the statute taken by me in my opinion in Edington v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564; but my brethren were then unwilling to concur with me in that view. When the same question again came before the court in Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281, I again attempted to enforce the same view upon my brethren, and again failed, and it was then distinctly held that the statute could not be confined to information of a confidential nature, and that the court was bound to follow and give effect to the plain language, without interpolating the broad exception contended for. It is further contended that the rule laid down in People v. Pierson, 79 N. Y. 424, should be applied to this case. We there held that the statute did not cover a case where its prohibition was invoked solely for the protection of a criminal, and not at all for the benefit or protection of the patient, who was dead, and a waiver of the prohibition had therefore become impossible. We are unable to perceive how the reasoning upon which that decision rests can have any application to this case. Here there is no allegation of crime, and there is a mere contest over the patient's property. It is probably true that the statute, as we feel obliged to construe it, will work considerable mischief. In testamentary cases, where the contest relates to the competency of the testator, it will exclude evidence of physicians, which is generally the most important and decisive. In actions upon policies of life insurance, where the inquiry relates to the health and physical condition of the insured, it will exclude the most reliable and vital evidence which is absolutely needed for the ends of justice. But the remedy is with the Legislature, and not with the courts. Dec. 7, 1886. Reinhan v. Dennin. Opinion by Earl, J.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CORPORATIONS STOCKHOLDERS - LIABILITY TRANSFER OF PROPERTY IN PAYMENT OF STOCK.—

Where the capital subscribed is settled for by the transfer to the corporation of personal property belonging to the subscribers at an honest valuation, fairly made, and agreed upon between them, they cannot be held individually liable to creditors because the value of the property, estimated in the light of subsequent events, does not equal the amount at which it was received by the corporation. Dec. 6, 1886. Coit v. North Carolina Gold Amalgamating Co. Opinion by Field, J.

EQUITY-JURISDICTION - REMEDY AT LAW.-The plaintiffs filed a bill in equity, alleging that they made a contract by which the defendant was to deliver them a certain number of cattle; that subsequently the defendant induced them to accept an assignment of a contract in his favor by another person to deliver the cattle; that thereupon the plaintiffs paid defendant $15.000, which he had paid to such third party, gave him their obligation to pay him a sum which represented his profits of the sales to them, and returned to him the original contract with him; that they were induced to accept such assignment, to pay said sum, and to give the obligation, by the false and fraudulent representations of the defendant as to such third party's solvency and business standing: and praying for a discovery, for the rescission and cancellation of the assignment, and of the plaintiff's obligation, for a reinstatement and confirmation of the original contract, and its enforcement; or if that could not be done, that the defendant be compelled to repay the $15,000 paid him, and to pay the damages sus

tained. Held, that a court of equity had no jurisdiction. A suit in equity to enforce a legal right can be brought only when the court can give more complete and effectual relief, in kind or in degree, on the equity side, than on the common-law side; as for instance by compelling a specific performance, or the removal a cloud on the title to real estate; or preventing an injury for which damages are not recoverable at law, as in Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; or where an agreement procured by fraud is of a continuing nature, and its rescission will prevent a multiplicity of suits, as in Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215, and in Jones v. Bolles, 9 Wall. 364, 369. In cases of fraud or mistake, as under any other head of chancery jurisdiction, a court of the United States will not sustain a bill in equity to obtain only a decree for the payment of money by way of damages, when the like amount can be recovered at law in an action sounding in tort or for money had and received. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 UJ. S. 487, 500; Ambler v. Choteau, 107 id. 586; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 id. 190. In England indeed the Court of Chancery, in cases of fraud, bas sometimes maintained bills in equity to recover the same damages which might be recovered in an action for money had and received. But the reason for this, as clearly brought out by Lords Justices KnightBruce and Turner, in Slim v. Croucher, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 518, 527, 528, was that such cases were within the ancient and original jurisdiction in chancery before any court of law had acquired jurisdiction of them, and that the assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of law, by gradually extending their powers, did not displace the earlier jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Upon any other ground such bills could not be maintained. Clifford v. Brooke, 13 Ves. 131; Thomp son v. Barclay, 9 L. J. Ch. 215, 218. And we have not been referred to any instance in which an English court of equity has maintained a bill in such a case as that now before us. In Newham v. May, 13 Price, 749 Chief Baron Alexander said: "It is not in every case of fraud that relief is to be administered by a court of equity. In the case, for instance, of a fraudulent warranty on the sale of a horse, or any fraud upon the sale of a chattel, no one, I apprehend, ever thought of filing a bill in equity." The present bill states a case for which an action of deceit could be maintained at law, and would afford full, adequate and complete remedy. Dec. 13, 1886. Buzard v. Houston. Opinion by Gray, J. Bradley, J., dissenting.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

CARRIERS-PASSENGER-EXPULSION-TRESPASSERNEGLIGENCE.--A. purchased a railroad ticket good for a continuous trip to a certain point and return within thirty days. He testified that he did not know that such a ticket was not good on a "limited express," and that he had previously travelled on such tickets by such trains. He boarded the "limited express" with his ticket, and was not informed by any one that it was not good on that train; but the regulations of the company required the purchase of special tickets for passage on that train. The conductor refused to receive A.'s ticket, or to receive his fare in cash, but stopped the train at night, and expelled him, without violence, at a point where there were many railroad tracks, and where many trains were continuously passing, and A. was knocked down and injured, it was supposed, by a train in motion. Held, that no irrebuttable legal presumption arose that he was acquainted with the regulation of the company requiring the purchase of special tickets; that the company

could not treat him as a mere trespasser, but only as a passenger who had by mistake taken the wrong train; and that if the place where he was landed was ungerous, the company was liable in damages for the injury. A contract was made between the parties when the plaintiff purchased the ticket. Although he neglected to inform himself of all its terms, he was bound by them unless waived by the defendant. He cannot set up ignorance of them in order to establish rights not therein stipulated and implied. If he could, the

the cold, whereby plaintiff was taken dangerously sick from such exposure," is good upon demurrer, as the sickness referred to is not too remote to support an action. Col. Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1886. Clifford v. Denver, S. P. & P. R. Co. Opinion by Helm, J.

OUR NEW YORK LETTER.

train. Hence in a proper sense he was bound to ascertain and know the regulations of the defendant entering into the contract, and he had no greater rights thereunder than if he had acquired actual knowledge of its terms. As his contract gave him no right to ride on the limited express, the company could lawfully eject him. But under the facts which the jury were warranted in finding, the defendant was bound to treat the plaintiff as a passenger who by mistake had got on a train not included in the contract. He was entitled to the rights and privileges of a passenger except as to limited express trains. He promptly exhibited his ticket, the evidence of his contract, to the conductor. As a passenger, he was rightfully at the station waiting for a train to take him to the place named in the ticket, and entered the car designated to him by an official as the coach for the passengers to Erie. There was neither gate nor closed door nor employee to warn him that his ticket was not good on that train. The plaintiff was at the station, a passenger. His entering the car was not like the case of a man entering the dwelling-house of another unbidden. One is a public conveyance; the other is private, and the occupant's home. A passenger who enters a car by mistake is not a trespasser who may be sued as such when he commits no actual injury. He has rights other than those of a trespasser. He may so conduct himself as to become a trespasser after being informed of his mistake. The defendant is a carrier, and its cars are for the accommodation of travellers. It owes a duty to every person who in good faith purchases a ticket and enters any of its conveyances. If the conveyance is not going in the direction the passenger wants to go, or is one which by the contract the passenger has no right to take, its duty is to inform the passenger, and put him off at a proper place. Penn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 4, 1886. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig. Opinion by Trunkey, J.

DAMAGES-ACTION BY WIDOW-EVIDENCE OF PRIOR EXISTING MARRIAGE.—In an action by a widow for damages for her husband's death, evidence that deceased was married to another woman prior to his marriage to the plaintiff, and that such woman is still living, and has not obtained a divorce, is properly excluded. The second marriage being proved, the law raises a strong presumption in its favor, which is not overcome by mere proof of a prior marriage from which the first wife has not obtained a divorce. Ill. Sup. Ct., Nov. 13, 1886. Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones. Opinion by Sheldon, J. Craig and Magruder, JJ., dis

sent.

MASTER AND SERVANT-RAILROAD LABORER-FAILURE TO SUPPLY SUITABLE LODGING.-In an action by a laborer engaged in the construction of a road, against his employer, a railroad company, for damages for breach of contract and negligence, in that defendant failed to supply him with good and suitable board and lodging, a complaint alleging that plaintiff "was compelled to sleep on the cold, wet, and frozen ground, without any thing under him except damp branches of pine or spruce trees, and without sufficient blankets or bedclothes to cover him, and protect him from

Davis and Hooper C. Van Voorst by the Bar Association last week was a notable and brilliant gathering. All the courts of record were represented by nearly their full complement of judges. Both of the guests of the evening have been very popular with their bretheren of the bench, and their retirement is greatly regretted by our bar. The age disability, could it have been set forward six years, would have preserved to us two very useful and upright jurists. Both these gentlemen return to the ranks of the profession where it is hoped they may be spared many years to enjoy the prosperity that is sure to attend them. The presence of Judge Donohue at the reception seemed to surprise some of the members who had been most active in the proceedings taken against him last winter, but was generally regarded as being in very good taste. Judge Donohue has a great many good friends in the association who believe in him thoroughly, and who will favor his renomination next year. His decision in the famous Baird case, rendered this week, brings that contest to a close, as the receiver, Mr. Baird's son, has already turned over to his father his fortune of $430,000. The question of Mr. Baird's insanity was recently tried before a sheriff's jury who found against his sanity, and declared that he was incapable of managing his own affairs. Judge Donohue refused to confirm the findings of the jury and restores him to the full management of his affairs. This case has been very ably conducted by Ex-Surrogate McClellan of Troy, and has attracted a good deal of attention here. Mr. Baird was one of the best known engineers in the country, and has had charge of the construction of some of the most important engineering works carried on during the last fifteen years. He was eccentric in many ways, and possessed of some harmless delusions, but those who have transacted business with him considered him entirely competent for all such purposes. This decision of Judge Donohue goes a good way toward maintaining that a man may have as many delusions as he appears to entertain so long as they are harmless in their influence upon himself, his estate and the community, without any interference by the law. The law that obtains in some of the States differs materially from this in that it maintains that when a man has an insane delusion, however harmless in itself, it is sufficient warning that other delusions more harmful may follow, and that therefore its restraining and protecting influence should be exerted in time.

The Paine Will case, now under review by our surrogate, excites much interest on account of its many unusual features. Here was a man living like and passing for a pauper, going about scantily clad, having a garret as his only home, who it was found after his death had left $400,000 tied up in an old cotton handkerchief, which he had intrusted to a friend as a bundle of papers to keep in his safe for him. Much of this was in cash, and had earned no interest for years. It is charged that a lawyer here learned his secret, and after the miser's death made an arrangement with the heirs to settle up the estate, which he represented as small, for half the proceeds. All but one of the interested parties agreed to this proposition, and he being of an investigating turn of mind found the bond

and its rich contents.

The enterprising lawyer retires and the young Hebrew attorney who secured $41,000, for services in the Hoyt Will case, still stands on record as having made the largest sale of Kahn-ned goods reported for many years.

There seems to be a fair prospect of a compromise in the Tilden Will case. Very few good lawers believe it could be sustained, and many think that Mr. Tilden was too good a lawyer not to know that fact when he executed it, and that his purpose was to get the credit of making a large public bequest, knowing that the provisions of the will in that direction would not be sustained, and that his relatives would enjoy his accumulations as he desired they should.

One law firm in this city of my acquaintance, last year made in fees $201,000. Young lawyers should cut this out and paste it in their hats. It may have "a far away look," but it is a fact, and should encourage them while they wait.

One of the brightest young members of our bar has recently informed his brethren in the profession, by circular, that he will make a speciality of trying and arguing their cases, and assures them that there after their clients cannot secure his services, except by being retained by their attorneys, all of which is very manly, enterprising, and commendable.

The victory of the district attorney's office in the McQuade case, was one of the most brilliant in the history of the office. It was a case where the city had to win, and the department was equal to the emergency. De Lancey Nicoll added new honors to his career, and now "bears them thick upon him." Some members of his party talk of rewarding him for his magnificent work by putting him on the bench of the Superior Court next year, although I doubt if he would accept it.

Judge Dugro has already assumed the duties of his new position, and has created a most favorable impression by the prompt manner in which he dispatches business.

It is believed from the indications that Jacob Sharp and the rest of the alleged bribers will next receive the attention of the district attorney's office. Recorder Smyth has recently handed down a decision in which he denies the application of counsel for Sharp, Richmond, and others, to compel the district attorney to furnish them with a copy of the testimony taken before the grand jury. He holds that all they are entitled to are the names of the witnesses whose testimony was taken.

The bill passed by the Legislature last winter limiting the period of imprisonment of judgment debtors to six months, will be very likely to be repealed this session, as it has already been found that there has been an increase in the number of cases where credit is procured upon false and fraudulent representatious. The rascals committing these frauds rest secure in the knowledge that so long as the representations are not in writing, the law does not regard their acts as punishable crimes, and that an execution against their worthless persons can only detain them six months. One of these enterprising traders recently bought about $30,000 worth of coffee here by inducing merchants to sell him on credit on representations of the most false and fraudulent character. After procuring possession of it he sold it for whatever he could get, pocketed the proceeds and calmly old his angry creditors that he supposed he would Jave to go six months in the Ludlow street jail.

The Bar Association, in accordance with the precedent long since established, has renominated William Allen Butler, Esq., for president. Mr. Butler is one of the most scholarly lawyers at the bar. His diver

After the lapse of ten years a much-needed new edition of this favorite treatise is furnished. This is the first since the author's death. The editors are right in asserting in the preface that this is the only comprehensive American treatise on 'the subject of Real Property," and that "it has, as an authority in the courts and a text-book in the schools, not only formulated the existing law, and helped in no inconsiderable degree to develop and harmonize it," "but its very language has, by frequent judicial citation, become incorporated in the authoritative law of many of the States." The original work was one of rare excellence, evolving out of the chaos of English real property common law a series of intelligible and convenient rules, and surveying the field of equitable and statutory modification with a comprehensive glauce. There are few treatises so frequently cited in our courts, none perhaps with more implicit reliance and recognition of their sovereign authority. It is but a few days since the writer, in consulting the last previous edition, was wishing for a new one to bring the work down to the present moment. The last decade has not been so fruitful in this field as in some others, but there has been a considerable amount of decisions which deserve to be digested and compared, and this has been done by the editors. Surely our real-estate law cannot be considered settled when Judge Holmes, in the 140th Massachusetts Reports, deems it neces sary to go back to the year books to determine whether a covenant runs with the land, and when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are called on to decide that a lease for a term of years to A., his heirs and assigns, is not a deed in fee. The merit of the work of the editors can only be determined by a more critical examination than we are able to bestow, but so far as we can judge it is faithfully and intelligently done. The editors acknowledge the use of our own "American

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JANUARY 29, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HERE was one part of Governor Hill's address

THER

before the Bar Association last week to which we did not exactly assent. His idea seems to be that it is dangerous to judges to associate with their fellow mortals because the latter may go away and boast of their influence with them. He quoted one judge as saying that "it is worth a thousand dollars to some men to be seen in conversation with a judge." And he concluded in this melancholy strain: "At last the character of the high official or the great judge is undermined, not by fault or weakness of his own, but by the whispered sale for counsel fees of that name beyond all others in man's intercourse with man - the sacred name of friend." To speak moderately, we believe this notion to be mistaken; i. e., men may trade on such a pretended influence, but it does not hurt the judge, for if he is really upright nobody whose good opinion is worth having will believe such a slander. Indeed, it is our own opinion that it is rather dangerous for a lawyer to be intimate with the judges, for a totally different reason, namely, because the judges are so afraid of being or seeming influenced that they unintentionally lean against the lawyer. So if we were in practice we should eschew intimacy with the judges for the sake of our clients.

Governor Hill is in favor of more holidays for workingmen. He illustrated this conviction last winter by releasing the workmen on the capitol for a whole year. We do not believe in many holidays. There are enough now. A holiday generally means an opportunity to squander money and get drunk. For sober, respectable workmen there are enough holidays now; for others there never will be enough.

We enjoyed very much the governor's portrait of the corporation lawyer: "Easily distinguished from his less fortunate brethren by his contented look, indicative of large fees and uncomplaining clients. He is usually attended by his stenographer, type-writer and a detective with all the other 'modern improvements.' And we acknowledge the occasional likeness of "the disagreeable lawyer, who although concededly 'learned in the law,' knows nothing of the courtesies of the profession, conceited in his own opinion, uncouth in his manners, never admitting the possibility of his being wrong, and making the court-room resound with his noisy declamation. How has he been better pictured than by Judge Story in these lines:

With just enough of learning to confuse,
With just enough of temper to abuse,
With just enough of genius, when confest,
To urge the worst of passions for the best,
VOL. 35-No. 5.

With just enough of all that wins in life
To make us hate a nature formed for strife,
With just enough of vanity and spite

To turn to all that's wrong from all that's right.'"

Mr. Matthew Hale made a strong point in his address, against preferences of causes. He was quite

humorous in his criticism of the rule that an infant's cause is preferred while his aged grandfather's is not, which seems contrary to the natural presumption that the infant can the better afford to wait. In regard to double appeals we cannot agree with Mr. Hale. He thinks "the law should be changed so that on questions of law appealable to the Court of Appeals an appeal may be taken directly in the first instance to that court." This would effectually prevent the solution of the problem to which a considerable part of his paper was addressed, namely, the relief of the over-burdened Court of Appeals. But it is not probable that half the causes in question ever go beyond the General Term. In most cases, we suppose, the decision of that court is accepted as final. Mr. Hale's scheme would throw our courts all out of balance - the General Terms would not have enough, the Court of Appeals would have too much to do.

Doctor Francis Wharton has edited, and the government has published in three volumes "A Digest of the International Law of the United States, taken from documents issued by presidents and secretaries of State, and from decisions of Federal courts and opinions of attorneys-general." This is a very important work, and one of singular interest to almost all classes of readers. To statesmen, judges, legislators, lawyers and historians, editors and teachers it will be invaluable. It contains much lively as well as grave reading, especially from the letters, diaries and memoirs of the presidents and others. Every topic is treated, even the dress, expenses and social intercourse of our envoys. Doctor Wharton has done a useful service in gathering this great mass of public information from so many recondite and unfamiliar sources, and arranging it in an orderly and convenient topical series. The book is worthy of a better typographical dress. The editor corrects one typographical error, "fire another Tory." It might well have stood as one of the curiosities of typography, and we would gladly "fire" the whole party.

From the crowded condition of the hospitable mansion of Doctor Vander Veer in this city, on Wednesday evening last, it was apparent that the Dutch had again taken Holland. The assemblage was to welcome those amiable and distinguished Dutchmen, Judge Van Voorst and Mr. Van Sicklen, president and secretary of the Holland Society of New York. The learned professions and our business circles were represented in an adequate manner, and even the presence of sundry members of the Legislature could not detract from the respectability of the concourse. Although no ladies