not evidence that the risk was to attach on the outward cargo.1

It is very clear, that if goods are insured "at and from " a certain place; they are covered, although previously loaded at another place.2 And goods subsequently loaded are covered, if such is the manifest intention of the parties, although the risk was to commence from the loading on board at the port of departure.3

The word "at," especially in connection with "to" and "from" may apply to an island, or region of coast or district, in such a way as to cover the vessel while sailing from port to port, or

examine the whole cargo on board, and then that taken out was reladen. This was considered as a reloading of the whole. In Murray v. Col. Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 302, the whole cargo was hoisted on deck at the loading port, in order to take on board some salt as ballast, and it was then examined and restowed. It was held, that the policy attached on the salt only.

1 Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 651.

2 Gardner v. Col. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, C. C. 473. The voyage described in the policy was, at and from Rio Janeiro to Santos, and two ports in South America, and at and from either of them to a port of discharge in the West Indies, or Europe, or the United States," and the risk was declared to be on goods, at and from Rio Janeiro. until safely landed at Santos." It was held, that goods laden on board at Cadiz, which were lost between Rio Janeiro and Santos, were covered.

3 In Grant v. Delacour, 3 Taunt. 466, "the policy was at and from London to all ports and places, on this side, and on the other side of the Cape of Good Hope, forwards and backwards at sea, at all times, on all services, and in all ports and places, until the ship's safe arrival back again at her last station of discharge at Blackwall, or Deptford, upon any kind of goods in the Brunswick, beginning the adventure upon the said goods from the loading thereof on board the said ship at London, and so should continue." The court held, that though these words literally applied only to goods taken on board at London, yet, as the course of such a voyage was to trade away the goods taken out, the words would apply to any goods, acquired by trading, wherever loaded on board. But in Grant v. Paxton, 1 Taunt. 463, where goods were insured "at and from China to all or any ports or places whatsoever and wheresoever in the East Indies, Persia, or elsewhere, beyond the Cape of Good Hope, in port and at sea, in all places, at all times, and in all services, until the ship's safe arrival at London," which was not the last place of discharge, the court held, that only goods put on board at China, were covered, and not those loaded elsewhere on the voyage from China to London.

Insurance on goods at and from Plymouth to Malta, with liberty to touch at Penzance for any purpose whatever, beginning the adventure from the loading thereof on board as aforesaid, will cover goods taken on board at Penzance. Violett v. Allnutt, 3 Taunt. 419. See also, Barclay v. Stirling, 5 M. & S. 6; Hunter v. Leathley, 10 B. & C. 858, 7 Bing, 517.

place to place within that district. Whether it shall have this effect must depend upon the construction which is required by usage, by the context of the policy, and by the facts of the case.1

If the insurance be on a certain voyage, the presumption of law-liable to be rebutted only by very strong evidence - would confine this to the next voyage which comes under this description.2 But the attachment of the policy may be delayed, and not prevented, by a different voyage previously, under circumstances of necessity or compulsion, or by a voyage permitted by usage.1

SECTION III.

OF THE TERMINATION OF THE RISK.

Insurance to a place, or to a port of discharge, or until arrival in port, must terminate at the first place or port of arrival, which distinctly and certainly answers to the description. But, if the ship reaches a port only for the purposes of inquiry or advice, and leaves it at once, or is instantly ordered by the owners to another port, there to discharge the cargo, the first port would not be a port of discharge. And, if the phrase be "a final port,"

1 Dickey v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 7 Cranch, 327; Cruikshank v. Janson, 2 Taunt. 301; Camden v. Cowley, 1 W. Bl. 417; Warre v. Miller, 4 B. & C. 538.

2 Courtenay v. Miss. M. & F. Ins. Co., 12 La. 233.

8 Driscol v. Passmore, 1 B. & P. 200.

4 See ante, p. 281, n. 2.

5 Coolidge v. Gray, 8 Mass. 527; Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co., 24 Pick. 1; King v. Middletown Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 184; Sage v. Middletown Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 239; King v. Hartford Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 333. And where a vessel is insured to two ports, either or both, she may put into a third port to inquire as to the state of the markets at these ports. Clark v. United F. & M. Ins. Co., 7 Mass. 365. In King v. Middletown Ins. Co., a ship was insured on her homeward voyage to a port of discharge in the United States. She cleared for, and arrived at New York. As soon as the owner heard of her arrival, he ordered her to proceed to Middletown. To enable her to sail up the river, part of the cargo was taken out to lighten her. The cargo was entered at the custom-house and the duties paid. On the way to Middletown, the vessel was

or to "ports of discharge," the insurance will cease upon such parts of the cargo as are landed at one port or another, but not on those remaining on board and in the ship, until the port is reached at which the whole of the cargo remaining is to be discharged. And whatever port may have been intended by the

wrecked, and the underwriters were held liable, on the ground that neither the clearing for New York, the arrival there, nor the waiting for orders and lightening the vessel, constituted New York the port of discharge, although it was said, that the unlading of the cargo would have had this effect. In Sage v. Middletown Ins. Co., it was held, that the unlading of part of the cargo, which was in a perishing condition, while waiting for orders, would not terminate the risk. And if the crew is discharged and another immediately reshipped at such a port, the underwriter is still liable for a subsequent loss. King v. Hartford Ins. Co., supra.

1 Inglis v. Vaux, 3 Camp. 437; Preston v. Greenwood, 4 Dong. 28. In Moore v. Taylor, 1 A. & E. 25, a ship was insured at and from St. Vincent, Barbadoes, and all or any of the West India islands, to her port or ports of discharge and loading in the United Kingdom, during her stay there and thence back to Barbadoes and all or any of the West Indies, until the ship should arrive at her final port, as aforesaid. The vessel took in a cargo at Liverpool and discharged the same at Barbadoes, except some coal and brick, which the jury found were kept on board merely for ballast. Held, that the risk ended as soon as the cargo was delivered, and did not continue while the ship, in ballast, was seeking for a new cargo. And in Upton v. Salem Comm. Ins. Co., 8 Met. 605, the court held, where a vessel was insured at and from Salem to her port or ports of discharge on the river La Plata, that the risk terminated when the cargo was substantially discharged. In Richardson v. London Ass. Co., 4 Camp. 94, goods, the investment of the captain, were insured on an East India voyage, until their arrival at the last place of discharge on the outward voyage. The captain landed the whole of his investment at Calcutta, sold part, but not being able to find purchasers for the residue, determined to carry it on for a new market. The outward cargo had all been discharged, and the vessel was ordered to make an intermediate voyage to Madras, under the usual clause in the charter-party. On the voyage, the goods were lost. Held, that the risk, being on the outward voyage merely, had terminated. In Brown v. Vigne, 12 East, 283, a ship was insured to any port or ports in the River Plata, until her arrival at her last port of discharge. The master intended to discharge at Buenos Ayres, but that place being in the hands of the enemy, he went to Monte Video, with the intent to make a full discharge there, if the market were favorable. But not finding the market there so favorable as he expected, he determined to go to Buenos Ayres, if it should be practicable, but while discharging his cargo a loss happened. The court held, that as he could not legally go to Buenos Ayres, that place being in possession of the enemy, Monte Video was to be considered as the last port of discharge, and on the arrival of the vessel there, the risk terminated. In Oliverson v. Brightman, 8 Q. B. 781, the goods were insured at and from Liverpool to Lintin, Hong Kong, Macao, Canton, or any other ports, etc., with liberty to transship or reship on board any other vessel at or off any of the ports above mentioned, and with leave for that vessel to proceed, and discharge the goods at any of the places above mentioned, or to remain there till it should be deemed expedient to proceed, "continuing the risk by land and water, until the goods should be arrived at their final port of destination." Before the arrival

parties, the port where the cargo is actually unladen from the ship, is "the port of discharge," and such a policy therefore terminates.1

The phrase," at sea," seems to be held as covering every place where the ship may be, from the commencement to the termination of the voyage insured, although during parts of it she may have been actually anchored in ports, for shelter or otherwise. And the phrase "on a passage" has been held to be of equivalent import with "at sea."2 But, perhaps, this construction should be

of the vessel at Macao, hostilities had taken place between the Chinese and the English, who in May had stormed Canton, but hostilities had been suspended, though peace was not declared till a year later. There had been no formal declaration of war. It not being considered safe for the ship to proceed to Canton, another ship was chartered to accompany her to Hong Kong in order that the goods might be transshipped and examined and kept there till they could be sent to Canton, or some other market. There was no market at Hong Kong, and it was not intended to make it the final place of deposit for sale. While the goods were on board the second ship, they were lost by a peril of the seas, and the underwriters were held liable. In Stephens v. Beverly Ins. Co., Sup. Jud. Ct., Mass., Essex, 1820, where a vessel was insured from Beverly to Bilboa, or a port of discharge in Europe, it was held, that the vessel could go only to Bilboa or some other port, and not to both.

1 In Moffat v. Ward, 4 Doug. 31, note, it appeared that the ship had unloaded all of her cargo at Madras, and was afterwards lost on her way to Bengal. The underwriters were exonerated, on the ground that the last port of discharge, was not the port where she was originally destined to discharge part of her cargo, but that at which it was in fact discharged. In Shapley v. Tappan, 9 Mass. 20, the ship was insured from Boston to Tonningen, for the purpose of carrying a cargo there. She was driven by a storm into the River Elbe, seized at Gluckstadt, and afterwards liberated, and the cargo delivered to the consignee there, by his consent. Held, that the risk was then terminated.

2 Bowen v. Hope Ins. Co., and The Same v. Merchants Ins. Co., 20 Pick. 275, were two cases argued and decided as one. In the one the ship was insured for a year, and if "at sea" when the year expired, then until her arrival at port. In the second, the insurance was the same, excepting that the phrase "if at sea" was in this latter case, "if on her passage." The year ended the 6th of October, 1834. On September 25, the ship being at Bangor, in Wales, with her cargo on board, weighed anchor with the intention of proceeding to Boston, and dropped down several miles below Bangor, but not being able to get out of the Straits of Menai (oh which Bangor is situated), on account of head winds, came to anchor; and on several days attempted to get out of the straits, but did not succeed until the 8th of October. Shaw, C. J., said: "The term 'at sea' may have different meanings, according to the connection in which it is used. Here it is used in contradistinction to arrival in port.' If the vessel has sailed, or commenced a voyage from one port to another, she must be considered to be at sea, within the meaning of this clause, from the commencement to the termination of that voyage, although during parts of it she may have sought shelter in a place on the way. . . . . In the other policy, the contingency upon which the risk is to con

applied especially to the case of a ship which, by the policy, is to be insured on a certain day "if at sea;" in which case it may be reasonable to consider the word as meaning only, "not at home." It is generally provided in time policies, that if the vessel be "at sea" at the expiration of the time agreed on, the risk shall continue until her arrival at a port of discharge, or at her port of destination.1 If, then, before the expiration of the time, she has actually broken ground for the voyage; or if she has sailed and is, when the time expires, in a port of necessity; she is considered "at sea," and is covered by the policy

tinue at the end of the year, is a little differently expressed, the words being, if the vessel shall then be 'on a passage.' We think the meaning and legal effect are the same in this as in the other policy."

1 In Wood v. New Eng. Mar. Ins. Co., 14 Mass. 31, a vessel was insured for twelve months, commencing on the 30th of December, from Newburyport to every place to which she might proceed, the risk to continue until the vessel should arrive, and be moored twenty-four hours in safety, or until the expiration of twelve months. It was further provided that if the vessel should be at sea at the expiration of the above period, the risk should continue until her arrival at a port of discharge. On the 14th of the following November the vessel sailed on a voyage from Beverly for Amsterdam, and on the 14th of December was captured and carried into port, where she was detained until after the expiration of the twelve months, when the vessel was liberated, and sailed for Amsterdam. On the way she was captured. Parker, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "At the expiration of the year, the ship was not literally at sea; but was in a British port, whither she had been carried against the will of the master. Was she then, within a fair construction of the contract, within the intent of the parties, at sea? We think she was. She was absent on a voyage, which had been commenced within the time of the original risk. She would have been protected, upon that voyage, to Amsterdam and back again, because within the common meaning of the term at sea, which was undoubtedly adopted by these parties. A vessel is considered in that condition, while on her voyage, and pursuing the business of it, although during part of the time she is necessarily within some port, in the prosecution of her voyage. The intention in prolonging the risk beyond twelve months, was unquestionably to give the ship protection under the policy, in case that time should expire, while the vessel should be employed in some unfinished voyage : and whether in a foreign port, or actually upon the high seas, we believe there was no difference in the contemplation of the parties, when the contract was made." We consider this case as having been correctly decided, but the language used by the court, as given above, went further than the facts of the case required, and cannot, it seems to us, with all deference to the learned judge who pronounced the opinion, be supported by principle or authority, for the risk was to continue only to a port of discharge, and not to the port, which might perhaps be construed as meaning the final port of discharge. See Bowen v. Hope Ins. Co., 20 Pick. 275, cited in the preceding note.

The dictum of Parker, C. J., cited above, is directly opposed to a case decided in New York. American Ins. Co. v. Hutton, 24 Wend. 330, affirmed Hutton v. American Ins. Co., 7 Hill, 321. In this case a vessel was insured for a year, commencing