vested subject to the power. In Ducker v. Burnham, supra, it was said (p. 18): "Although a will creates a life estate with power to sell and convey the fee, it may at the same time limit a remainder after the termination of the life estate. Whether such remainder is vested or contingent is not affected by the power of sale conferred by the will either on the life tenant or on the executor. If the power is so exercised as to dispose of all the estate, nothing may be left to go to the remainder-man. But the remainder is not made contingent, because it is uncertain whether the power will be exercised. The remainder may vest subject to the power. There is a distinction between a power and a right of property. A power of disposition does not imply ownership, but is a mere authority conferred by the will." If, under the provision of the will, the remainder would vest and the existence of the power would not render it contingent, the mere use of the word "if" by the testator would not accomplish that result, and it cannot have any controlling effect. It is also argued that where a gift is only by direction to divide or distribute an interest does not vest until the time of distribution arrives, and that for this reason the estate in Charles Lowell was not vested. There is, however, a well recognized exception to the rule where the division is postponed for the convenience of the fund or property, as, for the purpose of letting in a prior gift for life to another. In such a case the estate will be vested, and not contingent, and the vesting will not be deferred until the division. (Scofield v. Olcott, supra; Ducker v. Burnham, supra.) In this case the remainder was clearly postponed, by reason of the position and for the convenience of the fund, to let in the life estate to Franklin. The only reason why the four children named could not enter upon the enjoyment of the remainder was not because of anything personal to them, but because the property was given to Franklin during his life. The only object was to let in this life estate in Franklin, and whenever that object was fulfilled and there was no further use for the fund to fulfill that object it was to pass to the other children, and it came within the exception to the rule. The other interests are to be disposed of as follows: Washington survived Franklin, and one-fourth of that portion goes to him. George Hancock died leaving a will bequeathing all his property to Charles Lowell Hancock during his life, and then to go as Charles Lowell should in writing direct, and Charles Lowell directed the same to be paid to his three nieces, Elizabeth L. H. Wood, Mary E. Tilton and Delia P. Clegg, and his nephew, John H. Moriarty, in equal portions, and that interest now belongs to them. Elizabeth Lowell Hancock was married to Joseph Moriarty. She survived her husband and died. in 1857, intestate, leaving three children, John H. Moriarty, Elizabeth L. H. Wood and Joseph M. Moriarty. The son Joseph M. Moriarty died leaving a will bequeathing his estate to Joseph O. Rutter as trustee, for the use of Charles Lowell Hancock during his life, and at his decease to such person or persons as he in writing might direct. It is claimed by appellant that the devise of the residue of his estate by Charles Lowell passed this interest, and that the general residuary clause is a good appointment under the will of Joseph M. Moriarty. There is nothing in the will which shows an intention to dispose of that property or to exercise the power conferred. The question whether the will of Charles Lowell would operate as an appointment under the will of Joseph M. Moriarty depends upon whether he intended to act under the power. The will of Charles Lowell was made before the will of Joseph M. Moriarty was probated, and there is nothing to show that Charles Lowell knew of the power. There being no reference to the subject of the power or to the power itself, and the intention to execute it not appearing in any way, it did not operate as an exercise of the power. (Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515; 4 Kent's Com. 334; 1 Sugden on Powers, 356.) The interest of Joseph M. 171 284 e87a 339 171 284 e188 2118 f92a 4114 Moriarty therefore passed as intestate estate, and is now vested in his brother, John H. Moriarty, and his sister, Elizabeth L. H. Wood. The decree of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. FREDERICK G. BUCKELY et al. v. THE COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANK et al. Opinion filed February 14, 1898. 1. MECHANICS' LIENS-one failing to comply with terms of statute can not complain. The lien of a mechanic is purely statutory, and one who fails to substantially comply with the terms of the statute preliminary to establishing such lien has no ground of complaint. 2. SAME mechanic not entitled to single lien on distinct properties not constituting one block. Under the Mechanic's Lien law as it existed in 1893, a mechanic was not entitled to a single lien upon several houses located upon separate lots, not built so as to constitute a block of houses under a single roof. 3. SAME-lien on distinct properties must be against each separately. Under the Mechanic's Lien law in force in 1893, where work was done or materials furnished upon distinct properties the lien rested upon the several premises according to the value of the work and material bestowed upon each. 4. SAME when single lien cannot be apportioned. As against third persons whose rights have intervened, a mechanic's lien, claimed as a single lien upon distinct properties, cannot be apportioned so as to preserve the lien upon each, where there is nothing in the statement filed with the circuit clerk to indicate the amount claimed against each property, or the times when the labor and materials were respectively furnished. (Moore v. Parish, 163 Ill. 93, and Blanchard v. Fried, 162 id. 462, explained.) 5. SAME final payment presumed due at time work is completed. In the absence of any showing to the contrary, the final payment for work done under a contract is due upon its completion. Buckely v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 62 Ill. App. 202, affirmed. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN BARTON PAYNE, Judge, presiding. Appellee, the Commercial National Bank of Chicago, commenced its action in the Superior Court of Cook county, against John S. Woollacott and others, including these appellants, to foreclose two mortgages executed by Woollacott. The allegations of the bill as to appellants are, that they have, or claim to have, some interest in the premises as judgment or lien creditors, or otherwise, which interests have accrued since and are subject to the liens of complainant. Appellants, after answering, filed a cross-bill, setting up they had a mechanic's lien upon the premises for labor and materials furnished in painting and glazing certain buildings erected on the lots by the owner, Woollacott, for which they claimed a first lien. The cause was referred to a master to take and report the evidence, together with his conclusions. On this issue he found that about the latter part of November, 1892, John S. Woollacott requested appellants to examine and make a bid for painting and glazing the buildings then being erected by him upon sub-lots 1 to 7 inclusive, being the same premises described in the bill, and including lot 3 in the subdivision; that they made the estimate as requested, and on December 5 sent Woollacott a proposition in writing, offering to do the work on the buildings, according to plans and specifications, for the sum of $2664, not to include mirrors or stained glass; that afterwards, in December or January following, Woollacott made a verbal agreement with them to do said work and furnish said. material for the painting and glazing of said buildings for said sum of $2664; that they subsequently entered upon the work, and later completed the same; that the estimate upon which the contract was made was, upon sub-lot 1, $544.13; sub-lot 2, $390.09; sub-lot 3, $353.86; sub-lot 4, $399.16; sub-lot 5, $332.05; sub-lot 6, $322.78; and sub-lot 7, $322.76,—making $2664.83. He also found that, in addition to the work done in accordance with the contract, they furnished other and extra labor and material upon said houses, as follows: Lot 1, tinting house, $90, then follow several other items, the whole amount on that house being $162.68; on lot 2, $157.68; on lot 3, $108.68; on lot 4, $95.17; on lot 5, $80.18; on lot 6, $80.18; and on lot 7, painting fence, $5.18. He further found that they filed a statement of their lien with the clerk of the circuit court on December 16, 1893; that the work to be done under the contract was substantially finished as early as May or June, 1893, but that a slight amount of it was done as late as August of that year. He then stated. that claimants seek one entire lien upon the several sublots, and found that the statement filed with the clerk claimed one lien upon all the lots for all the work done upon the several houses, and that four of the lots (1, 2, 3 and 4,) front east on Lake View avenue and Lincoln Park, upon which are located four residence buildings, all four houses being joined together by partition walls, but that it does not appear that they are under one roof; that immediately west of lots 1 to 4, running the entire length of their rear frontage, is a private alley four feet wide, and to the west of this alley are situated lots 5, 6 and 7, fronting northerly on Roslyn place, with the resi dence buildings thereon, one upon each lot and all joined by partition walls, but that it does not appear they are under the same roof. In the report of his conclusions he disallowed the lien. The four houses fronting east are numbered 71, 73, 75 and 77, and those fronting north, 47, 49 and 51. The statement and notice of the lien filed with the clerk of the circuit court are as follows: "Just and true statement and demand of F. G. Buckely & Bro. against John S. Woollacott, for work done and material furnished on and in buildings at numbers 47-49-51 Roslyn place, |