strong and important while the others are feeble and trifling, and another case may present the exact reverse.

The elements to be considered are (1), length of residence; (2) continuity of residence; (3) purpose or cause of residence; (4) character and extent of business done there, and its relation to the person's whole business, or to his business elsewhere; that is, is it principal and dominant, or only ancillary and subordinate; (5) his household and family ties or relations; (6) the kind and degree of communication which he keeps up with an earlier home. The general principle is well settled, that if a person goes abroad for the purpose of remaining there permanently, either with the intent of entering into business or not, he is considered as an alien. So completely is this rule established, that if a citizen of one country has his commercial domicil in another, he may engage in trade with a country which is at peace with his adopted country, although at war with his native country, and insurance on such trade may be affected in the latter country.3

1

But if a person goes to a foreign country, for a short time and a special purpose, with a decided intention of returning, he would not be thought by any one to acquire a domicil there.1

1 One of the earliest, and the leading case on this subject is that of Mr. Whitehill, cited in The Diana, 5 Rob. Adm. 60. Here, a British merchant had gone to St. Eustatius only a day or two before it was taken possession of by a British force, but it being proved that he went for the purpose of remaining there permanently, his property was condemned. The general rule on this subject is well stated by Sir Wm. Scott, in The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Adm. 12, 18, as follows: "No position is more established than this, that if a person goes into another country, and engages in trade, and resides there, he is by the law of nations to be considered as a merchant of that country." See also, O'Mealey v. Wilson, 1 Camp. 482; Willison v. Patteson, 7 Taunt. 439; Tabbs v. Bendelack, 4 Esp. 108; The Citto, 3 Rob. Adm. 38; The Aina, Eng. Adm. 1854, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 600; The Abo, Eng. Adm. 1855, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 591, 594; The Frances, 8 Cranch, 363; Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 id. 64, 120.

2 Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 242; Laneuville v. Anderson, 17 Jur. 511, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 641, affirmed in the Privy Council, Anderson v. Laneuville, 9 Moore, P. C. 325, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 59.

8 Bell v. Reid, 1 M. & S. 726. And as a citizen of his adopted country, he may in time of peace engage in a trade which is prohibited to the citizens of his native country. Wilson v. Marryat, 8 T. R. 31, affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, Marryat v. Wilson, 1 B. & P. 430.

4 Sears v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 250. In this case a native inhabitant of Boston, intending to reside in France, departed for that country, and was followed by his family about three months afterwards. His dwelling-house and furniture were leased for a year, and he hired a house for a year in Paris. At the time of his departure, he

Nor if he is detained against his will and forcibly compelled to remain there, would any length of such enforced residence, give him there a legal domicil, or place upon him in his true home, whether that was natural or acquired, the disabilities of alienage,1 unless while under such restraint he performs certain acts which tend to the support and maintenance of the enemies of the country to which he claims to belong. In which case, as to those acts he would certainly be considered as an enemy.2

But whatever was the original purpose, if the residence be long continued, then all the circumstances above enumerated must be considered in determining whether he has changed his residence. And even if he goes there for a special purpose, yet if the time is indefinite and uncertain, his domicil is changed.*

intended to return and resume his residence in Boston, but had not fixed on any time for doing it. He returned in about sixteen months, and his family in about nine months afterwards. It was held that his domicil in Boston continued during his absence. See also, The Harmony, 2 Rob. Adm. 322, infra. In the Ship Ann Green, 1 Gallis. 274, a Scotchman, who was naturalized in 1804, and joined a commercial house in 1807, and was sent out to Jamaica in 1808 to collect debts due the house, where he remained about six or seven months and then returned to New York, and went out again in 1810, and remained there about a year, and went out a third time in 1811, and was still there at the time this suit was brought, in 1812, was held to be an American citizen.

1 The Ocean, 5 Rob. Adm. 90.

2 There is a dictum of Lord Ellenborough, to this effect in Bromley v. Hasseltine, 1 Camp. 75. The question in this case was whether an insurance by an alien resident in an enemy's country, on goods to be delivered for him at a neutral or friendly port, was valid. Lord Ellenborough said: “I don't know that merely because an alien happens to be resident in an enemy's country, goods to be delivered for him at a neutral or friendly port, are on that account uninsurable. Suppose a British merchant to be entrapped and confined in an enemy's country, it can scarcely be said that all the trade he may still carry on is, in aid of the king's enemies, illegal and incapable of being insured." See also, Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Ves. 198, 202, per Lord Chancellor Loughborough.

Thus in Elbers v. United Ins. Co., 16 Johns. 128, where a Swede came to the United States for the benefit of his health, and remained there two or three years transacting business, it was held that as to these transactions he was to be considered as having his domicil in the United States, and that it made no difference whether he had any permanent counting-house there or not.

* In The Harmony, 2 Rob. Adm. 322, Sir Wm. Scott considered the length of time a man resided in a place, as the great ingredient in determining whether his domicil was changed, when he went there for a special purpose. He said: "A special purpose may lead a man to a country, where it shall detain him the whole of his life. A man comes here to follow a lawsuit; it may happen, and indeed is often used as a ground 2

VOL. II.

His assertions on the subject are often of great weight, provided they are not caused by interest, and especially if they are against his interest, or known wishes. But the mere fact that one declares himself a foreign citizen, or the reverse, when it may well be that he does this to acquire rights which otherwise he could not possess, or escape from obligations which otherwise he could not avoid, would be of but little importance.2

of vulgar and unfounded reproach (unfounded as matter of just reproach, though the fact may be true), on the laws of this country, that it may last as long as himself. Some suits are famous in our juridical history for having even outlived generations of suitors. I cannot but think that against such a long residence, the plea of an original special purpose could not be averred." The case was also put of an American coming to Europe with six contemporary cargoes, he intending to return as soon as they were disposed of, and the same person coming with one cargo, and remaining to receive five other cargoes, one in each year successively, and the learned judge said: "I repeat, that time is the great agent in this matter; it is to be taken in a compound ratio, of the time and the occupation, with a great preponderance on the article of time: be the occupation what it may, it cannot happen, but with few exceptions, that mere length of time shall not constitute a domicil." In the case of The Ship Ann Green, 1 Gallis. 274, 285, Mr. Justice Story after citing the language of Sir Wm. Scott, above referred to, said: " Upon a residence therefore for mere temporary purposes, there may be engrafted all the effects of permanent settlement, if it be continued for a great length of time, and be attended with conduct which demonstrates that new views and new connections have supervened upon the original purposes: but on the other hand, mere length of time cannot of itself be decisive, where the purpose is clearly proved to have been temporary, and still continues so, without any enlargement of views; and even the shortest residence, if with a design of permanent settlement, stamps the party with a national character. The question, after all, results in an inquiry into the intention and conduct of the party; and it is extremely difficult to lay down any general rule upon the subject."

1 Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 242. The question in this case was, whether a party should be taxed in Boston, and it was held that a letter from him to an agent expressing his intention to reside abroad, was admissible, if written before he knew that a tax had been assessed upon him. See also Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Met. 199; Burnham v. Rangeley, 1 Woodb. & M. 7.

2 In The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253, Washington, J., said: "The question, whether the person to be affected by the right of domicil had sufficiently made known his intention of fixing himself permanently in the foreign country, must depend on all the circumstances of the case. If he had made no express declaration on the subject, and his secret intention is to be discovered, his acts must be attended to, as affording the most satisfactory evidence of his intention. On this ground it is that the courts of England have decided, that a person who removes to a foreign country, settles himself there, and engages in the trade of the country, furnishes, by these acts, such evidence of an intention permanently to reside there, as to stamp him with the national character of the State where he resides. In questions on this subject, the chief point to be considered is the animus manendi; and courts are to devise such reasonable rules of evidence as may establish the fact of intention. If it sufficiently appear that the inten

If one who was a foreign citizen becomes a citizen of this country by naturalization, or by residence, his whole future conduct will be judged of in reference to a principle asserted by many courts, and illustrated by many cases, namely, that the native nationality easily reverts.1 But a mere visit to his original country would not reintegrate him as a subject of that country if such visit was intended to be of short duration only.2 If a citizen of one country whether by birth or naturalization is doing business in a foreign country, and a war breaks out, the moment he puts himself in itinere to return to the country of his birth or adoption, the character which he had by residence, and which had become hostile by the war, is changed, and his native character is resumed. But the mere intention of returning

tion of removing was to make a permanent settlement, or for an indefinite time, the right of domicil is acquired by a residence even of a few days. This is one of the rules of the British courts, and it appears to be perfectly reasonable. Another is, that a neutral or subject, found residing in a foreign country is presumed to be there animo manendi; and if a state of war should bring his national character into question, it lies upon him to explain the circumstances of his residence. The Bernon, 1 Rob. Adm. 102.

1 La Virginie, 5 Rob. Adm. 98; The Indian Chief, 3 id. 12. See the remarks of Mr. Justice Story on this subject in the case of The Ship Ann Green, 1 Gallis. 274, 286, and in The Ship Francis, id. 614.

2 The Friendschaft, 3 Wheat. 14. In this case a British merchant was in Lisbon at the time of the capture of his goods, carrying on business there. He afterwards went to London on business, leaving his affairs in Lisbon in charge of his clerks, and intending to return to that city himself. It was held that he had not become a reintegrated British subject. See also, The Vriendschap, 4 Rob. Adm. 166; Laneuville &. Anderson, 17 Jur. 511, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 641, affirmed in the Privy Council, Anderson v. Laneuville, 9 Moore, P. C. 325, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 59; The Ship Ann Green, 1 Gallis. 274, cited ante, p. 12, n. 4; Burnham v. Rangeley, 1 Woodb. & M. 7.

The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Adm. 12; The Ocean, 5 Rob. Adm. 90. In the case of The Ship St. Lawrence, 1 Gallis. 467, 471, Mr. Justice Story said: "The cases in which the party's putting himself in itinere, to return to his native country, has been held to exempt his property from the hostile character acquired by residence, are cases where such property has been engaged in a trade completely lawful in the native character. But the principle never has been and never could be extended to protect a trade, which was illegal in a native citizen; more especially a trade, which in the native character would be in the highest degree noxious. This distinction pervades the cases and reconciles all the apparent inconsistency." The cases referred to are The William, cited in The Hoop, 1 Rob. Adm. 196, 8 T. R. 548; The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Adm. 12. In Amory v. M'Gregor, 15 Johns. 24, it was held that a citizen of the United States has the right on war breaking out between that country and England, to withdraw his property purchased before the war, within a reasonable time. In the case of the St. Lawrence, it was held that if this right existed, yet

without some overt act is not sufficient.1 A man may have a neutral residence, and yet his property may acquire a hostile character.2 In the same way he may be a merchant in more countries than one; and may thus acquire at least a quasi domicil beside that of his birth and parentage. And this would be respected by the law, provided there were no indication of fraudulent intention; none, that is, of an intention to mask his trade and nationality for a time; or to give himself two national characters, between which he could choose, from time to time, as suited the exigencies of the moment.3

We have here, as in other countries, trading partnerships, and even corporations. As a general rule, the former is not a legal person, and can have no domicil. And where a partner of a house of trade in one country is domiciled in another, he is con

that it must be exercised within a reasonable time, and that the withdrawal eleven months after the declaration of war was too late. This decision was affirmed on appeal. 9 Cranch, 120. In The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253, the question was whether the property of persons who were born in England, but naturalized in the United States, and who were settled in England and engaged in the commerce of that country, should be condemned as prize, the property being shipped before they had knowledge of the war, and captured afterwards by an American cruiser. It was contended that American citizens settled in a foreign country, are entitled to a reasonable time to elect, after the existence of the war is known to them, to remain or to return to their own country, and that until such election is bona fide made, they are to be considered as American citizens, and their property shipped before they have an opportunity to make this election, as protected against American capture. But the court held that until the election was actually made, they were as to their business transactions to be considered as aliens. The dissenting opinion of Marshall, C. J., in this case, is one of great ability, and may well cause the doctrine laid down by the majority of the court to be questioned. The objections of the learned chief justice, however, apply more forcibly to the case of a native born citizen than to a naturalized one being in the country of his nativity, which latter was the case before the court.

1 The Citto, 3 Rob. Adm. 38; The President, 5 Rob. Adm. 277; Tabbs v. Bendelack, 4 Esp. 108; The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253. In the case of The Frances, 8 Cranch, 335, a naturalized citizen returned in time of peace to his native country for the purpose of engaging in trade there, but with the design of ultimately returning to his adopted country. War broke out between the two countries, and he remained in his native country for more than a year in order to wind up his business. During this time he engaged in no new transactions, and often expressed his intention to return to his adopted country, which he actually did a little more than a year after war broke out. The court held that he had regained a domicil in his native country.

2 The San Jose Indiano, 2 Gallis. 268.

8 The Vriendschap, 4 Rob. Adm. 166; The Jonge Klassina, 5 id. 297; The Ann, 1 Dods. 221; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 750.

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