Governing the CommonsCambridge University Press, 2015 M09 23 - 280 páginas The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
Contenido
CHAPTER | 1 |
The metaphorical use of models | 7 |
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
245 | |
271 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Vista previa limitada - 1990 |
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Vista previa limitada - 2015 |
Términos y frases comunes
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements assigned associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Basin Chapter choice collective commitment commons complex continue costs court decisions dependent described developed discussed district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing Further future given groundwater important included increase individuals initial institutions internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets obtain occur officials operational organize Orihuela outcomes participants particular political position possible present principles problems producers pumping regulation resource resource units result rules set of rules share similar situation solve strategies structure substantial supply theory tion types variables village West Basin yield zanjera