navy and reduced to the condition of tributaries. The deliberative synod for discussing and conducting the affairs of the league had been discontinued, probably from the time when the treasury was removed from Delos to Athens; whilst the Hellenotamiæ had been converted into a board consisting solely of Athenians. Notwithstanding, therefore, the seeming independence of the three islands just mentioned, the Athenians were in fact the sole arbiters of the affairs of the league, and the sole administrators of the fund. Another grievance was the transference to Athens of all lawsuits, at least of all public suits; for on this subject we are unable to draw the line distinctly. In criminal cases, at all events, the allies seem to have been deprived of the power to inflict capital punishment. It can scarcely be doubted that even private suits in which an Athenian was concerned were referred to Athens. In some cases, it is true, the allies may have derived benefit from a trial before the Athenian people, as the dicasteries were then constituted; but on the whole, the practice can only be regarded as a means and a badge of their subjection. Besides all these causes of complaint, the allies had often to endure the oppressions and exactions of Athenian officers both military and naval, as well as of the rich and powerful Athenian citizens settled among them.

Many of these abuses had no doubt arisen before the time of Pericles; but the excuse for them had at all events ceased to exist with the death of

Cimon and the extinction of the Persian war. To expect that the Athenians should have voluntarily relinquished the advantages derived from them might be to demand too much of human nature, especially as society was then constituted; and the Athenians perhaps, on the whole, did not abuse their power to a greater extent than many other nations both in ancient and modern times. With this argument for their exculpation we must rest content; for it is the only one. They were neither better nor worse than other people. The allurement, it must be confessed, was a splendid one. By means of the league Athens had become the mistress of many scattered cities, formerly her equals; and the term of despot over them was applied to her not only by her enemies, but adopted in her overweening confidence and pride by herself.

§ 6. The principal event in the external history of Athens during the period comprised in the present chapter was the subjugation of the island of Samos, the most important of the three islands which still retained their independence. In B. C. 440, the Milesians, who had been defeated by the Samians in a war respecting the possession of Priené, lodged a formal complaint in Athens against the Samians; and it was seconded by a party in Samos itself, who were adverse to the oligarchical form of government established there. As the Samians refused to submit to the arbi tration of the Athenians, the latter resolved to reduce them to obedience by force; and for that purpose despatched an armament of forty

ships to Samos, under the command of Pericles, who established a democratical form of government in the island, and carried away hostages belonging to the first Samian families, whom he deposited in the isle of Lemnos. But no sooner had Pericles departed than some of the oligarchical party, supported by Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, passed over in the night-time to Samos, overpowered the small Athenian garrison which had been left by Pericles, and abolished the democracy. They then proceeded to Lemnos, and, having regained possession of the hostages, proclaimed an open revolt against Athens, in which they were joined by Byzantium.

When these tidings reached Athens a fleet of sixty triremes immediately sailed for Samos. Pericles was again one of the ten strategi or generals in command of the expedition, and among his colleagues was Sophocles, the tragic poet. After several engagements between the hostile fleets, the Samians were obliged to abandon the sea and take refuge in their city, which, after enduring a siege of nine months, was forced to capitulate.

The Samians were compelled to raze their fortifications, to surrender their fleet, to give hostages for their future conduct, and to pay the expenses of the war, amounting to one thousand talents. The Byzantines submitted at the same time. During these operations, it was a point disputed among the states opposed to Athens whether the Samians should be assisted in their revolt; a question decided in the negative, chiefly through the influence of the Corinthians, who maintained the right of every confederacy to punish its refractory members.

The triumphs and the power of Athens were no doubt regarded with. fear and jealousy by her rivals; but the conquest of Samos was not followed by any open manifestation of hostility. A general impression however prevailed, that sooner or later a war must ensue; but men looked forwards to it with fear and trembling, from a conviction of the internecine character which it must necessarily assume. It was a hollow peace, which the most trifling events might disturb. The train was already laid; and an apparently unimportant event, which occured in B. c. 435 in a remote corner of Greece, kindled the spark which was to produce the conflagration. This was the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, which will be detailed in the following chapter.

1. Quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra. 2. Corcyræan Embassy to Athens. De cision of the Athenians. § 3. They send a Fleet to Corcyra. Naval Engagements. Defeat of the Corinthians. § 4. Revolt of Potidea. § 5. Congress of the Peloponnesian Allies at Sparta. The Spartans decide for War. § 6. Second Congress. The Allies resolve upon War. 7. The Lacedæmonians require the Athenians to expel Pericles. § 8. Attacks upon Pericles, Aspasia, and Anaxagoras. Imprisonment and Death of Pheidias. 9. Further Requisitions of the Lacedæmonians. Rejected by the Athenians. 10. The Thebans surprise Platea. § 11. The Athenians prepare for War. Portents. §12. Forces of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. § 13. The Pelopon nesian Army assembles at the Isthmus of Corinth.

§ 1. On the coast of Illyria, near the site of the modern Durazzo, the Corcyræans had founded the city of Epidamnus. Corcyra (now Corfu) was itself a colony of Corinth; and, though long at enmity with its mother country, was forced, according to the time-hallowed custom of the Greeks in such matters, to select the founder or cekist* of Epidamnus from the Corinthians. Accordingly Corinth became the metropolis of Epidamnus also. At the time of which we speak, the Epidamnians were hard pressed by the Illyrians, led by some oligarchical exiles of their own city, whom they had expelled in consequence of a domestic sedition. In their distress they applied to Corcyra for assistance; which the Corcyræans, being principally connected with the Epidamnian oligarchy, refused. The Epidamnians, after consulting the oracle of Delphi, then sought help from the Corinthians, who undertook to assist them, and organized an expedition

for that purpose, consisting partly of new settlers, and partly of a military force. The Corcyræans highly resented this interference, proceeded to restore the Epidamnian oligarchs, and with a fleet of forty ships blockaded the town and its new Corinthian garrison. Hereupon the Corinthians fitted out a still stronger expedition, for which they collected both ships and money from their allies. The Corcyræans, having made a fruitless attempt to persuade the Corinthians to refer the matter to arbitration, prepared to meet the blow. Their fleet, the best in Greece after that of Athens, completely defeated the Corinthians off Cape Actium; and on the same day Epidamnus surrendered to their blockading squadron (B. c. 435).

§ 2. Deeply humbled by this defeat, the Corinthians spent the two following years in active preparations for retrieving it. They got ready ninety well-manned ships of their own; and by active exertions among their allies, they were in a condition, in the third year after their disgrace, to put to sea with a fleet of one hundred and fifty sail. The Corcyræans, who had not enrolled themselves either in the Lacedæmonian or Athenian alliance, and therefore stood alone, were greatly alarmed at these preparations. They now resolved to remedy this deficiency; and as Corinth belonged to the Lacedæmonian alliance, the Corcyræans had no option, and were obliged to apply to Athens. Ambassadors were accordingly despatched to that city, who, being introduced into the assembly, endeavored to set in a striking light the great accession of naval power which the Athenians would derive from an alliance with the Corcyræans. The Corinthians, who had also sent an embassy to Athens, replied to the arguments of the Corcyræan envoys, appealing to the terms of the Thirty Years' Truce, and reminding the Athenians that it was through the representations of the Corinthians that the Peloponnesian allies had not assisted the Samians in their late revolt. The opinions of the Athenian assembly were much divided on the subject; but the views of Pericles and other speakers at length prevailed. They urged that, whatever course might now be taken, war could not ultimately be avoided; and that therefore the more prudent course was to avail themselves of the increase of strength offered by the Corcyræan alliance, rather than to be at last driven to undertake the war at a comparative disadvantage. To avoid, however, an open infringement of the Thirty Years' Truce, a middle course was adopted. It was resolved to conclude only a defensive alliance with Corcyra; that is, to defend the Corcyræans in case their territories were actually invaded by the Corinthians, but beyond that not to lend them any active assistance.

§2. By entering upon this merely defensive alliance the Athenians also hoped to stand aloof and see the Corinthian and Corcyræan fleets mutually destroy one another; and it was probably in accordance with this policy that only a small squadron of ten triremes, under the command

of Lacedæmonius the son of Cimon, was despatched to the assistance of the Corcyræans. The Corinthian fleet of one hundred and fifty sail took up its station at Cape Cheimerium on the coast of Epeirus; where the Corinthians established a naval camp, and summoned to their assistance the friendly Epeirot tribes. The Corcyræan fleet of one hundred and ten sail, together with ten Athenian ships, was stationed at one of the adjoining islands called Sybota. A battle speedily ensued, which, for the number of ships engaged, was the greatest yet fought between fleets entirely Grecian. Neither side, however, had yet adopted the Athenian tactics. They had no conception of that mode of attack in which the ship itself, by the method of handling it, became a more important instrument than the crew by which it was manned. Their only idea of a naval engagement was to lay the ships alongside one another, and to leave the hoplites on deck to decide the combat after the fashion of a land fight. At first Lacedæmonius, in accordance with his instructions, took no part in the battle, though he afforded all the assistance he could to the Corcyræans by manœuvring as if he were preparing to engage. After a hard-fought day, victory finally declared in favor of the Corinthians. The Athenians now abandoned their neutrality, and did all in their power to save the flying Corcyræans from their pursuers. This action took place early in the morning; and the Corinthians, after returning to the spot where it had been fought, in order to pick up their own dead and wounded, prepared to renew the attack in the afternoon, and to effect a landing at Corcyra. The Corcyræans made the best preparations they could to receive them, and the Athenians, who were now within the strict letter of their instructions, determined to give their new allies all the assistance in their power. The war pæan had been sounded, and the Corinthian line was in full advance, when suddenly it tacked and stood away to the coast of Epeirus. This unexpected retreat was caused by the appearance of twenty Athenian vessels in the distance, which the Corinthians believed to be the advanced guard of a still larger fleet. But though this was not the case, the succor proved sufficient to deter the Corinthians from any further hostilities. Drawing up their ships along the coast of Epeirus, they sent a few men in a small boat to remonstrate with the Athenians for having violated the truce; and finding from the parley that the Athenians did not mean to undertake offensive operations against them, they sailed homewards with their whole fleet, after erecting a trophy at Sybota. On reaching Corinth eight hundred of their prisoners were sold as slaves; but the remaining two hundred and fifty, many of whom belonged to the first families in Corcyra, though detained in custody, were treated with peculiar kindness, in the hope that they would eventually establish in that island a party favorable to Corinth. These events took place in the year B. c. 432.

§ 4. The Corinthians were naturally incensed at the conduct of Athens,