contract at all, that is to say, by analogy we speak of the relations between the parties as if they were determined by contract, though in reality they are not.

In slavery in its rudest form the master lays down the conditions of work, and allots the reward altogether independently of the wishes of the slave; he may kill him with overwork or with insufficient food. By the theory of the Roman lawyers, slavery was derived from a supposed agreement between the victor and the vanquished, in which the first stipulated for the perpetual services of his foe, and the other gained in consideration the life which he had legitimately forfeited.1

Slaves may be regarded, from the point of view of their owners, like free labourers from the point of view of their employers, either as sources of profit or as causes of expenditure. In ancient Greece it was a common practice for people to invest their capital in slaves, and to make a profit by letting them out for all sorts of industrial undertakings. At the same time the poorest citizen had usually at least one slave for domestic service. At Rome, towards the end of the republic, and still more during the first centuries of the empire, a person's social position was estimated by the number of slaves he maintained. From the earliest times the Romans employed slaves even for the cultivation of land, although this was almost the only industrial employment considered to be consistent with the dignity of a free man.

It is impossible here to give the steps by which in progressive nations slavery gave place to serfdom, and serfdom to free labour.3 The causes were various legal, moral, political, as well as economic. But, as already shown, the discovery, by a long series of tentative experi

1 Maine, p. 162.

2 Quot pascit servos?" (Juv. Sat., III., 141) was the usual test of a man's expenditure, just as in modern times the number and kind of domestic servants might be taken as a fair measure.

8

3 Cf. supra, Bk. II., Chs. VI. and VII.

ments, that slave labour is of all kinds the most inefficient, and that punishment and authority are inferior to reward and free contract, as stimulants to exertion, may be considered as the dominant economic principle of abolition. It is, however, important to recall the fact that slavery still exists over large areas, and has only been abolished in the present century in the English and French colonies and in the United States. It is still more important to observe that so far as the power of making bargains for his labour is concerned, a free person may, under certain conditions, be little better off than a slave, and in effect he may be compelled to submit to any terms the employer chooses to impose. Industrial history is full of examples of these one-sided bargains, some of which will be noticed in the following sections.

Patria potestas may be regarded as originally a species of slave power 2 mitigated by natural affection. The varieties this power assumed in different countries and ages, and the modifications introduced by law and custom, have given rise to an extensive literature. Here again the causes of emancipation are only partly economic; but it is doubtful if the disintegration of the family would have been effected but for the action of purely economic forces. At Rome, for example, the powers of the father over the person became almost nominal, whilst his rights over the property of his son were still practically unlimited. In this respect the utmost relaxation under Justinian left the patria potestas "far ampler and severer than any analogous institution of the modern world."4 It is easy to see that, under any conditions, the power of the father must have been very real so long as he held the

1 The dates are 1833, 1848, and 1865 (end of the Civil War), respectively. In 1749 the preamble to an act of Parliament speaks of the slave trade as one of the most important branches of British commerce. 2 Cf. Maine's Ancient Law, Ch. V., p. 164, on the relation of the slave to the family.

8 Inst. Lib. II., Tit. IX.

Maine, op. cit., p. 143.

purse of the son. The gradual acquisition of the right of separate accumulation by the members of the family is as instructive from the economic as from the legal standpoint; but the subject is too intricate for intelligible condensation.

Although in modern industrial societies the individual has taken the place of the family, as the unit of society, to a great extent, the power of the parents over the children is always considerable. Some of the greatest abuses, often amounting to criminality, have arisen in connection with child-labour permitted or enforced by the parents. Even in the normal case of natural affection, the choice of employment, in the first place, depends on the parents, and they are apt to regard the present more than the future.

§ 3. Apprenticeship. The system of long apprenticeships is a good example of the superior power of the employer. The old term of seven years, as Adam Smith showed, was not necessary for instruction, even in the arts, such as watch-making, which are more difficult than common trades. The system in general tended to promote idleness rather than industry, for the obvious economic reason that for so long a period the apprentice received no proportionate pecuniary benefit from his work. All the legislation on the subject shows that the main result of the institution was to lower wages. Thus, provisions were constantly made, either by statute (e.g., the statute of Apprenticeship, 5 Elizabeth, c. 4) or by the bylaws of corporations and guilds, to restrict the number of apprentices any master might have, either indirectly by birth or pecuniary qualifications, or absolutely, or relatively to the number of journeymen. By the statute just referred to, whoever had three apprentices 2 must keep one

1 This opinion is confirmed by Eden, Vol. I., p. 430.

2 This regulation-section 33 - applies to "cloth-makers, fullers, shearmen, weavers, tailors, shoemakers," and not generally, as Brentano assumes, Guilds and Trade Unions, p. 103.

journeyman, and for every other apprentice above three, one other journeyman. In order to restrict the employment of this species of cheap forced labour, the opposition to the growth of the factory system towards the end of last century generally took the form of attempts to enforce the customary or legal limitation of the employment of apprentices. It was also to the interest of the masters, under the old system of small industries, that one should not obtain an unfair advantage over the rest, and they also wished to restrict the number of those who might eventually become masters. But with production on a large scale, and the increasing use of machinery, the advantage of employing more children than men seemed to the employers too great to admit of restriction, especially when there was no danger of those children rising to be masters themselves. Accordingly, the statute of Apprenticeship was repealed (1814) at the instigation of the employers and against the petitions of the men.1

The system of parish apprentices, by which people were compelled to take poor children as apprentices, at first sight appears to contradict the argument just advanced, for the employers often considered this forced apprenticeship as a burden.2 They did so, however, only because they were compelled to take more than they could profitably use. The various acts,3 passed at different times, enabling masters to take the children of the poor into their service against their will, show that in moderation it was regarded as a privilege. Apprentices under the old sys

1 This topic is very fully treated by Brentano: Guilds and Trade Unions, Part V.

2 Nicholls' Poor Laws, Vol. II., pp. 87, 88. The parish apprentices were at first bound up to 24 (39 Eliz.), but the age was restricted to 21 (18 George III.), in favour of the apprentices. Cooke Taylor's Modern Factory System, p. 185.

3 Cf. Howell's Conflicts of Labour and Capital, Ch. VI., for a full account of the existing system. At present, one of the constant points of dispute in the Edinburgh printing trades is as to due proportion of apprentices to journeymen.

tem seem to have been treated in many cases with great harshness and cruelty, so that the legislature was obliged to interfere. On the introduction of the factory system, these abuses were greatly increased, the labour of the parish apprentices being the cheapest obtainable. The custom of apprenticeship still prevails to a large extent, and in some trades the number of apprentices is restricted in favour of the journeyman, the former receiving lower wages for precisely the same work towards the end of their time.1

§ 4. Craft Guilds. The subject of apprenticeship naturally leads to some consideration of the craft guilds of which it was an essential element. Since the publication of the work of Brentano, much attention has been devoted to the history of the English guilds, and his position that the craft guilds were primarily instituted to protect the craftsmen against the richer members of the merchant guilds, seem to be no longer tenable. The craft guilds represented a peculiar form of the organisation of industry that was dominant during some six hundred years, and was only destroyed by the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. The guilds themselves, it is true, long before this time 3 lost most of their powers, but the principles at the basis of their regulations remained to a great extent in force, partly through legislation, and partly through custom. The general features of the system, when it was in full vigour, are in marked contrast to those that prevail at present. In the typical case before a man could practise any craft, he must be a burgess of the

1 See note 3, p. 361.

2 Dr. Gross (Gild Merchant, p. 109) says: "As to a general struggle throughout England between the Gild Merchant and the Craft Gilds in the fourteenth or any other century, resulting in a victory of the latter and a demoralisation of municipal government, all this is a myth, for the wide acceptance of which Brentano is mainly responsible." Cf. Cunningham, Vol. I., Bk. III., Ch. IV., pp. 309-318. Lambert, Two Thousand Years of Gild Life, Ch. XVIII., p. 185.

3 Cunningham, Vol. II., p. 45.