elected by the people who are to be taxed by them, or appointed in some manner to which they have given their assent.

4. SAME-limits on power of legislature to confer power to tax municipalities. Section 9 of article 9 of the constitution is a limitation upon the legislature to confer the power to assess or collect taxes for corporate purposes upon any officers other than corporate or local authorities of the municipalities sought to be taxed.

5. SAME-Cook county board is a "corporate authority" of towns within incorporated cities in county. The Cook county board constitutes the proper corporate authority to ascertain the amount of taxes necessary to be raised for corporate purposes by towns lying wholly within incorporated cities in such county.

6. SAME-section 4 of article 4 of the Township Organization act is constitutional. Section 4 of article 4 of the Township Organization act, (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 1072,) which provides that all money necessary to be raised for corporate purposes in towns lying wholly within incorporated cities shall be ascertained by the county board, etc., is constitutional, and does not confer power upon one municipality to levy taxes upon another municipality for the latter's corporate purposes without its consent.

7. SAME-section 7 of article 13 of Township Organization act is constitutional. Following the decision herein that section 4 of article 4 of the Township Organization act is constitutional, section 7 of article 13 of the same act, (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 1081,) referring to the certifying of the aggregate amount of indebtedness of towns lying within incorporated cities to the county board, must be held to be constitutional and valid.

PHILLIPS, C. J., and CARTWRIGHT, J., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. RICHARD W. CLIFFORD, Judge, presiding.

J. W. KASTE, Corporation Counsel, for appellant: Under our system of township organization the electors of a township, at their annual town meeting, are by statute vested with power to levy taxes upon the taxable property of the town for the corporate purposes of the town. Rev. Stat. chap. 139, art. 4, sec. 3; Railway Co. v. McCleave, 108 Ill. 368; Greenwood v. LaSalle, 137 id. 225.

Under our constitution and the decisions of our courts a county is a municipal corporation. Const. art. 9, sec. 12.

A town in a county under township organization is a municipal corporation. Const. art. 9, sec. 12; Martin v.

People, 87 Ill. 524; Freeport v. Stephenson County, 41 id. 495; Railway Co. v. McCleave, 108 id. 368; Greenwood v. LaSalle, 137 id. 225; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 id. 346; East St. Louis v. Rheim, 139 id. 116.

The legislature has no power to impose a tax upon a municipal corporation or its people, either directly or indirectly, without the consent of the municipality or of those to be taxed and affected thereby. It must grant the power, if at all, directly to the corporate authorities. of the municipality or district to be taxed. This limitation precludes the levy of local taxes by agencies created by the legislature, not being the corporate authorities of the locality or the municipality to be taxed or to be bound by the obligation. Updike v. Wright, 81 Ill. 49; People v. McAdams, 82 id. 356; Cornell v. People, 107 id. 372; Wetherell v. Devine, 116 id. 635; Will County v. People, 110 id. 511; Gage v. Graham, 57 id. 144; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 id. 218; Board of Directors v. Houston, 71 id. 318; Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 id. 133; Trustees of Schools v. People, 63 id. 229; Lovingston v. Wider, 53 id. 302; Hessler v. Drainage Comrs. 53 id. 105.

Corporate authorities are those municipal officers who are either directly elected by the people of the district or municipality to be taxed, or appointed in some manner to which they have given their consent. Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372; Harward v. Drainage Co. 51 id. 130.

The electors of a township, and they alone, represent the corporate authority of the town. Kankakee v. Railroad Co. 115 111. 88.

ROBERT S. ILES, for appellee:

The power of the General Assembly to enact laws is plenary, except as limited by the constitution. Firemen's Ben. Ass. v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511; Bradly v. Case, 3 Scam. 585; People v. Brown, 11 Ill. 478; Railway Co. v. Warrington, 92 id. 157; Richards v. Raymond, id. 612.

Where it is doubtful whether the power has been granted or denied, the doubt should be resolved in favor

of its existence. Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203; Peacock v. People, 98 id. 172.

It must be clear, beyond a doubt, that the legislature has exceeded its constitutional power before the courts will declare a statute unconstitutional. Bureau County v. Railway Co. 44 Ill. 229; People v. Salomon, 46 id. 333; Morton v. People, 47 id. 468; McVeagh v. Chicago, 49 id. 318.

The presumption is in favor of constitutionality. In re Welsh, 17 Ill. 161; Wulff v. Aldrich, 124 id. 591; Bunn v. People, 45 id. 397.

Grant of power to the legislature to do a certain thing without words of limitation or restriction carries power to employ all necessary means to make the power effectual. The legislature has sole power to determine the means to be employed. Houston v. Clark, 112 Ill. 344.

Where a statute has been directly sanctioned or acquiesced in by all departments of government for many years its constitutionality cannot be questioned. Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 266.

Counties and townships are mere political divisions of the State for purposes of government, and as such are under legislative control. Whiteside County v. Harris, 105 Ill. 445; Symes v. Clay, 71 id. 355; Hollenbeck v. Winnebago County, 95 id. 148; Coles v. Madison County, Breese, 154; Halliday v. People, 5 Gilm. 214; Freeport v. Stephenson County, 41 Ill. 495; Sangamon County v. Springfield, 93 id. 66; Marion County v. Law, 108 id. 343; Wetherell v. Devine, 116 id. 631.

The law by which townships are governed may be changed at the discretion of the legislature. Freeport v. Stephenson County, 41 Ill. 495.

The General Assembly is granted express power to provide the manner in which the affairs of a county under township organization may be transacted. Const. 1870,

art. 10, sec. 5; Const. 1848, art. 7, sec. 6.

The people of Cook county having adopted township organization by a majority vote of the electors of said county, thereby ratified said act, and authorized taxes to

be levied for town purposes in the manner and by the officers in said act specified. Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court: This was a petition for mandamus, brought in the name of the People, on the relation of William J. Neil, supervisor of the town of Lake, in Cook county, to compel the clerk to extend a certain sum as taxes against the taxable property of the town. The petition alleges that Cook county is under township organization; that the town of Lake is a town thus formed and lying wholly within the limits of Chicago; that William J. Neil is the supervisor of the town of Lake; that Philip Knopf, the defendant, is the county clerk of Cook county; that the electors of the town of Lake, in their annual town meeting held on April 6, 1897, did appropriate and levy the sum of $45,000 upon the taxable property of the town of Lake for corporate purposes for the year 1897; that thereafter the board of town auditors, at its semi-annual meeting, made a certificate of audit of the claims and indebtedness against the town of Lake, as provided by section 7, article 13, chapter 139, of the Revised Statutes, the aggregate amount whereof was $17,893.10; that the same was signed and filed by said board of auditors with the town clerk, and that the town clerk did certify, at the proper time, the aggregate amount of said certificate of audit, to-wit, $17,893.10, together with the further sum of $45,000 levied by the town electors at their annual town meeting, to the county clerk, making the total sum of $62,893. 10 as the amount of taxes required by said town of Lake for corporate purposes for the year 1897; that upon demand to extend that amount, $62,893.10, upon the tax books for the use and corporate purposes of the town of Lake, defendant, Philip Knopf, county clerk, refused, and thereupon appellant filed this petition in the circuit court, praying for a writ of mandamus against said county clerk to compel him to extend said amount as aforesaid. To the petition the defendant

interposed a general demurrer, which, upon a hearing, was sustained and judgment entered against petitioner for costs; to reverse which petitioner appealed.

The application for a writ of mandamus in this case is predicated on the proposition that section 4 of article 4 of the Township Organization act is unconstitutional. (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 1072.) Section 3 of article 4 provides what shall be done at a town meeting, embracing 15 different subjects, numbered from 1 to 15, inclusive. Among the powers enumerated will be found the power to raise money by taxation for certain purposes. Immediately following the enumerated powers will be found section 4, which reads as follows: "In towns in which there are incorporated cities or villages the boundaries of which are co-extensive with the limits of the town, or the town lies wholly within the limits of an incorporated city or village, the electors shall not exercise the several powers contained in subdivisions of section 3 of this article, namely, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, but all moneys necessary to be raised in such towns for town expenses shall be ascertained by the county board, and the county clerk shall extend the amount so ascertained upon the collector's books of such towns, and when collected the same shall be paid over to the town supervisors the same as in other towns, and the powers and provisions of all cities and villages under their organic law shall not be repealed by any, of the provisions of this article." It is claimed that this section of the statute is invalid, for the reason that power is conferred upon one municipality to levy taxes for corporate purposes upon another distinct municipality, without the consent of the people of the municipality upon which the taxes are imposed.

It may be conceded that under section 10 of article 9 of the constitution it is beyond the power of the legisla ture to impose taxes upon municipalities, and it may also be regarded as a well settled rule that under section 9 of the same article the legislature can only vest the cor