171 572 86a 513 to a fraud upon appellee, to require her, after she had complied with the contract, to submit to a loss of her interest in the estate of her father in order to obtain the fulfillment of the contract by the appellant. We have frequently held, that where a,parent makes a parol promise to a child to convey a tract of land if the child will take possession of, reside upon and improve the same, and in reliance upon the promise the child takes possession and makes improvements of a permanent and valuable character, a court of equity will decree specific performance of the agreement. Such a promise rests on a valuable consideration, and performance on the part of the child takes the oral contract out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds. Langston v. Bates, 84 Ill. 524; Bohanan v. Bohanan, 96 id. 591; Bright v. Bright, 41 id. 97; Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 id. 514; Wood v. Thornly, 58 id. 464; Padfield v. Padfield, 92 id. 198; McDowell v. Lucas, 97 id. 489. The decree is affirmed. Decree affirmed. SIEGEL, COOPER & CO. V. MARY A. CONNOR. Opinion filed February 14, 1898. APPEALS AND ERRORS-harmless error in giving instructions will not reverse. The giving of an instruction which, if considered alone, might be liable to the objection that it assumed the existence of a controverted fact, is not ground for reversal if, when considered with the other instructions, it is improbable that the jury could have been misled thereby. Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Connor, 70 Ill. App. 116, affirmed. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. FARLIN Q. BALL, Judge, presiding. A. BINSWANGER, and S. P. SHOPE, for appellant. LOUIS SPAHN, and MARCUS KAVANAGH, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: The Appellate Court has affirmed a judgment of the Superior Court of Cook county, recovered by appellee, against appellant, in an action of trespass for false imprisonment. Appellee, a resident of Colorado, but visiting relatives in Chicago and attending the World's Fair, went to appellant's store in company with two nieces and another young girl, and while there purchased two silk handkerchiefs. While the articles were being wrapped up, appellant's saleswoman accused appellee of having stolen and placed in an inner pocket of her cloak two other handkerchiefs, and came from behind the counter, put her hand in appellee's pocket and apparently took therefrom two handkerchiefs, but whether she took the handkerchiefs from the pocket or had them already in her own hands in advance was a controverted question on the trial. Complying with the commands of the saleswoman, appellee went with her to the office of appellant's store manager, where she was again accused of the theft, and, as the jury probably found from the conflicting evidence, was searched and detained upwards of half an hour and then required to pay five dollars before she was allowed to depart. It was not denied that she paid the five dollars, but it was claimed on behalf of appellant that the money was demanded as pay for the two handkerchiefs, which were worth one-fifth of that amount, and to reimburse appellant for similar losses from others, and that appellee paid the money voluntarily. This suit was brought soon after the occurrence. From the briefs and arguments filed herein before the revision of the rules, the controverted questions appear to have been chiefly questions of fact, all of which have been conclusively settled against appellant. Some con tention, however, is made that the judgment should be reversed because of alleged improper remarks made by counsel for appellee in his argument to the jury, but we are of the opinion that no abuse of discretion in this regard has been shown. It is next contended that the trial court erred in giving to the jury this (plaintiff's second) instruction: "If you believe, from the evidence, that the defendant, for the purpose of extorting money from the plaintiff, detained her in the office of the defendant by means of threats of imprisonment, the plaintiff then and there being innocent of the crime charged, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover." It is said that this instruction assumes, and states to the jury, that the plaintiff was innocent of the alleged theft. While this instruction, considered alone, might be liable to misconstruction by a jury, still, the court gave, upon its own motion, another, to the effect that in giving the instructions they were intended to give to the jury only the law of the case, and not to indicate any opinion of the court upon the facts or that the court had any opin- . ion upon the facts,-that it was for the jury alone to determine the facts. It is wholly improbable that the jury were misled by the second instruction. Eighteen instructions were given at the request of the defendant below. They covered every phase of the case, and, with two of them modified by the court, were more favorable to appellant than a strict application of the law applicable to such cases warranted. We find no error of law of which appellant can complain. The judgment of the Appellate Court must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. EDWARD J. HUGHES v. FRANK G. NOYES et al. Opinion filed February 14, 1898. 1. EQUITY-bill in aid of execution may be filed as soon as complainant obtains judgment. A bill to remove an alleged fraudulent conveyance out of the way of an execution may be filed as soon as the complainant obtains judgment, and before he has attempted to satisfy it out of the defendant's other property. 2. SAME-proof of defendant's insolvency is not necessary to equitable jurisdiction in aid of execution. Proof of the defendant's insolvency is not necessary to give a court of equity jurisdiction to remove an alleged fraudulent conveyance out of the way of an execution. 3. FRAUD statutory provisions concerning conveyances in fraud of creditors. Under sections 4 and 5 of the Conveyance act (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 540,) every gift, grant, conveyance, etc., of or charge upon property, made with intent to disturb, hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other persons, is void as against such creditors, purchasers or other persons; but the title of a purchaser for value is not affected, in the absence of notice of the fraud. 4. SAME-modes of ascertaining fraudulent intent in the conveyance of property. Intent to defraud creditors by the conveyance of property may be ascertained by inference, from circumstances, as a conclusive presumption of law, or as a prima facie presumption of law, or as an argumentative conclusion of fact, according to the facts and circumstances in each case. 5. SAME when conveyance is for valuable consideration, proof of fraudulent intent must be clear. Where a conveyance alleged to be in fraud of creditors is made for a valuable consideration, the fraudulent intent must be proved by evidence sufficient to establish the fact without the aid of legal presumptions. 6. SAME when conveyance is voluntary, fraudulent intent may be inferred. Where a conveyance alleged to be in fraud of creditors is voluntary, the fraudulent intent may be inferred from proof of circumstances, such as the grantor's insolvency, great indebtedness, or the like; but it is not necessary to show complete insolvency. 7. EVIDENCE-what sufficient to show valuable consideration. Uncontradicted evidence that a married woman conveyed her separate property to her son at a reasonable price; that the son paid part cash, assumed a mortgage and gave his note for the balance of the purchase price, which was afterward sold for nearly its face value, and that he paid the interest and part of the principal on the mortgage indebtedness, is sufficient to show valuable consideration. 8. SAME when verbal admissions are not controlling. Alleged verbal admissions of a party that he did not own the farm upon which he resided are entitled to little weight, where, at the time they were made, the party had in his possession a deed to the property,— particularly where the party seeking advantage from them seeks to connect the party making them with an alleged conspiracy to defraud the grantor's creditors by conveying the farm. 9. CONVEYANCES-when conveyance from mother to son will not be set aside. A conveyance of her separate property by a woman to her son, for a valuable consideration, about a month prior to the failure in business of her husband, on whose note the mother was surety, will not be set aside in equity in aid of an execution issued on a judgment on such note, in the absence of proof of the wife's fraudulent intent, or of the son's knowledge either of such intent or of the business relations of his father and mother. 10. HUSBAND AND WIFE—mere fact of wife's loaning money to husband is not sufficient as against creditors. A wife may loan her separate property to her husband and take security which will be binding against creditors; but the mere fact of her letting him have money is not sufficient, where no contractual relation is shown. 11. SAME-as against creditors, mere delivery of money by wife to husband does not imply a promise to repay., As against creditors the law does not imply, from the mere delivery of money by the wife to the husband, a promise of repayment, but requires either proof of an express promise or of circumstances showing that they dealt with each other as debtor and creditor. Hughes v. Noyes, 71 Ill. App. 212, affirmed. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Third District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Clark county; the Hon. F. BOOKWALTER, Judge, presiding. GRAHAM & TIBBS, for appellant: Where a debtor sells property with intent to binder, delay or defraud his creditors, notice to the purchaser of the debtor's intent is per se evidence of mala fides, and renders the sale void without reference to the purchaser's actual intent, the debtor's fraudulent motives being im puted to the purchaser. Hanchett v. Goetz, 25 Ill. App. 445. Where a sale is made by a failing debtor, and it appears from the transaction that it was designed that the vendor should retain a secret use in the property, it must |