or satisfaction may be derived from it."1 For, in this way, under the cover of the interpretation of a word, we beg the question as to the ideal scheme of distribution. It may, perhaps, be thought that the difference is rather verbal than material, and that practically the greatest happiness of the greatest number will be admitted by every one as the economic ideal. But a ready example shows that it is not so. Maximum freedom is at least as attractive, and may lay claim to at least equal authority. For my own part, I should not care to regard equality of distribution, even if it could be shown to be both practicable and also productive of maximum happiness, as the ultimate goal of human progress. Human energies, activities, and ambitions are not to be satisfied with a dead level of placid content. The sadness of wisdom may be preferable to the mirth of folly, and the penury of independence to the repletion of servitude. Even on the verbal question, I submit that the distribution which admits of the greatest liberty may be more properly described as economic than that which aims at greatest utility. In popular discourse, the laws of political economy are still laws of competition and freedom, and not laws of happiness and content; and even utilitarian economists still give the first place and lay the most stress on those laws which are arrived at under the assumption of a system of national liberty.2

But, as already explained, I do not consider the comparison of conflicting ethical ideals, and still less, the arbitrary choice of one in particular, to come within the province of political economy. In my view it is a positive science, and as regards the distribution of wealth, we must try to discover the real causes which have been and still are, at work, and deduce the consequences. We have to explain the nature and effects of the institution of private property, and describe and account for various species of income. Rents, wages, and profits are as definite facts as 1 Sidgwick's Principles, Bk. III., Ch. I.

2 Cf. Sidgwick's Principles, Introduction, Ch. III.

any treated of in the physical sciences. Just as land, labour, and capital are the great agents of production, so the owners of them are the dividers of the produce. Our present problem is to give an account of the positive methods of division. In accordance with recent practice, however, some attention will also be given, at a later stage,1 to certain proposed schemes which are more or less socialistic in character, partly because opinion is itself an economic force, and partly because the consideration of the opposite shows the real meaning of existing institutions, and is the best antidote to familiarity.

I propose, in the first place, to consider the economic principles at the root of the institution of private property, and to point out, briefly, how they have gradually become of more and more importance relatively to other principles.

1 Infra, Ch. XV.

CHAPTER II.

THE INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.

§ 1. The Economic, as distinguished from the Legal and Ethical, Characteristics of Private Property. In concluding his chapter on the institution of property, Mill observes that it is a subject of which, for the purposes of political economy, it is indispensable to treat, but in which we cannot usefully confine ourselves to economical considerations. In accordance, however, with the plan adopted throughout the present work, the economic will be carefully kept apart from other aspects of the question. In justification of this procedure, attention may be called, in general terms, to some of the modes in which property may be considered, which, on this view, are beyond the domain of political economy. We shall better understand what is to be included when we have decided what is to be excluded.

First of all, then, property may be regarded from the purely legal standpoint, as one of the subjects of positive law. A little reflection will show that for adequate treatment, in this respect, a certain amount of specialisation is necessary. We may, for example, describe the nature and the kinds of property (e.g., real and personal), and the different regulations affecting it, according to the law of England at the present time. Such is the mode of treatment adopted in legal text-books intended for the practical purposes of education or reference. A glance at any standard law-book of this kind will show at once that the economist cannot treat of property in this way. We may go further, and trace the historical growth of this law, a

study in itself of the greatest interest, and throwing light indirectly upon the social and economic condition of the people at various times. Any one, however, who has ever attempted to trace, for example, the actual history of our land laws, or even that of some small portion, will have no hesitation in saying that legal and economic history are logically quite distinct; what is of great importance in one department is often irrelevant to the other. Finally, still keeping within the domain of positive law, we may compare the different laws of different nations at various times, and by a combination of the historical and comparative methods attempt to discover the origin and trace the development of the institution of private property in general.1 An inquiry of this kind will no doubt assist in the discovery of the origins of economic history, but it is one thing to elucidate legal conceptions and practices, and another to show their connection with the economic condition of mankind at certain stages of progress.

The transition in the general treatment of property from the legal to the ethical point of view is easy and natural. The reason of man is not content with observing and classifying the various forms of positive law. The very observation of the differences that have occurred in the past, and the reforms which are still taking place, leads to the question: What are the principles on which the positive law, as regards this institution of private property, ought to be based? On this problem, from the dawn of speculative thought, great labour has been bestowed by a succession of philosophers. The only result, however, appears to be that the contrast between conflicting ideals has been more sharply defined. There are some who will say, with Beccaria,2 "the right of property is a terrible right and

1 For illustration of the work done recently in this direction, the general reader may compare the chapter in Blackstone's Commentaries (Bk. II., Ch. I.), on the origin of property, with the corresponding chapter in Maine's Ancient Law (Ch. VIII.).

2 Author of the famous treatise on Crimes and Punishments (Dei Delitti e delle Pene).

may not perhaps be necessary"; and others, who will wonder, with Bentham, that "so judicious a writer should have inserted in a work, dictated by the soundest philosophy, a doubt subversive of the social order." There can be little doubt, in spite of the present ascendency of utilitarianism, that men will continue to dispute as to what ought to be the basis of various positive laws, and their opinions as to what ought to be will, through their representatives, determine to some extent, at any rate, what will be. At the same time, the distinction is not only clear, but of the greatest importance. The truth has been admirably stated by Sir Frederick Pollock: "The analyt ical branch of political science, including the pure science of positive laws, is altogether independent of ethical theories, and that is the definite scientific result which we, in England, say that the work of the past century has given us." 1

If, however, it is granted that the pure science of positive laws is altogether independent of ethical theories, a fortiori political economy is also independent, and inter alia, the particular question of property can be treated from the economic point of view without any reference to ethics. Instead of attempting, then, to determine what the laws affecting property ought to be in conformity with the principles of reason or goodness or happiness or religion, I shall take as fundamental, the organisation of society for productive purposes, and I shall consider property as one of the conditions affecting production. I do not maintain simply that the positive law ought always to regulate property so as to secure the maximum production at the minimum cost. In my view there is, and need be, no question of ought in the matter,-Quot homines tot sententiæ. Adam Smith himself asserts that defence is of more importance than opulence, and other economists have for practical purposes constantly appealed to other principles. The factory legislation was carried mainly on moral grounds, though it 1 History of Politics, p. 113.