the direction of the court as to whom the purchase-money shall be paid.1 So, if a mortgagor wishes to redeem the mortgaged estate, and there are conflicting claims between third persons, as to their title to the mortgage-money, he may bring them before the court, to ascertain their rights, and to have a decree for a redemption, and to make a sccure payment to the party entitled to the money. In these cases, the plaintiff seeks relief for himself, whereas in an interpleading bill, strictly so called, the plaintiff only asks that he may be at liberty to pay the money, or deliver the property to the party to whom it of right belongs, and may, thereafter, be protected against the claims of both. In the latter case the only decree to which the plaintiff is entitled, is a decree that the bill is properly filed, or, in other words, that he shall be at liberty to pay the money, or bring the property into court, and have his costs, and that the defendants interplead, and settle the conflicting claims between themselves. So, a bill in nature of an interpleading bill, will lie by a bank, which has offered a reward for the recovery of money stolen, and a proportionate reward for a part recovered, where there are several claimants of the reward, or a proportion thereof, one or more of whom have sued the bank. And in such a bill all the claimants may be made parties, in order to have their respective claims adjusted.5 6 [* § 824 a. By the English statute, as well as by the NewYork Code of Procedure, courts of law may direct an interpleader to settle the rights of conflicting claims to the same property, in such cases as the courts of equity will allow an interpleader bill." 1 Parks v. Jackson, 11 Wendell, 443. See Goodrick v. Shotbolt, Prec. Ch. 333, 334, 335, 336; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, 199; Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; 1 Mad. Ch. Pr. 146, 147; S. P. Gilb. Eq. 18. 3 See ante, § 807, 809; Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; Meux v. Bell, 6 Sim. 175. See East India Company v. Campion, 11 Bligh, 158, 182, 185. ♦ Anon., 1 Vern. 351; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, 200; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cowen, 691; Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige, 384, 392; 1 Eq. Abridg. 80. ⚫ City Bank v. Bangs, 2 Paige, 570; Merchants' Bank of Providence v. Packhard and others, Circuit Court of Rhode Island District, November Term, 1838. See Gray v. Pitman, 5 Scott, 795. * [* 23 & 24 Vict. ch. 126, § 12. But this will not extend to equitable claims. Hurst v. Sheldon, 13 C. B. N. s. 750. See also Tanner v. European Bank, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 261. But a debtor has no right to interplead his creditor with one of his creditors who claims a lien upon the debt or property in the hands of such debtor. Nor can a suit of interpleader be maintained where the plaintiff denies the title of both the claimants.2 Nor will it entitle the plaintiff to an injunction in such case, that both the claimants have brought suits against the plaintiff for the same property, and that the plaintiff claims a conspiracy between the defendants to harass him by multiplicity of suits, or that he is in danger of suffering from a double recovery. Where two claimants both demand the same property of the plaintiff, and he has done acts tending to the recognition of the claim of both, he cannot maintain a bill of interpleader against them.*] CHAPTER XXI. BILLS QUIA TIMET. [§ 825. Definition of bills Quia timet. § 826. Mode of redress. § 827. Seeks to preserve property for the party entitled. § 829. Receivers act for the party ultimately entitled. § 829 a. Form of appointing receiver. § 830. Regard is had to legal and equitable priorities. § 831. The appointment rests in discretion. Officer of court. § 832. Importance of the discretion thus exercised. § 833. The receiver is put in possession as the agent of the court. § 833 a. And acts strictly under its control. § 833 b. Can only take possession against parties to the suit. § 834. Cases where a receiver will be appointed. § 835. Will not change the possession except for cause. § 836. Will not oust executors except for misconduct. § 837. Will not infringe the rights of prior encumbrancers. § 838. Receiver appointed to apply rents to extinguish interest. § 839. Trustee often required to pay money into court. § 840. So may also the banker of such trustee. 1 United States Trust Co. v. Wiley, 41 Barb. 477. 2 McHenry v. Hazard, 45 Barb. 657. Ibid. • Sabliech v. Russell, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 441.] § 841. This is done to secure the fund. § 842. Will also require deposit of writings with master. § 843. Bills Quia timet to protect the interests of reversioners, &c. § 844. So also to protect a remainder in personalty. § 845. This remedy applied to all future interests in personalty. § 845 a. The use of personal estate gives no right to possession. § 846, 847. One in remainder may demand security. § 848. Tenant for life may be decreed to keep down a charge on land. § 849. Sureties may protect themselves by bills Quia timet. § 850. Will decree specific performance of covenant to indemnify. § 850 a. Purchaser cannot maintain bill to secure mortgage on estate. § 825. IN the next place, let us proceed to the consideration of another class of cases, where the peculiar remedies administered by courts of equity constitute the principal although not the sole ground of jurisdiction; and that is, BILLS QUIA TIMET. We have already had occasion, in another place, to explain, in some measure, the nature of these bills, and the origin of the appellation; and to show their application to cases of covenants and contracts with sureties and others, where a specific performance is necessary to prevent future mischief. They are called (as we have seen) Bills Quia Timet, in analogy to certain writs of the Common Law, whose objects are of a similar nature. Lord Coke has explained this matter very clearly in his Commentary on Littleton. "And note" (says he) "that there be six writs in law, that may be maintained, Quia timet, before any molestation, distress, or impleading. As, (1.) A man may have a Writ of Mesne (whereof Littleton here speaks) before he be distrained; (2.) A Warrantia Charta, before he be impleaded; (3.) A Monstraverunt, before any distress or vexation; (4.) An Audita Querela, before any execution sued; (5.) A Curia Claudenda, before any default of enclosure; (6.) A Ne injuste vexes, before any distress or molestation. And these be called Brevia anticipantia, writs of prevention." 2 § 826. Now, bills in equity Quia timet, answer precisely to this latter description. They are in the nature of writs of prevention, to accomplish the ends of precautionary justice. They are, ordinarily, applied to prevent wrongs or anticipated mischiefs, and not merely to redress them when done. The party seeks the aid of a court of equity, because he fears (Quia timet) some future 1 Ante, § 701 to 710, 730. See also 1 Mad. Ch. Pr. 178, 179; Viner, Abridg. title, Quia timet, A. and B.; Mitf. Eq. Pl. y Jeremy, 148. 2 Co. Litt. 100 a. See also Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 148. probable injury to his rights or interests, and not because an injury has already occurred, which requires any compensation or other relief. The manner in which this aid is given by courts of equity is, of course, dependent upon circumstances. They interfere sometimes by the appointment of a receiver to receive rents or other income, sometimes by an order to pay a pecuniary fund into court, sometimes by directing security to be given, or money to be paid over, and sometimes by the mere issuing of an injunction or other remedial process, thus adapting their relief to the precise nature of the particular case, and the remedial justice required by it.1 § 827. In regard to equitable property, the jurisdiction is equally applicable to cases where there is a present right of enjoyment, and to cases where the right of enjoyment is future or contingent. The object of the bill in all such cases is, to secure the preservation of the property to its appropriate uses and ends; and wherever there is danger of its being converted to other purposes, or diminished, or lost by gross negligence, the interference of a court of equity becomes indispensable. It will, accordingly, take the fund into its own hands, or secure its due management and appropriation, either by the agency of its own officers or otherwise. Thus, for instance, if property in the hands of a trustee for certain specific uses or trusts (either expressed or implied) is in danger of being diverted or squandered, to the injury of any claimant having a present or future fixed title thereto, the administration will be duly secured by the court, according to the original purposes, in such a manner as the court may, in its discretion, under all the circumstances, deem best fitted to the end; as by the appointment of a receiver, or by payment of the fund, if pecuniary, into court, or by requiring security for its due preservation and appropriation.2 § 828. The same principle is applied to the cases of executors and administrators, who are treated as trustees of the personal estate of the deceased party. If there is danger of waste of the estate, or collusion between the debtors of the estate and the executors or administrators, whereby the assets may be subtracted, courts of equity will interfere and secure the fund; and, in the 1 Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, 2, p. 248 to 254; id. B. 3, ch. 2, § 2, p. 350; post, § 827, 828, 829, 830, 839, 845, 847. 2 Ibid. case of collusion with debtors, they will order the latter to pay the amount of their debts into court.1 § 829. The appointment of a receiver, when directed, is made for the benefit and on behalf of all the parties in interest, and not for the benefit of the plaintiff, or of one defendant only.2 It may be granted in any case of equitable property upon suitable circumstances. And, where there are creditors, annuitants, and others, some of whom are creditors at law, claiming under judgments, and others are creditors, claiming upon equitable debts; if the property be of such a nature, that if legal, it may be taken in execution, it may, if equitable, be put into the possession of a receiver, to hold the same, and apply the profits under the direction of the court, for the benefit of all the parties, according to their respective rights and priorities. The same rule applies to cases, where the property is legal, and judgment creditors have taken possession of it under writs of elegit; for it is competent for the court to appoint a receiver in favor of annuitants and equitable creditors, not disturbing the just prior rights, if any, of the judgment creditors. Hence, the appointment of a receiver, in cases of this sort, is often called an equitable execution.5 [* § 829 a. The form of the appointment of the receiver depends upon the duty to be performed, the security required to be given by the receiver, and the mode of accountability required of him; all of which should strictly and properly be defined in the order of appointment. A form will be found in Ambler, which may be regarded as a convenient model. It is common in practice 1 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, and note (y); Elmsley v. Macauley, 3 Bro. Ch. 624; Taylor v. Allen, 2 Atk. 213; Utterson v. Mair, 4 Bro. Ch. 277; Mandeville v. Mandeville, 8 Paige, 475; ante, § 422, 423, 424, 581, and note; post, § 836; Story on Eq. Pleadings, § 178, 514. • Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 1 Swanst. 83; s. c. 2 Swanst. 125. Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, p. 248; Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. 125, 135, 139, 145, 146, 173. • Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 1 Swanst. 83; s. c. 2 Swanst. 125, 135, 139, 140, 141, 145, 173; White v. Bishop of Peterborough, 3 Swanst. 117, 118. • Ibid. and Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, p. 248, 249. 6 [* Ambler, 599. After reciting the facts which laid the foundation for the appointment, and that the counsel consent, except those representing an infant party, who do not oppose it, and that it was agreed the receiver should act upon the security of his own recognizance only: "It is further ordered, that the said A. B. be appointed receiver of the said estates, and continue to have the care and management thereof, upon his entering into a recognizance by himself, to be approved |