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tiff purchased and received a deed of lot five, believing it to be the lot pointed out to her by D. L. neither knew of, authorized, nor ratified this fraud on the part of his agent. Plaintiff never demanded, and L. never refused, a rescission of the contract and restitution of the purchase-money. Held, that plaintiff could not maintain an action against L. to recover the difference in value between the two lots as damages for the fraud of the agent in effecting the sale; that her only remedy against L. was to demand a rescission of the contract and repayment of the purchase-money. Whether an action in tort will ever lie against the principal for misrepresentation of the agent, known by the agent to be false, but not by the principal, is a question which has given rise to considerable discussion and some conflict of opinion. See Benj. Sales, $$ 697-709; Bigelow Lead. Cas. Torts, 34; 8 Am. Law Rev. 631. When an agent, in the course of a princi. pal's business, and within the scope of his agency, has been guilty of negligence, trespass or the like, the principal is liable in an action for damages, and the amount of the recovery in such cases is co-extensive with the injury sustained by the plaintiff in the action, and is not limited to the amount of benefit received by the plaintiff from the tort of his agent. We fail to see any sensible distinction in this respect between a case of fraud and that of any other tort; and the authorities generally hold that an action for damages for the deceit of the agent will lie against the principal. This proceeds, not on the ground of any imputation of vicarious fraud to the principal, but upon the familiar doctrine of the law of agency-respondeat superior. Story Ag., § 452; Add. Cont. 94; Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289; Locke v. Stearns, 1 Metc. 560; White v. Sawyer, 16 Gray, 586; Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518; Sandford v. Handy, 23 id. 260; Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238; Durst v. Burton, 47 id. 167; Rhoda v. Annis, 75 Me. 17; Udell v. Atherton, 7 Hurl. & N. 171; Barwick v. English Joint-stock Bank, L. R., 2 Exch. 259; Swift v. Winterbotham, L. R., 8 Q. B. 244; Mackay v. Commercial Bank of N. B., 30 L. T. (N. S.) 180; Swire v. Francis, 3 App. Cas. 106. That the case of Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, 1 H. L. Sc. 145, does not lay down a general proposition as so all contracts, but was intended to be confined to the particular and peculiar facts of the case, is evident from was is said in the subsequent case of Houldsworth v. Glasgow Bank, 5 App. Cas. 317. See however Kennedy v. McKay, 43 N. J. L. 288. But while we think that an action in tort for damages may be maintained against the principal for the fraud of his agent, yet we are all agreed that upon the facts of this case no such action can be sustained, and that plaintiff's only remedy against defendant Lyon would be to rescind the contract, and reclaim the purchase-money. Minn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 16, 1887. Davies v. Lyon. Opinion by Mitchell, J. BANK-NATIONAL-USURIOUS INTEREST-WHO CAN ENFORCE FORFEITURE.—The right of action against a national bank for collecting usurious interest, given by Rev. Stat. U. S., § 5198, to the person paying it "or his legal representatives," is not available to a judgment creditor of such person. By the terms of this section the relief granted is confined to the debtor or his legal representatives, to be obtained by either only in an action in the nature of an action of debt, commenced within two years from the time the usurious action occurred. It does not therefore extend to the creditor of the debtor, as he is in no sense the debtor's legal representative; nor does it give to the creditor an action in equity to subject the forfeiture to the satisfaction of his debt. The right not being given, it cannot be supplied by intendment. No latitude of construction is permissible of a statute provid

ing a forfeiture as a penalty for its violation, and a remedy for its recovery. He who seeks to recover the amount forfeited must be the person authorized to sue, and must bring the action provided for. No other can have the redress, nor can it be obtained in any other action. These are familiar principles, and need no citation of authority to sustain them. The direct question as to right of creditor to sue, involved in this cause, has not been before the Supreme Court of the United States, so far as we are advised; but the statute in question has been often before that court in kindred aspects, and in each the plain intimations of the court have been that it was susceptible only of the construction which we have given it. Tenn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 1887. Barret v. Shelbyville Nat. Bank. Opinion by Snodgrass, J. Trunkey, J., dissenting.

OF PASSENGERS

STIPULATIONS ON

BOND-CONDITIONAL DELIVERY-SURETY'S LIABILITY. It has been long settled in this State, by a line of decisions which seem to be supported by the weight of authority, that it is good defense to an action on a bond that a defendant, who is a surety, intrusted the bond to the principal obligor as an escrow, without authority to deliver it only on the express condition that other named persons should join as sureties in its execution prior to such delivery, and that the instrument was delivered to the obligee in violation of this condition. Guild v. Thomas, 54 Ala. 414, and authorities there cited; Bibb v. Reid, 3 id. 88. There are two established modifications of this rule: (1) It does not apply to commercial paper which has come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser before maturity, who is without notice of the condition. Marks v. First Nat. Bank, 79 Ala. ; 1 Dan. Neg. Inst. (3d ed.), $$ 855, 856. (2) It does not apply where the surety, having knowledge or notice of the delivery of the bond, suffers the principal to act under it to the prejudice of the obligee, so as to waive the condition, and thus estop the surety from insisting on the defense. Wright v. Lang, 66 Ala. 389. Ala. Sup. Ct., Feb. 21, 1887. Smith v. Kirkland. Opinion by Somerville, J. CARRIERS TICKET.—(1) A passenger who buys and signs a coupon railroad ticket cannot plead that he is not bound by special stipulations written in small type on the ticket because his attention was not called to them. (2) Stipulations printed on a railroad coupon ticket, setting forth that the company issuing the ticket acts only as agent for other companies over whose lines the ticket purports to pass the passenger, and limiting its liability in respect to such lines, are binding on a passenger who signs a contract on the ticket referring to such stipulations. We have little doubt that the transaction of purchasing the ticket at Florence was somewhat hurried, but the plaintiff signed the contract, and in doing so certainly made himself a party to all the conditions therein stated. It would tend to disturb the force of all such contracts, if one in possession of ordinary capacity and intelligence were allowed to sign a contract, and act under it in the enjoyment of all its advantages, and then to repudiate it upon the ground that its terms were not brought to bis attention. In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, it must be presumed that he read the contract and assented to its conditions. Laws. Carr., § 102; 32 Am. Dec. 506, and note. Nor do we think that the plaintiff could disregard the stipulations on the ground that they were "unreasonable, and contrary to the policy of the law." It may be true that the weight of authority is in favor of excluding negligence altogether as an element of contract between the carrier and his employer, and of holding the former to a rigid accountability for every degree of negligence, without the power by contract, or in any mode to divest himself of it. But as we understand

it, the carrier may, in all other respects except as to
negligence (and there is no such complaint in this
case), limit his liability by special contract-more es-
pecially as to all lines beyond his own road. See
Piedmont Co. v. Columbia & G. R. Co., 19 8. C. 380;
Laws. Carr., § 28; Thomp. Carr. 525; Redf. Carr.,
$ 138, and the authorities cited. S. C. Sup. Ct., Feb.
8, 1887.
Bethea v. Northeastern R. Co. Opinion by
McGowan, J.

OF GOODS-PERISHABLE FREIGHT-DELAY

FLOOD.-Where the transportation of freight, perishable in its nature, is interrupted and delayed by a flood in a river which the track of the railroad crosses and the freight decays, and there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier in taking care of the freight or otherwise, the loss is attributable to the flood as an act of God, and the carrier is not liable. That a similar flood had occurred once in each of the two preceding years, but the carrier had not, by changing the construction of its road, or providing other means of crossing the river, avoided the detention, does not render him liable, such floods being up to the time of the trial of the cause otherwise unprecedented. Fla. Sup. Ct., March 1, 1887. Norris v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. Opinion by Rauey, J.

THE

OUR NEW YORK LETTER.

a horse or a lawyer-he "gets there." This quality is generally recognized by litigants, and Mr. Conkling is very likely to be retained by one side or the other in most of the important causes tried here. I question whether there is a more forcible speaker at our bar. Mr. Joseph Choate may excel him in polish, as he certainly does in brilliancy of wit and readiness of repartee, but with all the other qualities that go to make up the equipment of a successful advocate, Mr. Conkling is abundantly supplied. Notwithstanding the eminence attained by Mr. Conkling, the leaders of our bar, me judice, are Mr. James C. Carter and Mr. Joseph H. Choate, and I think this designation would be substantiated by a majority of the lawyers here. Mr. Evarts has to a great extent withdrawn from the smoke and din of the battle, and is now seldom heard except in the Supreme Court of the United States or the Court of Appeals. Mr. Robert G. Ingersoll is another prominent man who has recently located here. Mr. Ingersoll is likely to continue to derive his greatest reputation and fame from the "Mistakes of Moses," and although he is understood to derive a very handsome income from his law practice, I am inclined to think he is more earnest in bis denunciation of "Brimstone" than in his advocacy of the principles of Blackstone. Mr. Daniel Dougherty was so encouraged by his success in the Cleary case, and the compliments received from the bar, that he too has decided to open an office here. The latest addition to the ranks of distinguished counsel is Judge Hoadly, of Cincinnati, easily the leader of the Ohio bar when he left there a few weeks since. One of his old partners goes with him into the new firm here.

Cincinnati has a very strong bar, and the handsomest court-house in the United States. The old court house was burned three years ago by a mob, it will be remembered, and with it one of the most complete law libraries in the world. From the ashes of the old court-house has arisen a temple that is indeed a fitting abode for the blind goddess. The court-rooms are models for us. They are light, airy and well ventilated, the decorations are modest and tasteful, and the general arrangement admirable. The building contains accommodations for the various courts of

HE General Term of this department is for the first time in over twenty years nearly abreast of its work. The doubling up of the equipment, as first advocated in these letters, has more than doubled the capacity of the machinery for turning out work in this department. A lawyer who is diligent and wants to push his appeal can get his argument heard in from sixty to ninety days. The General Term of this department as at present constituted is very able, the judges are diligent, scholarly and prompt in rendering decisions, and it is to be doubted if we have had a stronger bench than the present one for many years. The selection of Judge Bartlett was a very happy one, and his appointment has added strength to the bench. While the appointment of Judge Van Brunt as presid-record, State and county, and for some of the finaning justice was a fitting recognition of his ability as a jurist, many of the bar felt that Judge Brady really merited that appointment, but it seldom happens that the justice whose qualities and capacity peculiarly fit him for the duties of presiding justice receives the recognition to which he is entitled-particularly where politics play a part. You will recall, for instance, the appointment of Chief Justice Richardson, of the Court of Claims at Washington, over the head of Judge Nott, a jurist in every way his superior, and who was in the opinion of most of the practitioners in that court the coming chief justice.

Our bar has received a very large influx of foreign talent in the last three years. Most of the distinguished lawyers who have come here with established reputations have at once entered upon a large and lucrative practice. Mr. Conkling was the first of the class referred to to cast his fortunes with the New York bar. His success was immediate. He did not come here with the reputation of a great lawyer, although few men in the nation were better known than Mr. Conkling. At first the tendency of the law yers was to decidedly underrate his attainments and ability. His achievements however have compelled a modification of opinion, and his great ability, especially as an advocate, is now generally conceded. Few will claim that his forte lies in dealing with abstruse questions of law, or that he is a profound scholar in the philosophy of the law. His training has not been in that school, but he has one quality most valuable in

cial departments of the county as well. There is a large and comfortable waiting room for witnesses, and a coat and hat room for the use of attorneys. The consulting rooms of the judges are light, tastefully furnished, and one is not required to give a password, or crawl on one's hands and knees, to enter there if one has business there. The Bar Association has its library in this building, and possesses all the facilities for study and investigation. The library now includes about 12 000 volumes, and is a very good working equipment. Before the fire the library contained nearly 25,000 volumes. The association numbers about 400 members, and in return for the facilities extended to the judges, receives its rent free from the county. The librarian, Mr. Myers, is indeed a librarian, and has occupied his present position for nearly a quarter of a century. He is an enthusiast, and an expert in the literature of the law, has all the leading cases at his fingers' ends, and can tell you the name of the reporter of the Common Pleas of Timbuctoo, or where every decision of Asher-Beni-Pal can be found if it is required. On the occasion of a recent trial in Cincinnati in which I was engaged, it was necessary for me to avail myself of the courtesies of the library extended by the counsel with whom I was associated, and I was very much interested in talking with Mr. Myers about some of his treasures, and while my limited acquaintance does not include over about 250 law librarians, Mr. Myers, in my humble opinion, easily stands at the head of his profession in this country.

The bench there, as is so likely to be the case where the bar is strong, is very able both in the State and Federal divisions. The judges, a number of whom I had the pleasure of meeting, impressed me as being scholarly, dignified and very courteous gentlemen. Among the younger judges of whom great things are expected is Mr. Justice Taft, of the Superior Court, a son of Ex-Attorney-General Taft. Judge Taft is but eight and twenty years of age, but has crowded a good deal of experience into the seven years that preceded his elevation to the bench. He served in the capacity both of assistant district attorney and assistant corporation counsel, and was an active practitioner from the time of his admission to the bar. He was the crack man of his class at Yale, and was the particular man of whom his classmates expected great things. They are not likely to be disappointed, for as a judge he possesses qualities which are certain to give him a distinguished judicial career.

I was present a few moments at the trial of Mannix while in Cincinnati. He was the assignee of Archbishop Purcell, and was indicted for embezzling funds belonging to his trust. Up to 1885 the statutes of Ohio provided no punishment for embezzlement by an assignee, although holding all others acting in a fiduciary capacity to the strictest account for their acts. Most of Mannix's alleged irregularities were committed before the enactment of the law referred to. Mannix admitted having used funds of the trust after the law was passed, making his alleged appropriation of the money a crime, but he claimed that all his speculations after that time were profitable, and that the money was immediately restored to the fund. The jury disagreed. It speaks well for the probity of Ohio's assignees in past years if they found no necessity for providing punishment for the crooked assignee. DEMOT ENMOT.

THE

OBITUARY.

CHIEF JUSTICE CARTTER.

HE death of Chief Justice David K. Cartter of the District Supreme Court at Washington, Saturday night, removes a man who was perhaps as closely identified with the administration of President Lincoln as anyone who lives. Judge Cartter was a type of the kind of Republicans represented by such men as Zach Chandler, Ben. Wade and Thad Stevens. He was not a man of the finest culture, but was full of common sense coupled with an aggressive disposition which made him a power in the troublesome early days of the Republican party. He was born in Rochester in 1812, and was left fatherless at the age of ten years to make his way in the world. His sister became the wife of the late Dennis McCarthy of Syracuse, who for many years represented that district in the State Senate. When a mere boy young Cartter learned the printing trade in the Albany Journal office under Thurlow Weed. He returned to Rochester, where he was admitted to the bar and soon after removed to Ohio to practice his profession. The purchase of a tract of land in Cleveland which afterward became very valuable was the nucleus of the large fortune he left. He was a Democrat, but opposed the extension of slavery when a member of Congress from 1848 to 1853. During the Fremont campaign in 1856 he joined the Free Soilers and was one of the strongest stump speakers of that party. In the Chicago convention of 1860 he was chairman of the Ohio delegation, and when Mr. Lincoln lacked three votes of a majority, Mr. Cartter with some of his associates from Obio, who had been instructed for Chase, joined the Lincoln forces and the nomination of Mr. Lincoln resulted.

After the inauguration of the president, Mr. Cartter was offered his choice of a number of excellent positions. He accepted the mission to Bolivia, remaining but a year and returning in the dark days of the rebellion. He was at once appointed Chief Justice of the District Court and became with Mr. Chase, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Stanton and others the daily companion and adviser of the president. Judge Cartter's career at Washington was notable, not so much for his legal attainments as for the common sense he displayed in his ruling on the bench. He had never been a careful student of the law, but his mind had an intuitive grasp of the equities of a case, and with him reason and common sense were always prevailing arguments. His mind was of a judicial mould, and he penetrated the intricacies of a legal question almost by intuition. He was from the time of Fremont a sterling, outspoken active Republican, and did great and good service for his party. Albany Evening Journal.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

An article in the LAW JOURNAL of the 9th instant, over the signature of L. B. Proctor, states that "in 1828 he" (Mr. Seward)" was elected to the State Senate from the seventh district;" and that "he was then only twenty-seven years of age."

That statement is a mistake. Hiram F. Mather was elected to the Senate from the seventh district in 1828, and William H. Seward was elected in 1830, when he was almost thirty years old.

Respectfully yours,

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This standard treatise, written by Judge James Gould, the founder of the celebrated Litchfield (Conn.) law school, and furnished in the fourth edition, with notes adapted to the New York Code of Procedure, by Judge George Gould, his sou, is now issued in a fifth edition, prepared by Mr. Franklin Fiske Heard, a very competent editor. There is nothing better on the common law system of pleading, probably nothing so good proceeding from this country. The legal learning of the author and his son was very remarkable, and the treatise has always been celebrated. Mr. Heard has now prefixed interesting memoirs of the author and Chief Justice Reeve, from Hollister's History of Connecticut. Published by Wm. Gould, Jr., & Co., Albany.

BIRDSEYE'S TABLE OF STATUTES.

A Table, chronologically arranged, of the Statutes of the State of New York, amended, repealed, continued, or otherwise modified or affected, covering the laws passed from the session of 1877 to the close of the session of 1886. By Clarence F. Birdseye. New York. L. K. Strouse & Co., 1887. 2 vols.

The title sufficiently describes this work, and it is evident that the work is one of vast labor and very great value to the practitioner. The possession of it must convey a sense of relief and security to any one who has before him the task of ascertaining whether a statute has been in any way affected by subsequent legislation. The editor says he has worked on this table for eight years, and collated it with the volumes four times. This ought to secure accuracy. We have

no doubt that Mr. Birdseye's book ought to be in the hands of every lawyer.

BARNARD'S PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT DIGEST. This volume contains abstracts of the decisions, motions and orders in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for the year 1886. The abstracts give the point decided, the reasons of the decision, and a concise statement of the facts. There is a very full index and a table of the cases. The work seems well done. Published by T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., Philadelphia.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

NOTES.

The latest statistics, based upon a period of five years, show that 150 thefts a day are committed on an average in the thirty principal dry goods stores of Paris. The temptation is so strong and women are so weak. Furthermore, experience has shown that not one-quarter of the thieves are caught. In order to avoid mistakes, no arrest is made until after a second theft by the same person. The municipal police watch only outside the shops; inside the watching is done by private policemen. Any person caught thieving outside the shop is taken at once to the police station; a person caught in the act inside the shop is taken immediately before the council of administra

HE following decisions were handed down Tues- tion, which is convoked instantaneously by electric day, April 26, 1887:

bells, whose tinkling may be invariably heard by afternoon visitors to the Bon Marché. The guilty person is searched, and if she-for it is always she-confesses and proves her identity, the council allows her to make a written engagement to pay for what she has stolen, and to authorize a search in her house without the intervention of the authorities. In this domiciliary visit the representative of the Louvre or Bon Marché only takes back goods that have not been used. According to her rank, her position, her fortune, the incriminated lady pays a sum varying between $400 and $2,000, which sum is supposed to go to the poor, though it is the opinion of M. Macé that a large part remains in the pockets of the council of administration thus self-elected into a tribunal. In the great Parisian dry goods stores none but professional thieves and pickpockets are prosecuted before the tribunal; kleptomaniacs, real or supposed, and society ladies who yield to temptation, are simply brought before the tribunal of the council of administration. M. Macé says that in Paris alone there are upward of 100,000 persons of all ranks and classes who are afflicted with the monomania of thieving in shops. -Sun.

Order affirmed with costs-Abner Buckland, administrator, etc., appellant, v. William Gallup, respondent. Judgment affirmed with costs-Caroline M. Mettuacht, appellant, v. John Kellerman and others, respondents. Judgment reversed and judgment ordered for plaintiff with costs-John M. Helck, admini. strator, etc., appellant, v. Heury Reinhamer and others, respondents.. -Order of General Term reversed and that of Special Term affirmed with costsJ. D'Hertz Crook, respondent, v. Leopold Riudskopf and others, appellants.- -Motion for reargument denied with costs-Tozer v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad company. -Motion for reargument denied with costs-Mutual Life Insurance company v. Anthony and another.-Motion for reargument denied with costs-Conklin v. Snider. -Motion to correct order. Ordered that the order of this court dated February 11, 1887, be vacated, and that the case be reargued at a time to be agreed on by parties or named by the court; conditions that respondent pay appellant $70 costs-Erastus S. Prosser v. First National Bank of Buffalo.-Motion to amend remittitur denied without costs-Symonson v. Selheimer. Motion to compel plaintiff to receive costs granted, without costs-Day v. Town of New Lots.- -Motion to modify decision denied, with costs-Alexander v. Alexander.-Motion for leave to file return granted, without costs-McClure v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad company.- -Motion to dismiss people's appeal from reversal of Kurtz's conviction and sentence, granted without costs-People v. Michael Kurtz.-Motion to strike from motion calendar, denied without costs-In re petition of Wadley v. Davis.-Motion to settle judgment. Order remitted to Supreme Court, with instructions for settlement of judgment-Bostwick v. Beach. -First, the appeal of Annie R. Platt and Edwin N. Martin, from the General Term order dated December 31, 1886, is dismissed, with costs against Martin to Catherine W. Cooke, Nathan C. Platt and Susan F. Platt severally. Second, the orders of the General and Special Terms, so far as they change any part of the DeGrann judgment upon the shares in this fund of Aunie R. Platt and Susan F. Platt are reversed. Third, the orders of the General and Special Terms, so far as they bring into considera-ket like a barrow of butcher's offal, and be thrown in tion in the distribution of this fund the four sums received respectively by Catherine W. Cooke William H. Platt, Spencer C. Platt and Nathan C. Platt, as determined by the judgment of Mrs. Cooke against her brothers, are reversed. Fourth, in all other respects the order of the General Term is affirmed with-graded to turn the mangle in the laundry, looked out costs, except as above provided, to any of the par- upon life as a 'demned horrid grind.' Surely the ties, and the case is remitted to the Special Term for maxim that cleanliness is next to godliness' is the a further hearing as to the distribution of the fund, or ample title of the laundry to the equal protection of for any further proceeding in accordance with the the laws. It is painfully true that the occupation of opinion handed down herein-Susan F. Platt, respond- the petitioner is not regarded by the courts as a ent, v. Annie R. Platt, appellant, and others, respond-harmless and useful occupation.' To cite cases upon

ents.

Judge Speer, in Re Hover, 30 Fed. Rep. 51, contrasts bar rooms with laundries, to the disadvantage of the former. He says: "There is but little in common between the bar room and the laundry. The laundry is pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case cited to be a harmless and useful occupation.' Unquestionably it is not without its influence upon the advancement of civilization. The necessities of sanitation, of decency, of adornment, and many other requisites of civilized society, if not expressly, certainly by implication, compel us to accord to the laundry a large degree of usefulness, and indeed of indispensableness. Who can view with alarm' the multiplication of laundries? Their very implements are innocuI can recall no instance in history or literature where they have been used contra bonos mores. True, the amorous and oleaginous Falstaff by his merry and fair tormentors was secreted in a buck-basket, but this seems to have mortified his evil disposition. 'Have I lived,' cried Sir John, to be carried in a bas

ous.

the Thames? A man of my kidney, think of that, that am as subject to heat as butter, a man of continual thaw and dissolution. It was a miracle to 'scape suffocation.' The more modern breaker of hearts, the wicked but irresistible Mantalini, when he was de

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this proposition is a waste of time."

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, MAY 7, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THES
able for several reasons. The proposal is to import
temporarily seven Supreme Court judges into the
court in order to despatch the accumulated busi-
In the first place the Supreme Court judges
have enough to do in their own court. The people
have just found it necessary to elect twelve new
ones to transact the business of that court. If seven

HE bill pending in our Legislature for the relief
of our Court of Appeals calendar is objection-

ness.

We recol

the weightier matters of the world - justice and temperance. The two important problems before the people of this State now are, how to suppress intemperance, the parent of crime, poverty, misery and death, and how to render justice prompt, certain and cheap. Our morals and our laws are in a shocking condition, and our legislators pass the time in trifling business, drifting down the current with no apparent appreciation of the seriousness of life and its duties.

nuisance to be abated, for these cases are entitled to just as much and as learned consideration as any others. It may be said that it would be well to pass the proposed bill and then provide for permanent relief. The danger is that the temporary relief will content every body, and that no permanent relief will be granted. There seems to be an insuperable aversion to looking beyond the present day and its necessity, but when it is considered that our legal business has grown into these great dimensions in seventeen years, it may easily be imagined to what it may grow in seventeen more. lsct that in the old Court of Appeals, before 1870, the accumulation of causes was only some four or five hundred, and now it is nearly twice that. The smaller accumulation led to the constituting of the Commission of appeals, and the amendment of of these are removed for a year or two the Supreme the Constitution in the present form. A provision Court business will accumulate to an inconvenient for more and permanent judges ought to have been degree. It is just as important to keep that busi- made two or three years ago, and there should not While our Legness down as it is to keep up with the Court of Ap-be a moment's delay about it now. peals calendar — more important, indeed, for most islature is quarreling over party matters, and over of it never goes to the Court of Appeals. The such petty and undignified business as a scheme for present force of Supreme Court judges, if fairly dis-legalizing betting on horse races, it is neglecting tributed through the State, is only sufficient to do justice to the litigation in that court, to work off the arrears and to keep up with the new cases. In the second place, a court constituted as proposed is not the kind of court to which these delayed suitors have appealed. The Supreme Court judges, while they are undoubtedly men of ability and learning, have not been accustomed to dealing with the questions habitually presented to the ultimate court. No suitor ought to be compelled to submit his cause to a court of whose composition he is ignorant. But the most serious objection to the scheme is that it is a mere temporary make-shift. In two years the calendar would be just as much in arrear as ever. It is a fact, we suppose, that the present judges of that court dislike the idea of any permanent addition to their number. As it is they form a very pleasant and harmonious family party, and naturally they resent the intrusion of new members. But they should yield their preferences to the public necessity. This court should have a sufficient number of judges to sit all the time, say ten or twelve, with five or seven for a quorum, and thus they could easily keep up with the business. This is the only way except to have a court sitting in two parts, which we deem much less desirable. Some such expedient is the only way to afford permanent relief to the calendar, and permanent relief is what should at once be provided. In several of the largest States of the Union the judges of the ultimate court apparently take turns in sitting. This seems to be so in Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, California. It is by no means necessary to have so many as seven judges constantly sitting in the court. Five probably would do just as well. But twelve would certainly be able to do all the work for many years. The present block ought to be removed, but it ought not to be done hastily or intemperately, as if it were a VOL. 35-No. 19.

The Central Law Journal says of the ante-mortem probate bill pending in our Legislature: "We think the effect of a law like this would be to increase very considerably the well-known evils attendant upon contested successions. Whenever there existed any reasonable ground for such allegations, charges of fraud, of undue influence, of imbecility, of lunacy, would at once be preferred, family quarrels would be prematurely precipitated, and all the dirty linen would be brought into open court to be washed before the multitude. These evils certainly exist to a scandalous extent under the present system. Under that proposed they would be greatly multiplied. There would be no finality. The testator would assuredly discover from the developments of the trials that he had made one, two, three, or more mistakes, and that he must execute a new will. Pending its incubation, lying, and slander, and back-biting would flourish like a green bay tree. Legatees, who under the first will would receive little, would maneuver to get more under the new dispensation, and those who stand to receive large gifts would exhaust the arts of cajolery and chicanery to preserve the existing status. And then the question would be reopened, and the battle fought over again with vastly increased virulence and acrimony. We have always been of opinion that the devils in the scrip

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