either propose (as one division of this class do) to use government, or the political authority of the State, as a means for attaining this unattainable end, or, (as another division of the class do,) in their frantic ravings against all government, as the great paramount cause of social grievances, propose a total abolition of all government, prospectively, if not immediately, as an indispensable prerequisite to the realization of their delusive dreams.

In all these three different classes of theories may be detected, more or less distinctly, as their fundamental basis, the idea that the social grievances of mankind are to be attributed, mainly, to political causes, though in some rather negatively than positively, or indirectly rather than directly; and they are all liable to this common criticism, that they fail to discern, or, at least, avowedly to recognize, that there are deeper and more fundamental causes of social suffering than any mere political ones, and which require to be counteracted before any high attainment can be made in the social scale, either individually or nationally. The two first named of these three classes may be regarded as negatively, or indirectly, asserting the idea, though they do not positively assert or avow it, that, the social grievances of mankind are attributable, mainly, to political causes, inasmuch as they do not aim at any other expedients for social improvement, than those which appertain to the domain of mere Politics. The third class, in both of its two divisions, as already designated, positively and directly assert this idea, which is the most distinguishing and pro

minent fundamental idea of the whole class.

These three classes will be considered by us in the order in which they have been designated, in doing which, some of the more noteworthy expositions of the fundamental ideas of these various classes will be incidentally considered, although, as already intimated, with but little regard to the historical order of their development, or any other circumstance than such as may serve to illustrate the logical connection of the ideas. As we are here sketching the history, and critically examining the character, of ideas, rather than of persons, we shall take note of persons or individuals, and of their peculiar works, only in so far as they may serve to illustrate ideas, according to the plan of considering them which we have adopted. It may very well happen, therefore, that names which merit distinguished consideration for contributions made to Social Philosophy, may be passed lightly over, or omitted altogether, in our review, partly because they have not seemed to the reviewer to illustrate, or to represent, very prominently, any of those fundamental ideas which he is aiming to bring into prominent view, and partly because some may have wholly escaped his observation. For who shall pretend to know all the meritorious laborers who have rendered service in this field of Philosophy, from the time of Solon to the present day? Who shall undertake to recount the names even of all, who, amid the teeming productions of the press, in the present age, have put forth valuable ideas in relation to the philosophy of society, or mere Political Philosophy, in Italy, Germany, France, Britain, and America? It is, in this respect, in the battle-field of science, (if we may so speak,) and in the great battle of life, on its largest scale, as it is in the battle-field of arms. It is only the chief captains, the leaders of division and brigade, who owe their position often to fortuitous circumstances rather than to pure merit, that are particularly noticed, and blazoned before the world, for their meritorious

deeds, while subaltern officers, in reality equally as heroic, nay, whole regiments of heroes, descend into the grave of oblivion, promiscuously encoffined in a parenthesis-thus verifying the sorrowful line of the poet

"All join the chase, but few the triumph share."*

In entering upon the consideration of the first of these classes, or, that which aims at improving the social condition simply by devising a political system, or organism, capable of performing, in the best possible manner, the legitimate function of government, we are met, on the very threshhold of the inquiry, by one of the most profound, difficult, and important practical questions within the whole range of Political Philosophy, nay, in a still wider compass, within the whole range of Social Philosophy. What is the legitimate function of government, or the political authority of a State?-for, until this be determined, we cannot decide what particular theories or ideas are to be comprehended in the class to be considered.

This question we might indeed have postponed, nay, pretermitted entirely, in our review, except in a very general and wholly incidental manner. We might have included in our definition of the class to be considered, so much of the definition of the legitimate function of government, as would answer, substantially, for a more particular, though less succinct, and certainly far less accurate and scientific, definition of the class. We might, for example, have defined it as the class which aims at improving the social condition simply by devising a political system capable of securing, most effectually, the rights of person and property. But to this definition of the class, assuming that it embodies, substantially, a correct definition of the legitimate function of government, it is to be objected that the phrase, "securing the rights of person and property," is rather vague and indeterminate, unless qualified and explained. And if, in order to qualify and explain this expression, as to the legitimate function of government, it is necessary to enter upon the consideration of the question in part, we might as well do so in whole.

Without further remark, however, as to the intrinsic propriety of the definition here given, of the class of social philosophers in question, it may be remarked, that it is no material objection to the definition, that it involves the necessity of meeting now, and in advance, this question, as to what is the legitimate function of government. For, in large, as well as in small matters, it is often most advisable, as the vulgar maxim recommends, "to take the bull by the horns."

In the consideration of all questions, however, large or small, we have to encounter, at some point or other, the real difficulty, the essential matter of the inquiry. This may be done either in the beginning, the middle, or the end of the discourse, disquisition, or treatise. In many discourses it is postponed to the end; in others it is encountered in the beginning, and in others again in the middle, or body of the discourse. Which is the most proper course, depends upon many contingencies, reting chiefly to the subject matter of the inquiry, and the occasion of it. In strictly scientific treatises, and, indeed, in all treatises in which it is practicable, it is generally far better to grapple with the difficulty to be

Byron in Child Harold.

encountered in the beginning, to state in brief the essential matter which is to be more fully developed and expounded in the body of the treatise. And this is, indeed, the method usually adopted in scientific treatises. For they generally begin with explicit definitions of the principles or facts they are intended to illustrate, which definitions, if rightly given, embody, and, to a very great extent, determine, the whole matter of the disquisi

tion.

Herein may be observed, by the way, the main difference between the analytical and synthetical methods of inquiry, and between the Philosophical and strictly Scientific. By the analytical method, which is more particularly the method of Philosophy accurately defined, and in its more restricted sense, as contradistinguished from science, we postpone the real matter of the inquiry, or matter to be ascertained, to the end of the inquiry, and this, indeed, from the necessity of the case; for in this case our object is to ascertain what is as yet unknown. By the synthetical method, which is eminently and peculiarly the method of Science, we begin with the essential matter, which has been already ascertained. It is the province of Philosophy to ascertain facts or principles, of Science, to classify and systematize them. This observation is to be understood, however, as relating to Philosophy in its more restricted and peculiar sense; for in its largest sense, and in that sense in which the term "Social Philosophy" is used in this review, Philosophy covers a much more extensive province, and comprehends Science itself. Every science, indeed, may be said to have its philosophy, as every art has its science, and the term "Social Philosophy," as here used, is intended to comprehend those principles of Sociology which have been already reduced to Science, not less than those which are, as yet, in an unsettled state, and undetermined as to their fitness to be received as scientific principles or facts.

In the present disquisition, therefore, which relates, mainly, to principles and facts that may now be regarded as scientifically established, it is often practicable, as it is proposed to do in the remaining parts of this review, to adopt the Synthetical or Scientific method, and to meet in advance the main difficulties and essential matters of the disquisition; and, as already intimated, this is eminently desirable wherever it is practicable.

That a clear and definite idea of the end proposed in any undertaking is eminently conducive to its successful prosecution, is obvious enough. The preliminary ascertainment of this end, in any disquisition-philosophical or otherwise-is what we have referred to, as meeting, in advance, the main difficulties of the disquisition. And this is simply doing what those writers do, who, in the beginning of their discourses, lay down accurate and precise definitions of the objects or ends they are aiming at. If Horace was right in saying, "He who has begun his work has already half finished it," with still more propriety may it be said, that he has already half finished his discourse, who, in the beginning of it, has accurately and clearly defined its object. With what disadvantages, for example, must an architect labor, who should undertake to erect a house without any definite plan? Yet such are the disadvantages under

* Sce Epistles of Horace, book i., Epistle ii., line 40.

which they are placed who labor in the incipient stages of any science, with a view to its establishment.

It is not until the fundamental principles of a science have been discovered, and their main applications discerned, that any clear and definite ideas can be had concerning the true plan for seeking to obtain more knowledge, in relation thereto, or even for systematizing that which has been already obtained. In this instance, indeed, we see but one manifestation of a much more general fact, which this serves to illustrate-that, in all human endeavors, we have to finish our work, (if it be allowable so to speak,) before we know, well, how to begin it. This is true even of the great business of life. It is only towards the close of a long and eventful life, and when a man is about to die, that he learns, and comes to see clearly, how he should have begun it. In like manner, substantially, it is with the sciences, or those at least which are not of the purely exact or mathematical order.

It was only towards the close of a long and brilliant series of experiments and theories in astronomy, for example, that the great controlling principle, of the universality of the laws of gravitation, was discovered by Newton, which served to explain all previously ascertained phenomena, and indicated how efforts should be directed with a view to further astronomical discoveries. Before this time, and even after Copernicus and Kepler had made their valuable contributions to the science, astronomers were very much in the dark, and were striving after astronomical knowledge, for the most part, by a blind process, and without any very definite ideas as to the plan on which their efforts should be conducted. In like manner social philosophers have been, hitherto, for the most part, striving, by a blind process, to arrive at truth in Sociology, and speculating and experimenting on government, without any definite or clear idea of its legitimate function, or of the end which it should propose to itself, in reference to all the manifold functions of the complex system of society.

All the speculations, as well as experiments, of the class of social philosophers now under particular consideration, and indeed of the whole political school, nay, in a still wider range, we may say, the speculations as well as experiments of all social philosophers, hitherto, have been characterized by the want of clear and definite ideas on this point. Could we but ascertain the truth on this point, discover the real principle which governs in respect to it, determine this great preliminary question, as to the legitimate function of government, the determination of which is a preliminary requisite to a truly scientific consideration of the complex problem of society, but, which, according to the actual order of the development of human ideas, and in exact reverse to the logical and scientific order of their development, is a posterior discovery, and one only to be made towards the conclusion of a long and laborious train of endeavors to establish the science of Sociology, we should obtain a grand result, towards explaining the phenomena of society, and towards simplifying our inquiries in regard to government in general, and the ideas of those political philosophers in particular, whose speculations and experiments are now about to come under our review.

To this great question, then, let us now come, with a becoming distrust of our ability, and of all human ability, to discern and express the precise truth in regard to a question which addresses itself to so many complex,

variable, and thousand-fold relations. Yet, at this age of the worldnear the close of the protracted discussion which the question has received, from the time of Solon to the present day-after the elaborate consideration to which it has been subjected, both speculatively and practically, in many different ages and countries after Grecian philosophy has shed its light upon it, Roman statesmanship has illustrated it, and Anglo-Saxon common sense has practically tested it, in many varied relations after the searching debates upon it in the Athenian Assembly, the Roman Comitia and Senate, the British Parliament, the American Congress, and the French Revolutionary Convention-it should not appear presumptuous, in an inquirer who has enjoyed the advantages of all these great discussions, and of all former experience, and with whom the Philosophy of Society, in its manifold relations, has long been a cherished theme of inquiry, to suppose that he has discerned, and is able to express, with substantial correctness, the real principle which governs as to the proper function of the political authority of a State, or, in other words, what is the proper and legitimate function of government.

However this may be, the writer of this review can feel little hesitation in asserting, that the legitimate function of government, in the largest, most comprehensive, and fundamental sense, is to let the people alone, itself, and insure their being let alone by others; in other words, and speaking with more logical accuracy, though with less rhetorial piquancy, the legitimate function of government is, to insure the people against being interfered with, by the least possible interference with them on its own part; or yet, in other words, and in order that a proposition of so much importance may be so variously and so explicitly expressed as to preclude, if possible, all possibility of misapprehension in regard to it, the legitimate function of government is, to insure the largest practicable measure of individual activity, with the least possible exertion of the aggregate force of the community as a controller or modifier of such individual activity.

The definition here given of the legitimate function of government may be made still more intelligible and explicit by adverting to the definition heretofore incidentally given in our review of "the best government." While reviewing Grecian sociology, and alluding to the constant aim of the social philosophers of that people to attain to "the best government," as to which they had very vague and indefinite ideas, generally, as well as some positively erroneous ones, in particular, we took occasion to define the best government as, that which insures stability and order in the State with the least possible sacrifice of the individal liberty of the citizen. Now the legitimate function of government is to do what it appertains to the best government to do, as just defined. And this accords entirely with what we have already said, as to the legitimate function of government; for the very end and object of insuring stability and order in the State is to insure individuals against being molested, or interfered with, to insure their being let alone.

It may be readily seen that the definition here given of the legitimate function of government is only a more fundamental, comprehensive, and truly scientific expression of the principle contained in another definition, which might appear more obvious, and would be more readily appreciated by common intelligence, namely, the definition which should assert

* See Merchants' Magazine for January, 1860, vol, 42, page 20.