east-bound or southerly track, the "devil" strip between both tracks, and got upon or between the rails of the northerly or west-bound track, when he suddenly became alarmed at the rapid approach of the westbound car, and decided it was best not to undertake to complete the crossing ahead of it, and he started to turn to the right, intending to swing off to the southeast and get back upon the south side of Jefferson avenue. His wagon got stalled, and the east-bound car struck the rear of his wagon.

The defendant's claim and theory was and is that the plaintiff was proceeding east on or with the wheels of his wagon straddle the north rail of the northerly or west-bound track; that while in this situation he was observed by the motormen of both cars; that he was "in the clear" so far as the east-bound car was concerned; that when within 20 to 30 feet ahead of the east-bound car he suddenly, and without looking to the rear, turned his wagon to the right directly in the path of the car; that, despite all that could be done to prevent, the car struck the wagon about in the middle, or near the right front wheel. The motorman of the west-bound car, seeing the danger, stopped and just stepped out of the vestibule, when the wagon was thrown upon the left front corner of the vestibule, breaking the glass in the windows, and tearing the controller box loose. The plaintiff's wagon was demolished, his horse was injured so badly it had to be killed, and he was thrown to the ground under the His right foot and ankle were crushed, his toes so badly as to necessitate amputation.

car.

The court overruled motions for a directed verdict on the plaintiff's evidence and on the whole evidence. The case went to the jury, who found for the plaintiff. A motion for a new trial was made and denied. The errors relied on are:

(1) The court should have directed a verdict.

(2) There was error in the charge of the court. (3) The verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

1 and 3 may be considered together. Plaintiff offered evidence which, if believed, should carry the case to the jury. Chauvin v. Railway, 135 Mich. 85 (97 N. W. 160); Ablard v. Railway, 139 Mich. 248 (102 N. W. 741).

2. Was there error in the charge of the court? That part of it which is most criticised reads:

"It was the duty of the motorman operating the approaching car, when the plaintiff was crossing in full view, so as to avoid a collision with him-to operate the car so as to avoid a collision with him, if possible. If you find that the motorman of the car coming from the west did not do so, and by reason thereof collided with and injured the plaintiff, then I charge you that the defendant company, through the acts of its agent was guilty of negligence."

Counsel for appellee in reply to the criticism say:

""The charge of a court to a jury must be considered as a whole, not by isolated sentences, and a jury, as one of the tribunals of the country, must be presumed to have some sense. It is not allowable, in reviewing instructions to the jury, to consider particular sentences or phrases as if they were independent, but they must be construed with their context.' Welch v. Ware, 32 Mich. 78.

""The charge to the jury is to be construed together as a whole, and where a portion of it is complained of, which, standing alone, would bear a construction that might mislead the jury, the objection will not be sustained if, when considered with the rest of the charge, the jury would not be likely to put such a construction upon it, or to be misled by it.""

-citing many cases, and insist the jury was not misled.

One trouble with this contention is that there is nothing in the other portions of the charge upon which to base it. The charge was quite long, and fully and

carefully stated the rights and duties of the plaintiff; but we have quoted all it said as to the duty of the motorman. We think it held him to a higher degree of care than the law demands and may have misled the jury. See Rascher v. Railway Co., 90 Mich. 413 (51 N. W. 463, 30 Am. St. Rep. 447) ; Chauvin v. Railway, 135 Mich. 85 (97 N. W. 160); Ablard v. Railway, 139 Mich. 248 (102 N. W. 741).

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered. BROOKE, C. J., and KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

The late Justice MCALVAY took no part in this decision.

WILLIAMS v. LAWSON.

DEEDS-BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-NOTICE-INJUNCTION-EQUITY. Where there were no restrictions in any of the title deeds to the lot defendant purchased, on the north side of a street, and he had no notice that the residents on the south side were restricted or considered the street a restricted district, and he was assured, if he bought the lot, he would have a perfect right to put up an apartment house, equity will not enjoin the building of a brick twostory four-family apartment house.

Appeal from Wayne; Van Zile, J. Submitted June 25, 1915. (Docket No. 88.) Decided September 28,

Bill by George E. Williams and others against George A. Lawson and another for an injunction restraining defendants from erecting an apartment house in an alleged restricted residence district. From a decree for defendants, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Robert E. Barber and Edwin S. Bartlett, for complainants.

N. Calvin Bigelow, for defendants.

The following cases were cited by complainant: Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647 (139 N. W. 878, 45 L. R. A. [N. S.] 726); Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464 (133 N. W. 317, 36 L. R. A. [N. S.] 890); Tallmadge v. Bank, 26 N. Y. 105; Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227 (29 N. E. 81, 26 Am. St. Rep. 516); Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 367 (24 N. W. 104, 58 Am. Rep. 363); Stott v. Avery, 156 Mich. 674 (121 N. W. 825); Jenks v. Pawlowski, 98 Mich. 110 (56 N. W. 1105, 22 L. R. A. 863, 39 Am. St. Rep. 522); Tillotson v. Gregory, 151 Mich: 128 (114 N. W. 1025); Bagnall v. Young, 151 Mich. 69 (114 N. W. 674); Harris v. Roraback, 137 Mich. 292 (100 N. W. 391, 109 Am. St. Rep. 681); James v. Irvine, 141 Mich. 376 (104 N. W. 631); Misch v. Lehman, 178 Mich. 225, 228 (144 N. W. 556); Moore v. Curry, 176 Mich. 456 (142 N. W. 839); Frink v. Hughes, 133 Mich. 63 (94 N. W. 601); Silberman v. Uhrlaub, 102 N. Y. Supp. 299 (116 App. Div. 869).

For defendant the following cases were cited: James v. Irvine, 141 Mich. 376 (104 N. W. 631); Frink v. Hughes, 133 Mich. 63 (94 N. W. 601); Easterbrook v. Society, 85 Conn. 289 (82 Atl. 561, 41 L. R. A. [N. S.] 615).

MOORE, J. Complainants in this bill, more than 30 in number, are residents and property holders on Grand avenue west in the village of Highland Park. This street runs from Woodward avenue west to Hamilton boulevard.

Defendant John Campbell is the owner of lot 8 in block 1 of Grand avenue subdivision, and defendant George A. Lawson is a contractor. Lot 8 is on the

north side of the street. The lots on the south side of the street have the following restriction:

"Dwelling houses erected on the south one-half of • W. H. Davison's subdivision of park lot 2 in south part of quarter section 5 shall be at least two stories high and cost not less than $2,250 between Woodward and Second avenues, and not less than $2,000 between Second avenue and Hamilton boulevard, and shall be not less than 20 feet from the front line of said lots."

It is the claim of complainants that the street is a residential street, and the bill is filed to enjoin defendants from putting up a two-story, brick, four-family apartment house 20 feet from the front line of the street. After a full hearing of the case, it appearing there were no building restrictions in any of the deeds resulting in defendants' title, and no parol agreement to which the defendants were parties, the chancellor dismissed the bill of complaint. The case is brought here by appeal.

We quote from the brief of appellants:

"The contentions of complainants are:

"First. That restrictive covenants of record and in parol are binding upon the property of defendants and upon the defendants, and limit the use of the property to the restrictions claimed.

"Second. That a general plan has been maintained and recognized by all owners in the subdivision, and followed out, and that rights have accrued to complainants and all other owners of property in the subdivision, which the defendants may not disregard in the use of their property.

"Third. That defendants are bound by the provisions of a universally recognized plan, of which they had notice before purchase, and must be bound by that plan in the use of their property.

"Fourth. That the violation of such a plan, to the injury of complainants, would constitute a nuisance, and may be enjoined."

There is no dispute about what is shown by the record. None of the title deeds to the lot in question