ments," and ought also to be authorized to call a convention whenever two-thirds of each branch concurred on the need for a convention. Madison also criticized the August 30 proposal, stating that the vagueness of the expression "call a convention for the purpose" was sufficient reason for recon; sideration. He then asked: "How was a Convention to be formed? by what rule decide? what the force of its acts?" As a result of the debate, the clause adopted on August 30 was dropped in favor of the following provision proposed by Madison: "The Legislature of the U-S- whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of the U.S." 23 On September 15, after the Committee of Style had returned its report, George Mason strongly objected to the amending article on the ground that both modes of initiating amendments depended on Congress so that "no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppressive .... Gerry and Gouverneur Morris then moved to amend the article "so as to require a convention on application of" two-thirds of the states.24 In response Madison said that he "did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to propose amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a Convention on the like application." He added that he had no objection against providing for a convention for the purpose of amendments "except only that difficulties might arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided." 25 *Mason's draft of the Constitution, as it stood at that point in the Convention, contained the following notations: "Article 5th - By this article Congress only have the power of proposing amendments at any future time to this constitution and should it prove ever so oppressive, the whole people of America can't make, or even propose alterations to it; a doctrine utterly subversive of the fundamental principles of the rights and liberties of the people." 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 629 n. 8 (Farrand ed. 1937) Thereupon, the motion by Morris and Gerry was agreed to and the amending article was thereby modified so as to include the convention method as it now reads. Morris then successfully moved to include in Article V the proviso that "no state, without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." There was little discussion of Article V in the state ratifying conventions. In The Federalist Alexander Hamilton spoke of Article V as contemplating "a single proposition." Whenever two-thirds of the states concur, he declared, Congress would be obliged to call a convention. "The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress 'shall call a convention'. Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body."2 Madison, as noted earlier, stated in The Federalist that both the general and state governments are equally enabled to "originate the amendment of errors." While the Constitutional Convention of 1787 may have exceeded the purpose of its call in framing the Constitution, it does not follow that a convention convened under Article V and subject to the Constitution can lawfully assume such authority. In the first place, the Convention of 1787 took place during an extraordinary period and at a time when the states were independent and there was no effective national government. Thomas Cooley described it as "a revolutionary proceeding, and could be justified only by the circumstances which had brought the Union to the brink of dissolution."27 Moreover, the Convention of 1787 did not ignore Congress. The draft Constitution was submitted to Congress, consented to by Congress, and transmitted by Congress to the states for ratification by popularly-elected conventions. Both pre-1787 convention practices and the general tenor of the amending provisions of the first state constitutions lend support to the conclusions that a convention could be convened for a specific purpose and that, once convened, it would have no authority to exceed that purpose. •This is because it was called "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting... such altera. tions and provisions therein as shall... render the federal constitu tion adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union." Of the first state constitutions, four provided for amendment by conventions and three by other methods. 28 Georgia's Constitution provided that "no alteration shall be made in this constitution without petitions from a majority of the counties, ... at which time the assembly shall order a convention to be called for that purpose,* specifying the alterations to be made, according to the petitions referred to the assembly by a majority of the counties as aforesaid." Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1776 provided for the election of a Council of Censors with power to call a convention #29 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 directed the General Court to have the qualified voters of the respective towns and plantations convened in 1795 to collect their sentiments on the necessity or expediency of amendments. If two-thirds of the qualified voters throughout the state favored "revision or amendment," it was provided that a convention of delegates would meet "for the purpose aforesaid." The report of the Annapolis Convention of 1786 also reflected an awareness of the binding effect of limitations on a convention. That Convention assembled to consider general trade matters and, because of the limited number of state representatives present, decided not to proceed, stating: "That the express terms of the powers to your Commissioners supposing a deputation from all the States, and having for object the Trade and Commerce of the United States, Your Commissioners did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their mission, under the Circumstances of so partial and defective a representation."31 In their report, the Commissioners expressed the opinion that there should be another convention, to consider not only trade matters but the *Note the similarity between this language (emphasis ours) and the language contained in the earliest drafts of Article V (p. 12, supra). amendment of the Articles of Confederation. The limited authority of the Annapolis Commissioners, however, was made clear: "If in expressing this wish, or in intimating any other sentiment, your Commissioners should seem to exceed the strict bounds of their appointment, they entertain a full confidence, that a conduct, dictated by an anxiety for the welfare, of the United States, will not fail to receive an indulgent construction. "Though your Commissioners could not with propriety address these observations and sentiments to any but the States they have the honor to Represent, they have nevertheless concluded from motives of respect, to transmit Copies of this Report to the United States in Congress assembled, and to the executives of the other States." From this history of the origins of the amending provision, we are led to conclude that there is no justification for the view that Article V sanctions only general conventions. Such an interpretation would relegate the alternative method to an “unequal" method of initiating amendments. Even if the state legislatures overwhelmingly felt that there was a necessity for limited change in the Constitution, they would be discouraged from calling for a convention if that convention would automatically have the power to propose a complete revision of the Constitution. Since Article V specifically and exclusively vests the state legislatures with the authority to apply for a convention, we can perceive no sound reason as to why they cannot invoke limitations in exercising that authority. At the state level, for example, it seems settled that the electorate may choose to delegate only a portion of its authority to a state constitutional convention and so limit it substantively.32 The rationale is that the state convention derives its authority from the people when they vote to hold a convention and that when they so vote they adopt the limitations on the convention contained in the enabling legislation drafted by the legislature and presented on a "take it or leave it" basis.33 As one state court decision stated: "When the people, acting under a proper resolution of the legislature, vote in favor of calling a constitutional convention, they are presumed to ratify the terms of the legislative call, which thereby becomes the basis of the authority delegated to the convention." Power of And another: “Certainly, the people, may, if they will, elect delegates for a particular purpose without conferring on them all their authority...." 35 In summary, we believe that a substantively-limited Article V convention is consistent with the purpose of the alternative method since the states and people would have a complete vehicle other than the Congress for remedying specific abuses of power by the national government; consistent with the actual history of the amending article throughout which only amendments on single subjects have been proposed by Congress; consistent with state practice under which limited conventions have been held under constitutional provisions not expressly sanctioning a substantively-limted convention;36 and consistent with democratic principles because convention delegates would be chosen by the people in an election in which the subject matter to be dealt with would be known and the issues identified, thereby enabling the electorate to exercise an informed judgment in the choice of delegates. Article V explicitly gives Congress the power to call a convention upon receipt of applications from two-thirds of the state legislatures and to choose the mode of ratification of a proposed amendment. We believe that, as a necessary incident of the power to call, Congress has the power initially to determine whether the conditions which give rise to its duty have been satisfied. Once a determination is made that the conditions are present, Congress' duty is clear-it "shall" call a convention. The language of Article V, the debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and statements made in The Federalist, in the debates in the state ratifying conventions, and in congressional debates during the early Congresses make clear the mandatory nature of this duty.* *Upon receipt of the first state application for a convention, a debate took place in the House of Representatives on May 5, 1789, as to whether it would be proper to refer that application to committee. A number of Representatives, including Madison, felt it would be improper to do so, since it would imply that Congress had a right to deliberate upon the subject. Madison said that this "was not the case until two-thirds of the State Legislatures concurred in such application, and then it is out of the power of Congress to decline complying, the words of the Constitution being express and positive relative to the agency Congress may have in case of |