The second volume of the old laws of this State, on the first volume of which comment was made in this journal two weeks ago, is now published, and contains much curious matter expressed in a quaint form. Among the more important statutes are a bill of rights, those on uses, wills and limitations, that establishing the University of the State (which Governor Hill would dis-establish), and that for re petitioner at the bar counsel is a part of the system of remedy, no part of the system of substantial rights. His first concern is with the system to which he belongs, and through which alone he is related to any right or justice outside of it. He is part of a machine, helping to keep the other parts in order and to operate the whole. What would impair the machine he cannot do; neither can he do any thing except with the machine. The neces-vising and digesting the laws, directing that the sity of procedure, and that alone, accounts for and justifies his existence. Were courts inspired, or did they know intuitively what they learn through procedure, he would be relegated to his law office, there to be consulted and give advice on rights of substance and the modes of their acquisition, preservation and transfer. His professional life would be retired and silent. * * * It is doubtful whether lawyers, in general, estimate justice of procedure at its true value, and it is certain that the public, in general, do not estimate it at all; they all; they do not think of it; they rarely hear it mentioned; they scarcely know of its existence. When they speak of justice they mean justice of substance, and that alone. We cannot do wrong to serve right; and the doing of one right thing that we must do is often the only obstacle to doing another right thing that we would do. All this is plain to all people, but that it applies to justice as well as to other good, is what they fail to realize, and yet its application to justice is no less certain and no less obvious. Justice of procedure consists in abiding by and faithfully administering the rules of procedure, whatever they may be. This a court must do, and what it would do is to ascertain and administer justice of substance by this means. Here then is a must do and a would do, and the doing of the must may, in certain cases, be the very thing, and the only thing, that hinders the doing of the would. Hence, justice done in adhering to appointed means may defeat the very end and the only end which the means were intended to accomplish; and so justice, instead of being the saviour, may be the executioner of justice." * * * A pamphlet on the "City Government of Philadelphia," by Edward P. Allinson and Boies Penrose, is the opening number of a series to be issued by Johns Hopkins University, of "Studies in Historical and Political Science," which will comprehend Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, San Francisco, New Orleans, New York. The essayists assert that scientific government in Philadelphia dates from the passage of the Bullitt Bill, which takes effect this year. We recommend this essay and the whole series to the consideration of our "Committee of Thirteen," and of our mayor, and of the citizens of Troy. Our own city made a great parade of its antiquity last summer, but it and Troy are not the best governed cities in this land- extremely profuse with little to show for the outlay, and by no means able to enforce their laws. Albany is old enough to know better. "stile" be corrected. A tax is laid on dogs in the NOTES OF CASES. N Bellman v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 42 Hun, 130, a military organization, whose headquarters were at Rochester, having agreed to give a public entertainment at the village of Brockport, one of its members engaged of the defendant railroad company passage for all the members from Rochester to Brockport and return. The members were carried to Brockport in a separate car, which after they had left it, was run upon a side track to the west of and beyond the station grounds, so that the west end of the car rested upon a bridge upon which the railroad crossed at a height of twelve minate the relation of carrier and passenger by attempting to assist the conductor as requested. It was the duty of the conductor to know the condition of the place where he asked the passengers to alight, aud if it was not safe and secure for them to do so, to inform them of the fact. The evidence tended to, if it did not conclusively establish the defendant's negligence. It was clearly a question for the jury to say whether the plaintiff himself was guilty of any negligence or carelessness which contributed to the injuries which he received. He was invited by the defendant's agent to leave the car at the place where he did, and it cannot be said that his action was altogether voluntary. Passengers on board of cars are largely under the direction and control of the conductor, and it is his duty to exercise the greatest care and caution in providing for their safety. Hickey v. Railroad Company, 14 Allen, 429; Sweeny v. Railroad Company, 10 id. 368; Hulbert v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 145." As to the right of a passenger to recover from the master for an injury sustained while assisting a servant, see St. Ry. Co. v. Bolton, 73 Ohio St. 224; S. C., 54 Am. Rep. 803, and note, 805. feet above a village street. Before ten o'clock in the evening the car was lighted and the doors unlocked, although no person representing the company was left in charge of it. The cars could be seen from the hotel where the members of the organization were staying. At about the time at which the freight train to which this car was to be attached was due at Brockport most of the members of the organization, including the plaintiff, had passed from the platform of the station across and along the tracks, and had taken their seats in the car. After the freight train had arrived and stopped its conductor opened the door of the car and said: "Boys, come out and give us a shove; shove this car on to the main track so I can hitch on." The plaintiff, with others, arose, went to the door, and seeing the freight train moving on his right-hand side, and fearing to alight on that side, stepped off the steps on the other side, and fell through or over the side of the bridge to the street below. Upon the trial of this action, brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the injuries so sustained, the plaintiff recovered a verdict, which was on motion set aside for the reason that when the plaintiff boarded the car it was outside of the station grounds, and there was not sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding an agreement or consent by the railroad company that the plaintiff might occupy the car in the place where he found it. Held, error. The court, by Barker, J., said: "In determining whether the verdict should stand or not it may be assumed that the relation of carrier and passenger did not exist at the time the conductor came to the passenger car and took the control and management of the same. But the moment he ordered the car to be moved I think it may be reasonably and fairly held, as matter of law, that the relation of carrier and passenger was resumed, as the company intended to carry the persons holding tickets back to Rochester in that car. The conductor made no request that the car be vacated by the passengers, and no objection was made to their remaining in their seats while the car was being moved so that it could be attached to the train. The plaintiff became a passenger as soon as he came to the depot building for the purpose of being carried to his home in Rochester, for which place he had a ticket, and was entitled to the care and protection which the law requires carriers of persons to bestow upon their patrons. The question is not whether the plaintiff took a seat in the car with or without the consent of the defendant. But the inquiry is, whether at the time he received his injury the conductor had taken charge of the car, and the plaintiff, as a passenger, had placed himself under his care. If the plaintiff had received injuries while passing from the depot build-resign from the police force of the city of Dayton?' ing to the car, or while in the car before the conductor assumed control of the car, a very different question would be presented. The conductor in ordering the car to be moved acted as the agent of the railroad company, and the plaintiff did not ter In State v. Pfefferle, Kansas Supreme Court, Dec. 9, 1886, on a prosecution for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, the defendant, who voluntarily became a witness, was asked by the State, on crossexamination, if he had not recently been tried and convicted several times for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, and over objection, gave an affirmative answer. Held, no error. The court said: "Mr. Wharton, in discussing this question, says that 'in this country there has been some hesitation in permitting a question, the answer to which not merely imputes disgrace, but touches on matter of record; but the tendency now is, if the question be given for the purpose of honestly discrediting a witness, to require an answer.' Whart. Crim. Ev., § 474. Stephens, in article 129 of his Digest of the Law of Evidence, in speaking of what are lawful questions on cross-examination, says: 'When a witness is cross-examined he may be asked any questions which tend, first, to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility; or second, to shake his credit by injuring his character. He may be compelled to answer any such question, however irrelevant it may be to the facts in issue, and however disgraceful the answer may be to himself, except in the case provided in article 120, viz., when the answer might expose him to a criminal charge or penalty.' In Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460, the witness for the defendant was asked, on cross-examination: Were you not discharged or compelled to And also: 'Are you not now under indictment for murder in the second degree in this court?' And another witness for the defendant was asked if he had not been indicted for assault and battery in that court, and pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court significant, and which will explain his credibility, held that the questions were allowable under the latitude of cross-examination; and stated in its opinion that 'it is difficult to lay down any precise rule fixing the limits to which a witness may be cross-examined on matters not relevant to the issue. This must, in a great measure, rest in the sound discretion of the court trying the cause. Such questions may well be allowed when there is reason to believe it will tend to the ends of justice; but they ought to be excluded when the disparaging course of the examination seems unjust to the witness, and uncalled for by the circumstances of the case.' In a later case in that State, where the defendant was on trial for murder in the first degree, and having offered himself as a witness, was asked, on cross-examination, if he had not previously been indicted for assault with intent to kill, and pleaded guilty to the same, and if he had not frequently been arrested in that county on charges of assault and battery, objections to these questions were overruled; and the Supreme Court held that it was within the discretion of the court to allow the questions for the purpose of judging of the character and credit of the witness from his own admissions, and that it did not appear that the discretion had been abused. Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178; S. C., 41 Am. Rep. 496. In Brandon v. People, 42 N. Y. 265, the defendant became a witness in his own behalf, and on cross-examination he was asked: 'Have you ever been arrested before for theft?' The counsel for the defendant objected to the question on the ground that the prosecuting attorney had no right to attack the character of the prisoner, she not having put her character in issue. The objection was overruled, and the Court of Appeals held the question proper for the purpose of impairing the credibility of the witness, saying that 'it had been the practice of the courts of this State from a very early period to permit questions of this character to be put to a witness, and for the purpose indicated. Its abuse is guarded against in two modes: First, by the privilege of the witness to decline to answer any question which may disgrace him, or may tend to charge him as a criminal. Second, by the power of the court, of its own motion, to prohibit an unreasonable or oppressive cross-examination.' The Supreme Court of Michigan considered the propriety of such testimony in a case where the defendant was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and controverted the plaintiff's case. On cross-exami- | nation he was allowed, against objection, to be asked whether he was ever confined in a State prison. The court held the objection was not tena-lowed depend upon the appearance and conduct of ble, saying that it has always been held that within reasonable limits a witness may, on crossexamination, be very thoroughly sifted upon his character and antecedents. The court has a discretion as to how far propriety will allow this to be done in a given case, and will or should prevent any needless or wanton abuse of the power. But within this discretion we think a witness may be asked concerning all antecedents which are really the witness, and all the circumstances of the case, and necessarily must be regulated by a sound judicial discretion. It is only where there has been an abuse of the exercise of this discretion by the court, resulting to the prejudice of the party complaining, that error will lie. We cannot say that the crossexamination went beyond the proper limits in this case, or that the court abused its discretion in allowing the questious objected to." NOT COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES. mata, imperceptible to the senses;' and in the same article the same authority also stated that 'among the multitude of substances that rank as poisons are many, some possessing the most active qualities, which are also useful drugs, and which, administered in suitable quantities, are recognized among medicines in universal employment, and of the most beneficial character. The difference between a medicine and a poison is frequently a mere question of dose, and the line which divides them is sometimes narrow.' As the question is raised by the evidence in this case whether chloroform is a poison or not, the court also deems it proper to state that it is a powerful anæsthetic agent, having been discovered so recently as 1831, and not having come into use by the medical profession until 1847, there may be some room for a difference of opinion as to its powers, properties and effects. In common parlance however chloroform' is classed among the poisons; and by the pharmacy act passed by the Legislature of this State in 1885 it is expressly named as one of the things which it is unlawful for any person to sell (except to physicians, photographers, or upon prescriptions) without being labeled as a 'poison.' The lawful and general use of chloroform is for the purpose of producing insensibility to pain during surgical operations and other painful processes; and in such cases it is gen OTIFY.-In Vinton v. Builders and Manuj'rs Ass'n, Indiana Supreme Court, Nov. 23, 1886, it was said: "The word 'notify' used in such section is a compound word of Latin derivation, and its primary and literal meaning is 'to make known.' According to the best American lexicographers of the English language, Webster and Worcester, the secondary meaning of the word 'notify' is 'to give notice to,' though it is conceded that the use of the word, in this secondary sense, is not sanctioned by English usage. Webster gives and illustrates this secondary meaning of the word 'notify' as follows: 'To give notice to; to inform by words or writing, in person or by message, or by any signs which are understood; as, 'the constable has notified the citizens to meet at the city hall;' 'the bell notifies us of the time of meeting.' It is clear from these secondary definitions of Webster, and clearer still, if possible, from his illustrations, that the word 'notify' ' never imports or implies of necessity a notice in writing. Whenever it is intended that the word 'notify,' as used in a statute, shall signify a notice in writing, we think that such intention should be expressed in words, or should be implied by, or be apparent from other provisions of the same statute. There is nothing in the statute under consideration to indicate that the word 'notify' is used in sec-erally administered by physicians and surgeons, and tion five of the act in any other than its primary and literal meaning. On the contrary, we think it clearly appears from all the provisions of the statute that whenever it was intended by the law-making power that notice in writing must be given, such intention is expressed therein in clear and unmistakable terms. Indeed, the rule is general that unless otherwise provided by statute a verbal notice will in all cases be as effective as a written notice, provided it conveys the necessary information between the proper parties, at or within the prescribed time." their assistants." The court on appeal said: "Neither do we think there was error in the statement of the court that in common parlance chloroform is classed as a poison. There may be some difference of opinion respecting some of its properties and effects, but it seems to us that it is regarded by the masses of the people as a poison. In addition to the fact that it is so classed in the books, the Legislature of the State has published it as a poison, and required that it shall not be sold except upon prescription, or to physicians or photographers, unless the vessel in which it is contained, as well as the outside wrapper, shall be distinctly labeled 'poison;' nor unless, upon due inquiry, it is found that the purchaser is aware of its poisonous character. Sec. 12, ch. 150, L. 1885. This law, which all are presumed to know, places the same restrictions upon the sale of chloroform as is done in the case of arsenic, corrosive sublimate and strychnia, and classes it with aconite, belladonna, digitalis, oxalic acid and other virulent poisons.' It cannot be well claimed that the court erred in telling the jury that in common parlance chloroform was classed among the poisons." POISON. As to whether chloroform is a poison, the trial court in State v. Baldwin, Kansas Supreme Court, Dec. 9, 1886, had charged: "Poison' is defined by Webster as 'any substance which, when introduced into the animal organization, is capable of producing morbid, noxious or deadly effect upon it.' In some of the editions of his work he makes the following comments: All medicines possessing sufficient activity to be of much value are always poisonous in inordinate or excessive quantities, and every thing poisonous is capable of proving medicinal in suitably reduced quantities. There are as many different modes in which poisons operate as COUSIN. The Law Times says: "In the case of there are different and distinct medicinal powers of Cloak v. Hammond the Court of Appeal were inany material activity.' In the American Cyclope-vited to solve a somewhat curious riddle, arising dia poison is defined as any substance which, in- out of a loosely worded gift in a will. A testatrix troduced in small quantities in the animal economy, bequeathed her residuary estate to her cousin, Harseriously disturbs or destroys the vital functions. riet Cloak. Of the two claimants to the gift neither Under this head are obviously included a vast num- exactly answered this description. One was corber of bodies belonging to the mineral, vegetable rectly described as Harriet Cloak, but she was not and animal kingdoms, some solid, others fluid, and a cousin of the testatrix, but the wife of a cousin. others gaseous and deleterious vapors and mias- The other was correctly described as a cousin, but 6 HABITUAL DRUNKARD. — In Richards v. Richards, 19 Bradw. 465, it was held that if "the defendant, for a period of two years prior to the beginning of the suit, was frequently and customarily or habitually given to the excessive use of intoxicating drink, and had during said two years or more lost the power or the will, by the frequent indulgence, to control his appetite for it, then the defendant was guilty of habitual drunkenness." And a refusal to charge that he must have "had a fixed habit of drinking to excess to such a degree as to disqualify him from attending to his business during the principal portion of the time usually devoted to business," was upheld. she had long before the will ceased to be Harriet Cloak by reason of her marriage with a Mr. Crane. In the language of Lord Justice Bowen, on the one side there was a true description of the consanguinity with an error in the name; on the other side the name was accurate, but the description of the consanguinity was wrong. Under these circumstances the question arose which of the two ladies had the better title. The late Mr. Justice Pearson had decided in favor of Harriet Crane, and Lord Justice Bowen agreed with that view. On the other hand, the majority of the Court of Appeal (consisting of Lords Justices Cotton and Fry) preferred the title of Harriet Cloak. It should be mentioned that the testatrix some years before she made her will was aware of Harriet Crane's marriage, and the Court of Appeal were unanimous in EVIDENCE-PRIVATE ENTRIES—BOOKS OF PHYadmitting evidence of this fact, as they were also unanimous in declining to admit evidence of the intention of the testatrix. Putting aside the legal aspect of the case-and the question was grammatical rather than legal- it would seem to be fairly obvious as a general proposition that a person speaking of another by his name and his relationship is more likely to be accurate as to the name than as to the relationship. That at least was the view of Lord Justice Fry. Moreover, any difficulty there might otherwise be in the way of that view almost entirely vanishes in the face of the fact that the word 'cousin' is constantly used in everyday SICIAN. SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT, TOWN OF BRIDGEWATER V. TOWN OF ROXBURY. The entries in the account book of a physician who attended a pauper, kept by him in his own hands, and made in the regular order and conrse of business, with like charges and credits against other persons and patients, are admissible in evidence in an action brought by a third per son against a town, though the physician at the time of the trial had become incompetent to testify or to transact business. HE facts are stated in the opinion. talk to describe a cousin by marriage. Lord Jus- THE tice Bowen admitted a similar usage as regards the words 'nephew' and 'niece,' but did not think that the usage extended to the word 'cousin.' The distinction strikes us as novel, and though we differ from Lord Justice Bowen, even on a question which cannot be considered legal in any proper sense, with the greatest hesitation, it does not appear to us to be in accordance with the fact. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this curious case is that a question of construction apparently of not extraordinary difficulty should have given rise to an equal division of opinion among four of the most eminent of recent judges." INCLOSE."The duty of the executors, under the codicil to this will, was to inclose the Friends' meeting-house grounds,' as also 'the school-house grounds attached,' and the 'Friends' burial ground.' The three different lots are severally designated, and the duty imposed clearly attached to each of them separately; the character and quality of the fence was not only particularly specified, but the testator in his life-time, by the partial erection of the work, indicated the kind of a fence he intended. The several and respective lots were to be inclosed - that is to say, shut in on all sides. A field with a fence on three sides only could not, in any proper sense, be spoken of as inclosed, unless the fourth side was bounded by some natural object or occupied by some artificial erection, which rendered a fence impracticable or unnecessary. The three grounds adjoined one another. Hall's Appeal, 112 Penn, St. 42. L. D. Brewster and J. H. McMahon, for appellant. J. Huntington and A. D. Warner, for appellee. LOOMIS, J. This is a complaint to recover for supplies furnished Esther A. Snyder and her three minor children. The alleged pauper was born in the defendant town in 1853, of parents, Chauncey and Patty Wilmot, who at the time of her birth had their settlement in New Milford. Chauncey Wilmot died in 1858, in the town of Roxbury, without having gained a settlement there. Soon after Patty, the mother, with her minor children, moved from the defendant to the plaintiff town, and remained there until May, 1860, and then, with her children, returned to the defendant town, where she lived in a shanty built by her son Daniel for her and her children to occupy, and there remained for about twenty years. Erther A., the pauper in question, was married November 27, 1871, to La Fayette Snyder, a person of full age, but who had at the time no settlement in any town in this State. Upon these facts it was conceded that the pauper in question would take the settlement of her mother, if the latter had gained one by commorancy in the defendant town after the decease of her husband. And it was also conceded that such settlement had been gained by the mother, unless prevented by two payments made by the town for medical attendance upon Patty in the years 1865 and 1866. Upon this subject the court finds: "In 1865, Patty being sick and needing medical aid, Dr. Downs, a phy. sician of Roxbury, informed a selectman of Roxbury that she was sick, and that he (the doctor) could no longer attend to her unless the town would pay him. The selectman thereupon directed the doctor to render her medical assistance, and charge the same to the town, she being unable to pay the doctor and having no property. Afterward the doctor, on the 26th day of April, 1865, rendered to her medicine and attendance, |