1 which such amendment shall be ratified in the event that the 2 amendment itself contains no such provision. In no case shall

3 such a resolution prescribe a period for ratification of less 4 than four years.

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RATIFICATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

SEC. 12. (a) Any amendment proposed by the conven7 tion and submitted to the States in accordance with the pro8 visions of this Act shall be valid for all intents and purposes 9 as part of the Constitution of the United States when duly 10 ratified by three-fourths of the States in the manner and 11 within the time specified consistent with the provisions of 12 article V of the Constitution of the United States.

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(b) The secretary of state of the State, or if there be no 14 such officer, the person who is charged by State law with 15 such function, shall transmit a certified copy of the State 16 action ratifying any proposed amendment to the Administra17 tor of General Services.

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RESCISSION OF RATIFICATIONS

SEC. 13. (a) Any State may rescind its ratification of a 20 proposed amendment by the same processes by which it rati21 fied the proposed amendment, except that no State may re22 scind when there are existing valid ratifications of such 23 amendment by three-fourths of the States.

24 (b) Any State may ratify a proposed amendment even 25 though it previously may have rejected the same proposal.

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2

PROCLAMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

SEC. 14. The Administrator of General Services, when 3 three-fourths of the several States have ratified a proposed 4 amendment to the Constitution of the United States, shall

5 issue a proclamation that the amendment is a part of the 6 Constitution of the United States.

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JUDICIAL REVIEW

SEC. 15. (a) Any State aggrieved by any determination 9 or finding, or by any failure of Congress to make a determi10 nation or finding within the periods provided, under section 6 11 or section 11 of this Act may bring an action in the Supreme 12 Court of the United States against the Secretary of the 13 Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives or, 14 where appropriate, the Administrator of General Services, 15 and such other parties as may be necessary to afford the 16 relief sought. Such an action shall be given priority on the 17 Court's docket.

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(b) Every claim arising under this Act shall be barred 19 unless suit is filed thereon within sixty days after such claim 20 first arises.

21 (c) The right to review by the Supreme Court provided 22 under subsection (a) does not limit or restrict the right to 23 judicial review of any other determination or decision made 24 under this Act of such review as is otherwise provided by the. 25 Constitution or any other law of the United States.

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2

EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENTS

SEC. 16. An amendment proposed to the Constitution of

3 the United States shall be effective from the date specified 4 therein or, if no date is specified, then on the date on which 5 the last State necessary to constitute three-fourths of the 6 States of the United States, as provided for in article V, has 7 ratified the same.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PRYOR, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS

Thank you, Senator Bayh, for this opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee on the Constitution. I must state at the outset that I strongly oppose the use of a constitutional convention to amend our Constitution. Some of my concerns are expressed in these remarks. The bottom line of my concern is that attempting to amend our Constitution by the conventional method would be opening a Pandora's Box.

That does not mean, however, that this discussion is not important. At the present time a number of states have submitted resolutions calling for a convention. To ignore these is to court danger. It is important that we discuss the possibility of a constitutional convention in an environment free from the pressures surrounding the current issues which may be topics of future constitutional conventions. I was pleased to hear of efforts to limit narrowly the testimony on these bills, and not deal with particular issues which might be before a constitutional convention. Earlier attempts have been bogged down in these pressing but side issues.

Prior to the preparation of my testimony, the staff of the Subcommittee submitted numerous questions for my consideration. Though I may not address each and every one, I will attempt in my testimony to comment on those I feel are of major importance or I have personal experiences which may be beneficial to the Subcommittee.

Article V of the Constitution provides two procedures for amending that document. Two-thirds of both Houses of Congress may propose amendments or two-thirds of the states may request the Congress to call a constitutional convention. Under the second method, Congress has two obligations: (1) to call the convention and (2) to select the mode of ratification. But its responsibility is more complex than that. The duty to call a constitutional convention contains the responsibility of Congress to determine the validity of the state resolutions. I do not believe this determination can be celegated to the states as is proposed in S. 1710. What is needed is a uniform review by Congress of the state resolutions. Congress should explore the intent of the resolutions submitted by each state legislature. I see no problem in each state applying procedures consistent with the normal passage of resolutions. States may differ in these procedures, but this should not be grounds to reject resolutions regardless of the use or exclusion of certain officials, votes or referendums.

I do not believe, however, that efforts, either by the states or by the Congress, to limit the scope of the convention are constitutional. While I was Governor of Arkansas, I proposed and the legislature adopted legislation calling for a limited state constitutional convention. The convention never convened, however, because the Supreme Court of Arkansas struck down this attempt to hold a limited convention. The Court held in Pryor v. Lowe, "delegates to a constitutional convention are exercising that *** power inherent in the people 523 S.W.2d 202. The attempt of the Arkansas Legislature to limit the scope of the convention was viewed by the Court to be a usurpation of the power of the citizens of the state. The Court left open the situation when the electorate passed on the limitations placed on a convention.

This country's only experience with a constitutional convention supports, I believe, my position. The constitutional convention of 1787 exceeded its purported call. The call was for the "sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of the Confederation." The result of the convention was the Constitution by which we rule ourselves today. Their drafting of a new constitution was justified by those who now seek a limited convention as valid due to the impending dissolution of the republic. The unity of the republic is a subjective opinion, and should not be confused with the right of the people to propose a new constitution or amendments to the present constitution.

Proponents of a limited convention cite the language of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The American Bar Association quoted proposed language which contained specific wording inferring the calling of a limited convention. This language was omitted from the resulting Constitution; however, the ABA contends that the intent is still embodied in the Constitution. I would suspect this to be just the reverse, removing the wording removes the option to hold a limited convention. Assuming a limited convention cannot be called, then no

limiting oath or other means to accomplish this end can be permitted. Even though it would not be required, I would hope that the delegates to the convention would do their best to heed the advisory comments and instructions contained in their state resolution.

Many of the state resolutions before Congress are worded to be effective only if a limited convention is called. If a limited convention may not be called, as I think it cannot, then it is only appropriate that these state resolutions are invalid. If the state legislature's resolution will permit a general convention, although recommending only a single subject of consideration, there appears to be no problem in these continuing in force.

Both S. 3 and S. 1710 address the selection of delegates to a constitutional convention. The act which authorized the 1976 Arkansas Constitutional Convention provided for the appointment of delegates by the governor. Since the Arkansas Supreme Court in Pryor v. Lowe held the call for a convention void on other grounds, it did not review the selection of delegates. The dissent, however, did address the issue of selection of delegates. The dissenters indicated a preference for a direct election of delegates, but found no provisions in the state constitution or statutes prohibiting the appointment of delegates. As to whether public officials should be allowed to serve as delegates, the 1970 Arkansas case of Harvey v. Ridgeway would seem to be instructive. The court in that case held participation in the convention was not similar to employment in any other office in the state. A constitutional convention is equal to and independent from existing branches of government. The Court found no conflict in any dual employment as a delegate and employee of a particular branch of government. I see no reason why any individual needs to be excluded from the pool of minds available to assist in the drafting of a new amendment.

Some provisions will be necessary to address the convening of a constitutional convention. Article V provides for the calling of the convention and the selection of the mode for ratification of amendments by the states. Congress may provide under the power granted by Article I's "Necessary and proper clause" for procedures necessary for the convention. I believe Congress possesses the power to provide for such matters as the time and place of the convention, financing of the convention, and to provide for the initial opening procedures.

While I believe that Congress should appropriate funds to finance a constitutional convention, there seems to be no obligation to do so under Article V. If Congress did not appropriate funds in the call for the constitutional convention, it would be necessary for the states to pay the expenses on some proportioned basis. I do not support the requirement of annual authorization by Congress. Congress should not be in a position to use the authorization process to influence the work of the convention.

S. 1710 provides for the nation's senior State Supreme Court Justice to convene the convention. I have no objection to such a procedure but fail to see the reason for doing so. Senator Helms' bill provides for the Vice President to preside on the opening day. This method appears to be simpler and more practical than the use of a state justice.

The vote on final passage of any amendment submitted by the Convention should parallel the two-thirds requirement imposed on Congress in submitting amendments to the States. Some who seek lower voting requirements feel the three-fourths vote by the States needed for ratification is a sufficient check. I can see no reason, however, to exempt the convention from the two-thirds requirement. On procedural matters and amendments to the proposed amendments, I would allow the convention itself to determine the required percentage.

I do not support the provisions in these bills which remove the constitution convention from judicial review. Congress has discretion in interpreting Article V, but neither Congress, the convention nor the states should be the final arbitration in every situation involving the convention.

The final responsibility of Congress under Article V is to propose the method of ratification. Automatic submission by the Administrator of the General Services Administration to the states is inappropriate and will not likely prove binding on future Congresses.

Mr. Chairman, these are a few of my thoughts on the bills before your Subcommittee. I appreciate your inviting me to testify. Let me end my statement as I began it-that is by restating my strong opposition to using the convention method to amend our Constitution.

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