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they come to this court and allege most flagrant misconduct, and ask us to protect them and the public by withdrawing from the respondents, as unfit persons, our license authorizing them to practice as attorneys. We think there is an undoubted inherent right and power in this court to inquire into the abuse mentioned, and if it be proven that the charges alleged in the bill referred to were made with malice and without probable cause, to disbar the respondents therefor. Colo. Sup. Ct., Feb. 18, 1887. People v. Green. Opinion per Curiam.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. The statements of one accused of crime made to one whose regular employmeut is, and for many years has been, practicing law before justices of the peace, and whose aid and counsel is sought as such attorney or counsellor, although he is not admitted to the bar, such statements being made in answer to the inquiries of such adviser as to what the facts concerning the alleged offense were, are privileged communications, and it is error to allow such adviser to testify upon the trial of the accused to the statements so made. It was very natural that the prisoner, charged with a grave offense, should seek his aid and counsel. It was too most natural that the prisoner, in answer to his adviser's question, should freely confide to him the secrets which he would repose in no one who did not sustain toward him the relation of legal adviser. The record discloses that the prisoner was not seeking simply the solace of some confidential friend in whom he might confide in the hour of his extremity. On the contrary, it was the counsel of some one of superior legal learning and experience he was seeking, aud it was for the purpose of putting his legal adviser in possession of the facts which would enable him to give intelligent and valuable legal counsel that the confidence was reposed. Indeed there was present every element which would invoke the application of the general rule upon this subject, except the mere form of the admission of the adviser to practice in courts of record. Every consideration of reason, justice, logic and fair play would seem to demand that the mere artificial distinction which the State calls upon us to enforce should be made to yield to the modern tendency to apply the spirit and reason of the rule instead of adhering rigidly and sullenly to its letter. The privilege has been held to include scriveners and conveyancers as well as general counsel. 1 Whart. Ev., § 581: Knight v. Turquand, 2 Mees. & W. 100; Carpmael v. Powis, 1 Phil. 687. Ohio Sup. Ct., March 1, 1887. Benedict v. State. Opinion by Owen, C. J.

BASTARDY-LEGITIMATION. A statute providing that if a man, having had a child by a woman, shall afterward marry her, such child, or its descendants, if recognized by him before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate, does not apply to the children of a married man begotten and born of another woman than his wife during his wife's life. It is insisted by counsel for the appellants that the meaning and intention of the statute is so plain that but one interpretation can be given it; and although the children were begotten by the intestate when he was the lawful husband of another, his adulterous practices with an unchaste woman, and unfaithfulness to his own wife and children, cannot be considered in determining the rights of those who were not participants in the wrong, and whose rights the statute was enacted to protect. If the case before us, or that class of cases where the husband has violated his marriage vows, and become the father of children by an adulterous sexual intercourse with another woman during the marital relation, had been the subject of legislative thought, it can scarcely be supposed that any law would have been enacted by which the children of the

adulterous intercourse would have been made legitimate, that they might inherit, with the children of the lawful wife, eqaal parts of his estate. Such a statute, if so construed, would only invite the husband to desert his wife, and the woman of easy virtue to encourage the violation of his marriage vows, that she might some day become his lawful wife, and her children the rightful heirs of his estate. The motive to supplant the love of a true woman by the lewd practices of degraded women would be found in such a statute; and the law, instead of securing to the innocent offspring an interest in the estate of the father, and encouraging the latter to make reparation for the wrong committed, by marrying the mother, would invite the commission of great moral wrong, and hold out an inducement to the guilty parties to remove those who stood in the way of legitimatizing their children by the consummation of the contract of marriage. Where the offspring is the result of an illicit intercourse between unmarried people, the Legislature saw the necessity of enacting some statute by which the children, in a certain state of case, might be made legitimate, and therefore the law has said to the parties: "If you will marry, your children shall not be bastardized, but will be under the law your legitimate offspring." And to say that this law applied to cases where married men were being guilty of adultery, and as an encouragement to them to do better, and to relieve their offspring from the position in which they are placed by the law, would be an absurd construction of this statute. It is a well-settled rule of construction that the letter of a statute will not be followed where it leads to an absurd conclusion; but on the contrary, the reason for the enactment must enter into its interpretation, so as to determine what was intended to be accomplished by it. This statute was not intended to apply to those who are married, by saying to them: "You cannot leave your lawful wife and marry your near kindred, because such a marriage to any woman would be unlawful, and the party guilty of bigamy;" but the language is addressed to those who are single, and are not at their second marriage, the lawful husband or wife of another. It was not to encourage those who had entered upon the marital relation to forsake their marriage vows, and cohabit with others, in anticipation of a future marriage, with a view of making their offspring legitimate, that this statute was enacted, but to make the illegitimate children, begotten by one unmarried, legitimate upon his marrying the mother. Ky. Ct. App., March 19, 1887. Sams v. Sams' Adm'r. Opinion by Pryor, C. J.

CARRIER-EJECTMENT OF PASSENGER-MULATTO.Plaintiff, a mulatto woman, purchased a ticket on defendant's railroad for a ten-mile journey. She passed through the front car, and attempted to enter the rear car, which by a regulation of the company was set apart for white ladies and gentlemen. She was stopped on the platform, and told to ride in the front car, which she refused to do, and refused to give up her ticket unless allowed to ride in the rear car. She was ejected from the train. It appeared on the trial that persons of both sexes were allowed to ride on the front car without regard to color or race, and the two cars were alike in every respect as to comfort, convenience, safety and equipment. There was conflicting evidence as to smoking going on at the time in the front car. Held, that as plaintiff's purpose evidently was to harass the defendant, with a view to bringing this action, and her persistence was not in good faith, with a view to obtain a comfortable seat for a short ride, the judgment in her favor in the court below should be reversed. Tenn. Sup. Ct., April, 1887. Chesapeake, O. & S. R. Co. v. Wells. Opinion by Turney, C. J.

EJECTION OF PASSENGER-REFUSAL TO DE

LIVER TICKET.-A. got on a passenger train at a city station, and went into the ladies' car, where he was unable to find a seat. He remained in this car standing, and refused to surrender his ticket until he was given a seat. The conductor told him that there would soon be seats vacant, or that he could find a seat in the gentlemen's car, but he refused to go into that car, on the ground that the smoking there would make him sick. When the ticket was again demanded of him he refused to give it up, and was ejected from the train, for which he sued the railroad company for damages. Held, that he was not entitled to recover. There can be no doubt that the contract of a carrier of passengers by railway is one not only to furnish the passenger with transportation, but with the comfort of a seat. The contract is no more performed by furnishing him with a seat, without transportation, than it is when he is offered transportation without a seat. It is equally well settled that the passenger need not surrender his ticket until he is furnished with a seat, for the ticket is the evidence of the contract which entitles him to one. But it cannot be that one may ride free because not furnished with a seat. If the passenger chooses to accept transportation without a seat, he must on demand pay his fare. If unwilling to ride without transportation is furnished him in a seat, he must get off at first opportunity, and by so doing may bring his action for breach of contract, and recover as damages such sum as will compensate him for such breach, including such damages as are the natural and immediate results of such breach. Rorer Railr. 968, 969; Davis v. Railroad Co., 53 Mo. 317; Railroad Co. v. Leigh, 45 Ark. 368. It results that for the indignity and vexation consequent upon the ejection in this case, there can be no recovery. This result is made the more certain by the facts of this case, it appearing that at the time this passenger entered the car at the terminal station he saw that this car, assigned to ladies, and gentlemen with ladies, was overcrowded, and he knew that he must either ride standing or take a seat in the car called the smoking-car. He gave the railway company no opportunity to furnish additional seats while at its station. We have at this term, in the case of Chesa., O. & S. R. Co. v. Wells, held that a railway company may make reasonable regulations concerning the car in which a passenger may be required to ride, provided that equal accommodations were furnished to all holding first-class tickets, and that a regulation assigning a particular car to persons of color, that car being in all respects equal in comfort to any other in the train, was reasonable. This rule has been sustained in the courts of many States. West Chester R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn. St. 209; Chicago & N. W. R. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185. So we think a regulation setting apart a car for ladies, or gentlemen accompanied by ladies, a reasonable regulation. A passenger may not dictate where he will sit or in which car he will ride. If he is furnished accommodations equal in all respects to those furnished other passengers on the same train, he cannot complain, and this was the substance of our decision in the Wells case. The doctrine is equally applicable here. This passenger, when he took passage at Memphis, did it with knowledge that the ladies' car was crowded, and that he would either have to ride standing in that car, or go into the car assigned exclusively to gentlemen, and in which smoking was permitted. The requirement that he should go temporarily into the smoking car, under the circumstances, is not unreasonable. He ought not to have started when he did, unless willing to submit to what he realized was an inevitable necessity, without giving the carrier notice of his demand. Tenn. Sup.

Ct., April, 1887. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Benson. Opinion by Lurton, J.

CONTRACT-ACCEPTANCE-WORK ON BUILDING.Under a contract for the covering of a parsonage with artificial stone of an agreed color, with a view to rendering its appearance in keeping with the church, if the society use the parsonage after stone of an unsightly color has been put in, it does not constitute an acceptance. We take the principle to be that a person entering into a contract has a right to insist on the performance of it in all particulars according to its meaning and spirit; but that if he chooses to waive any of the terms introduced for his own benefit, he has the power to do so. If he contracts for an article of a particular quality or style of workmanship, and he elects to accept in lieu of it one of another kind, he discharges the other party from the obligation of furnishing an article which complies with the specifications of the contract, and he becomes bound by a new implied contract to pay for the article which he has accepted, what it is reasonably worth; and so where there is a contract for work of a particular description, and he accepts work of another kind. But he is not obliged to accept any thing else in place of that which he has contracted for; and if he does not waive his right, the other party to the contract cannot recover against him without performing all the stipulations on his part. The question then in the present case, supposing that the work has not been done according to the contract, is whether the defendant has accepted it. The law on the subject of accepting work done on land or property of another has sometimes been declared with great severity against parties doing such work in a manner not conformable to the contracts which they have made. But these harsh judgments go beyond the requirements of justice, and are much modified by the benign and equitable construction of contracts which prevails in this State. It is true, when work is done on a man's house, it is in a measure fastened upon him, and he cannot very conveniently relieve himselt from it, even if it is not such as he contracted for, and as he desires to have. If it is covered with a roof, for instance, it may be different in its style and work manship and materials from that which his contract required, and he may have a right to reject it and demand its removal, But if he permits it to remain, and enjoys the benefit of it, such as it is, he is certainly appropriating the labor and property of another man, and of right ought to make compensation. Thero is however a peculiar feature in this case. The evidence shows that the contract required the artificial stone covering to be of a gray color, it being the object to have the defendant's parsonage and the church of the same color and appearance. Now if the color of the coating is of the unsightly character described in the evidence, the purpose of the defendant in contracting for it is entirely defeated; and if it cannot be considered as appropriating the labor and materials of the other party, because something has been placed on its building which it does not wish to have there, and which in no respect whatever fulfills any of its purposes or bestows any comfort or gratification on it, on the supposition which we have made, no acceptance of the work could be implied in law; and all the evidence goes to show that acceptance was refused in point of fact. Md. Ct. App., March 15, 1887. Presbyterian Church of Hagerstown v. Hoopes Artificial Stone-Cement & Paint Co. Opinion by Bryan, J.

SUNDAY WORK OF NECESSITY-TELEGRAPH MESSAGE-PENALTY FOR NEGLIGENCE.-An ordinary bustness message cannot be regarded as a work of necessity within the meaning of the statute prohibiting

persons from pursuing their vocation on Sunday; but if there be shown a reasonable necessity for contracting with the telegraph company to send the message on that day, the contract will not be deemed illegal; and if there be a necessity for sending the message ou that day, the contract will constitute a valid basis for the recovery of the statutory penalty imposed upou telegraph companies for a breach of duty. A telegraph company will not be liable for the statutory penalty for failing to transmit a message, where the message is received on Sunday, unless the message on its face shows a necessity for receiving it on that day, or the company has notice of such necessity, or retains the message without notice to the sender until a secular day, and then wholly fails to transmit it. A stipulation requiring claims to be presented within sixty days applies to penalties, and unless waived, a claim to the penalty must be presented within 60 days, and must precede the commencement of the action, as the demand by the action cannot be regarded as such a claim as the contract contemplates. Where the agent of a telegraph company, in response to the demand of the sender of a message, notifies the sender that no payment will be made of the penalty for the reason that the contract was illegal, because made on Sunday, such notice will be deemed a waiver of the stipulation requiring a written claim to be presented within sixty days. Ind. Sup. Ct., March 18, 1887. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Yopst. Opinion by Elliott, C. J.

outset be conceded that a telegraph company, like a
common carrier, must offer to do the business of the
public subject to ordinary liability for negligence,
upon terms fair and reasonable, and if it does not do
this, it does not offer a choice of terms, and cannot
escape full responsibility. Now upon an examina-
tion and analysis of the terms contained in both the
day and night message blanks of the defendant com-
pany, we find: (1) That in the usual day-message con-
tract they stipulate for immunity from all damage for
error or delay in an unrepeated message beyond the
price paid for the transmission of the message. (2) If
the message be repeated, they contract against liabil-
ity beyond fifty times the toll paid. (3) They offer to
insure the correctness of transmission, except error in
cipher or obscure messages, and damage for unavoid-
able interruption of line, upon payment of price of a
repeated day message, and a premium of one per cent
on an agreement of risk if under 1,000 miles, and two
per cent if over this; but such insurance must be by a
contract in writing. (4) They offer to send unre-
peated messages at night, for delivery next business
day, at half usual day rate, on condition that they
shall not be responsible for damages for a sum in ex-
cess of ten times the cost of transmission. Now when
we consider that the business of telegraphy is prac-
tically a monopoly, and that there is in fact no real
competition for the business of the public, and the
other fact, that the use of the facilities afforded by
such companies has become a matter of social and
commercial necessity, we can readily see that the pub-
lic are under a species of coercion to assent to what-
ever conditions such companies choose to impose.
Practically the scale of graded charges offered by this
The price at
company afford no real choice of terms.
which they propose to send messages subject to ordi-
nary legal liability-the insurance proposition-is so
grossly in excess of the cost of service, as ascertained
by comparison with the terms offered for service with-
out such liability that we do not hesitate to hold that
the conditions limiting the liability of this company
for negligence are not fair, just or reasonable, and
are void as against public policy. They constitute,
taken together, but an artful arrangement and device
by which the consequences of their own negligence is
thrown upon the shoulders of their customers, and
they are enabled to conduct business with no respon-

their own want of due care. The terms upon which

TELEGRAPH-NIGHT MESSAGES-LIMITING LIABILITY. A contract by a telegraph company limiting its liability for sending unrepeated messages at night, for delivery next day, at half the usual day rates, on condition that they shall not be responsible for damages for a sum in excess of ten times the cost of transmission, is invalid, so far as the damage is a result of the negligence of the company or its servants. The same reasons which make void the contracts of a common carrier by which he seeks to be wholly exempt from the consequences of his own negligence, or that of his servants, apply with equal force to similar agreements, contracts or stipulations or rules or notices, by which a telegraph company seeks immunity from all responsibility for its negligence. The great weight of the decided cases clearly establishes this proposition. Sweatland v. Illinois & M. Tel. Co., 27 Iowa, 432; Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301; Manville v. Tele-sibility, beyond that of the most trivial character, for graph Co., 37 Iowa, 214; Telegraph Co. v. Graham, 1 Col. 230; Telegraph Co. v. Blanchard, 68 Ga. 299; Tyler v. Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421; 74 id. 168; U. S. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Penn. St. 262; True v. Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9: Passmore v. Telegraph Co., 78 Penn. St. 238; Candee v. Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471. But it is insisted that if it be conceded that a telegraph company cannot by contract exempt itself absolutely from all liability for negligence, yet that it may, for a sufficient consideration, limit its liability to a certain pecuniary amount, when various grades of liability are offered, including full responsibility, and at various rates of charge. If it be assumed that the plaintiff in this case was offered a choice of terms upon which he might send a message, and that he selected the nightmessage contract by preference, we are then called upon to determine whether the regulations, rules and stipulations under which this company propose to do business for the public are just and reasonable limitations upon the responsibility imposed upon them in the absence of agreements and contracts. If it be assumed that a telegraph company may by fair, just and reasonable regulations, limit the amount of damages to which it may be subjected by reason of negligence, then will the terms and conditions upon which this company propose to conduct its business stand the test of justness and reasonableness? It must at the

they do assume full liability are so arranged, and so exorbitant as probably never to be called into use. We do not mean to decide that it is not in the power of such a company to graduate their charges in some sort of proportion to the responsibility and risk incurred. We are not insensible to the fact that public policy as much demands that liberty of contract shall be preserved as that unjust and unreasonable limitations shall be held void. But we do hold that under the printed notices, regulations and stipulations of this defendant, it did not propose to do the business of the public on the terms imposed by law-for a reasonable and just compensation, and that therefore these limitations contained in the agreement under which the message was sent, under any view of the power of the company to limit its liability for its own negligence, were invalid so far as the damage was a result of the negligence of the defendant or its servauts. Teun. Sup. Ct., March 8, 1887. Marr v. Western U. Tel. Co. Opinion by Lurton, J.

VAGRANT ACT-PRETENDING TO TELL FORTUNESROGUE AND VAGABOND.-Section 4 of 5 Geo. IV, ch. 83, enacts that " every person pretending or professing to tell fortunes, or using any subtle craft, means or device, by palmistry or otherwise, to deceive and im

* * *

pose on any of his majesty's subjects, and being subsequently convicted of the offense for which he or she shall have been so apprehended, shall be deemed a rogue and a vagabond." The issuing of a circular by way of advertisement, in which the issuer states, that on being informed of the dates of births of those who consult him, he will (on the payment of money) forecast their future, is a pretense or profession to tell fortunes within the above section, though no money is received by him, and the future of any particular person is not told. Proof that the issuer of such a circular does not believe in his own power to foretell the future is not necessary to substantiate the charge, and the intent to deceive and impose may rightly be inferred from the issuing of such circular. This is an instance in which the doctrine res ipsa loquitur applies. It is nonsense to suppose that in those days of advanced knowledge the appellant really did believe that he had the power to predict a man's future by knowing at what hour he was born, and the position of the stars at the particular moment of his birth. No person who was not a lunatic could believe he possessed such power. There was therefore no need on the part of the prosecution to negative his belief in such power or capacity. The magistrate rightfully drew an inference that the appellant had an intent to deceive and impose on the prosecutor. I do not decide whether merely telling fortunes is or is not an offense under the statute, but this advertisement and circular amounted to a pretending and profession to tell fortunes within section 4 of the act. think there was ample evidence on which we ought to hold the magistrate was right. Q. B. Div., Feb. 25, 1887. Penny v. Hanson. Opinion by Denman, J.

I

Johnston, Geneva; Charles E. Jordan, Lyons; Henry B. Johnson, Woodstock, Vt.; Frederick A. Johnston, Palmyra; R. Forsyth Jones, St. Louis, Mo.; George Lawyer, Middleburgh; George B. McKinney, Binghamton; Fred G. Merrill, Foxcraft, Me.; John A Milne, Trumansburgh; George M. Mayer, Olean; Irvin C. McDowell, Buffalo; William McElroy, Albany; Don S. Mayham, Schoharie; Stewart C. Newton, Albany; Albert B. Osborne, Corry, Penn.; Henry F. Remington, Rochester; Frank Rowland, Rensselaer Falls; George H. Smith, Woodburn; George W. Smith, Waterville, Me.; George W. Stedman, Albany; William M. Strauss, Poughkeepsie; Cornelius F. Scott, Deposit; William McM. Speer, Albany; Charles F. Smith, Peekskill; John C. R. Taylor, Pine Bush; Charles T. Titus, Jr., Scarborough; George W. Van Vranken, Albany; Fred. C. Valentine, Milton; Willard R. Van Allen, Albany; Chester G. Wager, Troy; Frank S. Wheeler, Kennedy; Max Wernaer, Albany; Sampson O. Wasserman, Portland, Ore.; John C. Wheeler, Canajoharie.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE SELDEN SOCIETY. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In answer to an inquiry, Prof. J. B. Thayer, of Cambridge, Mass., who has undertaken to receive American subscriptions to the Selden Society, informs me that a guinea (the amount of subscription in English money) costs about $5.18 lauded in England by means of a postal order.

Yours truly,

WILLIAM A. SHORTT.

35 BROADWAY, N. Y., May 24, 1887.

WITNESS - SLANDER-LIABILITY OF WITNESS FOR TESTIMONY.-Code Miss. 1880, § 1004, providing that "all words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are considered as insults, and lead to violence and breaches of the peace, shall hereafter be actionable," and that no plea shall be sustained so as to preclude a jury from passing on the A subscriber, who has derived both pleasure and question, does not take away the immunity of a wit-profit from the pages of your excellent journal, ven

ness in a judicial proceeding from liability to an action of slander on account of his evidence given in such proceeding. Miss. Sup. Ct., Feb. 14, 1887. Verner v. Verner. Opinion by Campbell, J.

ALBANY LAW SCHOOL.

THE thirty-sixth commencement exercises of the Albany Law School were held in the Leland Opera House May 26. The Hon. William L. Learned, president of the faculty, presided. Orations were delivered by George W. Stedman, Albany, on "Relation of Law to Public Conscience; Fred C. Valentine,

Milton, on "Our Naval Policy," and George W. Smith, of Waterville, Me., on "The Spirit of Equity." The valedictory fell to George Lawyer, of Middleburgh, who took as his theme, "Liberty and License." The address to the graduating class was delivered by Prof. John Ordronaux, M. D., LL. D., and the degrees were conferred by President Learned. The following is a list of the graduates: Lawrence W. Bigham, Mercer, Penn.; Charles F. Borden, Albion; John S. Bishop, Lyons; Corril E. Bridges, South Deerfield, Mass.; Benjamin A. Capron, Brownsville, Morris W. Chase, Syracuse; Victor G. Cozad, Canyon City, Ore.; Walter H. Coggeshall, Waterville, N. Y.; John E. Dolman, Topeka, Kans.; Egbert C. Everest, Champlain; Sanford E. Emery, Proctorsville, Vt.; Harry C. Green, Buffalo; Seymour N. Harris, Albany; Albert L. Halsey, Schenectady; Joseph C. Heinlein, Bridgeport, O.; Roger W. Hulburd, Hyde Park, Vt.; Russell M.

THE CORNELISON-REID CASE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

tures to write concerning an article in your last issue (May 21) about the " escape of Cornelison, the brutal assailant of Judge Reid, for you seem to have no idea of the fact that within thirty-six hours of his release under the habeas corpus Cornelison was rearrested and recommitted to jail, where he now is, and has been ever since. Moreover the magistrate, Stofer, was then arrested, and arraigned before the

county judge upon a charge of widing and abetting the escape of a prisoner. Stofer waived the examining trial, and was held over to answer before the grand jury of the Montgomery Circuit Court in June.

The tone and temper of the various articles, which have from time to time appeared in your journal in reference to this dreadful affair, seem to indicate a most lamentable ignorance of the facts as they actually occurred. I say ignorance, because I believe that you are more than willing to render full credit to the untiring efforts of the people of Mount Sterling and Montgomery county (sustained as they have been, and now are, by public sentiment throughout our entire State) to bring to justice and punishment not only that ruffian Cornelison, but likewise his judicial friend, Mr. "Dogberry "Stofer.

Indeed I am persuaded that if you but knew "the facts in record" a little better, it is more than possible that you might find something to hope for among the people, even among the "blue-grass chivalry" in this "semi-barbarous " State of Kentucky. Yours truly,

E. W. C. HUMPHREY.

LOUISVILLE, Ky., May 26, 1887.

The Albany
Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JUNE 11, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

TILL another essay on insanity "The Claim of Moral Insanity in its Medico-Legal Aspects, by James Hendrie Lloyd, M. D.," of the University of Pennsylvania. The writer says: "I have never yet seen in actual practice a case of so-called moral insanity, or read the descriptions of such in the books, that it has not seemed easy to me to detect the fallacy which ascribes to such cases a normal intellect amid the ruins of the shattered soul." He fortifies

this assertion with many interesting examples, and

continues: "The class of lunatics from whom are recruited most of the criminal insane comprises the patients with elaborate, systematized delusions. These are the monomaniacs, or as the Germans call them, the cases of original insanity, or Primäre Verrücktheit. This has sometimes been called the 'insanity of character.' Its roots are deep in the very construction of the man's brain; he was born with a bad brain, which is bound not to perform properly its function of ideation. It will not elaborate good thought or sound sentiment in whatever environment it is placed, and whatever sensations stimulate it to its special reflexes of comparison and action at least thus we are taught to believe of these congenital fools. Just here is where a fallacy, I think, creeps into the admirable logic of those who have described this class. While it is true, in every sense, that there is a class of men born with poorly constructed brains, it is not so applicable a truth that they must necessarily be forever in the grip of a fate which holds them all equally irresponsible lunatics. Men are born with every grade of brain-power, from the microcephalic idiot to the sage whose cerebral masses weigh sixty ounces. Character is a varying quality, not always strictly in proportion to the amount and quality of a brain, but also in proportion to the character of the environments of that brain. If there is any truth in the doctrine of evolution, or any force in our systems of education, it seems to me to rest upon this truth. Otherwise we are all the most unfortunate fatalists, and in a literal sense, the sins of our great-grandfathers are visited upon us without amendment or expiation possible on our parts. Hence this doctrine of original insanity, while attractive to the ear and eye, bears a fallacy with it if extended too far. Insanity is not a mere peculiarity of character, else this doctrine may extend its long arms until it embraces all the oddities, and eccentricities, and notions, and fallacies, and sins of mankind, or until one-half the human race is caught by this octopus of the extreme school of alienists. Insanity must be conceded to be something more definite than this, especially criminal insanity, wherein arises the question of responsibility under VOL. 35 No. 24.

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the law. If Erskine's test of delusion is applicable at all, it is certainly to this class of lunatics, for insane delusion, fixed and logical, is the essence of their disease; it supplies the motive, usually, of their crimes (whether its connection with the crime can be traced or not); it dominates their lives and perverts all their conceptions of moral, social and legal relations. Unless such a positive perversion of cerebral activity can be shown it seems very doubtful if these primary cranks' have passed from the borderland of folly and wickedness into The writer cannot but feel, in common with his prothe neighboring field of irresponsible lunacy. fession, a prejudice against hard and fast dogmatic tests of insanity. It is in this respect that the physician has all along been apt to part company with the lawyer. This arises in part from the directly opposite positions taken by the two in regard to the case in issue. The physician, searching for disease, may be too apt sometimes to construe slight and irrelevant symptoms as indicative of what he seeks, while the lawyer, upon the bald assertion of the law that every man is in normal health until he is proved to the contrary, is always too prone to resist any thing but the most glaring and unmistakable signs. It thus happens that the medical definiincludes cases which shock the common sense of tion has sometimes been stretched so wide that it the most intelligent, while the legal tests have been made so narrow and unscientific that it is difficult to include in them some of the most patent cases of insanity."

Mr. David Dudley Field, at the age of eightytwo, sails for Europe to attend a convention of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, to be held at the Guildhall, London, July 25th; one of the Institute of International Law, to be held at Heidelberg early in September; and one of the Commercial Law Congress, to be held in Antwerp the last of July.

The inconvenience arising from composing a court of an even number of judges is exemplified in Michigan. In 57th Michigan Reports are three cases affirmed by an equally divided court.

Mr.

Every event in history seems to lay the foundadation of some suit at law. The celebration of the accession of Victoria has occasioned a decision that "Jubilee" is not a valid trade-mark. Chitty, J., observes: "It is not obviously meaningless or not descriptive with reference to note paper, because it may be note paper which is produced in the Jubilee year. I have said the Jubilee year. Aston argued at some little length that the word 'Jubilee' was not a good English word, but it is plain it is a common English word, and used also without reference to the term 'year.' The term 'Jubilee' is used by several writers of authority, not of the present day, but of times past, such as Dryden and Sir Walter Scott, and I could give

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