property at Pittsburgh. The operation of that act was limited to railroad, gas and telegraph companies. The act of 1878 removed the limitation and was designed to protect all persons, natural or artificial, employers or employees, in the management and control of their own business. It simply extended the remedy. We cannot therefore limit the act of 1878 to subjects embraced in the act of 1877 without doing violence to the manifest intention of the Legislature. Do the acts which it is alleged the defendants conspired to do fall within the prohibition of the act of 1878? They propose to threaten and use means (the boycott) to intimidate the Carrington

Publishing Company to compel it, against its will, to abstain from doing an act (to keep in its employ the workmen of its own choice) which it had a legal right to do, aud to do an act (employ the defendants and such persons as they should name) which it had a legal right to abstain from doing. There can be but one answer to the question. The acts proposed are clearly prohibited by the statute. We might perhaps stop here, but the arguments of the case took a much wider range, and the case itself will justify, and the times in which we live seem to require a more extended examination of the subject. Conspiracies against the government and conspiracies to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice, which are also regarded as criminal conspiracies, need not be considered in this case. It has often been said that a conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose by unlawful means, is an offense. But this is said to be a limitation rather than a definition. It certainly lacks definition. Many acts are said to be unlawful which would not be the subject of a criminal conspiracy. Other acts are unlawful because they are in violation of the criminal law or of some penal statute. If the end or means are criminal in themselves, or contrary to some penal statute, the conspiracy is elearly an offense. Between these two extremes a great variety of cases may arise, many of which ought not to be regarded as criminal. Suppose two or more boys, for instance, agree to go upon another's land; the proposed act is, or may be, a trespass and therefore unlawful. If they do not go no harm is done; if they do go they are, or may be liable civilly; but no one would seriously contend that in either case they would be liable criminally for the conspiracy. But suppose two or more conspire unjustly and wrongfully to deprive another of his liberty or property. Then, as we shall hereafter see, the criminal law may take cognizance of the act. Of course it is difficult, if not impossible, to define accurately and clearly in advance what would and what would not be an offense. Hence the difficulty of regulating by statute in all cases the law of criminal conspiracy. But this difficulty is not confined to these cases. There are other offenses at common law that are not defined by any statute. ** Now if we look at this transaction as it appears in the face of this information, we shall be satisfied that the defendants' purpose was to deprive the Carrington Publishing Company of its liberty to carry on its business in its own way, although in doing so it interfered with no right of the defendant. The motive was a selfish one, to gain an advantage unjustly and at the expense of others, and therefore the act was legally corrupt. As a means of accomplishing the purpose the parties intended to harm the Carrington Publishing Company, and therefore it was malicious. It seems strange in a country, in which law interferes so little with the liberty of the individual, that it should be necessary to announce from the bench that every man may carry on his business as he pleases, may do what he will with his own so long as he does nothing unlawful and acts with due regard to the rights of others and that the occasion for such an announcement should be, not an attempt by government to interfere with the rights of citizens, nor by the rich and powerful to oppress the poor, but an attempt by a large body of workingmen to control, by means little if any better than force, the action of employers. The defendants and their associates said to the Carrington Publishing Company: "You shall discharge the men you have in your employ and shall hereafter employ only such men as we shall name. It is true we have no interest in your business, we have no capital invested therein, we are in no wise responsible for its success and we do not participate in its profits, yet we

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have a right to control its management and compel you to submit to our direction." The bare assertion of such a right is startling. The two alleged rights cannot co-exist; one or the other must yeld. If the defendants have the right which they claim, then all business enterprises are alike subject to their direction. No one is safe in engaging in business, for no one knows whether his business affairs are to be directed by intelligence or ignorance—whether law and justice will protect the business or brute force regardless of law will control it, for it must be remembered that the exercise of the power, if conceded, will by no means be confined to the manner of employing help. Upon the same principle and for the same reason the right to determine what business others shall engage in, when and where it shall be carried on, etc., etc., etc., will be demanded and must be conceded. The principle, if it once obtains a foothold, is aggressive and is not easily checked. It thrives on what it feeds and is insatiate in its demands. More requires more. If a large body of irresponsible men demand and receive power outside of law over and above law it is not to be expected that they will be satisfied with a moderate and reasonable use of it. All history proves that abuses and excesses are inevitable. The exercise of irresponsible power by men, like the taste of human blood by tigers, create an unappeasable appetite for more. Business men have a general understanding of their rights under the law and have some degree of confidence that the government through its courts will be able to protect those rights. This confidence is the corner stone of the whole business, but if their rights are such only as a secret and irresponsible organization is willing to concede to them and will receive only such protection as such an organization is willing to give, where is that confidence which is essential to the prosperity of the country?

Again, if the alleged right is conceded to the defendants a similar right must be conceded to the promoters of the Carrington Publishing Company, and those with whom they may associate. Otherwise all men are not equal before the law. It logically follows that they in turn may control the business matters of the defendants, may determine what trade or occupation they may follow, whether to work in this establishment or in that or in none at all. Obviously such conflicting claims in the absence of law can lead to but one result and that will be determined by brute force. It would be an instance of the survival not necessarily of the fittest but of the strongest. That would be subversive not only of all business but also of law and of the government itself. The end would be anarchy, pure and simple. Once more. Suppose the government should assert the right in the same manner to regulate and control the business affairs of the Carringtou Publishing Company and other business enterprise, how long would the people submit to it? And yet the exercise of such a power by government would be far more tolerable than its exercise would be by secret organizations, however wise and intelligent such organization may be, for government is established by the people and is responsible to all the people. If it abuses its power the people have the remedy in their own hands, but if a secret organization, in the management of which the people at large have no voice, has no power and is not amenable to law, where is the remedy? It is further alleged that another purpose of the defendants was to injure and oppress John E. Skinner and seven other workmen of the Carrington Publishing Company by depriving them of their employment. What we have already said applies equally well to this purpose of the defendants. The workmen named have just as good a right to work for the corporation as the defendants have, and their right is entitled to the same consideration and the same pro

tection. Then there are these further considerations. It is a combination, not against capital, nor employers, but against fellow workmen - men whose earnings are comparatively small, and who presumably used all their earnings for the support of themselves and their families. They are ordinarily poor men and men whose entire capital consists in their trade and time. It is proposed wantonly to deprive them of a livlihood and practically of all means of support. If a capitalist is driven from his business he has other resources, but the poor mechanic, driven from his employment, and as is often the case, deprived of employment elsewhere, is compelled to see his loved ones suffer or depend upon charity. It is also a combination of many to impoverish and oppress a few. The weaker party needs and must receive the protection of the law. If in any case it is criminal for many to combine to do what any one may lawfully do singly, it would seem that this would be such a case. Numbers can accomplish what one man cannot, evil as well as good, and that is the reason of the combination. The law encourages combination for good and combinations by workmen to better their condition by legitimate and fair means are commendable and should be encouraged. But combinations for evil purposes, whether by one class of men or another, are detrimental to the public weal and cannot be regarded with favor by the courts. But combinations for good purposes may be prevented and when their power is sought to be used to harm their fellow men, to deprive others of their just rights then, not the combination, but the use of it becomes criminal. In such use there is a large element of wantonness and malice. Any one man, or any one of several men, acting independently, is powerless; but when several combine and direct their united energies to the accomplishment of a bad purpose the combination is formidable. Its power for evil increases as its number increases. No one can drive these workmen from their situations. Numbers, if allowed their will, may do it. The intention by one man so long as he does nothing is not a crime of which the law will take cognizance of, and so two of any number of men acting separately. But when several men form the intent and come together and agree to carry it into execution the case is changed. The agreement is a step in the direction of accomplishing the purpose. The combination becomes dangerous and subserves the rights of others, and the law wisely says it is a crime. It is no answer to say the conspiracy was for a lawful purpose, to better their own condition, to fix and advance their rate of wages and further their own material interests. It is certainly true that they had a right to such a purpose, and to use all lawful means to carry it into effect; and so a purpose to acquire property is lawful so far as it contemplates lawful means only. But if it contemplates the accumulation of money by means of murder, theft, fraud, or injustice, the end does not sanctify the means. Neither will these defendants be permitted to advance their material interests or otherwise better their condition by any such reprehensible means. They had a right to ask the Carrington Publishing Company to discharge its workmen and employ themselves, and to use all proper arguments in support of their request. But they had not the right to say "you shall do this or we will ruin your business." Much less had they a right to ruin its business. In such a case the direct and primary object must be regarded as the destruction of the business. The fact that it is designed as a means to an end, and that end in itself considered a lawful one, does not divest the transaction of its criminality. ** We will also notice that it is alleged that the conspiracy contemplated boycotting as a means to the end sought. That word is not easily defined. It is frequently spoken of

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