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coal mining, we are forced to enquire why that individualism did not show itself when the mineowners created in the Newcastle Vend the most powerful coal cartel which has ever yet existed, and maintained it for seventy years. The monopolist organisation of copper production at the end of the eighteenth century is another important instance of the possibility of forming a cartel in former times, and Babbage in the thirties describes a bookseller's1 cartel, the aim of which was "to put down all competition," and which exhibited a striking similarity to the "Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler," as we can prove, though exact details are wanting. Further, we notice in the eighties and nineties, when neither cartel nor trust existed, repeated attempts by large firms to initiate a monopolist organisation of their particular branch of industry. There were, for instance, at the beginning of the eighties, attempts at forming a syndicate in pig iron, though they were not long successful. In 1894 a coal syndicate was formed in the north of England with the object of fixing a minimum price and of regulating conditions of output, but this also only lasted a few months.3 At the end of the eighties a syndicate was projected but never realised in the paper trade, the only monopolist branch of which at present is the wall-paper industry. Among other unsuccessful early monopolist organisations is the well-known Birmingham Alliance, which, created originally in the interest of the bedstead industry, transferred its activity subsequently to other trades. It was an effort to regulate the prices of the various trade products in conjunction with an organised association of workpeople. But these associations could not permanently withstand the pressure of outsiders and of foreign competition, and at the present time free competition obtains in these trades also.

Attempted cartels and trusts, which failed either

1'Economy of Manufactures,' London 1833, ed. 3, p. 312.

2 Cf. for details Levy, in Schmoller's 'Jahrbücher,' 1908, pp. 1538-1540. 3 Cf. for details Levy, in Schmoller's 'Jahrbücher,' 1907, pp. 1689-1690.

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because they never passed beyond the stage of a project, or because they had not sufficient vital power to carry them on for any length of time, can be seen in other branches of industry in the same years. It was clearly not through any lack of will on the part of manufacturers that the powerful and effective cartels and trusts of Germany and the United States did not exist in England. That their efforts to carry out their desires were unavailing was the result of competition, either that of the foreigner or that which arose at home.

It must therefore be recognised that the undoubted anti-monopolist conscience of the English nation and its belief in economic individualism has always been subject to limitation when the individual Englishman thought of himself as a producer and not as a consumer. The cartels and projected cartels of the past clearly show that English manufacturers have tried to form monopolist organisations wherever they saw a prospect of making any profit. English shipping firms inaugurated between 1870-80 the now well-known "shipping rings," and English business houses gave the first impetus to the nitrate cartels of Chili early in the nineties. Facts such as these show that the English man of business is a much greater lover of cartels than he should be, if his adhesion to the principle of individualism were as firm as is generally supposed. Let us turn lastly to the testimony of Prof. Clapham,1 the author of the best extant work on English textile industries. "It is true that in all branches of the trade the promoters of a combination have to deal with special obstacles, not the least of which is the strong local feeling and pronounced individualism of the manufacturer; but these things have been overcome before, and may be overcome again, when there is a gain to be made or a loss to be avoided." Thus, as the subjective conditions of monopoly have obviously existed in spite of the doctrine of individualism, we can only conclude that the external essentials of monopolist control were not as fully developed 1Clapham, 'Woollen and Worsted Industries,' London 1907, p. 154.

M

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OTHER EXPLANATIONS NEEDED

in England as in other countries, and that even at present they are in part lacking. What these "defective" elements are can be shown only by more intimate knowledge of the conditions of production and sale in those branches of industry in Great Britain which are still governed by competition.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SPHERE OF COMPETITION

A CONSIDERABLE number of cartels and trusts in all parts of the world are essentially dependent on the existence of mineral deposits which are easily convertible into a monopoly. In the first place, certain minerals, being found only in a single country or in one or two countries, are from the outset a monopoly to the rest of the world. In this connection may be mentioned the powerful monopolies of the potash deposits in Germany, of kaolin in Austria, nitrate in Chili, marble in Italy, petroleum, copper and borax in America, zinc in Germany, Belgium and America, and diamonds in the Transvaal. Secondly, certain areas of production, such as the coal and iron ore districts of America and Germany, hold monopolies, if not in the world's market, at least in a given national area, generally as a result of the freight charges which a foreign competitor would have to

face.

The naturally narrow limits of such mineral wealth and the marked tendency of mining from the very beginning to accumulate fixed capital have created relatively early and with comparative ease close monopolist combinations or a semi-monopolist predominance of particular interests in all such areas of production.

Great Britain, on the other hand, has no monopoly over other countries in any mineral whatever. The copper output of Great Britain, the largest in the world at the beginning of the nineteenth century, is estimated to-day at

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ENGLISH MINERAL ORES

the trifling amount of 500 tons a year. The output of English zinc is now equally unimportant.2 Cornish tin, the best known in the world for over 2000 years, amounted to only 5040 short tons in 1905 as against 65,565 short tons produced in the Malay States.3 In the last twenty years the output of English lead has been only a small fraction of that of the United States, Spain, Germany, and Australia. At the present time the mineral resources of Great Britain are practically confined to a very few products. Out of a total value of £135,200,000 in 1907 £120,500,000 came under the head of coal. Iron ore accounts for £4,400,000; the extremely important branches of stones and clays, so necessary to the Portland cement industry, for £7,100,000; and the salt industry, which represents a not unimportant proportion of the world's production, for £600,000. In all, these four products represent a value of £132,600,000 out of £135,200,000. The remaining minerals are divided among products of which England furnishes only a small part of her own needs. None of her chief mineral products are present in sufficient quantity to give them anything approaching a monopoly in the world's market. But from the point of view of its own national market it is a striking fact that precisely those very important raw materials and other products which are worked abroad as the closest monopolies, are subject in Great Britain to very marked competition. One most prominent instance is that of the coal trade.

Here we have to deal with a branch of English production which, although it has more and more lost during the last twenty years its former monopoly of the trade of the world, has, on the other hand, never been affected by

1'Mineral Resources,' Washington 1906, p. 358.

2 Cf. L. v. Wiese, 'Entwickelung der Rohzincfabrication.'

3 Mineral Resources,' p. 448.

46 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich,' Berlin 1908, p. 31.

Mines and Quarries,' part iii., London 1908, passim, p. 125.